WAY BEYOND FREUD

POSTMODERN PSYCHOANALYSIS OBSERVED

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Way Beyond Freud

Postmodern Psychoanalysis Observed

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Introduction

It has been almost two decades since one of the editors of this volume published *Beyond Freud: A Study of Modern Psychoanalytic Theorists* (Reppen, 1985). These have been years in which American psychoanalysis has been intrigued by some enduring topics and has scrutinized them with increasing sophistication. Matters of culture, gender, neurobiology, selfstates, and the profound complexities of relationships have riveted the attention of theorists and practitioners, and new models of treatment and additional theories of pathogenesis have emerged. There are modern Freudians, relational psychoanalysts, London Kleinians, Lacanians, Kohutians—to name the most visible of the new order. Of the recent trends that have captured the interests of psychoanalytic theorists and practitioners in the American arena, this volume will focus on postmodern psychoanalysis. The contributors are advocates, critics, interested observers—all of whom share an open, scholarly interest in this contemporary phenomenon.

Postmodern psychoanalysis, like its philosophical counterpart, is not a unified school or body of thought. Its antecedents are in the writings of Fairbaim, Balint, Ferenczi, Sullivan, Gill, Loewald, and even Freud, and its constituent contributors are intersubjective psychoanalysts,
interpersonalists, relationalists, feminist and gender-theory based psychoanalysts, social constructivists, hermeneuticists, self psychologists, and adherents of the middle school of British object relations theory.

What binds postmodern psychoanalysts is defined not only by thematic threads but by what is rejected in a segment of Freudian psychoanalysis usually termed the “classical model.” Most postmodernists have in common

a disdain for reductionism (seen as characterizing drive-focused psychoanalysis), criticism of the concept of neutrality (or the myth thereof), opposition to the exclusive focus on the intrapsychic dynamics of the analysand (what is termed a “one-person psychology”), and a counterposition regarding the emphasis on interpretation as the major mode of therapeutic change. “What these approaches share,” to quote Benjamin (1990), “is the belief that the human mind is interactive rather than monadic, that the psychoanalytic process should be understood as occurring between subjects rather than within the individual” (p. 33). Stolorow (1994), has stated this even more emphatically .. the concept of an isolated, individual mind is a theoretical fiction or myth, which reifies the subjective experience of psychological distinctions” (p. 71). Thus, the advent of a “two-person psychology.”

Not all thinking on this matter has been contemporary. Although it is
never cited, the following quote from Jung (1929/1966) is a historical antecedent of what are now regarded as postmodern observations:

> For twist and turn the matter as we may, the relation between doctor and patient remains a personal one within the impersonal framework of professional treatment. By no device can the treatment be anything but the product of mutual influence in which the whole being of the doctor as well as that of his patient plays its part. (p. 42)

While many of the terms employed by postmodern psychoanalysts are the same as those used since the time of Freud, the shift to an intersubjective or two-person perspective has generated new meanings. This can be seen even in the definition of psychoanalysis. For Freud, psychoanalysis as a therapeutic method is essentially concerned with bringing unconscious meanings into consciousness, and it is characterized by the interpretation, under controlled conditions, of wishes, transferences, and resistances (Laplanche & Pontalis 1967/1973, p. 367). Writing from the standpoint of ego psychology, what struck Kris (1947/1975) was the inherently conflictual nature of the activity Freud delineated. He narrowed the focus and boiled all this down to define psychoanalysis as “human behavior viewed as conflict” (p. 6).

Wolstein (1992), in contrast, writing from an interpersonal orientation, did not include the implication of conflict as an aspect of the definition and emphasized instead the exclusivity of the clinical encounter.
Psychoanalysis is that special branch of the study of the human psyche developed especially to explore the relations of conscious and unconscious psychic experience arising directly within the experiential field of therapy cocreated and shared through the unique and sharable, yet self-supporting, psychic connectedness of a particular psychoanalyst and patient. (p. 327)

Ghent (1992) posits that “... the intrapsychic is seen as constituted largely by the internalization of interpersonal experience mediated by the constraints imposed by biologically organized templates and delimiters” (p. xviii), rather than by structural dynamics. Conflict, in his view “... most usually is seen as taking place between opposing relational configurations rather than between drive and defense” (p. xviii).

The self is viewed as a superordinate agency by Kohut and as a representation of the system ego by ego psychology. For Mitchell (1992) it is “the subjective organization of meanings a person creates as he or she moves through time” (p. 9). Compare this with the “standard” definition given by Moore and Fine (1995): “The person of an individual in reality, including one's body and psychic organization” (p. 174).

Neutrality, for Freud (1915/1958), was a protection against analytic ambition: “... We ought not to give up the neutrality towards the patient, which we have acquired through keeping the counter-transference in check” (p. 164). Anna Freud (1936/1966) mapped it as “a point equidistant from the id, the ego, and the superego” (p. 28). Greenberg (1986) views it quite
differently, as “the goal of establishing an optimal tension between the patient’s tendency to see the analyst as an old object and his capacity to experience him as a new one” (p. 103).

While his view of the matter is distinctly different from that of both Freuds, Greenberg, unlike other more radical postmodernists, still accepts neutrality as analytically desirable. Aron and Hirsch (1992) question whether neutrality is feasible:

The analyst as person and/or respondent directly influences the patient, and the analyst can never totally control affect to the point that it is kept invisible and restricted to the analyst’s internal feeling states, (p. 124)

Renik (1993/1999) takes the step of eliminating neutrality entirely as an aspect of the analytic encounter. He states:

I would say that it is impossible for an analyst to be in that position even for an instant, since we are constantly acting in the analytic situation on the basis of personal motivation, of which we can not be aware until after the fact, our technique, listening included, is inescapably subjective. (p. 414)

The postmodern negation of truth, objectivity, and the self as object, leads to a different model of the analytic encounter than that posited by classical Freudians, ego psychologists, mainstream Kleinians, Kohutians, and even Sullivanians. Transference, viewed as a projection or compromise formation emanating from the analysand by other schools of thought, is seen
by postmodernists as co-constructed:

\[
\text{... variably shaped by both analysand and analyst within the two-person field model, it enables us to recognize that the degree to which the analyst contributes to the activation of the analysand's schema will determine whether the schema can be illuminated or the schema is reinforced through a replication of the relational pattern. (Fosshage, 1992, p. 34)}
\]

Resistance, another hallmark of clinical psychoanalysis, is seen by Moore and Fine (1990), representatives of the traditional position within American psychoanalysis, as “all of a patient’s defensive efforts to avoid self-knowledge” (p. 168). They go on to state:

\[
\text{Analysis threatens to bring into awareness (through free association) unacceptable childhood wishes, fantasies and impulses that would produce painful affect; the ego defends against this possibility by opposing the analysis itself, (p. 168)}
\]

Stolorow and Atwood (1992/1999) in their definition eliminate the fantasy, impulse, and wish components and define resistance as

\[
\text{... the patient's expectations and fears in the transference that if his central affective states and developmental longings are exposed to the analyst they will meet with the same traumatogenic, faulty responsiveness that they received from the original caregivers, (p. 371)}
\]

Interpretation as the making of the unconscious conscious, and an essential function of the analyst from Freud to contemporary theorists, does not retain its original function or status in postmodern theories. The patient’s
free associative productions are no longer center stage. According to Ogden (1994),

> It is now widely held that instead of being about the patient's intrapsychic dynamics, interpretation should be made about the interaction of patient and analyst at an intrapsychic level, (p. 3)

From a postmodern perspective, objective positivistic knowledge is viewed as scientific. Historically, neurality and abstinence were designated as differentiating the discourse of psychoanalysis from that of hypnosis and suggestion. The analyst as a mirror and a neutral screen, situated apart from the patient’s conflicts, has led, according to postmodernists, to a neglect of the impact of the analyst’s personality on the treatment. In such a one-person psychology, insufficient attention is given to the character and psychological constitution of the analyst; in line with scientific, experimental paradigms, the focus is on the patient/subject, not the researcher/analyst. The postmodern view, as summarized by Hutsebaut (2001), is that

> . . . the accent is placed on the personal presence of the analyst as the subject in an interactional relation of influencing and being influenced. The analyst can not simply have an objective insight into the past and the conflicts of the patient, (p. 66)

This represents a two-person psychology. Implicit is the belief that there is a continuous involvement of the analyst in the process. Neutrality and objectivity are thus myths. Interpretation is itself a deviation from neutrality
and a form of suggestion in that it is an attempt to influence the patient; since an interpretation is a choice from among possible interventions, it must be chosen as a result of who the analyst is—his or her psychology—and necessarily represents the personal agenda of the analyst. It is from such a position that Aron (1991) speaks when he states; “I have called on analysts to acknowledge the irrepressible influence of the analyst’s subjectivity” (p. 51).

If the foregoing dictum is correct, all knowledge in the psychoanalytic situation is contingent upon the experience of the moment, and the view of the analyst can be no more accurate than the view of the patient. The authority of the analyst, an inherent aspect of both Freudian and Sullivanian clinical systems, must from the postmodern orientation therefore also be rejected. The following quotation from Hutsebaut (2001) succinctly summarizes the postmodern position:

The analytic relation is being more and more conceptualized as an intersubjective system of mutual influence. The concept of neutrality is therefore an illusion. Interpretations are always suggestion, transference is never a pure projection, and the analyst is never objective in the positivistic sense of the word. All that analysts do or say and especially their interpretations is the product of their own personality. An analyst perceives reality out of the constant mixture of fantasy and reality and imposes his/her personal organization and theoretical system onto his/her perceptions to give them meaning. (p. 70)

While we have glossed over differences that indeed exist within the postmodern psychoanalytic movement, what we have presented are its
fundamental assertions, and we have focused on definitional differences in order to highlight essentials. In the context of such juxtapositions it can be easy to lose sight of what about postmodernism may not be quite as new, radical, or sufficient as may at first glance appear.

Although it is accurate to say that Freudian psychoanalysis has emphasized interpretation as the transmutative factor in the clinical situation, the importance of the analyst-patient relationship as an agent of change has been a significant theme of psychoanalytic discourse since the 1930s, and there have been a range of positions regarding the nature and value of the analyst's participation in the therapeutic enterprise. Object relations were an important component of Freud's writings, and for psychoanalytic developmental psychology object relations and internalization processes have always been cardinal, with attachment recognized as a restructuring experience in itself. This is not to ignore controversies regarding specific issues, but there has been an evolution and an integration into mainstream psychoanalysis of concepts from object relations schools that postmodernists tend insufficiently to acknowledge.

It is, for example, from a modern Freudian position of developmental psychoanalysis that Grunes (1984) has provided us with the construct of the therapeutic object relationship, defined as “a situation of primal intimacy between patient and analyst which contains both an illusional (transference)
and real aspect . . . [and involves] a special type of empathic permeability of boundaries between analyst and patient” (p. 131). Grunes regards this relationship as a primary facilitator of change, and in this aspect his is a two-person psychology.

There is, in Grunes’s view, however, another very important component of the process as well. The analyst is not neutral, according to Grunes. but he or she is objective. And, like Loewald (1951, 1960) before him, Grunes asserts that verbal interpretation yet remains crucial, because without the differentiation it promotes the reorganization of experience could not come about.

It is such reorganization that makes possible the owning of one’s own mind. The owning of one’s own mind is a developmental achievement without which there can be no sense of personal responsibility, and it is a concept that requires a one-person psychology. Postmodernism advances a two-person psychology, but do we not still need a one-person psychology as well?

The way in which the analyst contributes to the psychoanalytic process is not a settled subject, nor is there certainty about how knowledge is created and new meanings generated. Such is the frame from which the contributions to this volume should be read.

The 13 contributors to *Way Beyond Freud* range over a wide spectrum
of theoretical positions and interests. All are published authorities on psychoanalysis, having written among them a total of more than 50 books. Their contributions to this volume include chapters that are clinical, empirical, philosophical, historical, developmental, and theoretical. In spite of this wide range of interest, it remains difficult to classify not only the authors but the papers that they have contributed to *Way Beyond Freud*.

Robert Bornstein, one of our foremost empirical psychologists, argues that although psychoanalysis was once central within mainstream psychology, psychodynamic models have recently become marginalized. He explains the factors that contributed to this “disconnect” and proposes several strategies that can help reconnect psychoanalysis to mainstream psychology. He stresses the opportunities for a scientific psychoanalysis that may arise through a rebirth of a truly heuristic and integrative psychoanalysis.

Donald Spence, who has written on narrative truth in psychoanalysis, offers a critique of the belief that numbers can capture important pieces of the psychoanalytic process. He argues that what we do as analysts is hermeneutic and inspired and therefore cannot be studied by the analysis of the linguistic structure of the patient’s associations.

David Pincus, who is interested in the interface of psychoanalysis and
neuroscience, concentrates in his paper on the nature of reality and examines current conceptualizations of the psychoanalytic situation that call into question the nature of truth and reality. He explores neurobiological perspectives on the nature of reality and how these neurobiological conceptualizations can be helpful in illuminating versions of psychoanalysis that emphasize either construction or real truth.

William Meissner has written on many important subjects relevant to psychoanalysis. In his chapter, he discusses theories of the self and their role in psychoanalysis. He argues that such theories are in a state of uncertainty and ambiguity. He presents a synthetic account of the concept of self-as-person, indicating its relevance to the analytic process.

Kimberlyn Leary, who has directed considerable attention to postmodernism, argues that the turn to a postmodern psychoanalysis is complete, that contemporary clinical theory recognizes the intersubjective in psychoanalytic work, although different analytic schools argue about when that intersubjectivity is most important. She explores current problems that surface in postmodern psychoanalysis and recent innovations.

Frank Summers, an expert on object relations theory, argues that neither the relational, objectivist, nor narrative theorists have established a basis for psychoanalytic knowledge. He argues that the relativists are correct
in their delineation of psychoanalytic knowledge as hermeneutic, but that hermeneutic understanding does not imply relativism. Instead, he argues that Dilthey’s category of a human science that establishes knowledge by interpreting from what is said to what is meant is fundamentally a different form of knowledge than that of the natural science/objectivist position. Knowledge thus derives from the way human beings understand each other, an idea that fits Dilthey’s category of human science.

Michael Miller, an authority on chaos theory in psychoanalysis, proposes that action-oriented techniques change implicit, procedural memories that mediate affect regulation, self-esteem maintenance, and object relations. He employs a dynamic systems theory to show that the brain and mind self-organize within a dynamic, reciprocal, intersubjective/interpersonal framework that determines how the analyst must interact with a patient in order to change patterns of experience.

Peter Shabad examines the question of self-consciousness and the need for reality, arguing that in the aftermath of trauma and disappointment people look inward defensively and often begin to doubt that what actually happened to them really happened. In order for patients to come out of their self-consciousness, he argues, they must find a new reality. Psychoanalysis becomes a credible witness to the traumatic event that caused suffering and returns the patient to a center of gravity.
M. Guy Thompson brings his broad knowledge of philosophy to a view of the basic tenets of the postmodernist perspective in the light of Martin Heidegger’s impact on a paradigm shift in contemporary thought. He explores postmodernism’s corruption of Heidegger’s philosophy and the implications that this perspective suggests for psychoanalytic theory and practice.

Paul Roazen, the author of many texts on Freud and his followers, political theory and Freud, and psychoanalytic history, emphasizes the importance as well as the neglect of a historical view of psychoanalysis. He describes his own intellectual journey and emphasizes the importance of the use of the past by poets and novelists as well as by Freud, who had a special interest in the ancient world.

Arnold Rachman, an expert on the work of Sandor Ferenczi, examines the importance of self-disclosure and the search for authenticity in the analytic discourse. He views Freud’s authoritarian style, the development of “taboos,” and the notion of a blank screen as hindering spontaneity in the analytic interchange.

Doris Silverman, an expert on female development, in her reading of the literature of feminists and feminist psychoanalysts, explains that there are markedly different positions as well as current areas of agreement about female development. In her paper, she spells out the positions of some
important contemporary theorists.

Barnaby Barratt, who brings a breadth of philosophical knowledge, understands psychoanalysis as a spiritual-existential discipline that involves an interchange between patient and analyst that heals fractured relations. Healing occurs through the free-associative process by enhancing the libidinality of our desire and by moving patients away from the compulsiveness of mental preoccupations.

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Reconnecting Psychoanalysis to Mainstream Psychology: An Agenda for the 21st Century

Robert F. Bornstein, PhD

There is literally nothing to be said, scientifically or therapeutically, to the advantage of the entire Freudian system or any of its component dogmas.

—Crews (1996, p. 63)

From a scientific point of view, classical Freudian psychoanalysis is dead both as a theory of the mind and a mode of therapy . . . No empirical evidence supports any specific proposition of psychoanalytic theory.

—Kihlstrom (1999, p. 376)

Not too long ago, psychoanalysis dominated American and European psychology. As the preceding quotations illustrate, however, the status of psychoanalysis within the intellectual community has diminished substantially in recent years. Given recent trends in academic and clinical research (Robins, Gosling & Craik, 1999), and the impact of managed care on insight-oriented treatment (Sperling, Sack & Field, 2000), it is difficult to envision psychoanalytic theory regaining its former status any time soon. It is a worrisome situation for any practitioner or researcher interested in the
long-term health of psychoanalysis.

The diminished influence of psychoanalytic theory would be understandable if treatment outcome studies had shown psychodynamic psychotherapy to be ineffective, or research findings had demonstrated that the key tenets of psychoanalytic theory had little empirical support, but neither of these things has occurred. The efficacy of insight-oriented treatment is well established (Blatt & Ford, 1994; Crits-Christoph & Connolly, 1998), and the heuristic value of psychoanalytic theory is robust (Bornstein & Masling, in press; Fisher & Greenberg, 1996).

What accounts for the marginalized state of contemporary psychoanalysis in the academic and clinical communities? More than anything else, it reflects psychoanalysts’ willingness to stand by silently as their ideas are co-opted by theoreticians and researchers in other areas of psychology. The end result of this discipline-wide passivity is that while psychoanalytic concepts remain strong, psychoanalysis as a discipline has become "disconnected" from contemporary scientific and clinical psychology.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a framework for reconnecting psychoanalysis to mainstream psychology, and reclaiming psychoanalytic ideas that have been co-opted by others. I begin by exploring the process by which psychoanalysis became disconnected from psychology during the latter
half of the 20th century. I then demonstrate that despite this disconnection, psychoanalytic concepts have been surprisingly heuristic, though the origins of these ideas are often misattributed by clinicians, theoreticians, and researchers. Finally, I offer suggestions for reconnecting psychoanalysis to mainstream psychology so that the first decades of the 21st century may be as exciting as those of the early 20th century—the time when Freud’s revolutionary ideas were altering forever clinical practice, psychological science, and popular culture.

THE EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS: FROM MAINSTREAM TO PERIPHERY

Broadly speaking, the evolution of psychoanalysis during the 20th century can be divided into two phases: (1) the construction and refinement of psychoanalytic theory through the mid-1950s; and (2) the evolution of the theory during the latter half of the century. In terms of clinical and research influence. Phase 1 was a time of growth, while Phase 2 was a time of decline.

The two disciplines of 19th century psychology

In the mid 1980s, Erdelyi (1985, p. xii) remarked that “contrary to textbook tradition, the nineteenth century gave birth not to one but to two psychologies, one at Leipzig, the other at Vienna. For a hundred years each struggled to develop into a viable science of mind but each, perversely
complementing the other, remained incomplete.” Erdelyi was referring, of course, to Wundt’s empiricism and Freud’s psychoanalysis.

Freud and Wundt grappled with a number of common problems (e.g., the nature of consciousness, the dynamics of memory), but they approached these problems from very different perspectives. Wundt’s empirical method—derived from 19th-century positivism and modeled after the natural sciences—adhered to a nomothetic tradition that emphasized controlled experimentation to delineate general laws of human psychological functioning (Bornstein, 1999a; Hilgard, 1987). Freud’s psychoanalytic method—derived from medicine, and invoking a more idiographic approach—emphasized the intensive study of individuals within the context of their past and present relationships (Galatzer-Levy & Cohler, 1993; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Early in the history of the psychoanalytic movement, general laws of human behavior were secondary to the deepest possible understanding of the person being studied. As psychoanalysis matured, this emphasis reversed: Toward the end of his career Freud shifted much of his effort to setting forth general principles of human mental life that would dictate the direction of psychoanalysis after his death (see Gay, 1988).

The marginalization of psychoanalysis

During the first decades of the 20th century, Freud’s psychoanalysis was
more influential than Wundt’s empiricism, due in no small part to Freud’s persuasiveness as a writer and speaker. Following Freud’s 1909 Clark University lectures, psychoanalysis became immensely influential within and outside academia, not only shaping psychology and the other mental health professions, but also art, literature, law, politics, education, anthropology, and myriad other fields (Holland, 1984; Torrey, 1992). By the early 1960s, the landscape had changed. Psychoanalysis was becoming increasingly marginalized within the clinical and academic communities, to the point that a slightly tempered version of 19th-century positivism more or less completely replaced the Freudian approach as a unifying psychological framework and world view (Bornstein, 1999a).

It is ironic that psychoanalysis reached its peak of influence during a period when in-depth analysis of individuals was the centerpiece of Freud’s work. Today, the theory’s idiographic roots have become its greatest burden within the larger intellectual community. The idiographic underpinnings of psychoanalysis were not the sole reason that the theory became marginalized, however. As I have argued elsewhere (Bornstein, 2001), the diminished influence of contemporary psychoanalysis is largely a product of theory mismanagement: Rather than looking forward (to the evolving demands of science and practice) and outward (to ideas and findings in other areas of psychology and medicine), many psychoanalysts have chosen to look backward (at the seminal but dated contributions of early psychoanalytic
practitioners) and inward (at their like-minded colleagues’ own analytic writings). As a result, psychoanalysts committed seven “deadly sins” that exacerbated the theory's decline: insularity, inaccuracy, indifference, irrelevance, inefficiency, indeterminacy, and insolence (see Bornstein, 2001, for a detailed discussion of these psychoanalytic “sins”).[1]

THE POSTMODERN REINVENTION AND CO-OPTING OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

A key tenet of postmodernism is that both internal and external reality are social constructions, reflecting (among other things) an individual’s cultural background, expressive language, and past and present experience (Gergen, 1997; Vollmer, 2000). In the empirical setting, postmodernism has led to a resurgence of constructivist research (Kvale, 1992), and an emphasis on cultural relativism in intellectual discourse (Hermans, Kempen & van Loon, 1992). In the clinical setting, postmodernism has led to greater focus on “narrative truth” (Spence, 1994), and skepticism regarding the relevance of objective research methods to thorny psychological issues (Nichols, 1993; Wertz, 1994).[2]

A key corollary of postmodern thought is the notion that scientific truth—like individual experience—is actively constructed by individuals (Couvalis, 1997; Kirshner, 1999). Theoretical propositions and research results are generated and interpreted within the context of a scientist's personal and
professional milieu, and they may be revised and reinterpreted—many times, if need be—as this milieu changes. In the end, Zeitgeist shapes the generation and interpretation of scientific findings as much as (if not more than) scientific findings influence the prevailing Zeitgeist (a process described by Kuhn 11962, 1977] in terms of “paradigm shifts”—wholesale Zeitgeist changes that impel a radical reinterpretation of past methods and findings).

The postmodern view of science created new interpretive challenges for a broad array of disciplines (Kruglanski, 2001; Kvale, 1992; Vollmer, 2000), but it has posed a particular problem for psychoanalysis. When coupled with the theory mismanagement difficulties described earlier, postmodernism set the stage for a wholesale co-opting of psychoanalytic ideas by researchers in other areas of psychology. To the extent that scientific and historical “truth” is seen as something constructed rather than observed, researchers in different areas have at hand a ready rationale for rediscovering old concepts within their particular theoretical perspective. And just as an individual's personal history is rewritten and revised to accomodate present-day psychological needs, scientific history is rewritten and revised to accomodate present-day disciplinary needs. Studies show that once personal narratives are rewritten, it can be difficult (sometimes impossible) to change them back to their original form (Greenwald, 1980, 1992). So it is with scientific narratives: Once a revised account has taken hold, it can be extremely difficult (sometimes impossible) to change it back.
Across different domains of psychology, the process by which psychoanalytic ideas have been co-opted by researchers in other areas is characterized by a common dynamic. By deconstructing this dynamic, we can better understand one of the most vexing paradoxes of contemporary psychoanalysis: how the theory itself became marginalized at the same time as its central concepts flourished in other domains.

The dynamic, in its most basic form, involves three steps:

**Step 1: Revision and Reinvention**

The co-opting process begins when a psychoanalytic concept is revised and reinvented: A researcher reframes some Freudian construct in the language of another discipline, emphasizing differences between the newly described concept and the one from which it was derived. At times, this may involve conscious suppression of common elements on the part of the co-opting researcher, but in many cases, the psychoanalytic roots of the construct in question are unknown (at least consciously) to the person who co-opts it. As I previously noted (Bornstein, 1996, p. 2), many researchers in other areas of psychology were exposed to psychoanalytic concepts during their undergraduate and graduate training, but they no longer remember having been exposed to these concepts. Consequently, they may unintentionally “reinvent” the same concepts several—or even many—years later.
Jacoby and his colleagues refer to this process as “unconscious plagiarism” rooted in the individual’s “source amnesia” regarding the original concept (Jacoby & Kelley, 1987; Jacoby, Toth, Lindsay & Debner, 1992).

Table 1 (below) lists some key psychoanalytic constructs that have been revised and reinvented in other areas of psychology. In some cases, the researchers who reframed the construct acknowledged its psychoanalytic roots; in other cases they did not. Certain constructs originated more or less exclusively in some variant of psychodynamic theory (e.g., parapraxis); certain constructs had roots in other domains as well (e.g., object representation).

As Table 1 shows, these co-opted constructs represent a broad range of psychological domains, from memory and motivation to personality and psychopathology. Though not every reinvented construct is operationally defined in precisely the same way as the initial Freudian construct it reflects, perusal of the initial and later sources confirms considerable conceptual overlap for each of these constructs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychoanalytic Concept</th>
<th>Revision/Reinvention</th>
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<td>Unconscious Memory (1900/1953a)</td>
<td>Implicit Memory (Schacter, 1987)</td>
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</table>
Primary Process Thought (1900/1953a) Spreading Activation (Collins & Loftus, 1975)

Object Representation (1905/1953b) Person Schema (Neisser, 1976)


Preconscious Processing (1915/1957b) Preattentive Processing (Treisman, 1969)

Parapraxis (1916/1963) Retrieval Error (Tulving, 1983)

Abreaction (1916/1963) Redintegration (Bower & Glass, 1976)

Repetition Compulsion (1920/1955) Nuclear Script (Tomkins, 1979)

Ego (1923/1961) Central Executive (Baddeley, 1992)


**Step 2: Constructing an Empirical Base**

The second step in the co-opting process involves studying the rediscovered concept empirically, using the measures and methods of the
discipline that co-opted it. Over time, this research typically yields valuable new information regarding the concept in question—information that might not have been obtained had the concept remained solely within the psychoanalytic canon. Thus, it is not surprising that in mainstream psychology, the articles in the right-hand column of Table 1 tend to be more widely known (and more frequently cited) than the original Freudian sources.

The evolution of “implicit memory” illustrates this aspect of the coopting process. Although unconscious (or repressed) memories were central to much of Freud’s work, the psychoanalytic concept of unconscious memory was only loosely defined, and much of the early research testing the psychoanalytic model of unconscious memory was methodologically flawed (Erdelyi, 1985; Holmes, 1990). Following publication of Schacter’s seminal (1987) article, however, hundreds of studies and conceptual critiques have been published on this topic. The broad empirical base created by these analyses has increased substantially our understanding of unconscious/implicit memory. Certain psychoanalytic hypotheses have proven to be incorrect (Bornstein, 1993; Brenneis, 2000); others are reasonably well supported (Bowers & Farvolden, 1996; Williams, 1995).

**Step 3: Acknowledgment of Parallels/Reintegration**

The third step in the co-opting process occurs when enough new
information has accumulated that the co-opting discipline assumes full ownership of the construct in question, which is now more or less completely divorced from its psychoanalytic roots. At this point, one or more researchers may identify important parallels between the newfound concept and the earlier psychoanalytic construct from which it was derived, noting (with some amusement) that Freud speculated about this issue way back when—and some of his hypotheses have been actually supported by recent empirical studies!

Once these parallels have been identified, the stage is set for the concept to be reintegrated with psychoanalytic theory—fleshed out, refined, and reframed to fit with prevailing psychoanalytic language. The concept remains a part of the discipline that co-opted it, but a new connection is forged between that discipline and psychoanalysis (see, e.g., Weinberger, Siegel & Decamello, 2000). Reintegration is often a long time coming (and for some co-opted constructs it may never happen at all). Note, however, that in the context of postmodern constructivist science, the narrative has effectively been rewritten, and in most cases there is no going back: Whatever historical roots this idea might have had, it is now the intellectual property of the discipline that co-opted it.

Again, recent work on implicit memory is illustrative. Initial studies in this area emphasized difficulties with the psychoanalytic model (e.g,
tautological features of the traditional Freudian conceptualization of repressed memory; see Holmes, 1990; Kihlstrom, 1987; Roediger, 1990). As research continued, parallels between the psychodynamic and information-processing models of memory became increasingly clear, ultimately leading to some tentative efforts at reintegration (Bornstein, 1999b; Bucci, 1997; Epstein, 1994; Weinberger, 2000). However far this reintegration process proceeds, it seems likely that the concept of implicit memory will remain a part of cognitive psychology, with psychoanalytic work on unconscious memory relegated to historical footnote status in the minds of most researchers.

RECONNECTING PSYCHOANALYSIS: FROM PERIPHERY TO MAINSTREAM

Psychoanalysis is rich with ideas, but its empirical methods are limited both in scope and rigor (Bornstein & Masling, 2002; Fisher & Greenberg, 1996). Mainstream academic psychology emphasizes rigorous empirical testing and verification, but often this rigor has a stultifying effect on the generation and acceptance of novel concepts (Bornstein, 1999a; Wertz, 1994). Academic psychology has enriched itself by co-opting psychoanalytic constructs and testing them rigorously. The time has come for psychoanalysis to enrich itself by adapting cutting-edge empirical methods from other areas of psychology, and using these methods to validate and refine psychodynamic ideas.
Using nomothetic procedures to test psychoanalytic concepts is easier said than done. Just as resistance to psychoanalytic theory pervades the larger scientific community (Westen, 1998), resistance to nonpsychoanalytic research techniques is widespread among psychoanalysts (Bornstein, 2001). It is ironic (to say the least) that these contrasting forms of resistance have led psychologists in both camps to the same erroneous conclusion: The belief that psychoanalytic concepts cannot be studied empirically using traditional research methods.

Consider a recent passage from a leading undergraduate textbook in abnormal psychology:

A major criticism of psychoanalysis is that it is basically unscientific . . . There has been no careful measurement of any of these psychological phenomena, and there is no obvious way to prove or disprove the basic hypotheses of psychoanalysis. (Barlow & Durand, 1999, p. 21)

Contrast this with a recent assertion by a leading psychoanalytic theorist:

Handing over ultimate authority on psychoanalytic ideas to empirical verification . . . is a mistake. It gives too much away. We have a perfect right to claim validity (the nonstatistical sort) for our ideas because they are grounded in rigorous thinking and continually cross-checked with clinical experience. (Mitchell, 2000, pp. 158-159)

The first quotation is demonstrably incorrect: Contrary to the assertions of Barlow & Durand (1999), it is possible to define operationally and study
empirically virtually any psychoanalytic construct, regardless of whether that construct originated in drive theory, ego psychology, object relations theory, or self psychology. Operationalizing and testing psychodynamic concepts is challenging, but it has been accomplished successfully thousands of times (see Barron, Eagle & Wolitzky [1992]; Fisher & Greenberg [1996]; Masling & Schwartz [1979]; and Westen [1998] for reviews).

The second quotation is incorrect as well: Contrary to the assertions of Mitchell (2000), rigorous thinking and clinical experience can never compensate for the absence of scientific data (the statistical sort). The unavoidable perceptual and information-processing biases of observers (including clinicians) have been amply documented (Bowers & Meichenbaum, 1984; Gilovich, 1991; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Uleman & Bargh, 1989). Studies confirm that even when people are made aware of these biases, they continue to occur (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Jacoby et al., 1992; Ross & Sicoly, 1979). [4]

Over the years, certain mainstream research methods (e.g., content analysis of audio- and videotaped psychotherapy sessions, observational studies of infant-caregiver interactions, tachistoscopic presentation of subliminal stimuli) have been used to evaluate the validity of psychoanalytic ideas and the efficacy of psychodynamic treatment techniques (see Bornstein & Masling, 1998; Masling & Bornstein, 1996). Continued use of these
empirical methods is critical to the long term growth and well being of psychoanalysis. In addition, we must utilize more frequently some alternative empirical methods that have rarely been applied to the psychoanalytic context, because these methods hold particular promise in testing and refining the key tenets of psychoanalytic theory. In the following sections, I discuss three such methods. [5]

**Epidemiological studies**

Originally developed to identify population-wide risk factors for illness and disease, in recent years epidemiological techniques have been used with increasing frequency in health psychology and psychopathology (e.g., Kessler, McGonagle, Zhao & Nelson, 1994). Though correlational, epidemiological data are amenable to statistical procedures (e.g., path analysis) that allow strong conclusions to be drawn regarding biological, behavioral, and environmental influences on physical and psychological pathology (Kendler, MacLean & Neale, 1991). By identifying those variables that—alone or in combination—predict illness risk, epidemiological techniques allow for rigorous evaluation of diathesis-stress models of psychopathology.

Although most epidemiological studies of psychopathology risk have focused on categories from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), these techniques can easily be applied to forms of pathology
unique to psychoanalytic theory (e.g., introjective depression). They can be used to assess: (1) prevalence rates of risk factors presumed to produce these disorders in various segments of the population (e.g., overemphasis on individual achievement at the expense of social connectedness); and (2) comorbid traits and experiences (e.g., perfectionism, stressful life events) that are presumed to exacerbate these underlying risk factors (see Blatt & Homann, 1992).

Just as epidemiological methods can be used to predict the development of specific forms of pathology, they can (with some modification) be used to predict the developmental trajectory of personality traits, or trait clusters (Rost & Langeheine, 1997). Such investigations use different outcome measures (e.g., questionnaire or projective test responses in lieu of diagnoses), but the overall procedure is quite similar: Potential personality precursors are identified, mediating and moderating variables are measured, and theoretically related personality indices are subsequently (perhaps repeatedly) assessed.

Using this framework, epidemiological methods hold great promise in testing and refining psychoanalytic models of personality, and exploring the relationship between family configuration/dynamics and subsequent personality development. Longitudinal follow-up assessments of participants in these studies can help clarify the inter- and intrapersonal causes and
consequences of different personality styles (see Franz, McClelland & Weinberger, 1991).

**Meta-analytic investigations**

Meta-analytic techniques have a long history in psychology (Rosenthal, 1984), and they have been used in thousands of investigations to summarize complex sets of research findings and uncover hidden patterns in the literature (Meyer et al., 2001). Meta-analyses have at least two advantages over traditional narrative literature reviews. First, they allow researchers to quantify the magnitude of an experimental effect rather than simply tallying the proportion of studies that yielded statistically significant results. Second, meta-analytic techniques allow researchers to assess the impact of moderating variables on the phenomenon under investigation, even if certain of these variables differed across (rather than within) studies.

Smith and Glass's classic (1977) meta-analysis of psychotherapy effects remains a model for researchers who seek to quantify and contrast the impact of different psychological treatment techniques, and the applicability of meta-analytic methods to the psychoanalytic treatment literature is obvious. Meta-analysis can be used to test theoretical propositions as well. For example, meta-analyses of research using Silverman's subliminal psychodynamic activation (SPA) paradigm demonstrated that: (1) subliminal
message exposures produce significantly stronger effects on behavior than do supraliminal exposures of identical messages (Bornstein, 1990); and (2) only those SPA messages with drive-related content produce reliable behavior change (Hardaway, 1990). In an entirely different context, metaanalysis of the literature on interpersonal dependency revealed that—contrary to clinical lore—men actually have significantly higher dependency levels than women do, but only when dependency is assessed via projective measures with low face validity (Bornstein, 1995).

At another level, meta-analytic techniques can be used to assess the state of the discipline. Thus, a recent analysis of published psychoanalytic research showed that when investigators examine women and men within the same study, significantly stronger experimental results are obtained for men than women. When the behavior of men and women is compared across (rather than within) studies, comparable results are produced by women and men (Masling, Bornstein, Fishman & Davila, 2002). Apparently, the degree to which psychoanalytic theory can predict the behavior of women and men is in part a function of the way studies are designed, and gender differences assessed.

**Neuroimaging techniques**

Although they use a wide range of procedures for constructing brain
images, neuroimaging techniques share the common goal of linking neural activity to psychological activity (e.g., emotion, thought, motivation; see Becker & Mueller, 1998; Buchel & Friston, 2000). Among the most promising neuroimaging techniques for psychoanalytic research are: (1) the positron emission tomography (PET) scan (which measures brain activity by tracking differential uptake of a radioactively tagged substance in various brain regions); and (2) the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technique (which uses low-frequency energy to alter neural activity at the molecular level, and produce mathematically reconstructed “snapshots” of brain tissue). PET scans are most useful in linking functional brain changes to ongoing psychological processes (e.g., memory retrieval); fMRI scans can identify structural differences in brain tissue associated with different personality traits and pathologies.

Neuroimaging techniques are already being used to contrast the patterns of cortical activity associated with conscious versus unconscious perception, memory, thought, and motivation (e.g., Rauch et al., 1996; Whalen et al., 1998). Although few of these studies are designed specifically to test psychodynamic models of the unconscious, the results of these investigations have important theoretical implications for psychoanalysis (see LeDoux, 1996; Slipp, 2000). Other neuroimaging investigations have demonstrated that different cortical activation patterns are associated with genuine and confabulated memories (Schacter & Curran, 1995). Aside from the potential
applications of these results in forensic settings, such findings may eventually enable psychoanalysts to distinguish genuine memories from false (or “screen”) memories within the analytic setting.

Such in vivo applications of PET and fMRI technology are not yet feasible, but there is every reason to expect that they will be in the future. When these assessment methods become less intrusive (and less expensive), they will have profound empirical and clinical implications. Perhaps neuroimaging technology will enable psychoanalytic researchers to contrast the patterns of cortical activation associated with realistic versus fantasy-based perceptions of the therapist, providing a real-time neural index of transference. Perhaps researchers will link unique patterns of cortical excitation with specific defense clusters, enabling analysts to validate their inference that a patient was using a particular defensive strategy within the analytic session.

**CONCLUSION**

When neuroimaging techniques become central to the testing and verification of psychoanalytic ideas, we will have gone full circle. Freud’s first outlines of psychoanalysis were derived from biological principles as well as psychological ones (e.g., Freud, 1895), and much of his early drive model was framed in the language of 19th-century physiology (Gay, 1988; Greenberg &
Mitchell, 1983). The post-Freudian evolution of psychoanalysis has been characterized by an increasing emphasis on psychological processes, with decreasing attention to biology (cf., Slavin & Kriegman, 1992; Winson, 1985). As neuroimaging techniques move from research laboratory to consulting room, the stage will be set for a renewal of Freud’s dream: the creation of a psychoanalysis that integrates biological and psychological principles into a unified theory of human mental life.

Psychoanalytic theorists and researchers have made progress toward this goal, but there is no guarantee we will get there. Postmodern science offers numerous opportunities for reconnecting psychoanalysis with mainstream psychology, and writing a more accurate psychoanalytic narrative during the coming years. To do this effectively, we must reclaim those ideas that have been co-opted by other disciplines at the same time that we reach out to other disciplines for empirical inspiration. Unless we do both of these things, we may find that—unlike the journals and textbooks of the latter half of the 20th century—the journals and textbooks of the late 21st century no longer criticize psychoanalysis. Instead they might not mention it at all.

References


**Notes**

[1] The perceived sexism of Freud’s ideas also played a role in the marginalization of psychoanalysis, though in a number of instances psychoanalysis has been unfairly criticized in this regard (see Bornstein & Masling, 2002).

[2] As Reisner (1999) noted, psychoanalysis has always reflected postmodernism’s emphasis on
subjective truth, reconstruction, and private, personal meaning. In fact, several theoreticians have pointed out that in certain respects, psychoanalytic theory was postmodern before postmodernism had a name (see Arons, 1999; Kirshner, 1999).

[3] Unconscious plagiarism is not merely an academic concept. In a widely publicized civil trial nearly three decades ago, ex-Beatle George Harrison was acquitted of plagiarizing The Chiffons’ “He’s So Fine” when he composed his hit tune “My Sweet Lord.” The grounds for acquittal: Harrison was judged to have plagiarized the melody unconsciously, not deliberately.

[4] An important ethical issue emerges here as well: As long as psychoanalysis is used to treat mental disorders, a paucity of nomothetic research evidence violates the American Psychological Association’s (1992) Ethical Standards. Principle 1.06 (Basis for Scientific and Professional Judgments) and Principle 2.01 (Evaluation, Diagnosis, and Interventions in a Professional Context) are particularly germane to this issue.

[5] These are not the only underutilized research methods that hold promise for psychoanalysis. Other potentially useful methods include neural and artificial intelligence (AI) simulations, mathematical modeling techniques, and regression analyses (statistical, not psychosexual).
Matters of Fact or Flights of Fancy?

Donald P. Spence, PhD

In a recent review of the book *On Bearing Unbearable States of Mind* by Ruth Riesenberg-Malcolm, Roy Schafer reminds us that the phenomena in a clinical hour (and the analyst's reactions to them)

are not inevitable, unmistakable empirical discoveries being made in some mind-independent natural world. . . [W]e must not confuse what is searched for systematically with what is; similarly, we must distinguish what is merely supposed to be so on the basis of some general doctrine from what has been carefully worked out through all the trials and tribulations of clinical interpretation. (Schafer, 2000, p. 832)

If we enlarge on this distinction, it would seem to follow that the patterns observed by the analyst, found useful, often healing, by the patient and convincing by readers of the case report are not necessarily in the material or in the hour. A panel of analysts, listening to a recording of the session, would probably not arrive independently at the same formulation discovered by the analyst and a computer program, tuned to detect subtle changes in word usage or word combination, would clearly not necessarily start flashing “Eureka!” when a specific clinical happening was first detected.
An analytic interpretation, therefore, stands on quite different grounds than a suddenly elevated PSA (prostate specific antigen). This marker is patently present in the patient’s blood and can be reliably observed by a panel of experts; the clinical happening, on the other hand, may or may not be noticed (and its interpretation may or may not be helpful to the patient).

Because of this slippage between what happened in the hour and how it is interpreted, we may have reason to worry about the truth value of our literature of case reports. These, after all, are largely based on memory and who is to say how faithfully they conform to the events of the session? Convincing case reports all too often make it seem as if the analyst’s intervention were the only possible response whereas we know, from later discussion with colleagues, that what seems obvious or elementary (to us) is often found by others to be hard to follow, unlikely or even bizarre. The analyst’s contents of consciousness at the time of the session, frequently out of awareness and almost never included in the case report, has everything to do with just how he or she hears and understands the material and frames an interpretation. But these contents are almost never known to others. We know next to nothing about the way personal experiences combine to create these contents and, in the process, increase the analyst’s awareness of this or that issue, shaping the wording and timing of an interpretation and influencing (down the line) the very texture of the case report to make it more or less convincing.
If the key pieces of a clinical happening are not always in the material, we begin to see that too much focus on high-fidelity recordings of a session may be seriously misplaced. We may have an accurate and complete account of the words spoken but this gives us almost no information about their connotations at the moment. What is more, words alone say nothing about such paralinguistic features as pauses or inflections which may make the difference between what is clinically important and what goes unheard. And no analysis of past recordings, no matter how complete, can tell us why the analyst chose to use one particular metaphor to reframe the material or why his or her attention was drawn to certain parts of the session.

In the same issue of the *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* as Roy Schafer’s book review, Betty Joseph describes an adolescent who comes into a Monday session and begins a string of sentences almost before she reaches the couch. One of the events described was the discovery that she had killed her goldfish by giving them too much food. Joseph senses a connection between overfeeding the fish and “overfeeding” the analyst. “It is significant that the way Jenny talks from the beginning of the session is quite overwhelming, as if aimed at preventing me from responding, and as became clearer, pushing my interpretations into her. She puts in too much food, too massive a communication, which pollutes the whole analytic atmosphere” (Joseph, 2000, p. 643).
The metaphor of overfeeding gives us a way of sensing what the analyst was feeling as she listened to this patient talking nonstop; once Joseph makes the connection for us, it seems reasonable and insightful. But notice that the feeding-the-analyst metaphor does not appear in the material. Nor does it follow that another analyst would feel quite the same pressure of speech. If Jenny’s speech pattern had seemed, to a second analyst, to be rather ordinary and relaxed, there is less chance that the metaphor of overfeeding would come to mind and with it, the link to killing the goldfish.

We next learn that another reason for Jenny’s nonstop talking is to persuade the analyst that the world is as she sees it and reduce the chance of disagreement. To hear another point of view is to risk being invaded and suffocated—again the overfeeding metaphor, with shades of being poisoned or drugged.

To talk things over is to risk annihilation; only by keeping the analyst quiet (by talking nonstop) can this threat be removed. In similar fashion, the best response to a challenging interpretation is to feign agreement, set it aside, and continue talking as if nothing had happened.

None of this is said by the patient, “but as the treatment goes on it is increasingly apparent that the agreeableness is a kind of drug that the patient uses to placate and sedate her object and to protect herself from violent
intrusion by the object” (Joseph, 2000, p. 648). Just how it becomes apparent is never fully explained but we can assume that something in Joseph’s clinical experience or style of listening had prepared her to hear Jenny’s material as overwhelming, nonresponsive and invasive. This experience may have given her (via projective identification) the hunch that similar feelings were triggered in the patient whenever she was exposed to an argument she could not answer.

IMPLICATIONS

Several conclusions follow from the fact that interpretations do not flow directly from the material. The gap between what was said in the session and how it was framed by the analyst makes us wonder, first of all, whether detailed research on the transcript alone can ever lead to useful findings in the long run. If the healing metaphor is not contained in the material, then we should be asking more about where it came from and how good clinicians are able to sense the useful metaphor at just the right moment. The impact of an insightful interpretation—its contribution to the clinical texture of the session—is something like the impact of an inspired director on the production of a play. The bare script tells us almost nothing about where the actors should stand, how they might move, and how long they might wait before responding; indeed, the magic of good direction lies in an almost mystical intuition of how a scene should be blocked, lit, and acted. Ditto for the healing
analyst. Perhaps all psychoanalytic candidates should study the performing arts in more detail and learn from good directors how they learn to listen.

A similar disjunction is now being actively discussed by historians.

The conventional procedures of socio-cultural history are perceived as implying that meanings are not produced as actual, “material” events within the dense interrelations of systems of signs but are epiphenomenal and determined by an extralinguistic reality through relations of cause, reflection, representation, analogy, or expression.

As a result,

all forms of historical evidence have not only a referential, “documentary” dimension . . . but they also exhibit a ‘work-like’ dimension as acts of meaning-production in which the given forms and contents are set into new patterns of relationship in order to constitute a new meaningful reality. (Toews, 1987, p. 885, in a summary review of recent historical texts)

Part of this new approach to document study argues that language should be seen “as a system of signs within which worlds are constructed rather than reflected” (Toews, 1987, p. 887, in a comment on work by the historian Peter Jelavich; see also Rorty, 1979). By this reading, the manuscript (or analytic transcript) marks only the beginning of a process which ends, minutes or days or years later, in an understanding which can be captured in language. The transcript, no matter how faithful, only gives us brief glimpses of the analytic conversation and to fully understand the process by which
specific symptoms were converted into intelligible discourse, we need something closer to timelapse photography, which might let us see how change took place over time. This emphasis on the importance of discourse makes us realize that the patient’s voice in the conversation is almost always silent; as in the Sherlock Holmes story about the dog who didn’t bark in the night, we notice it more by its absence than by what it contributes.

A second implication sheds some light on why our clinical literature contains so few convincing examples of effective interpretations—the words alone are simply not sufficient (see Spence, 1992). What was said by the analyst is always filtered through the patient’s context of consciousness and without knowing what the analysand was thinking at the moment the analyst spoke, we have no way of knowing what was heard. Clues to this context can sometimes be deduced from the patient’s response to the intervention, but in a high proportion of cases this response is omitted. Joseph’s account stands out because it describes the patient’s response at length and uses it to further refine the overriding metaphor.

Third, we need to realize that because of the slippage between what actually happened in the hour and its subsequent case report, the bulk of our clinical literature cannot be taken as a body of evidence but must be seen as a set of associations—some reliable, some not. While it is usually assumed that standard psychoanalytic doctrine has been borne out by case studies, we now
have reason to wonder whether the match is more contrived than real. In choosing what parts of a case to publish, we might suspect that the vignettes selected are the ones that best exemplify pieces of received theory. Sections that seem to violate standard doctrine may simply be left out of the final write-up. Because no case presentation is exhaustive, we never know what is left out, and a quick reading of this or that case may be more misleading than otherwise because the clinical story being told is, more often than we might suspect, the story of what ought to happen rather than what did.

**AVAILABLE MEASURING INSTRUMENTS**

Continued devotion to conventional (quantitative) research as a supplement to clinical reports has produced some intermittent successes but much to everyone’s disappointment, has been unable to develop an overarching theory that applies to all cases. Nor has conventional research produced a measuring instrument which is uniquely sensitive to the typical concerns of the practicing analyst. Scales aplenty have been applied to recorded transcripts but turning the average hour into a set of numbers does not seem to bring us any closer to the inspiration for this or that interpretation or precisely how countertransference pressure molded the analyst’s vocabulary and turn of phrase. Scales cannot take a reading of the key themes which circulate silently through both patient’s and analyst’s thoughts (their partly observed contents of consciousness which is almost
never spoken of during a session), nor are they responsive to subtle changes over time in a favorite memory or obtrusive dream.

A similar concern has been sounded by Andre Green.

It is my belief [he writes] that all the researches on the psychoanalytic cure have failed to discover truly significant facts. . . There is a neglect in most of the investigations of the specificity of what is intrapsychic and unconscious, and an underestimation of the parameters of the analytic situation . . . . (Green, 1996a, p. 12)

Significant support for this charge may be found in a cursory analysis of the recent psychoanalytic literature: sampling from the three main psychoanalytic journals, we find that clinical papers almost never cite quantitative research findings. The attempt inspired by the hard sciences to reduce psychoanalytic practice to a set of general laws has largely failed. Many social scientists have come to agree with Flyvbjerg (2001) that “social science never has been, and probably never will be, able to develop the type of explanatory and predictive theory that is the ideal and hallmark of natural science” (p. 4). In more technical language, he argues that “in the study of human affairs, there exists only context-dependent knowledge, which thus presently rules out the possibility of epistemic theoretical construction” (p. 71).

If we turn, then, to the case study as the road to greater knowledge, what do we find? Two kinds of context seem missing—the participants’
context of consciousness, already discussed, and what might be called a context of cases. Psychoanalysis has always prided itself on its extensive literature of case reports but we are now beginning to wonder (as noted above) how much they reflect the actual happenings within the hour; at the least, these reports must be viewed with caution. And even if we could find some way to separate the more reliable pieces from the rest, no way has been found to assemble them into a meaningful and inter-connected universe of meanings. We still have not learned how to build on the data of the analytic hour and turn it into a collection that is cumulative, comprehensive (if not always exhaustive), and one that lends itself to cross-indexing (and other kinds of cataloguing) and is compatible with computer-based search engines. We have focused our computer interests largely on Strachey’s *Standard Edition* of Freud and the published psychoanalytic literature; little thought has been given to how to process incoming case reports and how to build up an archive for the future. We have many anecdotal reports but because these stories are for the most part uncorroborated, fragmentary and based largely on memory, they can hardly be taken as reference points to real happenings. Instead, they are probably more valuable for what they say about the author.

The interest in storytelling comes not only from a wish to compete with Freud; it follows naturally from one of the analyst’s main activities in his daily work. The central burden of Schafer’s *Retelling a Life* (1992) holds that the analyst’s primary function is to work with the patient to fashion a coherent
account of both his early and his current life. Schafer’s view of the process is shared by many other contemporary analysts. Relevant storylines are discovered in the course of treatment and these are used to organize early memories and provide a perspective on the larger life unfolding. The analyst is seen as an influential coauthor of a

In constructing his storyline, the analyst is alert to the

gaps and contradictions in the patient’s account of his or her past and present life; taboo subjects and subjects too painful to discuss; family myths that transform major features of the circumstances in which the patient developed and now lives; misunderstood compulsions, moods, aches and pains; missing satisfactions and stunted interests . . . . (Schafer, 1999, p. 223)

Interpretations, reconstructions and alternative formulations can be seen as the provisional building blocks of a larger narrative which is gradually and jointly constructed by patient and analyst in the course of treatment.

If we assume that creating this account is an important aspect of analytic work, then it is no surprise that when the analyst comes to writing up the case, he or she construes the task in much the same manner. It is the
overarching storyline that gives the case report its shape and significance and which goes a long way toward making it readable and ready for publication. And we might suspect that editors are also influenced by these concerns and might easily prefer a dramatic but piecemeal account to a fact-strewn chronicle with no obvious narrative focus. Our most famous cases, after all, are those that read like stories and in their telling, important details often get lost. But as we have seen, once we turn clinical reports into short or short-short stories, we have pretty much abandoned the possibility of combining them into a useful archive. The two genres—chronicle and narrative—are essentially contradictory in both style and content.

How can we find a way of separating fantasy from fact in our case reports? What is needed is some kind of controlling context—perhaps an archive of clinical happenings organized around common themes. As we begin to accumulate repeated samplings of similar clinical moments, a kind of formal order might emerge which could surprise us, a regularity which suggests more lawfulness in the process than we have grown to expect. Suppose we collected, in as much detail as possible, all cases in which the patient was exposed to an increasingly pregnant analyst. What kind of common themes would appear? An accumulating archive would give us a chance to study how derivatives change over time as the stimulus (the analyst’s pregnant condition) comes more clearly into consciousness. Do the derivatives of this gradually appearing stimulus first appear in dreams? When
they later become visible in associations, are the indicators of early pregnancy more disguised (as theory might predict) than later derivatives? Does this disguise function largely to keep the patient unaware of the changing state of the analyst?

As the analyst’s pregnancy comes more fully into awareness, do we find that the derivatives emerge in a natural sequence which is correlated with awareness and might be used to predict when the patient will recognize the analyst’s condition? Does the sequence vary according to the sex of the patient? If a woman, according to her parity? Is the sequence inversely correlated with the workings of the primary process? Can it be used to predict the patient’s reaction to the announcement of the analyst’s pregnancy? We might suspect that a sudden upwelling of derivatives might be a promising indicator of the patient’s readiness to hear the full story. On the other hand, were the analyst to announce her condition before a certain number of these derivatives had appeared, she might run the risk of either a more negative patient reaction or a frank expression of disbelief.

A small number of papers describing the patient’s reaction to his or her analyst’s pregnancy have appeared in the literature, but all too often they lack the kind of detail that would settle these issues and they are written in a variety of formats which makes close comparison difficult. For example: “Two years later the analyst became pregnant. The patient did not appear to notice
in the early months, other than to comment that she seemed to be putting on weight. . . Only when she was in her sixth month did the patient observe that the analyst was pregnant” (Uyehara et al., 1995, p. 121). We might suspect that a closer analysis of the sessions leading up to the patient’s awareness might also reveal hidden or overlooked references to her condition, but given the fragmentary report, we are unable to pursue this question.

In another example from the same paper, the authors report that “the patient’s awareness of her analyst’s pregnancy emerged through dreams and associations related to pregnancy, abortion and childhood” (p. 122). What were the details? Do they resemble association of other patients in similar situations? Only a detailed archive would answer these questions.

Mariotti (1993) describes a male patient who seemed to have some early awareness that his analyst was pregnant as early as the second month. In his associations, he mentions a problem he is having with a locksmith and is reminded of how many ways there are to enter his house from the front. (By contrast, he remembers, there is only one entrance from the back.) Could this material be taken as a reference to insemination? Some days later, he reports that a pregnant girl he met at a party had miscarried; he wonders if it were somehow his fault. At this point the analyst discloses that she is pregnant. The patient becomes sarcastic and upset and we might wonder why. Was he in fact unaware of the pregnancy? Did he dislike being reminded
of the miscarriage? His strong negative reaction raises the possibility that the analyst spoke too soon, that she was reading too much meaning into his associations, and that what seemed like preconscious clues in the material could be more easily explained on more routine grounds. If a larger database were available and a more systematic, archival approach had been used, we could easily assess the frequency (and thus the likelihood) of his locksmith associations and estimate the chances that they were, in fact, derivatives of a preconscious pregnancy theme.

It can be seen that a useful archival account of an hour must stifle the usual temptation to speculate on the material and to read between the lines. To write an adequately detailed account is, by definition, to set aside the story-telling tradition of the case report and to settle for a much leaner, even repetitive account that faces largely toward the future. In the process of building up the archive, it may be necessary to restrict this approach to only a handful of key moments and, as a necessary next step, to arrive at an arrangement whereby the editors of the major psychoanalytic journals would agree on a certain set of archival standards. They might decide, for example, that any case report that mentions a pregnant analyst must use a restricted set of key terms, include verbatim excerpts of dreams and associations, and find some way to sample the material over a time span that starts with the analyst’s first awareness of her pregnancy until it becomes recognized by the patient.
INDEX OF CHRISTIAN ART

The inspiration for this line of thinking can be found in the Index of Christian Art because it provides an outstanding example of how a “soft” science (art history) can be systematic, cumulative and formally disciplined. Whereas analysts have been more than casual in the manner in which they report and catalog clinical happenings, there is nothing in the subject matter that requires this to be the case. Much can be learned from a careful study of the Christian Index which can serve as an opposite example. Founded in 1917 by Dr. Rufus Morley (an art historian at Princeton), its goal is to catalogue, by subject and picture type, all known specimens of Christian art (whether paintings, frescos, sculptures or any other form) from early apostolic times to 1400 A.D. Each specimen is briefly described, using a standard set of Index terms, and cross-referenced to one or more photographs. Accompanying the description is a brief history of the specimen and a short bibliography. The collection is intended to record every significant detail of every work of Christian art for which the curators could obtain an illustration (see Woodruff, 1942). More than 1,000 new objects are added every year as archaeologists and archivists continue to uncover pieces of the past. Work is now under way to computerize the database and make it possible to use the standard Index terms as key words to search for relevant examples.

The overarching concern for completeness in compiling the Index
means that what were initially sensed as uninteresting details may take on new significance as larger patterns emerge; it also means that one can quickly connect new findings with past discoveries because all entries in the card catalogue are written in a common language and use a standard format. As a result, it is fairly straightforward to instantiate such categories as Animal: Fantastic (e.g., centaurs, griffins and dragons) and Personification: Vice (e.g., cruelty, cowardice and vanity).

For an example of how the Index can further our understanding of Christian art, consider the Annunciation of the Virgin Mary—the moment when she is informed (usually by the Angel Gabriel) that she is with child (incarnated with Christ). This subject is considered by many (John Ruskin among others) to be one of the most painted topics in Christian art and as of March, 2000, it took up 10 drawers in the Index card catalogue. What has the Index added to our understanding of this famous scene? Firstly, it has provided an enumeration of its classical features—e.g., the Angel Gabriel and the Virgin, the position and stance of these two figures, and their relation to the Holy Ghost. The Virgin frequently holds a spindle; a vase of lilies often appears between Mary and the angel. The angel is usually on the left and kneeling; the Virgin is often seated and the two figures are often divided by a column or wall. God (with halo) may appear in the upper left with a shaft of rays striking the Virgin; a dove is often visible part way along the shaft and sliding down the rays (see Robb, 1936). The Virgin may be seated under a
canopy.

Other symbols of purity often include a water basin, towel, unspotted mirror, water carafe, rose without thorns, an enclosed garden, and a sealed fountain. It would be a simple matter, using the Index and its computer linkages, to come up with a frequency count of each of these items and the order in which they appeared throughout the Christian era. A careful study of this subject can sensitize us to the essential features of the Annunciation and make us more aware of other examples which may have escaped notice. One scholar (Denny, 1977) has documented the fact that the position of Gabriel, vis a vis Mary, changed from right to left around 5th century A.D; he suggests possible reasons why this reversal took place, what it implies with respect to the role of Mary and her relation to God’s messenger, and the changing significance of the Incarnation. Other features of the Annunciation invite a similar kind of analysis.

Here are two descriptions of the Annunciation taken from the Index:

Within architectural frame decorated with masks, Gabriel decorated nimbus [halo], scroll with inscription from Luke, i, 28 in draped L hand, R extended toward Virgin Mary, decorated nimbus, book in L hand, R raised, dove of Holy Ghost above her head; flanking lilies in vase; patterned background.

Gabriel nimbed [wearing halo], with peacock wings, kneeling, R hand raised beside scroll with inscription from Luke, i, 28; dove of Holy Ghost descending on rays from arc of heaven to Virgin Mary crowned, scalloped
nimbus, hands crossed, scroll with inscription from Luke, i, 38 in L, seated on throne.

The emphasis on detail crowds out the story; no attempt is made to speculate about the meaning or significance of any part of the image. We are struck by an almost ruthless focus on concrete particulars. By the same token, it is the similarity of detail and language from one description to the next that gives us the opportunity to accumulate and organize information and fit the individual specimens into some larger pattern. Each new acquisition adds to our current understanding and we see how knowledge can accumulate as easily in art history as in the harder sciences. By comparison, each new report in the psychoanalytic literature about the patient’s reaction to a pregnant analyst is read once and largely forgotten. It is usually presented in a way that cannot be compared with earlier or future reports and does not increase our larger understanding. Titled in a way that makes it often impossible to find again, it leaves no measurable trace.

Suppose the principles governing the Index were applied to distinctive happenings in a psychoanalytic hour; could they also be catalogued in a way that would make them useful to future scholars? The subject matter of psychoanalysis is also composed of a limited number of meanings expressed in a limited number of different ways (associations, dreams, symptoms, parapraxises, etc.). In parallel with Christian art, the clinical happenings that take place in analytic hours could also be catalogued and compared, with the
better representations helping us to understand the poorer. But in keeping with our emphasis on context, the bare bones of an Index entry would have to be supplemented by the participants' thoughts about the interchange, how it was understood and what associations it triggered.

CLOSING THE GAP

Does an archive of this kind help to bridge Schafer's original distinction between what is suggested by theory and what has been worked out over the course of treatment? The Index would sensitize us to ways in which themes develop over time, give added meaning to single happenings, and make us aware of what might be called the developmental history of certain kinds of common phenomena. An ideal Index might include such frequently recurring themes as the patient's first dream; the first session after vacation; the last session before termination or before vacation; the hour when the date of an upcoming vacation is mentioned; the first session after a cancellation; the first session after a change of appointment time; the first session containing a new memory; and the first session after a missed appointment. A focus on any one of these themes could look for family resemblances across hours and across patients, duplicating the rationale of the Index of Christian Art in its search for common themes across different artists who are all rendering a common subject. But psychoanalytic process can also be studied by gathering evidence for early warnings of specific happenings. We have already described how we
might search for the patient’s awareness of the analyst’s pregnancy; similar questions might be asked about how and when the patient anticipates an unexpected illness or interruption (see Dewald, 1982; Frayn, 1987; Gervais, 1994; and Pizer, 1997, for prominent examples). Early signs of recurrent illness (e.g., a growing depression or an upsurge of symptoms) or the onset of an upsetting, private event (e.g., a death in the family) might prompt the analyst to start gathering more detailed process notes; when these are reviewed and combined with data from other patients, we might detect an early sensitivity to the upcoming trauma in the patient’s material.

Suppose we had collected a sample of hours which included some mention of the analyst’s upcoming vacation; what kind of pattern might emerge? We can take a paper by Ramzy (1974) as a possible template. He described a patient who had discovered, just before the session, that his cleaning lady had not appeared at the expected time. Ramzy made the following comment: “Your earlier thoughts about the cleaning lady which occurred to you on the way here and your worry over losing her makes me think that they may be connected with my upcoming absence for the next two weeks, starting next Monday” (p. 546). I was recently told of a patient surprised by the abrupt resignation of his secretary and who related this worry to his analyst’s upcoming vacation. The analyst wondered whether he might be afraid that he, the analyst, might not be coming back. This kind of displacement occurs so frequently that most practitioners are sensitized to its
possibility and confidently expect that announcement of a vacation will be followed, almost automatically, by mention of one or more parallel separations, real or imaginary.

A systematic collection of such incidents might reveal the more important variants of a single pattern: concern about the analyst and his or her imminent disappearance is displaced on to another employee—cleaning lady, secretary, etc. An important qualifier might turn out to be the amount of advance warning given the patient. A notice given two or more months before the upcoming vacation might trigger a more benign response and perhaps invoke a servant of higher status—e.g., butler—than one that was left until the last minute. Early notice of an interruption might trigger a more distant or disguised association—e.g., a related memory or a reference to a book or movie—than a more abrupt warning.

Now suppose that an inexperienced analyst had just announced that he would be leaving shortly on vacation. Acquaintance with the Index could alert him to the possibility that some kind of displacement would be expected and he would start to listen for parallel reactions. Prepared by the Index, he would be better equipped to detect the Ramzy template and its more frequent variations. It is this preparation that makes the difference between the novice and higher levels of expertise. Flyvbjerg (2001) has argued that high levels of decision making demand a perspective which “enables certain key features of
a situation to stand out, while others recede into the background . . . No objective choice or conscious evaluation of appropriateness takes place, which is the case in selecting elements, rules and plans” (p. 16); rather, the performer is governed by an overall Gestalt. If the analyst is sensitized to the Ramzy template, he can more easily appreciate the link between loss or cancellation and an upcoming vacation; the data may still not be entirely transparent but the distance between utterance and formulation has been appreciably shortened.

More generally, the presence of such an Index would serve as a reference norm against which new case reports could be judged. It would supply a controlling context that is based on actual happenings, not on standard theory, and would give us a way of assessing the truth value of each new report. As the archive began to grow, we would begin to understand the range of reactions to, say, the analyst’s emerging pregnancy or her upcoming vacation. Reactions which fell outside this range might be looked at more critically and discussed with more hesitation; reports which fell within normal limits would strengthen our sense that a real phenomenon was emerging and could be incorporated into new theory.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Holzman and Aronson (1992) have attacked the hermeneutic tradition
in psychoanalysis on the grounds that it offers no rules of procedure and that it "accepts the view that there is a logical distinction between scientific and other realms of explanation." They continue: “But, indeed, there are no qualitatively different kinds of explanation and different epistemologies, one requiring test and manipulation of physical reality, the other requiring reflection on the nature of experience via reenactment and vicarious participation” (p. 80).

We quite agree: explanation is of a piece because nature is indivisible. But precisely because explanation is blind to the nature of the data, logical conclusions can be drawn from verbal accounts as well as from numerical data (and as the archive grows, many of the verbal conclusions can be put into quantitative form). Thus it does not follow that the interpretative disciplines (the so-called soft sciences) are at an explanatory disadvantage or that adopting a hermeneutic tradition is to adopt a different standard of validation. The growth of art history as an established discipline shows quite clearly that reliable judgments can be made about nonnumerical data; that similarities and differences can be systematically analyzed and that reasonable experts can agree on the period and often the creator of an unknown fresco or painting. An authority on early Christian art, presented with an unidentified painting of the Annunciation showing Mary on the left and Gabriel on the right, would almost certainly conclude that such a specimen was created before the sixth century because, as we have seen, it
was after that date that the tradition of showing Gabriel on the left was firmly established (see Denny, 1977). As the database of early Christian art continues to grow and as computer searches become more refined, arriving at a justified provenance will become more and more straightforward.

A similar future is in store for psychoanalysis—but only on the condition that we find some way to prevent our clinical experience from disappearing soon after it is put into words. To reinforce Freud’s belief that psychoanalysis is “founded securely upon the observation of the facts of mental life” (Freud, 1926, p. 721), we need to (a) ground these observations in a limited and unambiguous vocabulary of descriptive terms; (b) develop a literature that is cumulative and cross-referenced; and (c) find ways of making this literature accessible to future analysts so that key observations will not be lost because of vague titles or a poor choice of key words. We need to find ways to resist the lure of the narrative tradition and realize that a report of clinical happenings is a different genre than making an interpretation or spinning out a storyline. To be useful for future generations, the clinical report must necessarily be somewhat boring, more than a little repetitious, limited to a specific vocabulary, and routinely complemented by the analyst’s and patient’s context of consciousness.

Holzman and Aronson (1992) have made the claim that a hermeneutic approach entails what they term the “nihilistic position” which states that
“psychoanalytic hypotheses and propositions are incapable of confirmation or disconfirmation by any means, whether by clinical or extraclinical methods. Psychoanalysis is, in this view, not a scientific enterprise, and generalizations are defied in the face of a discipline that confronts only individuality” (p. 76). Not necessarily true. Patients are certainly treated one case at a time but in the accumulation of cases, a lawfulness may emerge which can lend itself to a deeper understanding of everyday clinical phenomena; such a regularity can nourish both theory and practice. Because this lawfulness will emerge across a sample of patients, it is also protected from the charge made by Grünbaum (1984) that data from a clinical hour are necessarily contaminated by the participants’ knowledge of the theory. Emerging regularities will very likely be unexpected and therefore not contained in present theory or anticipated either by patient or by analyst; on the contrary, they may easily point the way to new, unanticipated paradigms. Everything depends, as we have seen, on the nature of the database and we have much to learn from other interpretative disciplines in the way of assembling a cumulative, interrelated and accessible body of findings. When that day comes, we can begin to enjoy an ever-enriching dialogue between theorist and practitioner, having finally found a “method for research which is coherent, not with the content of psychoanalysis, but with the type of thinking which is its true object” (Green, 1996b, p. 21).

It seems clear that by grounding a clinical report in an ever-expanding
Index of Clinical Happenings, we can make more necessary and natural any given interpretation. By showing a communality across patients, we can dissolve the mystique often associated with a penetrating interpretation and by normalizing it, make it more persuasive. At the same moment, we will be demonstrating that the hermeneutic approach is systematic, not nihilistic, can be just as lawful as a Euclid proof, and stands at the center of any successful psychoanalysis.

References


Problems on the Nature of Reality: Neuroscience and Evolutionary Biology Inform the Psychoanalytic Debate

David Pincus, DMH

The Skin Horse had lived longer in the nursery than any of the others. He was so old that his brown coat was bald in patches and showed the seams underneath, and most of the hairs in his tail had been pulled out to string bead necklaces. He was wise, for he had seen a long succession of mechanical toys arrive to boast and swagger, and by and by break their mainsprings and pass away, and he knew that they were only toys, and would never turn into anything else. For nursery magic is very strange and wonderful, and only those playthings that are old and wise and experienced like the Skin Horse understand all about it.

“What is real?” asked the Rabbit one day, when they were lying side by side near the nursery fender, before Nana came to tidy the room. “Does it mean having things that buzz inside you and a stick-out handle?”

“Real isn’t how you are made,” said the Skin Horse. “It’s a thing that happens to you. When a child loves you for a long, long time, not just to play with, but really loves you, then you become Real.”

“Does it hurt?” asked the Rabbit.

“Sometimes,” said the Skin Horse, for he was always truthful. When you are Real, you don’t mind being hurt.”

“Does it happen all at once, like being wound up,” he asked, “or bit by bit?”
“It doesn’t happen all at once,” said the Skin Horse. “You become. It takes a long time. That is why it doesn’t often happen to people who break easily, or have sharp edges, or have to be carefully kept. Generally, by the time you are Real, most of your hair has been loved off and your eyes drop out and you get loose in the joints and very shabby. But these things don’t matter at all, because once you are Real you can’t be ugly, except to people who don’t understand.”

“I suppose you are Real?” said the Rabbit. And then he wished he had not said it, for he thought that the Skin Horse might be sensitive.

But the Skin Horse only smiled.

“The boy’s uncle made me Real,” he said. “That was a great many years ago; but once you are Real you can’t become unreal again. It lasts for always.”

(Williams, 1997, pp. 10-13)

Modern and postmodern debates always bring with them some statement on the nature of reality. For instance, is reality given or constructed? Further, what type of reality is under consideration: are we talking about reality at the ontological, epistemological, or metaphysical level? The Skin Horse[1] weighs in on these issues, and so does David, the robot boy in Steven Spielberg’s (2001) movie Artificial Intelligence (AI), who is made “real” through a sequence of words that activate a program resulting in an immediate attachment to his human mother-to-be. In David’s case, his attachment is pure and more enduring than time itself, humbling the ambivalence and fragility of human attachments. For the Skin Horse, physical form has nothing to do with making things real.
The issue of reality has taken many twists and turns through the centuries and has found itself in many philosophical and psychological discussions. In psychoanalysis the question of reality is a lively topic as our clinical and theoretical models are changing—the current uncertainty of our field upon us and our directions being forged for the future. In this chapter I studiously avoid these debates as they occur within psychoanalysis; instead, I look to the horizons of evolution and brain science to see how they might illuminate our perspective in the analytic trenches. I do so in the following manner:

1) I lay out some basic issues of mind versus the material surround, using the theme of the Skin Horse, and begin to lay the groundwork for my view that brains have been built to be mental-material melders-transformers. Later mammalian brains, in particular, may be viewed as digesting and constructivistic postmodern wonders, yet they are exquisitely attuned to and dependent upon the material surround. Furthermore—despite some brains’ more recent postmodern leanings—brains are always utterly devoted to themes of regularity, predictability, repetition, redundancy.

2) I develop the notion of constructivism, as I view it, in the operations of brains. Constructivism in neuroscience has many connections to the modern-postmodern debate.

3) I take four examples from neuroscience that shed light upon the modern-postmodern discussion: (a) facial recognition, (b)
dendritic morphogenesis, (c) dreaming, and (d) modularism and modernism in evolutionary psychology.

4) In conclusion, I reconstruct these neuroscience observations in the context of the modern-postmodern debate, and inquire about implications for psychoanalysis.

**BASIC ISSUES**

Returning to the Skin Horse and the movie *Al*, the device of a Cartesian dualism raises the issue of emphasis or priority: Does the reality of feeling, of attachment, of loving, become more compelling than that of the material universe? This is a salient, compelling question, as Spielberg surely knows. And as psychotherapists who toil in the pained subjectivities of others, we are all too aware that the material comforts of our patients do little to improve their psychological lives. But do we conclude that affective reality is more important than the material surround? To do so is to grant precedence to *psyche*, to place the material world in something of a secondary, or, more extremely, epiphenomenal position. This position is tempting—if for no other reason than the fact that materialist traditions have dominated the Western scene for hundreds of years—but if we take it we deny the obvious truth that the organization of material substances of various sorts provides the conditions for our environments, our bodies, and our brains. Feeling minds must have bodies, floors, tabletops, a living biosphere. You can't have one .. .
without the .. other(s).

Let us, then, while staying within the Cartesian bifurcation, modify our position. The material universe exists; the subjective universe exists (only for living creatures; for now at least, as there are no sentient machines in the production lines). Let us grant precedence to neither, nor contemplate how one emerges from the other (despite the very interesting possibilities to consider). Instead, let us ask which is more important—that is, which do we pay attention to, care about more? This is an arbitrary question, and its answer depends on the lens of analysis. In the past, psychoanalysts were inclined to agree that good mental organization has more going for it than good material organization—assuming that material reality is provided for to a certain degree, that there is an average expectable environment, a base provision of the usual things. Under normal circumstances, therefore, mind is more important. If, however, a usual brain suffers an unusual event (such as an infarct), or a usual liver suffers a cancer, or a usual home suffers a devastating fire, then a psychological emphasis fades and material concerns are more apparent.

And so this is the way it has been viewed: The figure of psyche could emerge into bold relief from the ground of its context, provided there were no eruptions from other factors in the offing. And this practical separation of mind from brain, internal psychology from the external surround, has yielded
plentiful fruit. This neo-Cartesian device has created a border around intrapsychic space that has allowed for meaningful study, theory-building, and clinical care. We now accept that this separation is a convention—simplistic and inaccurate—for many, many reasons, not least the fact that there is no average brain, nor a static, unchanging one. But the device has been a useful tool.

This neo-Cartesian device has had its equivalent in the temporal dimension: that which is given versus that which emerges. We know that nature (given)-nurture (emergent) bifurcations are naive, though they are sometimes helpful. I will exploit the nature-nurture (or nativism-constructivism) bifurcation in order to amplify certain points, keeping in mind that there are elaborate and compelling attempts to meaningfully dissolve these partitions, whether they be, for example, in terms of developmental psychology and psychoanalysis in general, cognitive development (Piaget, 1937/1954), phylogeny-ontogeny (e.g., Gould, 1997), selectionism-constructivism (Changeux & Danchin, 1973), Changeux, 1985, 1997; Spoms & Tononi, 1994; Purves et al., 1996; Quartz & Sejnowski, 1997), neural network development (van Ooyen, 1994), emergence and neurodynamics (Arbib, et al., 1997; Freeman, 1995, 2000), dynamic perspectives on cognitive and cortical modularization (Karmiloff-Smith, 1992), self organization in the nervous system (Szentagothai, 1993; Szentagothai & Erdi, 1989), and neurodynamics and systems theory (Erdi,
With respect to evolution, one can parse between phylogenetic time and ontogenetic time, and make the observation that mammalian brains have increasingly emphasized the importance of ontogenetic experience. This development is supported by newer brain organization, structure, and capacity. Have brains been evolving to become constructivistic-postmodern wonders? To what extent do they remain tethered to fixed realities and relatively fixed adaptations? In what follows, I look at brains through evolutionary time to see if they can weigh in meaningfully on this conversation. Brains may have been working toward a modern-postmodern synthesis long before humans began to consider such things. Understanding our brains’ solutions may help us in resolving our debates.

**BETTER MODELS**

There are many opinions as to why the postmodern era has emerged with such vigor. Some argue that it is because we are disenchanted with the results that science and technology have brought to our lives; others say that adequate dynamic, context-dependent models and technologies were not available before now; still others attribute the cause to the periodic dismissal of that which is given (universal) in favor of that which is created (emergent) —that is, to an oedipal drama of generations.

While there are a multitude of reasons for the current zest in the
modern-postmodern debate, I am of the belief that the debate, through the ages and in its various forms, partially results from flaws in our explanatory models, whether these be scientific, cultural, or religiously informed. Ecological or context-oriented explanations are needed to understand biological phenomena; our science has only begun to tackle this area, and Western thought has vigorously avoided it. Crude parsings have beset the behavioral sciences since their inception: mind-body/brain, self-other, inside-outside/environment, structure-process, to name just a few. Because we have had limited models and limited technology to support our imaginations, it is understandable that context has not been easily amenable to description. The problem with nonecological models, however, is that separate boundaries lead to separate constructs, categories, and languages, with resultantly separate “pictures” of reality. These bounded categories are then employed in explanatory service—a sequence of causal chains may be offered, whereby, for example, a “drive” prevails upon a “defense.” A clinically relevant postmodern view asks that all bounded categories be deconstructed-reconstructed in the context of the dyad. This dynamism is a welcome breath of air, freeing us from the constraint of our models, but it may cast us into a current of relativism that leads to the open sea, where there are no markers. In the biological universe, and in the world of neural networks and robots, the challenge has been to create models that provide anchors (the givens) and yet allow for complex, emergent, and novel phenomena (the emergents).
In Lawrence Friedman’s (1999) fascinating paper “Why Is Reality a Troubling Concept” he framed the modern-postmodern debate in terms of an age-old philosophical argument between nominalism and realism. Friedman argued that there can exist a reality “in here” and one “out there” whose edges and contents are still porous, dynamically changing, and can become only relatively known. This balanced approach appeals to me, and it also finds voice in Cavell’s (1998) position (though she argues it for different reasons).

In my reply to Friedman’s paper (Pincus, 2000), I focused upon the weakness of our explanatory models, how they have helped to create our problems and have fueled much of the debate between nominalism and realism. In a portion of my reply, I stated:

I would add that the nominalist-realist discussion, at least in our field, gathers strength from impoverished models of capturing mind and behavior in the context of their environment. If, on a conceptual level, inside is severed too precipitously from outside, or person from person, models that flush context back into the fold will have their revenge.

For very “primitive” creatures with reflex-like interactions with their environment, and virtually no capacity to transform or be transformed by it, either-or models of inside-outside, biology-environment, etc. are not that limiting. But for creatures capable of learning and sustaining more complex interactions with the environment beyond their bodies, simple parsings fall on hard times. This is especially true for humans, who have the capacity to transform the surround through technological innovation, creation of social realities, and the emergence of cultures. For the profoundly plastic and capable human creature, we should wonder if definitions of “biology” shouldn’t be extended beyond our bodies to the complex organizations and cultures we create. (p. 596)
If we are to meaningfully understand the individual-in-the-world, the relationship between “individual” and “world” must be more fluid, the boundaries more porous, the causality and organizations more emergent.

In my reply to Friedman, I am attempting to soften what I had viewed as his too-harsh critique of the postmodern (nominalist) position, and that I find the current emphasis upon contextualism to be an understandable reaction to overly bounded models of psychic space. However, a radical contextualism that becomes a form of relativism that has its problems as well.

In our field, the constructivist or radical postmodern thinker reactively floods context into the situation, to a degree that obliterates the realities of levels of separation, contrast, and organization. But context can be overstated precisely because explanatory models have parcelled up the psychic field into naive reductionisms, parallelisms, and dualisms. Part of the overcontextualization by postmodern thinkers is in reaction to a too simplistic cleavage between the psyches of patient and analyst in the clinical situation. Endless contextualization is a process of never quite separating anything off, always enfolding causes, reasons, and things into one another.

It is my belief that once the mind-brain sciences develop a language that adequately captures dynamic interaction, embeddedness, and context, explanatory hierarchies will settle out that allow relatively noncontextual factors a robust existence, side by side with the hopelessly drenched contextual ones. (p. 597)

The difficulty, of course, is to develop those models and language. The newer sciences of complexity, self-organizing systems, and general systems theory appear to be compelling efforts to respond to this very challenge.
A BRIEF FRAMING OF THE DEBATE

What is reality within the clinical situation? What is reality outside of it? Is reality defined by that which is given . . . by the material contours of the objects and participants . . . by what is felt or intended . . . or by what happens? Of course, the answer depends upon the lens of analysis and whether one is concerned with material reality, psychological reality, or the relationship of the two. In clinical psychoanalysis, the concept of context and the notions of emergent phenomena and field theories have stolen the show in recent years, leaving the “givens” a minimal role. To the extent that the “givens” assert their claim to the construction of reality, under the current lighting their assertion appears clutchy—desperate and overstated. But the enthusiasm of the “emergents” has brought a potentially relativist euphoria; with anchors tossed to the wind, postmodern ships drift off into the universe, having not even gravity, friction, or an atmosphere to provide resistance.

There is something wrong with this picture. Living systems depend upon regularity, redundancy, even repetition, therefore these features must not be cast to the wind. All biological creatures find some balance between stasis and emergence, and therefore the study of them may be able to help us with the above debate. In particular, the human brain seems to do a remarkable job in balancing the “givens” with the “emergents.” Let us look to see how our postmodern value creating brain still finds itself tethered to
certain parameters, certain givens.

The Limits of Constructivism

It is as if the Milky Way enters upon some cosmic dance. Swiftly the brain becomes an enchanted loom, where millions of flashing shuttles weave a dissolving pattern, always a meaningful pattern though never an abiding one, a shifting harmony of subpatterns ...

—Sir Charles Sherrington (1940, p. 147)

To address how brains develop and change over time, models of neuronal selection, constructivism or some combination of the two are prominent in the literature. While the emphasis may vary, we may conclude that there are few credible hypotheses in neuroscience today that do not subscribe to some form of constructivism. Each moment in time changes the orientation and perspective of all others. The brain is viewed as a transforming and modifying entity, and the brain is simultaneously modified by experience. The human brain, more than any other, is profoundly unfinished at birth, with experience-dependent sculpting that defines future categories, perceptions, and shapings of the self. It is the plasticity of all brain tissue, but especially the organization of the human brain, that allows it to adapt to and form itself to ontogenetic experience, rather than being relatively dominated by phylogenetic history (see section on modernism and modularism in evolutionary psychology, pp. 52-59, below). The principle of
experience-dependent shapings of concepts and constructs through the organization and modification of neural tissue would greatly appeal to the postmodern mind.

As a psychoanalytic clinician, I believe that our perceptions of the world around us are not simply copies of the data of external reality but must, in a profound way, incorporate and reflect our personal experience. The experience of our lives is woven through us (much like Sherrington’s enchanted loom), altering the eyes through which we see the world. This personal perspective, in my mind, can never be removed from the theories we construct, the data we find to be most significant. One could rely upon the physicists to “harden” this position, one in which the impossibility of pure "objectivity" has been acknowledged and deference given to notions of indeterminacy, relativity, and quantum mechanics. But I base this conclusion on personal experience and clinical reality. What is important to us, and what we believe, sifts itself imperceptibly into what we see, what we experience.

Our construction of the world around us, while unique and meaningful to each of us, must bear some relationship to the shape and organization of things “out there,” otherwise we would not be particularly well adjusted to our environment. Some would say that the way to solve this problem is to parse "meaning" from “objective reality” and say that our neuronal equipment makes relatively accurate copies of the physical world and we
each then add our individual hues of meaning to that copied world. This has been the mantra of representationalist and computationalist modelers of mind-brain. From where I view things, there are serious difficulties with this proposition. Space only allows me to mention them briefly. First, proposing that the brain copies the physical world and our “mind” interprets that world propagates a dualistic severing of mind from brain. Second, there is no evidence that these “copies” exist, and, as we know, the world around is infinite (Freeman, 1995, 2000; Nagel, 1974) and is sampled from by the species and individual in question according to rules of relevance for that individual. The digestion of and assimilation to the world undergoes profound transformational and selective processes. Perception is a meaningful and active construction, reflecting the biases of our neuronal equipment and the biases of our particular individual experience. If the bias of the neuronal equipment can be thought of as reflecting the “memory” of species-wide adaptational victories, then no neuronal or psychological perception can be viewed as free from memory. Brown (1996) concurs, as he poetically captures the notion that perception apprehends objects through the past, when he states “the past reappears in the body of the present and dies in the final shape the present takes on. Every past moment is transformed as it propels an object into the present” (p. 43). We do not merely distort the pure, copied neural input according to our psychological needs and preferences. The neural image itself is constructed. Individual history and evolutionary
history bring their memories to bear on the perceptual processing—up and
down—all along the way.

The postmodern theorist would heartily endorse this picture of things,
as the picture would affirm, at the level of brain tissue, an experience-
dependent orienting process, from which all perceptions are sifted through.
Whatever givens, whatever universals are biased into our brains and nervous
systems, these givens are taken up by the organizational processes of the
constructing mind-brain and swept along into individual and culturally
meaningful categories of experience. But before the postmodern can claim
victory, let us hear from the modernist on these matters. The modernist might
reply “well, of course, the brain is a constructing device par excellence . . . but
universals can still be determined and are the basis for all subsequent
organization The universals set the parameters; experience allows definition
within those parameters

The debate between the modern and postmodern, in terms of the issue
of constructivism, would take shape around matters of emphasis: just how
much do the “universals” dominate subsequent organization? Or, more
radically, does plasticity, especially human plasticity, virtually obliterate the
usefulness of the notion of “universals”?

Let us take an example that calls into question the obliteration of
universals, an example I first observed in John Dowling’s *Creating Mind* (1998). Certain types of experience are preferred by all people, and cannot be unlearned. Facial recognition is one of them. We all possess the neurological equipment to accomplish this task more or less well, but for some curious reason the face we are looking at must be properly oriented. Our equipment is biased to do the job with faces right-side up, but does a lousy job with faces in any other orientation, even with people we know very well. Furthermore, we will miss important cues from the upside-down face—cues that are profoundly meaningful beyond recognition of the face itself. Looking at an upside-down face, we may miss not only who the person is, but what their facial expression is telling us about their intent, how they feel, etc. Facial recognition is a right-side-up capacity, perhaps because in an evolutionary and experiential sense that is the way most faces are viewed in the real world. Below are two photographs of an inverted face. The one on the left has been altered slightly, though you will not be able to discern the significance of this alteration. This is because your neural equipment, your phylogenetic bias if you will, is geared to make significant distinctions of right-side up faces, not the reverse. But turn the image 180 degrees. The left picture with the minor modifications (his eyes and mouth have been cut out and inverted with respect to the rest of his face) produces an astonishing effect in the “normal” orientation that is entirely missed in the inverted orientation.
No matter how many times you train yourself to “see” the menacing features as you look at him in the upside-down mode, you will always be surprised when his head turns 180 degrees to the right-side-up viewpoint. I have tried to untrain myself to this bias, thinking that I might be able to overcome my predilection for interpreting faces in the right-side-up mode, but I cannot do it. Nor can you. We all do it the same way, see it the same way, and this is a universal. No matter how much wisdom can be found in the postmodern emphasis upon dynamic construction, anchors exist nonetheless. And we need those anchors.

**Dendritic Morphogenesis**

The ancient Greek philosopher Heraclitus said: “As they step into the same rivers, other and still other waters flow upon them” (quoted in Kahn, 1979, p. 53). Thomas Wolfe wrote a novel called *You Can't Go Home Again*. It
has been known for some time that the brain is sculpted by experience, is never the same thing twice. This idea has been offered by many but can be described by Hebb's (1949) Rule, which emphasized that neurons that fire together wire together. The mechanisms of that sculpting have been identified by a variety of methods, but relatively little had been known about the role of synaptic activity in the development of dendritic morphology until Maletic-Savatic et al. (1999) observed structural changes in living dendrites as a result of synaptic activity. While it is true that this demonstration occurred in the nervous tissue of the lowly worm, its significance cannot be underestimated. We can “see” brain structure being altered by a learning event. Things are never the same. These changes were quite specific and astonishing—in some cases the structural changes “morphed” within three minutes of the onset of the stimulation. This is such a dramatic example of plasticity and the Hebbian Rule that it justifies going into a bit more detail. We now have direct observation of dendritic structural change in living brain tissue as a function of experience.

The researchers cultured living tissue from the hippocampus of rat brains and injected it with a virus that emits a green fluorescent protein. They then looked at the tissue through a two-photon laser-scanning microscope and were able to easily see all aspects of the associated axons and dendrites. They then placed a stimulating electrode very close (within about 10 microns) to the dendrite under observation. There were numerous new
growths and protrusions within 20 minutes of stimulation. Most significant were new structures (43%) and extensions of existing structures (57%) that the authors described as filopodia, which are hairlike protrusions. Below is my rendering of the stimulating electrode close to the dendrite and an actual picture of the dendrite 8 minutes before stimulation and 25 minutes after. The filopodia are thought to develop into mature dendritic spines, which are capable of forming new synapses.

If these structures generate synapses, they will have greater likelihood of connecting with presynaptic axons that were active during the synaptic stimulus, providing a mechanism for synaptic plasticity satisfying Hebbian rules. Such a mechanism could play a role in the establishment of functional neural circuits during development and memory storage, (p. 1926)

This dramatic evidence helps to delineate the proposition that experience (stimulation) leads to structural and organizational changes within the dendritic arbors. It helps us to see that the reality of the physical
structure of the brain can be modified within minutes. Extrapolating to humans, if we consider what we refer to as consciousness, emotion, and a self as being global state variables (that is, states that emerge in the context of massively interacting structures and dynamics), then each morphological change within the brain has the potential to alter the global states slightly, even if the tilt is infinitesimal. It is as if the enchanted loom is weaving a tapestry that is ever evolving, and each new thread has the remarkable ability to reconfigure the relationships of all threads before it. But before we conclude that the brain is making a case for an endless constructivism or relativism, we must remember that there surely are constraints on this process. A simple example is the registration of sensation. Humans may never respond to a particular odorant because it is "off the charts" of what our neural equipment deigns worthy. No amount of training can put it in the range of registration, and yet for another species the odorant is remarkably salient—readily recognized. There are some systems that are relatively impervious to experience, and these "universals" are relatively unresponsive to nudging. There are the boundaries that the skull imposes, and much is constrained by the genetic parameters of each person. These are just a few of the limitations imposed upon the evolving brain, but the capacity for new organization and dynamic interaction, which is reconfigured with each experience, is still immense.
The current scientific status of human dreaming provides us with a good opportunity to view the modern and postmodern perspectives at work. What is the reality of dreaming? Are dreams bottom-up neurological noise, arising from pontine volleys in the lower reaches of the brainstem, which we psychological creatures and especially psychotherapists like to organize and give meaning to? The thrust of brain science has been to show us that these volleys are responsible for REM sleep and that dreams occur within REM. If this picture is accurate, then the reality of a dream is two things: lower level nonmeaningful neuronal volleys and upper level narrative construction—the latter being something we do before waking or as we wake. Following this line of thought, conscious dream-remembering is completely constructing or “membering” a dismembered event. Depending on one’s viewpoint then, the dream could be viewed as chatter or gossip (if one views the dismembered event as what is “real”, the dream story is epiphenomenal garbage) or, more respectfully, a weaving together of a plot line that is emotionally and psychologically salient to the dreamer. In the latter instance, the dreamer’s creation of a narrative might be viewed as anything from postmodern con-artistry to a sculpting.

We know that dreams are important. Whether their meaning is a sort of postmodern, constructed add-on or whether they are made according to meaningful design should not matter to psychotherapists, some would argue. Dreams are clinical facts and we interpret them as such. But the viewpoint
one has about the origins of dreams has an influence in the interpretive stance. If the recounting of a dream in a clinical hour is seen as profoundly shaped by the contours of the dynamic between the patient and analyst, then, whatever its sources, it takes up residence in the context of the transference-countertransference matrix and its enfolding-unfolding there will be highlighted in the interpretive approach. If a dream is viewed as having been pieced together from forbidden wishes (a process presumably occurring in the neocortex), then those disguised wishes will be looked for in the interpretation. If a dream is viewed as having been put together as a sort of tapestry of one’s important emotional themes (via stimulation, presumably at the limbic level), then the interpretation of the dream will focus more on the surface of its content. And if a dream is viewed as a result of brain stem discharges and the theme is merely a composing and giving harmony to the neural cacophony of fingers randomly pounding a piano keyboard (which was the position offered by Wilhelm Wundt, the father of experimental psychology), then there is little at all to be said about the dream, except, perhaps, that it is a remarkable piece of music. Given the lack of definitive knowledge in the area and the great varieties of clinical presentation, most clinicians are probably pragmatists when it comes to dreams: some dreams seem to tell a surface level story of emotional significance, some reveal hidden wishes, and others we cannot make heads or tails of. However, despite the evolving knowledge base in dream research, it is unlikely that we would
assign each dream type to a particular place on the neuroaxis, for this would amount to a form of dream phrenology. We are more likely to retain an attitude of curiosity and flexibility, inclined to say that those dreams which we cannot understand we are not listening to properly, we have too few associations, or that the material is too deeply defended/layered.

Some reductionist or essentialist traditions in neuroscience would make all psychological experience of secondary importance, with dreaming no exception. The “real stuff” of brains and minds, it is thought, can be reduced to physical organization and chemical interactions. A more reasonable way of approaching the situation is to think about how the content and interaction of neural tissue leads to getting over the hump of the “hard problem” in neuroscience (Chalmers, 1995), that is, of how brains become minds. From this position, it is assumed that brains are necessary for minds but that there is something emergent from the remarkable interactive processes that cannot be reduced to the components themselves.

Neuroscience has been telling us that the reality of dreams are in the bottom reaches of the brain stem, where censors, selves, objects, and meanings do not readily reside. This argument has its origins in Moruzzi & Magoun’s appreciation of the reticular activating system in 1949, the discovery of REM sleep by Aserinsky & Kleitman in 1953, and Dement & Kleitman’s correlation of REM with dreaming in 1957. These three
discoveries provided the basis for belief in an activating system from down below, that this activation occurs during the REM phase of sleep, and that dreams occur during REM. McCarley & Hobson proposed their reciprocal interaction model in 1975, and Alan Hobson’s work over the past 25 years has regularly attacked psychoanalytic idea that dreams are meaningfully constructed. Recently, Hobson has allowed that dreams can become meaningful, or that they are fashioned by some limbic level emotionally salient categories, but there can be no censor orchestrating all of this.

The hard truth, we have heard from neuroscience, is that dreams, at the level of psychological function and experience, are only epiphenomenal or secondary to more basic purposes and processes. Given that dreams correlate primarily with REM sleep, and given that REM is a volley of neurons firing from way down in the brainstem, then dreams, it is said, cannot be driven by complex psychological motivations. These complex motivations and processes are thought by many to reside much “higher up” and forward in the cortical regions. The nonpsychological purposes of REM (and, by implication, REM dreaming) are thought to be memory consolidation (the pruning of an overlapping distributive store), a fresh acetylcholine bath (something like hard drive maintenance and garbage disposal), and synthesis (norepinephrine and serotonin utilization are virtually shut down during REM, allowing for their replenishment).
The hard line, bottom-up camp gives very short shrift to the contributions of “higher” (and more forward) functions and structures. These thinkers and scientists are more drawn to an essentialist or fundamentalist spirit, and some have been stridently critical of top-down levels of explanation, especially the Freudian variety (see Hobson 1994, 1999). Recent evidence has begun to challenge the dominance of the bottom-up paradigm. First, a full 20% of dreams occur outside of REM and therefore without the benefit of the pontine bottom-up volley, though the experience of the dream is indistinguishable from that of REM dreams. Second, neuroimagers such as Braun (1997, 1999), Maquet (1996, 1997), and Nofzinger (1997) have found selective activation of paralimbic and neocortical areas during REM. Note Braun’s (1999) comments in a recent issue of the journal Neuro-Psychoanalysis:

Limbic activation in the absence of the rational prefrontal activity simply represents an unusual circumstance in which memory, emotion, and appetite may be expressed in the absence of the rational context provided by the prefrontal cortex. Limbic processes are unbridled, without being examined, categorized, rationalized, ordered. Rather than disinhibition, this could represent, in psychoanalytic jargon the suspension of the “reality principle” in favor of the “pleasure principle”— “regression” if you will. (p. 99)

Third, psychoanalyst Mark Solms (1997) has found that some patients with pontine lesions, who as a result no longer have REM, are still capable of dreaming. He also observed that others who had forebrain lesions were still
having REM sleep but no longer reported having any dreams. And fourth, many patients who have had lobotomies have also lost their capacity to dream along with some tissue in their frontal lobes, again suggesting a role for “higher up” areas in dream organization. This latter finding is particularly interesting, in that a lobotomy’s efficacy is thought to reside in a diminution of spirit or wishfulness. Why do dreams go away, post-lobotomy, along with a certain intensity of wanting? Perhaps there is something to Freud’s dream theory after all. Together, these observations suggest that (a) dreaming is not synonymous with REM, although 80% of dreams are correlated with those pontine volleys; (b) scanning data supports the role of limbic activation and selected cortical regions in dreaming; and (c) certain forebrain areas may be crucial for dreaming to occur, and those areas may have something to do with regulating or expressing complex and/or intense “wishes” through the dream process.

Having briefly reviewed the complexity of the neuroscience debate on dreaming, we are left with the conclusion that the content of dreams is not merely epiphenomenal noise from the brainstem, and that limbic and neocortical levels of activation may have a great deal of influence in shaping the content of dreams. But does upper level activation during dreaming mean that a wish fulfillment censor is weaving the plot line? Or is a dream’s plot determined by the limbic level emotional circuits that are stimulated, with these basic emotional experiences then elaborated into eloquent narrative?
Or is a dream merely a mental event that truly begins with awakening, whereby brain stimulation of whatever variety is placed in differing baskets and constructed afresh as the preconscious and conscious mind awaken to meet the sunrise? In my opinion, the jury remains out on these matters, but each type of question asks different things of the modern and postmodern debate.

Let us view this matter from three different vantage points.

(1) At the level of brain functioning, the issue of that which is “given” versus that which “emerges” can be parsed as following: Even if limbic and neocortical circuits are active in dreaming, the issue is a matter of dominance—that is, what is the overwhelming “given” in dream formation. Hobson’s (1999) recent position is clear: Even if motivation and emotion centers are activated in dreaming, the forebrain is still “in the neuromodulatory thrall of the brainstem” (p. 218). A problem with this position is that it doesn't account for dreams that exist without brainstem activation. Ignoring this difficulty, Hobson clearly places brainstem activation in a dominant role, with limbic level activation secondary. Somewhere along the way a meaningful structure of a dream is created by the dreamer, but the plot line merely articulates the emotion centers activated. There is, then, no hidden meaning to dreams. Instead, there is an ability, through the dream, to articulate emotions in more affectively raw categories that are not so under the dominance of logical and
secondary process mentation. Meaning is on the surface of the dream, constructed into a narrative story that contains the affective themes, and when a dream is told to a therapist the narrative is again under influence of reconstruction according to the dynamics of the therapeutic relationship. The task of clinician and patient is to clarify the affective categories that are on the surface of the dream, for those are fixed and real (even though they are secondary to brainstem activation). Apart from the affective fixity of the dream’s constituents, the postmodern perspective would hold sway here.

(2) Solms and others would emphasize the more top-down constituents of dreams, highlighting cortical and limbic activation. This picture would preserve certain elements of Freudian dream theory, for it allows the plot weaver to have complicated psychological-cognitive capacities. The dreamer does not merely create any narrative to organize pontine/limbic data, that narrative is motivated to express salient emotional themes and hidden wishes, often in a quite disguised manner. This picture takes neurophysiological data to support a complex psychological process, and it attributes motivation to that psychological process. And as we turn to the psychological dimension, in our consideration of the modern and postmodern world views, are there, then, fixed meanings and fixed hidden wishes that are to be discerned from the dream narrative? If so, then constructivism takes a back seat to finding the “truth,” and the meaning must be found. This method of dream interpretation would take into consideration the constructivistic
aspects of the transference-countertransference matrix, and while the
dream’s meaning could not be found without this contextual consideration
(though some Jungian and other schools say that it can), it can be ultimately
“found.” And even if the dream is multiply determined, with multiple
interpretations over time, the idea remains that a meaning can be found,
because dreams are built according to certain principles. Modernism survives
in this model.

(3) The third vantage point is to emphasize the postmodern perspective
of the dream and its interpretation. This picture would be as follows:
regardless of what areas of the brain are involved or necessary for a dream to
be produced, the narrative must be fashioned into a relatively coherent form
so that the dreamer can “receive” it (though not necessarily make sense of it).
A dreamer is a mind, and minds experience through a narrative space (which
must include space-time sequencing) via the vehicles of subjects, objects,
feelings and relationships. The ongoing creation of narrative space is what
minds do throughout life, and that space is continually altered and
transformed through each moment in time and in the context of each
experience. Therefore, and this is a big therefore, while a dream may be
composed according to certain rules which express certain motivations, the
dream is a forever evolving act of mentation which is reconstructed and
reconfigured with each remembering, and with each telling, whether to
oneself or to one’s analyst. The “givens” are swept up into the current context.
Each of the above three interpretations of the neurobiological data remains tenable and can be appropriated by those wishing to emphasize modern or postmodern sentiments. But the crucial issue remains: how to juxtapose and yet articulate that which is “given,” that which is “emergent,” that which is a “universal,” that which is “constructed.” The intercalation of neuroscientific and psychoanalytic pictures of dreaming provides us with another vehicle for considering the modern-postmodern debate.

**Modularism and Modernism in Evolutionary Psychology**

On a daily basis we are inundated with “newly discovered” evolutionary explanations for our behaviors. As a generic example for this sort of reasoning: We do this thing or have that desire because it had an x, y, or z adaptive value a very long time ago. What is “real” is not the meaning we assign to our behavior but, rather, its reason for surviving throughout evolutionary history. Truth can be found, and it is in the phylogenetic past. On first impression, we might be intrigued or shocked by yet another “hidden” meaning to our desires and behavior, an effect not unlike that of the psychoanalytic positing of unconscious meanings for our conscious thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. This can be a sexy and compelling assertion, and its unsettling effect can initially pass for a sense that “it must be true.” However, I will attempt to show that this straight arrow from time-present to time-past is drawn by an argument fraught with assumptions that are often incorrect.
The postmodern in all of us will hail my argument as support for a relativist or context-dependent position and analogize the issue to the matter of veridical truth in the psychoanalytic situation. And there is something to be said for such a conclusion, but let us not get ahead of ourselves.

Because of space limitations, I focus on only three of the most glaring false assumptions:

*Flaw 1: Everything that survives has been selected.*

When a current feeling or behavior finds its raison d’etre in x, y, or z past adaptation, an unbroken arrow of time and causality are assumed that reaches from present to past. A great deal of evidence must be amassed to arrive at such a conclusion, and we know that if we are to assert such a claim to our patients at all it must be given tentatively and not without significant, multiple lines of support. We know that all behavior is multiply determined and context-dependent, and so we are at the very least cautious. Many thinkers in sociobiology and evolutionary psychology, by contrast, often do the equivalent of “wild analysis,” as if they have a magic viewing portal that allows them to transpose the meaning of current behavior in terms of ancient history. Current behavior is understood to have been selected untold generations ago because it had adaptive value. It is a strange sense of enlightenment that supports the notion that the current truth can only be
seen in the absolute shadows of the past.

In this model, it is assumed that (a) the behaviors which survive today have been selected for many years ago and (b) selection is the sole and fundamental operative in evolution. There are many ways to challenge this model, but let me focus on a group of ideas that were first coherently captured by Stephen Jay Gould and Richard Lewontin (1979) in their groundbreaking paper “The Spandrels of San Marco and the Panglossian Paradigm: A Critique of the Adaptionist Programme.” In that paper, Gould and Lewontin sought to challenge the dominant motif in evolutionary biology, which I would describe as an extremist or neo-Darwinian motif. The extreme selectionist model holds that natural selection is the only causal agent in behavior that emerges and survives: All things that we do now have been selected for with some adaptive benefit. This is a position that goes, in its singularity, far beyond anything that Darwin stated or intended. Darwin (1872/1965) himself suggested that there were many factors beyond adaptation and selection in the survivability of form and behavior, and even proposed a version of Lamarckian causality.

Instead of the singular causal explanatory model that lands solely in selection’s hands, Gould and Lewontin proposed the idea that many traits, behaviors, and designs survive which are not adaptations, at least not in the biological sense. The color of bones or the sounds of hearts, for example,
provide no selective benefit but are tag-alongs that come with evolving organs and structures that work in a particular manner. Gould and Lewontin provide a term for the tag-alongs, calling them spandrels. A spandrel is an architectural term for a triangular space that is created when two arches are joined together. In the building of certain types of building with adjoining arches, spandrels emerge, so to speak, as a result of design. In churches they are often ornately decorated, otherwise there is the appearance of a barren space. The decoration is useful and aesthetically pleasing, indeed, these spaces become quite functional. But a spandrel in the biological sense is a feature that results from, emerges, or tags along with other features that truly have survived because of their adaptive benefit.

Spandrels may not remain spandrels, because, as we say, things change. This is a feature of living and many nonliving complex systems, and in the pursuit of a unifying principle or one clear explanation, some models restrict and hone, shoehoming a complex process into a restrictive explanation. Gould and Lewontin appreciate this complexity and even allow spandrels to become other things, because their context can change. In an upcoming review in *Psychoanalytic Psychology* (Pincus, 2002) I state:

A spandrel can become selected for because of a change in the environment or because it acquires some new survival value (for which it was not selected originally). And so a spandrel can become an *exaptation*—which, by the way, is not an architectural term. A nonadaptation can become an adaptation, or an adaptation can be coopted to serve another
adapted purpose, and both of these would qualify as exaptations—the “ex” referring to the fact that at a later time something has selected value that has been acquired, so to speak, because of changes in circumstances. Let me give you an example which is a favorite of Owen Flanagan’s. Wing buds on insects and feathers on birds are thought to have originally been selected for as a means of thermoregulation. These buds did not help at all for flight, but it turned out that creatures who had these little thermoregulatory devices could jump around a bit better than others, because the buds gave them a little more lift under their bodies when hopping. As a result, budded creatures evaded prey a bit better. Buds were an adaptation with respect to the function of thermoregulation, but spandrels with respect to jumping. Longer buds became even better, leading to nearly Wright-Brothers-like capabilities. Flying (and wings) becomes, then, a biological adaptation, but is an exaptation with respect to the original adaptation of wing buds or feathers for thermoregulation. The beauty of Gould and Lewontin’s position is that it removes evolutionary theory from the clutches of panadaptationism, or selectionist reductionism. The idea is that the process of evolution unfolds, stumbling along, environments change, that which is important shifts about. This type of thinking opens the door to a type of cultural dynamism within evolutionary biology without needing to be Lamarckian. (Pincus, 2002, p. 421)

And it leads to an evolutionary theory full of multiple causes and possibilities, a postmodern evolutionary theory of sorts. Evolutionary psychology, or at least some versions of it, often takes the ardent modernist and converts him or her into a fundamentalist.

There is one more compelling point to be made in this area, and it has implications for our modern-postmodern discussion. If selection—and therefore its result, adaptation—was the only driving force in evolution, we would expect incredible divergence for creatures which have evolved
independently, as they would have had different experiences in very different environments. Each environment would create its own selection pressures, and its creatures would evolve their own particular adaptations. But this is not how it has gone on our earth—there is a remarkable conservation of solutions across different environments. This conservative element counterbalances any premature euphoria in postmodernists who celebrate multiplicity of causes, continual change, and endless contextualization. Gould states:

In the most stunning evolutionary discoveries of our decade, developmental biologists have documented an astonishing “conservation” or close similarity, of basic pathways of development among phyla that have been evolving independently for at least 500 million years, and that seem so different in basic anatomy (insects and vertebrates, for example). The famous homeotic genes of fruit flies—responsible for odd mutations that disturb the order of parts along the main body axis, placing legs, for example, where antennae or mouth parts should be—are also present (and repeated four times on four separate chromosomes) in vertebrates, where they function in effectively the same way. The major developmental pathway for eyes is conserved and mediated by the same gene in squids, flies, and vertebrates, though the end products differ substantially (our single-lens eye vs. the multiple facets of insects). The same genes regulate the formation of top and bottom surfaces of vertebrates, though with inverted order—as our back, with the spinal cord running above the gut, is anatomically equivalent to an insect’s belly, where the main nerve cords run along the bottom surface, with the gut above. One could argue, I suppose, that these instances of conservation only record adaptation, unchanged through all of life’s vicissitudes because their optimality can’t be improved. But most biologists feel that such stability acts primarily as a constraint upon the range and potentiality of adaptation, for if organisms of such different function and ecology must build bodies along the same basic pathways, then limitation of possibilities rather than adaptive honing
(my emphasis) to perfection becomes a dominant theme in evolution.
(Gould, 1997, p. 35)

Conservation, the establishment of reasonable universals, and qualities of constraint are all aspects of the evolutionary process that must counterbalance the emergent half of the dialectic. Repetition, predictability, and reliability are especially important principles to engineer into brains that also tend to maximize limitless possibilities. We want to set sail, but we want to be able to find land, later. Humans may have the biggest sails, but all the more need for proper anchoring. And this anchoring may be more appropriately found in the astonishing conservation and homology in the subcortical structures of all mammals.

Flaw 2: Where have all the modules gone? Newer brains don’t always work that way.

Amongst the worst offenders are the psychologists Cosmides & Tooby (2001) who argue that human nature is universal and unchanging inasmuch as our genes are no different from those of our ancestors from the late Pleistocene period (25,000 years ago). As this time frame is too short to allow for genetic change, our genes must reflect the same environmental adaptation to the Pleistocene environment as those of our ancestors . . . genetic determinism is used to support a belief in a universal psyche that completely ignores the plasticity of the brain. (Modell, personal communication)

Even if the evolutionary psychologists have it right from an evolutionary biological viewpoint, there are other ways to question their assertions. In my
mind, these thinkers are too smitten with the modernist viewpoint, which has spawned a number of reductionist explanations for many phenomena in the biological universe that require more complex consideration. In keeping with my point in the earlier section Better Models (pp. 40-42), I think that our models must evolve toward an appropriate balance between the givens and the emergents, one capable of capturing the ideas of context, that is, capturing the capacity for both stability and change. Here, I suggest that evolutionary psychology falls out on the “given” side of the equation when it comes to its implied picture of the brain. In their enthusiasm and (perhaps) naivete, evolutionary psychologists propose modules in areas of the brain where such placement violates most of what we already know.

If a behavior survives the millennia because it has an adaptive purpose and has been selected for, there should be some instantiation at the physical level which both guarantees that behavior’s future and simultaneously promotes its expression. Evolution has decided that all land mammals need kidneys, for example, and genes send the messages early in development so that a kidney that has remarkable specificity and reliability is built within each body. In the case of a kidney, structure, process, and function are pretty much pre-ordained, as it were. But where in the brain is the roll out that guarantees and supports the existence for a given behavior or attitude? Where is that “module”? Where is that place or process in the brain that “injects” itself into all futures for the species? Furthermore, isn’t it true that...
mammalian brains (and especially the human mammalian brain) have been evolving toward maximum adaptability in currently lived and changing environments? If so, aren’t flexibility and plasticity the hallmarks of many newer brain processes, and doesn’t the modular approach go against the grain of all we know about the most complex brains? If modularism has any place in the way we look at brain organization and function, the best candidates are the areas where the most conserved, nuclei-like organizations exist: the subcortical regions. But instead, many thinkers of modularist or modernist persuasion have a corticophilic bias, which, in my mind, is a clear misappropriation of brain space for their ideas. Jaak and Jules Panksepp (2000) have written a beautifully crafted critique of modularism in their paper “The Seven Sins of Evolutionary Psychology,” and I refer interested readers to that paper for a more extensive critique than I offer here. At this point in our understanding of brains, there is no evidence in cortical regions for modules of the type that evolutionary psychology needs to anchor its claims. The groupings that do occur in the neocortex are in the structure of “columns” or “patches,” but there is little to suggest that these functional units exist to express specific behaviors. The 3000-cell patches are very similar throughout our brains and many other species’ brains, and seem more general-purpose groupings that await specialization according to individual experience. Furthermore, the modular approach denies matters of plasticity. 

"Put another way, the relatively homogeneous columnar organization of the
neocortex is not straightforwardly compatible with any highly resolved, genetically governed, modular point of view. Indeed, functional studies suggest a vast plasticity in many of the traditionally accepted cortical functions. For instance, the visual cortex can be destroyed in fetal mice, and visual ability will emerge in adjacent tissues” (see Deacon, 1997, p.116).

I have been making the point, through constructivism, the subtleties of facial recognition, dendritic morphogenesis, dreaming and now evolutionary theory, that our construction of reality is a delicate balance between the “givens” and the “emergents.” I have described this debate in philosophy as being between realism and nominalism, or, in contemporary parlance, between modernism and postmodernism. Furthermore, I have argued that the history of brains through evolutionary time has optimized the building of bridges between both sides of this debate or, better, this dialectical process. Later brains have gone toward being larger and more capable of value-creating, and better responsive to emergent possibility. Emergence, construction, reconstruction and contextual learning have been highlighted in brains over the last 5(H) million years. An appreciation of plasticity helps us to recognize how the neocortex is oriented toward a massive, general, purpose flexible system and that there are few crystal-like modules able to capture light from the phylogenetic past and transmit that light into the day-to-day motivations and behaviors that guide our lives. Again, from Panksepp and Panksepp (2000):
In our estimation, the type of psychological functions that evolutionary psychologists speak of, arise largely from the utilization of very old emotional capacities working in concert with newly evolved inductive abilities supported by the vast general purpose neocortical association areas. Although there are bound to be certain manifestations of emotional and motivational tendencies within these newly evolved regions of the human brain/mind, the massive modularity thesis entertained by evolutionary psychologists remains, except for certain well-accepted sensory-perceptual processes, far fetched and inconsistent with what we presently know about the higher reaches of the human brain/mind. (p. 125)

*Flaw 3: Genes do not proscribe behavior: The mapping of the genetic code is just the beginning.*

The balance between the historical past and the experienced present is an issue that is crucial to how the psychoanalytic situation is viewed, the way that the brain is constructed, and, as I have tried to show, how one thinks about evolution in biological creatures. Modernist or postmodernist enthusiasms tend to polarize and collapse the forest for the trees, positing singular causes for complex processes and attributing capacities to inappropriate places. I would just like to mention a third area of concern: the tendency to envision the genetic code as a bible-like truth table that can illuminate our each and every behavior. We are all familiar with the seductiveness of universal explanations and single, linear causes, whether in the area of illuminating unconscious fantasies, finding solutions to certain heating or water pressure situations in our homes, or in the pleasurable directedness that a particular tasty dish will require of our attention. The last
half century has brought with it the attribution of a sense of veridical truth to “genetic” explanations when it comes to biological reasons for psychological behavior, following 50 years of causal-historical enthusiasm in psychoanalysis. While we might consider this tendency a counterbalance to the remarkable transformations that occur in our society and culture each and every day, I mark the last 50 years because of Crick and Watson's elucidation of the structure of DNA in 1953. The following five decades were punctuated with vigorous idealizations about the “truth” that can be ascertained by the genetic code, and, just as vigorously, renunciations and denials about whether anything at all can be learned. In keeping with the theme of this chapter, either-or and neither-nor causal models will not serve us well.

The explanatory distance from gene to phenotype can be vast, and now that the genetic code has been clarified, the hard work of comprehending the array of emergent and interactive factors, and their influence upon phenotypic expression, can begin. The new field of computational genomics is an attempt to model and predict these emergent/interactive effects, an effort to balance the “givens” of genes with the “emergents” of complex behavior and other forms of phenotypic expression. In our clinical work, at the level of psychological phenomena, we help our patients to understand the historical contexts of their current feelings and actions (and how their current behaviors, while historically organized, are never reducible to those past
meanings). In neuroscience, the parallel issue, as already mentioned, is the "hard" problem of comprehending how the function of mind emerges from the structure of brain. Fixed causes, locations, entities, and meanings are subject to an emerging whirlwind that enfolds, amplifies, and reconstitutes. We are witnessing an explosion in the study of complex adaptive systems and emergent phenomena, whether they are applied to weather patterns, economic systems, the distance from genes to behavior, or the workings of brains. It is in this context that a modernist wishfulness (as expressed through modularism and some evolutionary psychology models) must be better informed.

All evolutionary psychological endeavors should recognize that genes do not directly control mind or behavior but only the proteins and developmental patterns that help construct specific types of brains. Equally important is the recognition that genes and brains can only operate within environmental constraints (Oyama, 1985/2000). These stipulations will help temper radically reductionistic agendas in evolutionary thinking that simply cannot work. They are also a potential saving "grace" for our apparent proclivity to misuse genetic knowledge. (p. 123)

It is not my intent, however, to suggest that genetics provides us with merely a mental tabula rasa, as that would lean too heavily toward a postmodern, nominalist naivete. There are profound parameters that are sculpted into our “human natures,” as well as untold possibilities that arise from complex and fluid interactions.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have turned to a few examples from neuroscience and evolutionary theory to shed a different kind of light on the modern-postmodern issue as it is encountered within psychoanalysis. We are used to approaching the issue from the facets of epistemology and models of mind. We inquire about the nature of what we know and what we can know and the reality of clinical facts. And we inquire about the nature of mind, the relevance of the structural metaphor, the representationalist picture, and the context-dependent constitution of mind. All of these things are regularly debated at psychoanalytic conferences and in journals, but usually without sufficient reference to neuroscience and evolutionary theory. I have tried to import examples from these areas as a means of enhancing our discussions.

I agree with Lawrence Friedman (1999) that “reality is such a troubling concept,” and I think that is very much worth being troubled about, because it is implicit in all aspects of our clinical work and central to our theories about mind. But I do not think that it can be sorted out by creating a new philosophical and theoretical edifice that does not anchor itself adequately enough in neuroscience and evolution. If we are to add something truly new to a philosophical debate that has been raging for centuries (though disguised in different clothings) it will be through reference to biological processes, observed in brains and species over time. The examples presented here
provide a few footholds for that rich and compelling journey.

I have set in opposition two concepts—the “givens” and the “emergents”—as a means of elucidating some aspects of the modern-postmodern debate. In a sense, these categories are nothing more than the pouring of old wine into new bottles: taking the nature-nurture controversy and restating it with different words. Surely the philosophical and psychological discussion cannot be reduced to these categories, nor can it find much good taste if it is only a return to the older, re-poured stuff. But these categories can be useful devices, and a continual reference to them as one sifts through the philosophical, psychological, and biological data can help one organize one’s findings and enrich their context. Perhaps the image of a continuum between “givens” and “emergents” would be a more accurate representation, though the device of emphasizing the end points helps to identify the very important task of finding a means to articulate the in between.

A line representing a continuum, two words representing supposedly separable categories . . . neither representation navigates the very tricky landscape I am trying to describe: the notion of context. Ardent postmodern theorists focus on the everchanging evolving process, their theoretical rivals emphasize the discrete, that which is knowable. Each perspective misses something when it loses sight of the other. A helix or an evolving spiral may
provide us with a better working model. And this is what we are looking for: a better representation, a better model, one that can capture the discrete as well as the evolving, emerging order. As our researchers and theorists scramble for new ways to conceptualize behavior, we hope, at the level of thinking about the quandary of how mind emerges from brain, that they will not arrive at limiting biochemical reductionisms or, conversely, naive holisms. We know better from the richness of our clinical work—my patient recalls, in the midst of a strong reaction to a transference interpretation, a detail, a memory, that has a synthetic, integrating quality that organizes much of what we are dealing with and explains much of what has been haunting her. The memory shapes and defines our psychic landscape, all at once providing greater clarity, discrimination, and a richer path into the past and toward the future. How can our models capture this complexity?

Supervenience, hierarchical organizations, dynamic systems theories, complexity theory, and various forms of chaos are now being put forward to capture this richness. I, for one, will look for evidence from neuroscience, genetics, and evolutionary theory for direction and confirmation, for I have little faith that debates between modernism and postmodernism, for example, will do much to point our way. It is not that the epistemological or philosophical questions are not relevant, since I think that they are crucial and must be explicit in the study of each neuroscientific “fact” that is discovered and each new model that is proposed. Instead, I will look to
findings such as the ones I’ve mentioned and to better models of mind-brain (Walter Freeman's work always comes to mind) that instantiate and elucidate the epistemological and philosophical questions. Tethering our conjectures to those findings, and then seeing how they fit with our clinical data, will provide us with a better opportunity to learn about that vexing problem of reality in all its varied manifestations and meanings. The Skin Horse has told me so.

References


**Notes**

[1] I would like to thank Marian Birch, Doug Watt, and Arthur Valenstein who each, over a 20-year span, have shown me how valuable it could be to use *The Velveteen Rabbit* to make a crucial point. A story, like a stuffed animal, is more real when it is loved.
Current Psychoanalytic Theories of the Self: View and Re-View

W. W. Meissner, SJ, MD

ABSTRACT

Theories of the self and its role in psychoanalysis are in a state of uncertain and ambiguous flux. In an effort to gain greater comprehensiveness and compatibility with analytic needs, I present a synthetic account of the concept of the self-as-person and indicate its relevance to the analytic process. The self-as-person is consistent with or comparable to some recent accounts of the self, but stands in contradistinction to a variety of other extant approaches to the self, including the concept of the self as representation prevailing in the generally accepted structural theory, the concept of the self in self psychology, and that prevailing in intersubjective and relational approaches. These formulations are found wanting on the basis of providing an incomplete account of the functioning and organization of the self or as rendering an insufficient account of the role of the self in the analytic process.

INTRODUCTION
Recent years have seen an upsurge in thinking about the role of self in psychoanalysis. But we have yet to arrive at any consensus regarding either meaning of the self as a theoretical construct or the role of the self in the analytic process (Green, 2000; Tyson, 1989). Rudiments of an understanding of the self had emerged prior to the introduction of self psychology, beginning with Hartmann’s (1950) formulations regarding the distinction of self and ego. My review (Meissner, 1986a) of that literature left me dissatisfied with its ambiguities and limitations.

Subsequently I undertook a theoretical construction of the self concept that I hoped would more adequately encompass data relevant to functioning of the self and measure up to the demands of analytic understanding. This resulted in a series of studies of various aspects of the self as a functional psychic system. My purpose in the present essay is to draw together elements of my understanding of the self into a coherent account, analyze aspects of this understanding distinguishing it from other contemporary views, and suggest some implications for the analytic process.

THE SELF AS PERSON

The self I am proposing is synonymous with the human person—no aspect of the human person is excluded from this conceptualization of the self (Meissner, 2001). It is the human person, therefore, whether as analyst or
analysand, who participates in the analytic process. Specifically, the person embraces both mental acts and capacities, and physical and bodily functions. [3] The human person is thus embodied and bodily functions are integral aspects of the functioning of the self. The body-self, constituting all aspects of the physical body and its functioning, is an integral constituent of the self-as-person (Meissner, 1997, 1998a,b,c). [4] The person in addition has an identity whose expression is heterogeneous and diversified in various contexts of action, reaction and interaction, but withal the person retains a certain consistency and unity that identifies him and allows us to recognize him as this individual person (Erikson, 1959; Mischel & Mischel (1977); Wallerstein & Goldberger, 1998). [5] Building on Erikson’s psychosocial view of identity, Lichtenstein (1977) appealed to an “identity theme” to express the sameness, individuality, consistency and style, that is self-constancy (Meissner, 1986b), inherent in any one personality despite the variations and changes of context and circumstance. Despite variations in expression and context, the person remains consistently one and undivided (Meissner 1993, 1996a, 2001) and not multiple (Bromberg, 1996; Davies, 1996; Mitchell 1993, 1997, 1998). [6]

The self as a functional system can be analyzed in terms of its component aspects. The self is the source of its own agency, however conceived, whether active or passive, voluntary or involuntary, conscious or unconscious. [7] All bodily functions—beating of the heart, respiration, digestion, elimination, muscular movement, etc.—are actions of the self-as-
agent. By implication some of the actions of the self are conscious and some unconscious; unconscious actions are not attributable to any set of independent agencies operating within the self, as are the drives or unconscious structural derivatives as classically conceived, but unconscious actions, including unconscious mentation, motivation and affects, are actions of the self (Meissner, 1993).[8] Actions that reach the level of conscious awareness are also actions of the self, now qualified as subjective—they are actions of the self both as-agent (as acting) and as-subject (as knowing) (Meissner, 1999a,b). When unconscious content or mental activity becomes conscious in the course of analysis, activity of the self-as-agent becomes available to the self-as-subject. The self-as-subject is the self-as-agent acting consciously and is thus the originative source of conscious acts, whether mental or physical.[9] It is synonymously the subjective source of all conscious activity but cannot itself be known objectively, but only subjectively as the active source of action—as such the self-as-subject knows but is not known (Meissner, 1999a,b).

This last point is further illuminated by the contrast between the self-as-subject and the self-as-object (Meissner, 1996a). The self can serve as an object to itself. As embodied, I am an object to the observation of others around me. They can observe my body, my movements, my behavior, and the ways in which I express myself physically—including my speech and other channels of self-expression. But I am also an external object to myself, when I
look in the mirror or more immediately when I look at my body. When I examine the palm of my hand, I am experiencing myself as an object, even if it is only part of my body-self I am attending to. Mentally I can also observe myself introspectively, that is I can make some aspect of my inner mental life an object of attention and scrutiny.\textsuperscript{[10]} This process is mediated by my self-representation(s) or self-image(s), that is forms of my self-knowing. This form of self-knowing or awareness of myself as object is contrasted with my awareness of myself as subject.\textsuperscript{[11]} I am aware of myself simultaneously in the act of knowing as the subjective knower—so that I am at once knowing and known; as subject I am the knower, and as object I am known.

In the course of the analytic process, we facilitate the process by which the subject-knower in the patient comes to know himself objectively more fully and profoundly. By implication, however, the knower himself is never known as an object, but only as the subject of action. To whatever extent action of the self is known objectively, it is no longer subjective since it is known by the subject which itself eludes objectification. In addition, my self-conscious awareness of myself as acting, experiencing, feeling, thinking subject is the primary basis of my sense of myself as unique, continually existing, and the identical individual from moment to moment of my existence.\textsuperscript{[12]} As Modell (1992) put it, “There is a core of the self that remains the same over time; this is not to claim an absolute sameness but a recognizable sameness, an ability to recover one’s identity despite whatever
happens to oneself (p. 1). This subjective experience of my self-sameness, together with the continuity and coherence of memory systems, serves to support my sense that I am the same person at this moment as I was when having breakfast, that I am the same person when I awoke this morning as I was when I went to sleep the night before, etc. The self-as-object, however, known and reflected in a variety of self-representings, is open to a variety of experiential modifications and thematic contextualizations that advocates of the self as multiple usually have in mind. The variance in identity themes does not obliterate the inherent unity of the self-as-agent-and-as-subject.

The unity-multiplicity debate in modern times can be traced back to Locke and Hume, Locke holding to the permanence and continuity of personal identity as against Hume’s view of the self as discontinuous and no more than a disconnected succession of states of consciousness (Alford, 1991; Viney, 1969). The paradox of self as enduring through the flux of conscious change puzzled William James (1890/1950) as well. Smith (1969) distinguished a more or less stable and consistent self-concept from transitory self-percepts developed in the course of transactions with the environment. Or as Mischel (1977) put it,

Since we can say of someone that his personality at work is very different from what it is at home, there is a sense of “self” in which the style in which a social role is performed can be called a “presentation of self”. But there is another and quite different sense of “self” in which we say that someone’s personality shines through, or is expressed in, everything he
does—in the different roles he performs and the way he performs them, as well as in the way he engages in those interpersonal relations that are not social roles, (pp. 25-26)

Horowitz & Zilberg (1983) pointed out that multiplicity is usually described in terms of self-images and self-representations, but they then confused the issue by assigning diversity to the self-as-subject rather than to the self-as-object: “Because subjective experiences may be organized by multiple self concepts, the ‘I’ of one state of mind is not necessarily the same as the ‘T’ of a person’s next state of mind” (p. 285). But “subjective experiences” here are the experiences of the self-as-subject in knowing the self-as-object introspectively, not in experiencing itself as subject. The multiplicity is in the object of the experience and not in the subject.[14]

This composite of self as agent, subject, and object has certain inherent qualities that distinguish it from other views of the self. This self is first of all synonymous with the real human person; I am real, existing, acting, thinking, feeling, etc. This view of the self thereby contradicts views of the self as unreal, illusory, or as some form of fantasy.[15] This self also possesses an inherent unity such that there is only one self in the human person that can be viewed from these various perspectives but remains one in its internal constitution. This self can experience various states of emotional arousal, failures of memory, various states of consciousness, even states of radical dissociation or depersonalization, without foregoing its inherent unity or
losing its identity. It thereby stands in opposition to views of the self as multiple or somehow internally divided or fragmented. Analyses of the self as internally multiple or divided, as far as I can see, have in mind the self-as-object but seem to accept that aspect of the self as the whole of the self, leaving the unifying aspects of the self-as-agent and as-subject aside (Meissner, 1996a).

The further question concerns the relationship between self-as-structural and as supraordinate—supraordinate as a higher level of organization within which component psychic substructures (id, ego, and superego) carry out their appropriate functions. The self can be regarded as supraordinate on the following terms: (1) The self-as-agent is the sole source of agency in the person, the structural entities (ego, superego, id) acting as component subsystems. (2) The self provides a point of focus for formulating complex integrations of processes involving combinations of functions of the respective psychic entities. This would have specific reference to such complex activities as affects, in which all of the psyche systems seem to be represented, complex superego-ego integrations reflected in such formations as value systems, and other complex interactions of psyche systems involving fantasy production, motive-motor integrations, cognitive-affective integrations, etc. (3) As supraordinate the self provides a more specific and less ambiguous frame of reference for articulation of self-object interrelationships and interactions, including complex areas of object-
relations and internalizations. (4) The self-concept provides a locus in the theory for articulating experience of a personal self, whether grasped introspectively and reflexively or experienced as the originating source of personal activity.

Some self theorists follow Kohut in dispensing with economic and dynamic principles as central to analytic understanding, but I would insist on preservation of traditional dynamic perspectives with some modifications. The significant difference introduced by the self-as-person is that there is only one agency in the self, that of the self-as-agent, so that the drives are no longer considered as quasi-autonomous causal entities, but instead take the form of instinctual motivations reflecting libidinal, aggressive and/or narcissistic motivational states.[20] In this view, the person in analysis is the ultimately (if not immediately) responsible agent of all his actions, conscious or unconscious, including wishes, fantasies, dreams, associations, etc.

The self is the relatively integral source of its own action and the more or less autonomous subject of its thinking and feeling experience. Formulation of these aspects of the self’s functioning is best accommodated by a structural theory of the self, that is according to the structural principles familiar to psychoanalytic classical theory (Meissner, 2000f, g). This raises specific questions relevant to the status of the self in relation to the structural entities of the classic tripartite model of the mind. I have argued that ego, id,
and superego are constituents of the self, conceived as component subsystems: thus ego-functions are synonymously functions of the self acting in its ego-modality, superego-functions are synonymously functions of the self acting in its superego-modality, and id-functions are synonymously functions of the self acting in its id-modality (Meissner, 2000e). On these terms, for example, the language of ego-functions familiar to classical analysts expresses synonymously actions of the self, but the agency proper to those actions is not in the ego but in the self. There is only one agent in the self. It is fair to say in this sense that the ego does not exist as such, but is only a theoretical construct for categorizing and expressing certain functions of the self.

But this self is not an isolated, solipsistic entity floating in a vacuum of time and space. From the beginning of its existence, even before emergence of an identifiable subject, it is related to, involved with, and dependent on its environment, both physical and interpersonal. The fetus in the womb interacts with the mother’s body and is in some degree reactive to physical stimuli. The transition of birth exposes the infant to a different external environment with which he must interact: he must be able to breathe, suck, and react to the complex impact of external stimuli. He must learn to adapt to a world of objects around him, the most important of which are human. From the moment of birth, if not before, he is caught up in complex relationships with caretakers, maternal or otherwise. His subsequent development is
elaborated in and through his continuing interactions with these others, for good or ill. In the context of these relationships, he becomes a human person; particularly from an analytic perspective he internalizes qualities derived from these relationships and these internalizations go a long way in shaping the nature and quality of his personality and psychic structure (Meissner, 1981a, 2001). The self, then, is relational in the sense that it is capable of relating to the world around it and especially is involved in complex relations and interactions with other selves constituting its social environment. Object relationships on these terms take place between the self and other persons, not between self and object representations (Meissner, 1979). These relationships are instrumental in shaping the development of the self and of influencing and modifying its structure and functioning in a continuing way throughout the life cycle (Meissner, 2000c). Analysis is uniquely invested in studying and working therapeutically with the complex ways in which analyst and patient relate to and interact with each other as whole persons in the analytic process (Meissner, 1996b, 2000a,b,d, 2003).

DIFFERENTIATING FEATURES OF THE SELF

This view of the self differs significantly from other current approaches to the self. I will limit my considerations to some analytic views of the self and their differences.
**Self as representational.** The substantiality and concrete existence of the self-as-person excludes nothing proper to the human person from its scope. The self is a bodily presence, physical as well as mental, thus opposing views of the self as nonexistent or merely phenomenal or as an illusion without substantive and independent existence.[23] The first of such views is the more or less standard view of the self as defined in terms of phenomenal self-representations. This view, confronting the ambiguities of “ego” and “Ich” in Freud’s usage (McIntosh, 1986; Ticho, 1982),[24] derives from Hartmann (1950) and later Sandler and Rosenblatt (1962) and Jacobson (1964), and has become the standard analytic view of the self in the structural model (Boesky, 1983; Eisnitz, 1981). The self-representation referred to the self as synonymous with the total person particularly in contexts of object-relationship, but created first an ambiguity between connotations of the self as referring to the total person and the role of the self as an ego subfunction, and second a contradiction in attributing agency to a representation.[25] As inherently representational it could not act. The difficulty is that I am not a representation but a person (Meissner, 2001). This has not prevented generations of analysts from trying to attribute structural and action potential to the self-representation in bald-faced contradiction (Meissner, 1993, 1996a). I would insist that it is a person who engages in the analytic process and not a representation.

The tripartite structural model increasingly ran afoul of the need to
explain more complex and higher-order integrative functions, particularly those that could not be adequately attributed to separate entities or their combination (Meissner, 1986a, 2000e). As a result, the self-representation gradually acquired structural characteristics transforming it into a structural entity variously conceived as related to the tripartite entities, whether subordinately or supraordinately (Kemberg, 1976, 1982; Rothstein, 1983, 1991). These approaches inevitably encountered the inherent contradiction of a representational configuration serving structural functions and the persistent fallacy of regarding hypothetical constructs as exercising independent causality.\[26\] But the self-representation is itself an action, a self-representing, of a subject-agent who does the representing (i.e., the self-as-agent or subject). Representations are in effect cognitive actions by which I am able to know myself and the world around me. Actions do not act, they are acts. Representations do not act; they represent. Actions are actions only of the self, specifically as agent. If we were to ask, who does the representing, it cannot be the representing itself, but must be some other agency that performs the action of representing.

Since the function of self-representations is to represent and not to act, what do they represent? They are cognitive acts by which the self represents itself to itself; they are consequentially representings of the self-as-object\[27\] (as knowable) and not of self as either subject or agent, since neither of these can be represented. They are thereby involved in any form of introspection and
form the basis of predication about the self. When I say anything about myself I am speaking of the self-as-object. When the patient, directly or indirectly, conveys some self-understanding or self-feeling, he is addressing his sense of himself as object. Internalization, whether of an introjective or identificatory nature (Meissner, 1971, 1972, 1981a) applies primarily to the self-as-object and only secondarily involves self-as-agent or subject.[28] This structural self is capable of acting on and relating to other selves; the self-representation serves in this context of object-relatedness only to express my perception or understanding of myself as I interact with, relate to, and am responded to by others in my experience. In other words, object relations are an integral aspect of the function and capacity of the self and not of self-representations. It is not my self-representation that relates to another person, but me, my self; I do not relate to the object-representation of the other but to that other himself (Meissner, 1979).

Winnicott’s false vs. true self. Winnicott’s (1960/1965a) distinction between a true self, consisting of a core sense of authentic subjectivity expressing genuine desires and affects, and a false self, based on compliance and imitation for adapting to external demands and impingements, thereby protecting and concealing the true self from manipulation, exploitation or control, is quite familiar.[29] The false self configuration can vary from extreme schizoid isolation to more moderate and relatively adaptive forms of social compliance. If this polarization can be described as a splitting, the
splitting takes place more or less vertically within the self-as-agent and as-subject since any action, whether in virtue of the true or false self, is still action of the self and can involve a degree of subjective awareness (Downey, 1989).

The primary difference between them lies mainly in the self-as-object, insofar as the self as presented externally—and often to a degree as identified internally—functions defensively to protect the inner self or not. The implications of the false self alignment for the relation between the self-as-subject and/or as-object for the functioning of the self-as-relational, and even further as social, deserve further exploration.[30] Clearly there is no contradiction between Winnicott’s usage and the self-as-person. At one point, he wrote, “For me the self, which is not the ego, is the person who is me. who is only me, who has a totality based on the operation of the maturational process. At the same time the self has parts, and in fact is constituted of these parts” (cited in Gaddini, 1986, p. 177, and in Schacht, 1988, p. 516). There is also no difficulty in envisioning the true or authentic self as an idealized goal of the analytic process (Havens, 1986; Meissner, 1983, 2003; Schou. 2000).

Self psychology. The self-as-person, then, also diverges from accounts of the self as merely phenomenological or experiential as in Kohut’s (1971, 1977) account of the self.[31] His notion of the self is somewhat obscure and ambiguous, particularly in relation to more traditional structural entities,
since it is “based entirely on the patient’s subjective experience” (Modell, 1993, p. 13).[32] The patient in a narcissistic transference experiences the analyst as an extension or part of himself, and not as another person in a separate body. Focussing on the phenomenology of the self, Kohut brushed aside other sources of evidence regarding the self (Meissner, 1989,1991).[33] He distinguishes between the self as experience-near and the structural entities as experience-distant, implying that the self-organization is cast at a different level of psychic integration than the structural entities.[34] Emphasis falls on the first-person quality of self-experience as personal and quasi-solipsistic, accenting the uniqueness and innemess of the experience (Sass, 1988). As Alford (1991) observed: “The tendency [in self psychology] is to deny the otherness of the other, to achieve autonomy only by absorbing the other. Transmuting internalization becomes transmuting absorption, and what is supposed to be a statement of maturity is actually the quintessential narcissistic fantasy: the entire world as selfobject—as extension of oneself” (p. 29).[35] Beginning with his stipulation of the roots of psychoanalytic understanding in introspection and empathy (1959, 1971),[36] Kohut (1977) characterized the self as “the basis of our sense of being an independent center of initiative and perception, integrated with our most central ambitions and ideals and with our experience that our body and mind form a unit in space and a continuum in time” (p. 177). But that self is “not knowable in its essence. We cannot, by introspection and empathy, penetrate to the self
per se: only its introspectively and empathically perceived manifestations are open to us” (p. 311). So far so good, but if we settle for this description we could apply it only to the self-as-object, whether of oneself by introspection or of others by empathy. The self-as-agent and as-subject are left behind.

Nonetheless, the self is accounted a source of initiative and action but paradoxically is not granted the capacity for agency. In somewhat paradoxical fashion, Kohut (1971) states:

The self, however, emerges in the psychoanalytic situation and is conceptualized, in the mode of a comparatively low-level, i.e., comparatively experience-near, psychoanalytic abstraction, as a content of the mental apparatus. While it is thus not an agency of the mind, it is a structure within the mind . . . To be more specific, various—and frequently inconsistent—self representations are present not only in the id, the ego, and the superego, but also within a single agency of the mind. There may, for example, exist contradictory conscious and pre-conscious self representations—e.g., of grandiosity and inferiority, side by side, occupying either delimited loci within the realm of the ego or sectorial positions of that realm of the psyche in which id and ego form a continuum. The self then, quite analogous to the representations of objects, is a content of the mental apparatus but is not one of the constituents, i.e., not one of the agencies of the mind. (p. xv)

The relevance of this description to the self-as-object, particularly with respect to the narcissistic introjective configurations (grandiosity and inferiority) (Meissner, 1981a, 1994), to the detriment of any other aspect of the self seems clear. Kohut does not escape the contradictions of the content vs. structure dichotomy—representations cannot act, mental content cannot
serve as a center of initiative. The concept of self in this usage is thus experiential, as is the concept of selfobject, which Kohut describes as experience of objects “not separate and independent from the self” (1971, p. 3) or as part of the self (Galatzer-Levy & Cohler, 1993; Kohut & Wolf, 1978; Wolf, 1979). What is known is only experience, known either introspectively or empathically (Lichtenberg & Wolf, 1997). Others have also emphasized the phenomenology of the self, either making it more or less synonymous with identity as a mental construct with shifting content (Abend, 1974) or a fantasy system (Grossman, 1982), concepts that may find application restrictively to self-representations, but deprive the self of its substantive and substantial reality and its capacity for agency. Modell (1992) criticized these approaches, particularly self-psychology, in their objectifying of the self to the neglect of the unique core subjectivity; thus Kohut he thought focused on the social self, embedded in self-selfobject relations, and disregarded the private and incommunicable subject.

Kohut specifies that the self can be known only introspectively, but as the object of introspection what is known is the self-as-object (Meissner, 1996a). But is it true that we only know the self by introspection? I have argued that I also am aware of myself as a center of initiative and agency (Meissner, 1993) and as subject of my conscious activity (Meissner, 1999a). But the self-as-subject is not known by introspection since it does the introspecting, that is, the self-as-subject cannot be the object of introspection.
since it is the subject. But the self-as-subject is known by concurrent experience in the very performance of its action. I am aware of myself as acting and as the initiating source of action in all of my conscious actions. But also some of my actions are unconscious and as such fall within the purview of the self-as-agent but not as subject (Meissner, 1993). My experience may be cast in varying degrees of activity-passivity, as in certain relatively passive affective states, reflecting the degree to which my action derives from the self-as-agent and is experienced or defensively disowned by the self-as-subject as other. Further, if the self is only experiential, it cannot serve as source of action and causality. The fact of action and causality implies a substantive and structural self, aspects of the self that go beyond mere experience.

Kohut’s (1977) later work distinguishes his psychology of the self in a broad sense from a previous narrow usage. The latter is no more than a content of the mental apparatus, in the form of mental representations within id, ego, and superego (Kohut, 1971; Wallerstein, 1981). The broader perspective “puts the self in the center, examines its genesis and development and its constituents, in health and disease” (Kohut, 1977, p. xv). This broader self forms a “supraordinate unified and coherent constellation, with drives and defenses (the classic ingredients of psychic functioning) subsumed as constituents of this self. This is the view of what is called the bipolar self, with, in its maturation, the crystallization of normally self-assertive ambitions as one pole and attained ideals and values as the other” (Wallerstein, 1981, p.
But Bacal and Newman (1990) take Kohut to task for neglecting the influence of unconscious drives and fantasies (a la Klein) in selfobject experience. Gedo’s subsequent attempt to define the self in terms of a similar hierarchy of motives, goals and values is cast in a framework of developmental modes (Gedo, 1979; Gedo & Goldberg, 1973) that extends the Kohutian scheme but the account of the self remains tied to the bipolar model.[40]

Theoretically, Kohut’s self remains excessively tied to narcissistic concerns; I would argue that, granted the importance of narcissistic investments in the self, the concept of the self is neither limited to the vicissitudes of narcissism nor adequately defined in narcissistic terms (Meissner, 1981b, 1986a).[41] The account in terms of aims and goals is only partial and derivative: partial in that it substitutes a limited subset of self functions for the total self, and derivative in that other developmental, dynamic and structural events are implicit in the patterning of ambitions and ideals. While the hierarchical organization of ambitions and ideals may play an important role in our understanding of self-as-object, it by no means exhausts its intelligibility, even for limited psychoanalytic purposes.

The intersubjective and relational self: The theory of the self-as-person also takes issue with another approach to understanding of the self that seems to be open to considerable misunderstanding. The concept of the self
as intersubjective has undergone a diffusion of meanings, some of which are congruent with an understanding of the self-as-subject, some of which are not.\[42\] These views resonate with postmodern conceptions of knowledge as effected by social construction so that any concept of a unified self or identity is no more than a transient version in constant flux and open to continuous revision.\[43\] The self as an entity existing beyond experience and linguistic symbolization cannot be substantiated, and thus can have no essential or unitary core (Elliott & Spezzano, 1996; Jacques, 1991; Leary, 1994).\[44\] The concept of intersubjectivity among analysts seemingly evolved out of vicissitudes of subjectivity in reference to countertransference, abetted by an intersubjective interpretation of projective identification (Steiner, 1996), that term having expanded its reference from the original engagement of the analyst’s unconscious in the analytic process to the whole range of his personality and analytic activity. Another source seems to have been Kohut’s self-selfobject relationship (Goldberg, 1998; Kemberg, 1999; Lichtenberg & Wolf, 1997; Teicholz, 1999), involving a degree of symbiotic fusion and lack of differentiation between self and object. Such a self is not contained by the integument of the person, but for Kohut the borders between self and nonself were fluid and highly permeable.\[45\] Along similar lines, Ogden (1994, 1996), for example, bases his “analytic third” on intersubjective interactions between analyst’s and analysand’s subjectivities—a dialectic of interpenetrating subjectivities, not I would note an engagement between
separate subjects, but as reflecting a single intersubjective totality. The direct communication between subjectivities specified in the intersubjective perspective is not possible in my world. From the perspective of the self-as-person, “intersubjective” refers to a relation or interaction between at least two persons each of whom is individually a subject. We cannot mean a relation or interaction between their respective subjectivities, pace those who would argue for a “subject relations theory” (Bollas, 1989).

The self-as-subject remains subjective and can never be anything but subjective; that is, the subject as such is never known objectively even by the subject, but is experienced subjectively only by the subject. As such it is a private and incommunicable component of my mental existence. As May (1953) put it, “I can never know exactly how you see yourself and you can never know exactly how I relate to myself. This is the inner sanctum where each man must stand alone” (p. 82). To others around me I can only be known as an object since those others have no access to my subjectivity. They not only cannot know my subjectivity, they cannot even know my consciousness—neither the inner world of my self-experience (self-as-object) nor my objective nonself thought content. They have no access to my objective consciousness except by way of my communication of it. Any sense of myself as subject must be inferred from objective data. In these terms, then, what does it mean to say that I know the other not merely as object, but as subject? Since I have no access to his subjectivity, I must intend an inferential process.
At one level, I am able to observe his behavior—how he speaks, acts, looks, etc.—and conclude that such behavior must reflect the existence of a subjective source. Part of my reasoning may relate to my own subjectivity in that I infer internal mental processes in that other similar to those I experience in my own subjectivity. I presume a commonality of experience to all human beings, and insofar as I can satisfy myself that the other is also human I conclude to a degree of mental similarity. If my behavior reflects my self-conscious subjectivity, then his must too.

The same question arises regarding any “subject relations theory” (Bollas, 1989; Kennedy, 1998) or references to “intersubjective relatedness.” The term “intersubjective” is used widely and loosely in analysis and among some philosophers, most notably social action theorists. For Schutz (1973), for example, the common sense world of everyday experience presumes a context of intersubjective interaction, “the world is from the outset not the private world of the single individual but an intersubjective world common to all of us” (pp. 208-209); thus as a natural attitude, intersubjectivity is assumed as a given (Gavin, 1981). The compounding of these views with a concept of the self as constituted by its relations (Curtis, 1991; Levenson, 1983, 1991; Mitchell, 1988, 1993) tends to undermine subjectivity and self-other differentiation. As Gergen (1991) commented, “We may be entering a new era of self-conception. In this era the self is redefined as no longer an essence in itself, but relational. In the postmodern world, selves may become
the manifestations of relationship, thus placing relationships in the central position occupied by the individual self (pp. 146-147). We even find some analysts, in the wake of Lacan,[50] writing: “Because the unconscious is an intersubjective phenomenon, it necessarily follows that its study has to be considered in the light of intersubjectivity . . . The structures of the unconscious refer to that dialectical relationship between self and other, whereby self is of necessity constituted by the other” (Rendon, 1979, pp. 348-349). In my view, the proper term in this context is “interpersonal” rather than "intersubjective," “object related” rather than “subject related.” The term “intersubjective" is often used to denominate a pattern of interaction or interrelation between two persons—a very different matter than interaction or interrelation between two subjectivities. My self-as-subject does engage in interpersonal dialogue, but the dialogue is with another object who is also a subject; as object he is known by me, including his objectified external verbal and nonverbal expressions, but as subject he is the one who speaks or acts and is known to me only through his objectification. In other words, object relations take place between subjects, but between subjects known to each other as independent objects, not as subjects.[51]

The matter is complicated by attempts to redefine concepts like transference in intersubjective terms—the transference then becomes not the product of the patient’s unconscious mental activity but is co-constructed intersubjectively (Bachant & Adler, 1997). To that extent, transference cannot
be viewed as manifesting aspects of the patient’s self-as-object, but reflects a
expresses this idea in terms of “dedifferentiation in which the boundaries
around the self-experience of the two participants become permeable” (p. 151).
On these terms, the genesis of the transference in the patient’s previous
history becomes secondary if not irrelevant. The present constructive
interaction in which the experience of analyst and analysand of each other are
continually created is privileged over past experience in favor of a constantly
unfolding present (Leary, 1994). In consequence, transference and
countertransference are intermingled and undifferentiated. Discrimination of
one from the other is no longer possible.

The problem to my understanding is a failure to distinguish relational
interaction and communication from intersubjective conflation—if the
patient’s transference is open to relational influences from the analyst, it is
not thereby co-constructed by both but only by the patient. The analyst is
better advised to pay attention to the patient as author of the transference;
his concurrent attention to his own internal processes supplements his
experience of his relation to the patient as reflective of the patient’s effect on
him in the course of interaction. As Jacobs (1997) notes, the effort to focus
excessively on one’s own subjective experience can introduce certain
distortions in data from the patient. If Jacobs speaks a truth in saying that “the
inner experience of the analyst, properly used, opens a pathway to
understanding the ways in which unconscious processes are transmitted to the mind of another person” (p. 1057), the statement cannot be taken without qualification and due respect for what is communicated and how—and an understanding of how the analyst’s experience in relation with his patient is associated with and reflective of the interactional patterns connecting them. [53]

An important component of such observational data are feelings. But again I have no subjective access to the other’s feelings. What I do have is a set of observational data that resonate with my own affective experience—tone of voice, gestures, posture, tears, smiles, facial expressions, etc.—and may in the moment of communication of feelings arouse in me a set of affective resonances that provide another set of data from which I can conclude something about the subjective experience of the other. But if there is no objective, even bodily, expression of any of this, I have no way of knowing anything about it. These implications have even greater relevance in relation to unconscious processes. Not even the subject is aware of his own unconscious mentation or processing. The unconscious is only potentially subjective, and only to the extent that it becomes known as such does it merit being called subjective.

Beyond these considerations, psychoanalysis presumes continuity and preservation of self-identity from developmental past to analytic present,
from session to session, from moment to moment of the analytic interaction. Otherwise notions like transference or any inference of developmental influences in personality organization and functioning are impossible. The patient’s history becomes irrelevant, and any assumptions of transferal of therapeutic effects or cumulative modification of the patient’s self-understanding and/or character structure are brought into question. Mitchell (1997) aptly poses the issue: “If self-organization is contextual, how can what is authentically me be distinguished from you? And how can I determine which of the variable ‘me’s’ that emerge in different interactive contexts is the true or authentic me?” (p. 21). What guarantees do we have that the patient’s “me” of yesterday is the same “me” as of today?

CONCLUSION

I have tried to present a compressed but comprehensive theory of the self that encompasses the total reality of the human person in terms that are congruent with the dimensions of psychoanalytic understanding and praxis. This theory of the self-as-person, as I call it, can be differentiated from alternative analytic perspectives of the self either on grounds that those alternate views define the self in terms of one or other aspect of self functioning or expression, thus truncating the comprehensiveness of the understanding of the human person, or on the grounds that the account of the person does not adequately represent the participation of either analyst or
analysand in the analytic process.

References


Notes

[1] Beginnings of a psychology of the self can also be found earlier in Horney with many resemblances to Kohut (van den Daele, 1981). Variations and vicissitudes of the self-concept in alternate analytic schools were traced by Ticho (1982).

[2] Guntrip (1969, 1973), for one, had bemoaned lack of a personal self in psychoanalysis. The self-as-person reflects a more or less consensus view; as Mischel (1977) put it, “There is one point on which philosophers and psychologists, or at least those who contribute to this volume, can easily agree: the self is not some entity other than the person” (p. 3).

[3] I am not inclined to view mind-body-self integration in dualistic terms, but have yet to come to any closure on this issue which is more specifically philosophical, although it has many ramifications for analytic theory.

[4] This view of the self parts company with anti-essentialist versions of the self, such as, for example,
Schafer's (1983) view of the self as a form of narrative construction—another form of linguistic translation of the self.

Ricoeur (1992) drew a distinction between identity (*ipse*) and sameness (*idem*), the former characterizing selfhood as one-and-the-same and the latter characterizing identity as continuous in time. Identity of the self has sameness (*idem*) as when we say the tender shoot and the tree have the same identity of structure; but the sameness implied in staying true to my promises has a different connotation—no matter how I change I remain faithful to my promises, reflecting a sense of identity (*ipseity*) different from the sense of identity implied in sameness of structure.

Curiously, the Shanes (1998) would like to have it both ways—the self as unified when it seems useful, and as multiple when that serves better. This seems to ignore the reality of the person as one and suggests a Humpty-Dumpty approach to theory, i.e., the self is whatever I wish it to be. A similar uncertainty and ambiguity was expressed by Holland (1998). A curious twist to this problem is the confusion of the concept of a unitary self with a fictive concept of a normative or prescriptive version of the self (Flax, 1993). However, unity of the self residing in the self-as-agent and/or subject does not exclude a degree of diversity and freedom to adapt and change in the self-as-object.

See Alston (1977). A psychoanalytic view of the self differs from phenomenological approaches by including unconscious sources of action and motivation rather than locating the source of causal agency entirely within the phenomenal field of conscious experience. The problem was reflected in Nietzsche’s (1886/1973) comment: "What gives me the right to speak of an ‘T’, and even of an T as cause, and finally of an ‘I’ as cause of thought? . . . A thought comes when ‘it’ wants, not when ‘I’ want” (pp. 28-29). See the reservations and qualifications of the phenomenological approach in Smith (1969).

Fast (1998) proposed a view of the self as action or better acting. For her, “thinking, feeling, and acting are not what our self does, but what our self is” (p. 6). The metaphysics of acting without an actor escapes me. Substitution of “selving” for the self-as-agent does not escape this difficulty. There is a conceptual difficulty lurking behind much analytic thinking about the self which was cryptically tagged by Brenner (2000): many "seem to want to separate what a person thinks and says from the rest of the individual, as though mental functioning were not part of the chemical structural entity called a person” (p. 603). Benjamin (1995) also concedes that even if the self turns out to be multiple, psychoanalysis still needs to conceive or imagine a subject who owns a history and acts.
Some authors, Tahka (1988) for example, restrict the self to “subjective self experience” (p. 107) which does not honor the unconscious as part of the self since the unconscious is not experienced.

In this sense, attributes by which I characterize myself objectively as this person belong to the self-as-object, including introjective configurations, ego-ideal, grandiose self, and even Steiner's (1999) “heroic self.”

Some analysts prefer to see the subject, rather than a self-as-agent, as source of action as well as both conscious and unconscious mentation; see for example Benjamin (1988, 1998) and Kennedy (1998, 2000). Their subject seems to be equivalent to my self, including the self-as-object. As far as I can see, the elusive and ambiguous quality Kennedy (1998) esteems in his subject is adequately embraced by the combined perspective of the self-as-agent and as-subject and as-object.

This aspect of self-reflective awareness is rejected by anti-essentialist and postmodern critics as illusory. Variations in vantage points, experiences, or reflecting narrative social constructions are said to indicate multiple selves rather than one self having varying experiences and reacting to varying relational contexts. These views equivalently dispense with the self as a center of subjectivity.


This fragmenting and multiplying of the self seems to be an inescapable consequence of postmodern analyses, despite the objections of Elliott and Spezzano (1996) who protest that the postmodern self is decentered and not fragmented. Freud’s decentering portrayed the self as no longer master in its own house, but not as thereby fragmented. That is his conscious ego (i.e., a function of the self-as-subject) was not in control of all of the agency of the self (i.e. the self-as-agent) some part of which is unconscious. If there is fragmentation it is in the self-as-object, or in some combination of subject and object as in multiple personality (Meissner, 1996a), not in the self-as-agent. Rorty (1986) takes Freud's discussion of decentering as though “some other person is behaving as if he or she were in charge” (p. 5), but clearly multiple psychic entities in the Freudian metapsychology are not persons. Kennedy (2000) comments that “Without decentering there would be no unconscious” (p. 882), but it seems more accurate to say that without the unconscious there would be no decentering—but this would require acknowledge
ment of a core self (at least as-agent) which Kennedy disallows, “the subject has no central self” (p. 882).

[15] As far as I can see, the view of the self as illusory results from a restrictive focus on the self-as-object which is the only aspect of the self that can be objectively known—or as Elliott and Spezzano (1996) put it, “Psychical life is portrayed as a nonlinear movement of fantasies, containers, introjects, representational wrappings, semiotic sensations, envelopes, and memories” (p. 80), components which, whether metaphorically or not, reflect aspects of the self-as-object. Since the self-as-subject cannot be known as object, it is presumed to be an illusion or without knowable reality. Some absorb the self into the ego (Spruiell, 1981), so that what acts is the ego and the self as “I” becomes an illusory abstraction. This reverses the situation in which the self-as-person is the real agent and the ego a theoretically constructed substructure of the self. For a discussion of phenomenological philosophical currents underlying evacuation or dilution of the self-concept, see Chessick (1992).

[16] Schafer (1992) bases his view of the multiplicity of the self on self-deception, implying one self deceiving another. This would seem to deny any capacity for conflict or defense to a unified self. See Goldberg’s (1991) comments on the unity vs. diversity tension. Leary (1994) addressed the postmodern fragmentation and multiplication of the self in terms of the evacuation of the significance of personal history in analysis, doing away with self as a center of subjectivity, and ignoring the fact that the self is embodied. I am in sympathy with Alford (1991) who writes: “It is important to draw the right lesson from these considerations, lest we end up like Lacan, concluding that because wholeness is a myth, so too is the self. Indeed, beyond analyzing the concept of the self held by various authors, this has been my primary concern: to challenge the all-or-nothing perspective on the self, a perspective that appears in several guises” (p. 186).

[17] The problem of unity-in-multiplicity in the self comes into play in anthropology too. The Spindlers (1992), for example, distinguish the enduring self from the situated self—the former connoting the personal continuity and persistent identity of the self and the latter the contextual variability of the self interacting with the physical and social world.

The question of the relation between the self conceived as the whole person and its relation to psychic structures was addressed by Lichtenstein (1965) in trying to resolve ambiguities in Hartmann's formulation. See my further discussion in Meissner (2000f, g). Richards (1982) took Klein, Gedo and Kohut to task for replacing diverse functions of the mental apparatus with a supraordinate self in some form, implying that global explanations in terms of the whole person would transcend detailed accounting of details of motive and defense. In distinction from these other positions, the unity and supraordinate position of the self-as-person does not contradict multiplicity and conflict between or within constituents of the self (Steingart, 1969; Schafer, 1979) nor does explication in terms of the self replace explanations in terms of its constituent parts—the functioning of the self operating as ego can be in conflict with the self operating as id, but the agency of both is the agency of the self. There is also no reason why intrasystemic conflicts, say between aspects of ego-functioning, cannot persist in one self-as-agent. The analytic task is to help the patient understand that one aspect of himself is in conflict with another. The self does not replace ego, superego and id; rather the ego *is* the self operating in its ego mode, superego *is* the self operating in its superego mode, and id *is* self operating in its id mode.

Consequently, instead of viewing the drives as causal principles of unconscious action, they become motivational principles guiding and directing the causal efficiency of the self-as-agent. See my review and analysis of these metapsychological principles in Meissner (1993, 1995a, b, c, 1999a, b). For a further application of these principles with respect to aggression, see Rizzuto et al. (1993).

Some authors seem to write as though the self-as-subject were somehow incompatible with a view of the self-as-related. Rubin (1997), for example, contrasts "self-centered subjectivity" with "nonself-centered subjectivity" as though the former somehow contradicts the latter. The difference lies in the focus of intentionality, not in any contradiction in the self.

I would hope that any obscurities or densities in the above formulations could be relieved by reference to the published articles. Readers can then better make up their own minds as to the advantages or disadvantages of my position. Rather than persuading the reader to the advantages of my view of the self, I would hope to enter it in the lists of contending versions, illumine as best I can the crucial distinguishing features, and suggest some of the implications for the analytic process, and leave it to the reader to judge.

Bollas (1987) commented: “There is no unified mental phenomenon that we can term self,
although I shall use this term as if it were a unity; it is true to say that all of us live within the realm of illusion and within this realm the concept of the self has a particularly relevant meaning” (p. 9). Gargiulo (1997), in turn, concludes “that the self does not exist in itself. The 'I' is a cultural-imaginative construct” (p. 3). See also Bromberg (1994,1996) and Knoblauch (1997). In addition, I would note that representational theorists assume that including bodily representations in the self-representation accounts for the self as bodily. Steiner (1999) makes this point in regard to Klein and Kernberg. Obviously, the body image or bodily representation is not the same as the body.

[24] Freud left us an ego as part of his systemic metapsychology, but did not hesitate to unabashedly personalize the ego when it suited him. Rather than seeing Freud's usage as ambiguous, some prefer to see it as advantageous, e.g. Spruiell (1981). I would see it as advantageous only in the absence of an adequate theory of the self. Spruiell's "self' turns out to be an abstraction or fantasy, reducible to activity of the ego.

[25] This difficulty was also noted and commented on by Boesky (1983).

[26] Schafer (1968) drew attention to this difficulty, objecting that such crossing of conceptual lines only confused meaning of the terms—"if all representations are structures, of what use is the term structure?" (p. 61)—and increased the risks of reification and theoretical redundancy—representations and structures end up doing the same job and the self becomes a multiplicity of minds and the person fragmented into multiple component selves. Also the term self-representation is misleading in connoting a substantive (noun) that too readily lends itself to predication (e.g. as if the self-representation could be a subject of action, as in Rothstein's [1983; Panel, 1989] self-representation-as-agent). See also my critique in Meissner (2000e).

[27] McIntosh (1986) underlines the role of the self-representation as intentional object of self-knowing. I am arguing that the self-as-known intrapsychically is the self-as-object and the medium of such knowing is the self-representing—the self-representation is not what is known but how it is known.

[28] I have elsewhere (Meissner, 1978, 1981a, 1996a) described introjective configurations as structural components contributing to the organization of the self-as-object. These configurations are known in virtue of their reflection in self-representings and are in many respects comparable to Bollas' (1989) "alternative objects" or what Sutherland (1983) referred to as "subselves."
[29] See also Winnicott (c. 1950/1989) and further Auerbach (1991) and Schacht (1988) for discussion of the development of the true self and its involvement in intercorporeal, intersubjective and intrasubjective fields of symbolic dialogue and meaning. Havens (1986) also discussed some of the clinical complexities pertaining to this distinction. Also Modell (1992, 1993) regards the true self and his private self as synonymous, reflecting Winnicott’s (1963/1965b) view that “Although healthy persons communicate and enjoy communicating, the other fact is equally true, that each individual is an isolate, permanently noncommunicating, permanently unknown, in fact unfound” (p. 187, italics in original). The analogy with the self-as-subject is clear.

[30] I had previously hinted at these connections in reference to Winnicott's (1969/1971) concept of use of the object (Meissner, 2000c,d), but the exploration of the self-as-social is still in process.

[31] This would apply to phenomenal accounts of the self following Kohut’s lead, e.g. Lichtenberg (1975). See also Chessick's (1998) reservations on Lichtenberg's later experiential and intersubjective perspective on the self.

[32] In Kohut’s (1977) and intersubjectivist usages, the self is identified with the personal “I”—that is with the self-as-subject, but this self is defined in terms of relations with selfobjects, i.e., objectively, and leaves no room for actions and/or functions of the self that are unconscious, i.e., not experienced. See Barnett (1980) for a similar view of the self as defined in terms of subjective experience.

[33] Not without qualifications. Arguing for empathy and introspection as defining the field of analytic observation, he comments that they “are not the only ingredients of psychoanalytic observation. In psychoanalysis, as in all other psychological observation, introspection and empathy, the essential constituents of observation, are often linked and amalgamated with other methods of observation” (Kohut, 1959, p. 463). However, these other methods never seem to play much of a role.

[34] See, however, Schafer’s (1991) and Chessick's (1988) reservations on the experience-near vs. experience-distant distinction in Kohut, especially in regard to the later bipolar self.

[35] Lacan reverses this absorption. His Other is like a selfobject, but, rather than gaining support for the self by transmuting internalization, part of the self becomes alienated in the Other.
(similar to projective identification) never to be retrieved (Alford, 1991).

[36] The implications of the methodological shift to empathy and introspection as the basis for analytic exploration are traced by Balter and Spencer (1991).

[37] Chessick (1988) drew attention to this ambiguity in Kohut’s rendition of the self. Galatzer-Levy and Cohler (1993), despite their commitment to self psychology, also recognize this difficulty. See also Tyson (1991).

[38] See also Coen (1981) on the lack of differentiation between self and selfobject experience, thus equating selfobjects with preoedipal objects, and Omstein (1978), according to whom the selfobject relationship is characterized by “the lack of differentiation, or only partial differentiation of self from object” (p. 62). For Goldberg (1996) “there is a self composed of and/or constituted by selfobjects” (p. 192). Hirsch (1999) commented on the retreat from an object-relations theory to a one-person isolation of the self. Later developments extended the selfobject to include any object of dependence (Baker & Baker, 1987) or almost anything the self can be related to or connected with—see Galatzer-Levy and Cohler (1993) and Goldberg’s (1998) reservations. The diversity of self-selfobject relations, in which the self is identified with its multiple and changing selfobjects, introduces an inherent multiplicity to the self concept, as Grotstein (1983) noted. Pizer (1998), for example, views the individual as selecting one among available multiple selves suitable for engagement in the current intersubjective space. In the treatment situation, we are left with the multiple selves of the analyst interacting with the multiple selves of the patient—or conversely, the patient can be interacting with his selfobject, a part of himself, rather than with the person of the analyst, so that even if we count two bodies in the room, there may be only one self. Clearly the Kohutian self is not confined to bodily limits (Levine, 1985).

[39] And Gedo (1992) adds: “Kohut strongly overstated the nature of the need for selfobjects (and, as an inevitable consequence, he overlooked the crucial importance of autonomous competence)” (p. 19).

[40] Segel (1981), in opposing Kohut’s dichotomizing self and structure, argued for their integration—an approach similar to my view of the self-as-person. But such integration is only possible with a concept of self that is consistent with structural integration—the self of self psychology, as far as I can see, is not.
Tahkii (1988) also noted the ambiguity of investing narcissistic cathexis, as an investment in the self, in object representations as in the concept of selfobject.

The ambiguities are alive and well in the next generation of self psychologists. By concentrating on the subjective experience of the selfobject, has Kohut blurred the distinction between the object as real and the object as experienced (Bacal, 1990; Bacal & Newman, 1990)? Or has the self become composed of its relations with objects, a view tending toward the intersubjective paradigm (Goldberg, 1990; Kirshner, 1999; Shane & Shane, 1993)? Certainly, Stolorow and Atwood (1984) have no hesitation in declaring "the basic units of analysis for our investigations of personality are structures of experience—the distinctive configurations of the experience of self and object that shape and organize a person's subjective world. These psychological structures are not to be viewed simply as "internalizations" or mental replicas of interpersonal events. Nor should they be regarded as having an objective existence in physical space or somewhere in a "mental apparatus" (pp. 97-98, italics in original). Besides the confusion between and substitution of structure for representational content (Meissner, 2000f), this phenomenological perspective does not allow for the continuity, persistence, or agency of the self.

Or as Sass (1992) put it, "There is a fragmentation from within that effaces reality and renders the self a mere occasion for the swarming of independent subjective events—sensations, perceptions, memories, and the like. The overwhelming vividness, diversity, and independence of this experiential swarm fragment the self, obliterating its distinctive features—the sense of unity and control" (p. 31). See the extended reflection on postmodern views of the self and their limitations in Schrag (1997). Benjamin (1995) also complains that excesses in the deconstruction of feminine identity have led to abandonment of unitary self and subjectivity required by analysis. See also Robbins (1996) for a similar critique.

Jacques (1991) refers to the "illusion of subjectivity... whose purpose," he says, "in its most philosophical form, is to turn the individual into a subject of knowledge or action, to constitute the subject-self into a form of being. An illusion that allows persons to appear to themselves with a feeling of autonomy and permanence, with memories, qualities, and their own baggage of guilt" (p. 163, italics in original).

Trop (1995) discussed similarities and differences between self psychology and intersubjective theory.
Similar views have been advanced by other intersubjective theorists; see for example Atwood and Stolorow (1984), Benjamin (1988), Gargiulo (1997), Hoffman (1996), Orange (1995), Renik (1998), and Stolorow and Atwood (1984, 1997).

For Bollas (1987), “The person’s self is the history of many internal relations” (p. 9, my emphasis), rather than the self having a history of such relations.

The emphasis in this view of subjectivity resonates with Modell’s (1993) advocacy of the “private self” and its prerogatives. I would also concur with his rejection of Hartmann’s objectivizing representational self and Kohut’s phenomenologically subjective self, both inadequate for understanding the self-as-person. See also Spruiell (1981) on this score.

Mitchell (1993) tries to weave a middle course combining intrapsychic and interpersonal perspectives of both one-body and two-body approaches, as does Benjamin (1988, 1995). However, it is one thing to shift perspectives in relation to the therapeutic context and another to try to shift or combine perspectives theoretically. The self-as-person lends itself to both pragmatic perspectives, but theoretically it cannot be both an autonomous center of causality and subjectivity and at the same time defined in terms of its external relations. As Robbins (1996) comments, “Pragmatically useful as this hybridized form of thinking may sometimes be, it must be seen for what it is, a form of applied science or technology that overlooks crucial conceptual and organizational distinctions among theoretical models” (p. 47). By the same token, I would take issue with Macmurray’s (1957/1968) view of the private, autonomous and subjective self as egocentric, solipsistic and fictive, and his argument that the self is defined as inherently relational. Leary (1994) has underlined the similarity of the self defined by its relations with others with borderline or narcissistic pathology. “This sort of self,” she comments, “for the analytic clinician, far from being liberated, is instead enslaved” (p. 454). To which Elliott and Spezzano (1996) add, “the fragmentation idealized in the post-modernity discourse is really multiple personality disorder and schizophrenia; flux threatens the self, subjectivity and identity” (p. 62).

Lacan’s contribution to the interpretation of intersubjectivity is discussed by Loewenstein (1994) and Meissner (1999b).

It is interesting to note that a similar shift, parallel to that in psychoanalysis, from more or less objective observation to an interest in subjectivity and the relational interaction between
observer and observed, has arisen in anthropology, especially in the context of ethnographic field studies. See the discussion of this phenomenon in Nash and Wintrob (1972).

[52] Similar relational concerns have been applied to feminine subjectivity and gender identity. See Chodorow's (1996) discussion. Again the need for relatedness gets confused with relatedness as foundational for the self.

[53] After formulating these ideas, I came across an old German proverb that seemed apt:

"Rechne fleissig, rechne gut,
rechne nur auf dich;

Denn wer auf andere rechnet,
der verrechnen tut sich."

A free rendering might go: "Interpret diligently and well, but only with regard to yourself; for anyone who tries to interpret another, may only interpret falsely."
Psychoanalytic Selves in Digital Space

Kimberlyn Leary, PhD

Psychoanalysis has always built its conceptual home in the neighborhood of the scientific models and cultural sensibilities of the day.\[1\] From Freud's hydraulic account of the drives and defenses to the American pragmatism of ego psychology, psychoanalysis has remained a culture-bound enterprise. One result is that the psychoanalytic encounter with human subjectivity is sensitive to social change even when the profession has not recognized this itself. In key ways, psychoanalytic understanding shifts from generation to generation, resonating with the problems and preoccupations of each. The explanatory strength of psychoanalysis issues precisely from its being embedded in culture. As a theory and a practice that is itself in transition, psychoanalysis permits us a view of who we are and what we are becoming.

My intention here is to consider the ways in which cyberspace has come to intersect with psychoanalytic space. I will do so by considering how clinical
exploration of our patients’ experiences with e-mail and other digital media resonates with evolving psychoanalytic accounts of self, subjectivity and relation. Concepts such as “enactment,” “multiplicity,” and “paradox” represent some of the diversity of psychoanalytic opinion on how the psychoanalytic exchange is best conceptualized. These accounts—recently dubbed as “new view” psychoanalytic theories (Eagle et al., 2001)—have been influenced by postmodern critiques of power and authority that have successively changed the climate of the psychoanalytic consulting room. The digital revolution likewise challenges fundamental assumptions. The everyday immersion in cyberspace that is increasingly common for many of us deconstructs traditional beliefs about what is private and what is public. Foundational notions of “interiority and “depth”—so central to everyday clinical work—are transformed in digital environments in which multiple realities and identities appear to co-exist seamlessly as a function of the interlinked architecture of the Internet.

The backdrop for this paper is the ascendancy of postmodern perspectives in the humanities. The term “postmodernism” is of course notoriously elastic, referring in practice to a diverse collection of positions and predilections. It is perhaps most usefully appreciated as a take on theory, identifying the contradictions and inconsistencies within an idea that had otherwise been assumed to be authoritative and true. Postmodernism has been effectively used as a strategy to disrupt centralized authority and has
offered as a counterpoint a view of reality and truth as multiple and determined by context.

Since the early 1980s, psychoanalytic theory and practice have come to reflect this postmodern metier. The impact of postmodern perspectives in the psychoanalytic consulting room has been considerable. The view of the analyst as an authoritative source of truth about the working of the patient’s mind has gradually given way to the view that the proper sites for psychoanalytic understanding are intersubjective. Virtually all forms of psychoanalytic treatment now recognize that the transformative potential of an analysis takes shape in the context of interpersonal events experienced by both patient and analyst (Mitchell, 1993; Mitchell & Black, 1995). The analytic work therefore consists of giving their differing subjectivities an articulated voice.

One consequence of these efforts is that practitioners across differing schools of analysis are shifting from models of abstemious practice to those that increasingly emphasize “analytic provision” (cf. Lindon, 1994). Most innovations in psychoanalytic technique involve extensions of the analyst’s expressive participation in the session. For some analysts, these measures remain occasional adjuncts to standard technique. They are deployed to bootstrap the analytic couple through a period of some extremity (e.g., a rupture in the therapeutic alliance or an extra-analytic crisis in the life of
either patient or analyst). For other analysts, an eschewing of neutrality and a focus on action in the clinical situation represent credible alternatives to established practice, and signal fundamental change in psychoanalytic technique (Renik, 1996).

A related set of issues has been played out within the professional organizations of psychoanalysis (e.g. the American Psychoanalytic Association, the Division of Psychoanalysis of the American Psychological Association and the International Psychoanalytic Association). The introduction of e-mail communications in these venues has successfully disrupted hierarchies of power, permitting individual members outside the political structure of these organizations an expressive voice to shape debate about the representation of their public identities as psychoanalysts.[2] Thus, the turn is undeniably to a postmodern psychoanalysis.

Cultural theorists have suggested that postmodern sensibilities inflect everyday experience through the widespread use of computers and accessibility to the Internet. Sherry Turkle (1995) has called the computer the pre-eminent actor on the postmodern stage for its capacity to make manifest semi-independent “multiple selves” that challenge traditional understandings of what it means to be a self and lay claim to an identity existing in space and time.
I would like to extend Turkle’s ideas to the consulting room by considering the ways in which technology and the postmodern worldview it affords highlight problems of self and subjectivity for which people turn to psychoanalysis for help. I will use clinical case examples to illustrate some of the tensions that arise when it is possible to experience multiplicity “for real” in digital environments and the challenges that arise when technology makes permeable the boundaries between space, time and persons. Likewise, I will discuss the ways that some patients make use of e-mail communications and other technologies to locate themselves more concretely in the analytic conversation. I will suggest that clinical moments like these highlight questions of importance about how we understand cultural and personal experience.

II

By now, an entire generation has “grown up wired” (Tapscott, 1997). For these elites, technology seems to change basic dimensions of human experience even as it creates a new class of others, disenfranchised and/or estranged from the information revolution.[3] As numerous authors have noted, the advent of mass telecommunications and the widespread public use of the Internet has restructured the boundaries existing between persons and countries, and between time and space (Harvey, 1989; Gergen, 1991, 1995). This was made heartbreakingly evident during the terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center, the Pentagon and United Flight 93. Access to cell phones and e-mail allowed hundreds of victims a last contact with their loved ones that would not otherwise have been possible. For those of us at some remove from the immediate horror, the televised image—replayed again and again and again—of jet planes detonating the towers transformed time, fixing the mind on an instant that could not end.

Sherry Turkle (1995), in her usefully provocative book *Life on the Screen: Identity in the Age of the Internet* comments on the ways in which digital environments illuminate the concerns of contemporary theory. Even a superficial consideration of virtual media shows the way in which they are instances of multiple realities in which more than one thing may be true at any given time. She notes, for example, that the computer evokes conflicting images of isolation and of interconnection. The end user may be simultaneously viewed as singular person holed up alone in front of the screen even as she may also be engaged in a dense collaboration with others across the globe.

Which image is “true”? The answer of course is both. The user as isolate and the user-in-community represent multiple realities. In this way, as Turkle puts it, “life on the screen carries theory” (Turkle, 1995, p. 49). Which is the *better* answer, however, is entirely pragmatic and depends on your interests and the question you need to have answered (cf. Renik, 1998; Turkle,
Perhaps the most significant challenge to traditional views of the self as bounded and stable is mounted in the chat rooms and in the proliferation of virtual worlds online that the Internet makes possible. In these venues, often devoted to special interests or imaginary worlds in which the user may enter as a player, identity is treated as a matter of self-presentation. A user may participate by adopting an alias or persona whose age, race or even species are recognizably different from the self the user would otherwise be understood to be. These online masquerades of course have their predecessor forms in racial passing or the refuge in closeting that gay men and women have sometimes sought. As I have written elsewhere (Leary, 1999), such passing always occurs in the context of a relationship; it requires, on the one side, a subject who doesn’t tell and, on the other, an audience who fails to ask. [5]

Consider the following clinical vignette. Matthew, a patient in psychotherapy, spends his evening hours pursuing relationships online. He has been unhappy with his marriage for some time, and had considered having an affair. In an apparent compromise, he reports his involvement with several women he met in a chat room. Their conversations were animated with a lot of breathless, sexually titillating talk but none progressed to the cybersex that appeared to be his goal. Over time, Matthew becomes frustrated
with these relationships feeling that these women are withholding something of themselves from him. Matthew has the very same complaint about his wife, but this fact rarely interests him. Nor is he often interested in how his own aloofness and disingenuousness might contribute to the problems he has had with women. Matthew is now considering entering a chat room as a woman, hoping to meet a lesbian who might seduce him. As Matthew discusses his intentions, he begins to recognize that he has always believed that women reserve their emotional intimacies for each other. It is exciting to him to imagine being loved by a woman who believed he was a woman. He tells me: “That would be quite a trick.”

Matthew is self-consciously constructing alternate selves to mitigate his unhappiness, believing that they might be more successful than he in getting their needs met. At the same time, Matthew fully expects that it is he who will reap the benefits of their adventures. Matthew hopes to derive from an imaginary contact something real. That is his “trick.”

Matthew is drawing in part on a fantasy of transformation familiar to us all. From this standpoint, the Internet is simply the current medium for the elaboration of his fantasy. However, his use of the Internet is different in several key respects. As Bader (2002) suggests, online affairs exist “halfway between a fantasy and a real relationship.” While the technology allows Matthew to instantiate multiple selves and precisely configure himself in the
(feminine) shape he hopes will yield the intimacy he craves, the technology also establishes the parameters for the masquerade. Matthew can “pass” as a woman in the chat room because his online self is created through language rather than say an exchange of digital photos or through video streaming. At the same time, Matthew’s relational ambitions cannot be realized without a real and separate person present in the interaction on the other end of the phone line (Bader, 2002).

Matthew comes to therapy to tell me about his online pursuits. In doing so, he is conveying to me, a woman, his efforts to locate himself among women. It makes sense to assume that at least part of his message is intended for me. How do I, as a real live woman, figure in this psychic/cyber drama? I learn later that Matthew’s intention to become a woman online occurred after he had seen me dining with a woman friend in a local restaurant. For Matthew, online or offline, it is the presence of a real person with autonomous interests outside of his control that he finds both threatening and also the object of his longing.

Melissa, a young undergraduate student, brings a related set of issues to her treatment. For some time, she has been sharing with me the details of an online fantasy game with which she is engrossed. Now she tells me she has met someone, a “knight” who has begun to court her. He attends to her tenderly and she is smitten. Their conversations involve erotic exchanges,
occurring in real time. Some weeks later, Melissa presses the knight to reveal himself. Their Internet relationship is no longer enough. She wants to meet him and asks him to drive the distance from his hometown to meet her for coffee at a local bar. The knight comes clean, telling Melissa that he is all of 15 years old, a high school sophomore sitting at his father’s computer in the basement of his home. Melissa is chagrined but in conflict. She has enjoyed what has taken place between them and she doesn’t want it to stop. Since he is 15, is she doing anything wrong if they continue? The knight mounts his own challenge. He also wants their erotic talk to proceed. In one e-mail, he reminds Melissa that he is still the person he was on the screen. Melissa hesitates for a moment and then types back: “You may be the same in the game but you are now different in my head.”

For Melissa, the recognition that the knight was “now different in my head” acted as a constraint on virtuality. Once she knew him to be 15, he could not ever be anyone else. Few of us would consider Melissa’s choice as indicating a lack of imagination. Indeed, most clinicians would consider it to be adaptive. Melissa’s experience indicates that the postmodern gravitation to the multiple selves the computer makes possible is only approximate and not fully realized. Multiple subjectivity is perhaps “really” only an emergent sensibility.

Thus, the postmodern attention to surfaces de-emphasizes depth but
does not do away with it all together. The surface manipulations on the screen after all exist as a consequence of the machine language underneath and the unseen hand of the software developer who coded the application in the first place. Perhaps it is when problems develop that interiority and depth return as matters of importance. It when things go wrong that we look beyond the surface.

III

The clinical vignettes of Matthew and Melissa are quite familiar to most clinicians. Our patients have always expressed their desires and defenses through the cultural materials of their day. However, even if the move to multiple subjectivities is itself virtual (i.e., only approximate or partially realized), it is a way of thinking about human experience that yields very different potentials for clinical engagement.

Paradigm change in psychoanalysis has also been relative rather than absolute. In one sense, psychoanalysis remains as lowtech a venture as one could imagine. The “hardware,” if you will, is typically a private room. The “software” consists of the emotional histories, hopes and dreads (cf. Mitchell, 1993) each brings to the treatment relationship.

To be sure, psychoanalysis has developed a new vocabulary. Many analysts are now fluent in the languages of social constructivism and
dialectical reasoning. Even though discussions about the objectivity and the subjectivity of the analyst and the analytic situation continue to dominate psychoanalytic discourse (Greenberg, 2001; Eagle, et al., 2001), the whole of contemporary clinical theory recognizes the intersubjective medium of psychoanalytic work.

The idiom of psychoanalysis increasingly resembles the lexicon that is used with respect to digital environments. The analytic relationship is described in terms of its interactivity. Patient and analyst engage in a liminal space outside of normal time. The language of medicine and natural science has given way to a clinical medium characterized by virtuality and connectivity.

This change in analytic ethos requires the analyst to provide more by way of involvement than was the case in times past (cf. Lindon, 1994). Analysts no longer see themselves as technical surgeons, if ever they did in actual practice. Many now openly invoke models of developmental caregiving or mentorship (Hoffman, 1998) to describe the role they believe themselves to play in their patients’ lives. The focus of analytic work is also different. Authenticity and relational connection are increasingly recognized as the outcomes of successful treatment rather than preconditions for analyzability (Mitchell, 1993). While technology is frequently implicated in the etiology of the existential ills for which patients need help (i.e. the lone
hacker isolated in his room), psychoanalysts are now attentive to the ways in which technology can also mediate analytic experience and even assist patient and analyst to participate in a meaningful intersubjective exchange (e.g., Gabbard. 2001).

IV

Specific turns to a postmodern sensibility have been prominent in the work of Irwin Hoffman and Owen Renik. The challenges they raise about the nature of everyday clinical practice offer new metaphors for the analytic enterprise that in turn resonate with the potentials of the Internet and the subjectivity it makes possible.

Hoffman's (1998) work, for example, on “dialectical constructivism” puts relational struggle at the center of effective clinical work. Hoffman argues that analyst and analysand function in constant tension with one another and in the context of internal tensions within each one. For Hoffman, effective clinical work rests on the analyst’s ability to fall into a kind of spontaneous authenticity with his or her patient. Although the analyst tries to subordinate his personal needs in favor of the patient’s interests, the analyst also expects that he will fail the patient in some unique fashion. The analyst’s capacity to deviate from his preferred stance (“throwing away the book”) instigates therapeutic potential.
By way of illustration, Hoffman describes a clinical hour in which he and his patient become able to explore the meaning of a transaction only after Hoffman meets the patient’s demand for immediate help by spontaneously offering to call the patient’s internist to secure Valium for her (Hoffman is a clinical psychologist and therefore cannot prescribe medication himself). For this patient, interpretation is possible only after her analyst is willing to do something for her that in this instance lies outside of his preferred assumptions about how analysts are normally helpful (i.e., by analyzing rather than enacting). The content of the shift is not important, rather it is the analyst’s willingness to be shifted and moved by his patient.

Thus, Hoffman suggests that the analyst is called upon to become personally responsive in a way that will be unique for each of his or her patients. Such a therapeutic moment cannot be explicitly invoked or instigated by the analyst. It is an emergent phenomenon, issuing from the interactive-intersubjective context that cannot be predicted in advance.

Owen Renik’s formulations (1993, 1994, 1995, 1998a, 1998b, 1999) have achieved iconic status in contemporary psychoanalysis. Renik (1995) has offered a cogent critique of the notion of the anonymous analyst. He forcefully suggests that the principle of anonymity promotes an impossible ideal and thus renders the analytic enterprise disingenuous. Rather than clearing the field, anonymity promotes active idealization by assuming that if
the analyst’s ideas were known, the patient would no longer be in a position to think for him or herself.

Renik has used the metaphors of "getting real" in analysis (1998b) and of "playing one’s cards face up" (1999) to denote the process of establishing ground rules that create a collaborative clinical environment. This is a way of working that requires the analyst to depart from her preferred ways of working and bear a measure of discomfort, just as the patient is asked to do. Furthermore, the analyst’s understanding of what it is useful to disclose is always open to counter-critique by the patient.

Renik (2002) has also suggested that from the very start analyst and analysand ought to formulate goals for the analytic work. He suggests that the outcome in clinical analysis is best assessed with respect to the patient’s experience of therapeutic benefit. For Renik, clinical analysis is only effective to the extent that it promotes therapeutic change.

Analytic models such as those of Hoffman and Renik accord primary importance to a kind of clinical problem-solving that resonates with a postmodern sensibility. Both of these analysts configure the analytic situation as one that permits the patient an opportunity to work out nonlinear solutions to complex emotional and interpersonal problems. Neither approaches the patient’s difficulties in a top-down or bottom-up fashion. Each
advocates a therapeutic process that is emergent, provisional and which constructs itself as it goes along. In these contexts, clinical learning occurs through reciprocal and recursive exchanges of information, especially of emotional and relational information. Clinical engagement occurs as a kind of dynamic construction of content and action; a "just in time" build of what is needed at a given moment.

These ideas remain controversial within psychoanalysis. Jay Greenberg (2001) has gone on record as suggesting that “new view” theorists like Hoffman and Renik focus narrowly on only a partial truth. He argues that that the current focus on mutual influences between patient and analyst unwittingly functions as a prescriptive story for psychoanalysis, every bit as limiting as the traditional authority that earlier generations of analysts uncritically assumed.

I agree with Greenberg to the extent that what he is observing is that the clinical stories that analysts tell have shifted in decisive ways.[7] He is right to suggest that analytic perspectives such as those offered by Hoffman and Renik have little in common with the archaeological metaphor that Freud used to significant advantage during the first century of psychoanalytic thought. Instead, contemporary psychoanalysis perhaps conceptually resembles the architecture of the Web and other media technologies. Psychoanalytic knowledge takes shape in local contexts and in custom-
tailored connections between two people and their subjectivities. Analytic subjectivity increasingly emphasizes *strategic* subjectivity. Analyst and analysand configure a relational surface that phenomenologically yields emotional and psychic depth.

In this respect, contemporary psychoanalysis may find new metaphors by looking to interactive storytelling on the Web. Interactive media forms offer narratives that are shared among users. They have no fixed beginning, middle or end. The story is traded back and forth with each user contributing to the actions and characterizations that develop. The narrative has no one author; it is the product of multiple interacting subjectivities.

As with any jointly constructed narrative, there are times when it makes sense to limit one’s focus on one or the other of the analytic couple in order to understand how the story took the turn that it did. But as before, this is entirely pragmatic and constituted by the question you wish to have answered (cf. Turkle, 1995)—a question whose utility is also to be determined by the analytic couple themselves (cf. Renik, 1999).

Psychoanalysis—a discipline popularly assumed to be preoccupied only with the past—also shows itself to be remarkably sensitive to presentday contexts. In naming the alienation, dislocation and dissonance of contemporary culture, psychoanalyst practitioners are increasingly willing to
acknowledge their role in providing relational comfort and deep connection, alongside the provision of insight. Clinical actions (beyond the verbal) are now routinely included in clinical reports. Other analysts (e.g. Renik) promote a renewed emphasis on clinical accountability in arguing for demonstrated links between analytic work and patient experienced therapeutic benefit. With this, the profession is attempting to come to grips with the fact that in good treatments, patients almost always want and frequently extract something considerably beyond the pure self-understanding that theory dictates (Friedman, 2000).

Psychoanalysts are also beginning to grapple with ways in which technology may transform dimensions of experience relevant to psychoanalytic attention. Gabbard (2001) has suggested that psychoanalysis and communications in cyberspace share common potentials as well as common dangers. Each may also be deployed as substitutes for actual engagements, even as each may be used at any time to expand the boundaries of self and relation. As we have seen, interactive media create new classes of imagination and subjective activity, neither public nor private. The question of what is “real” and what is a “fantasy” (as well as the question of when such a distinction should matter)—an ongoing preoccupation for psychoanalysis—becomes newly relevant to critics, scholars and clinical practitioners. The living legacy of psychoanalysis lies in exactly this capacity to find in the new a glimpse of the old and to locate in the strange something familiar.
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**Notes**

[1] The author wishes to thank Jonathan Metzl, Daniel Shapiro and Richard Hale Shaw for their helpful suggestions on an earlier draft of this paper.

[2] During the summer of 2001, several members of the American Psychoanalytic Association’s “Open Line” raised questions about the language of the International Psychoanalytic Association’s policy of nondiscrimination, noting that it did not explicitly prohibit discrimination against gays and lesbians. The online discussion prompted the American analyst David Sachs (who had previously held office in the International Psychoanalytic Association) to write a letter to the IPA’s current president, Daniel Widlocher, who subsequently circulated an e-mail affirming his organization’s opposition to all forms of discrimination, including that related to sexual orientation.

The discussion on the open line prompted action driven by the membership. Even more importantly, the open line postings allowed North American analysts a chance to redress their own organizational history of pathologizing gay experience. The e-mail forum functioned as a mechanism for members to acknowledge affirmative gay identities.

At this writing, correspondents on the open line are now actively debating the process by which the American Psychoanalytic Association certifies and credentializes
its members.

[3] Preliminary findings from the Stanford Institute for the Quantitative Study of Society indicate that the most important features facilitating or inhibiting Internet usage appear to be education, age and access to computers outside of work environments (Nie & Erbring, 2000).

[4] Turkle (2002) suggests that computation and psychoanalysis offer different faces: “There is a modernist way to experience computation, and this, in fact, is what most people usually think of when they think about deciphering the computer or a program. The surprise is more that it shows this other face. But I think that the tension between the two elements is what gives it much of its cultural richness. Computational emergence and complexity does not ‘trump’ computational reductionism in any simple sense. Which side has the upper hand is a matter not just of technical but of cultural negotiation.”


[6] The crucial question of course is this: how could Melissa know for sure that her knight was only 15? The answer is that she could not. Information in digital contexts remains highly ambiguous (Johnson, 2001). The knight’s “true” identity was endlessly manipulable in cyberspace. In this instance, in presenting himself as 15—whether he was or was not 15—Melissa’s knight was now perceived as unavailable for the offscreen relationship she desired. In this, she recognized him as someone other than who she had in mind. This functioned as a relational fact, interfering with Melissa’s ability to return him to the figure he had occupied in her imagination. I am indebted to Robert Hatcher for raising this question.

[7] Greenberg’s critique brought to mind a genre of children’s literature that I found quite appealing when I was a young girl. In it, the child protagonist—a certain “Trixie Belden”—was regularly called upon to solve a mystery. Her detective work always began in the same way. Aware of some strange goings on, Trixie and her curious friends would take it upon themselves to visit the abandoned cave or warehouse or forest cabin that they had been expressly forbidden to explore. Once inside some clue would alert them to the fact that they were in the midst of a ghostly presence. The hairs on the back of their necks would
stand on end. The young detectives would be forced to flee temporarily, vowing in the interim that they would uncover the identity of the troublesome intruder. The story ended equally predictably. Trixie and her friends would flush out the nefarious interloper who invariably was the disaffected teenager, local recluse or new arrival that until that moment had existed only on the periphery of the town’s attention. With Trixie’s help, the alien stranger became familiar and was made subject to reparation, rehabilitation or punishment. The mystery was over. Order was restored.

Our clinical stories have of late gravitated towards something of this same narrative trajectory. This makes sense of a certain sort. All of our psychoanalytic accounts concern the alienated other within, the stranger in our midst, the disavowed recluse that in the course of an analysis we discover ourselves to be. Confrontation with the patient's externality and the countertransference that results is perhaps the “ghostly presence” of the contemporary consulting room.

Analysts of different traditions have responded variably to the challenge this presents. For classically trained analysts, the analytic work consisted of the interpretative effort to drive forcefully into the open the alien stranger causing the ruckus. Analysts trained in relational, self-psychological and intersubjective perspectives have always understood their task differently. For them, the analytic relationship could provide the milieu in which that stranger might emerge voluntarily. The analyst’s activity has been in the service of helping the patient to develop the conviction, based on experience with the analyst, that the alien and alienated self could be accepted and welcomed, perhaps for the very first time. Here, it is the analyst’s empathy and emotional attunement that becomes the medium through which mysteries are solved and order restored.
The epistemological status of psychoanalysis has become the object of heated debate in recent years as the evidential basis for its clinical theories and procedures has been increasingly questioned. Objectivists view psychoanalysis as a natural science that can be tested by the same objective methods as any other natural science. On the other side, the advocates of relativism contend that psychoanalytic truths are relative to the situation and standpoint of the observer. It is the contention of the present paper that neither side of this argument recognizes the unique nature of psychoanalytic knowledge, and, therefore, neither position provides an epistemological basis for psychoanalysis. Both the objectivist and relativist viewpoints will be examined in detail to illustrate the fundamental flaws in each position. It will be argued that only a specifically human science standpoint avoids the unresolvable problems of the other two positions and provides a valid epistemological basis for psychoanalytic science.
According to objectivism, psychoanalytic inquiry differs from that of the natural sciences only in the aspect of nature being investigated, so that the methods and causal principles applicable to psychoanalytic data are no different from that of the natural sciences (eg, Holt, 1972; Wallerstein, 1986, 1988). The objectivist argument tends to rely heavily on Popper’s (1962) critique of positivism and his alternative view of scientific method as “conjecture and refutation” (Blight, 1981; Holzman, 1985; Wallerstein, 1986, 1988). The positivist critique is that psychoanalysis has not proven its hypotheses because it has not compiled observations to demonstrate their truth (Grünbbaum, 1984). Psychoanalytic objectivists point out that Popper (1962) in his thorough critique of positivism showed that no amount of observations can ever conclusively prove a theory because future observations could theoretically disprove it and that there are no observations without theories. Popper concluded that science does not proceed “blindly,” by compiling random lists of observations, but by conjectures, leaps of imagination, that are then tested. Scientific theories are demarcated from nonscientific statements by virtue of their falsifiability. While all theory purports to “explain,” only falsifiable statements are scientific theories. Objectivist psychoanalysts argue that psychoanalysis is a series of propositions, “conjectures,” awaiting tests that could refute them, and, therefore, is no different from any other science. In their view, the Popperian view of science shows that psychoanalysis is a science with the
same methods as any other science.

Some objectivists view the analyst as a natural scientist within the analytic setting and use various analogies for the analyst’s stance, such as looking through a microscope (Bachrach, 1989). Rubenstein (1976, 1980) believes the analyst predicts an event likely to be derivative of an unconscious motive, and if the prediction is confirmed, the unconscious motive is assumed to be present. According to Blight (1981), the analyst understands the patient’s motives at the experiential level, but invokes nonexperiential mechanisms to explain via causation, and this level of explanation is the natural scientific aspect of psychoanalysis. For example, the patient’s excessive sympathy may be understood clinically as a defense against underlying feelings of cruelty, but the scientific level explains this defense by the mechanism of reaction formation. Similarly, Eagle (1980) contends that the analyst searches for both motives (or reasons) and causes, but only the latter provides explanation, the hallmark of natural science. Other objectivists, like Holzman (1985) and Wallerstein (1986, 1988), believe the psychoanalytic setting is too contaminated for objective investigation and, therefore, the ultimate validation of psychoanalytic hypotheses must come from controlled extraclinical experimental research. Despite these differences, the fundamental principle of objectivism in all its forms is that the subject matter of psychoanalysis is the natural world, and the task of the analyst is to explain its workings via the methods of the natural sciences.
There are several problems with the objectivist position. First, the objectivist model is self-contradictory because the contention that knowledge is gained by the testing of natural phenomena is itself not testable. The objectivist contradicts himself in the very statement of his position because objectivism relies on a truth claim (that all scientific knowledge is testable) that is not founded on the testability it claims is the only basis for scientific knowledge. Such a contradiction in itself vitiates truth claims for objectivism and renders it an untenable ground for psychoanalysis.

Second, the objectivist’s reliance on Popper’s critique of positivism for the justification of a “unitary” view of science is unfounded. Far from endorsing a distinctly human science with its own methods, the positivist position is that there is only one method for science, the observation of nature, and any endeavor not subject to the canons of natural science is not scientific. Therefore, Popper’s attack on the positivist view of science is not relevant to the distinction between natural and human science. Positivism holds to the unitary view of science espoused by objectivism (Ayer, 1946). The fact that Popper believed in one method for all science does not in any way imply that psychoanalysis fits that method; in fact, Popper concluded that psychoanalysis is not scientific because it is hopelessly unverifiable. To contend that the methods of the natural sciences constitute the appropriate mode of investigation for all science it must be shown that human science proceeds best by these methods, and Popper’s critique of positivism includes
no such demonstration.

This point leads to the third, and perhaps most psychoanalytically significant, flaw in objectivism. Rather than fitting the methods of the science to the domain of inquiry, the objectivist predetermines his method and then attempts to fit the data to it. In this sense, the objectivist is in the position of the drunk in the old story who looks for his watch under the lamppost in the alley because the light is there even though he lost it up the street. The objectivist position applies the methods appropriate to the investigation of the material world to the analytic process despite the fact that analysis investigates psychological reality, the experiencing subject as presented in language, rather than the material world. Absent any demonstration that psychological reality is material reality, or, at least, is best understood by the methods used to investigate the latter, there is no reason to believe the natural science model fits the analytic process, and the equation of psychoanalytic data with the material world is an unfounded theoretical prejudice.

If psychoanalysis claims to have objective knowledge, it must conform to the standards of objectivism: falsifiability and the logic of explanation. From the objectivist viewpoint, if all variables except one are not controlled, no causal inferences can be drawn because the only criterion for a scientific hypothesis is its falsifiability (Popper, 1962). However, controlled
experimentation, although it can examine general hypotheses, could only validate an interpretation if it were somehow replicated in an experiment. Such a replication is not only a practical difficulty, it is, in principle, an impossibility because the clinical situation in which the interpretation was made is not replicable, and replication is the criterion for objectivist science. Any less stringent criterion for objective truth does not fulfill the objectivist standard of verifiability, and, therefore leaves psychoanalysis open to scathing attacks from philosophers of science (eg., Nagel, 1959; Scriven, 1959; Grünbaum, 1984) who point out that the uncontrolled nature and lack of independent investigators in the analytic process reduce any truth claims generated in this setting to unfounded speculation. It must be emphasized here that if psychoanalysis is regarded as an objectivist science, there is no answer to these charges because psychoanalytic investigation fails to meet objectivist criteria for knowledge.

Additionally, the claim that analysis is a natural science because the analyst uses “nonexperiential mechanisms” in his understanding is precisely the sort of “pseudo-science” that objectivist philosophers have so aptly criticized. In the example used by Blight, employing the concept “reaction formation” is not an explanation because it does not add to the clinical understanding that the patient uses oversolicitousness to hide his cruelty. As long as psychoanalysis claims to be an explanatory science of observables, such attacks are warranted because any putative explanatory “mechanism”
can be no more than a label for phenomena already understood.

The impossibility of conducting controlled scientific experiment has been recognized by objectivists who believe that extraclinical investigation is the method of verification for psychoanalytic hypotheses (eg., Holzman, 1985; Wallerstein, 1986, 1988). While controlled experiments can test the validity of general hypotheses, they cannot assess the validity of interpretations because of the impossibility of replicating clinical process.

The critique of objectivist philosophers cannot be dismissed as the complaint of an outmoded positivist philosophy of science. Nonpositivist philosophers such as Popper (1962) and Scriven (1959) are no less relenting in their attacks on psychoanalysis than positivists such as Grünbaum (1984). If psychoanalysis must claim to be a natural science, these philosophers win the argument. It is at this point that we must turn to the viewpoint of the relativists who have provided the most commonly voiced epistemological alternative to this view of psychoanalysis.

RELATIVISM

In reaction to the difficulties of the objectivist stance, the relativist regards the analyst’s viewpoint as relative to her perspective. There are several variations of epistemological relativism. The most well-known is Schafer’s view (1983, 1992) that the essence of psychoanalysis consists of
analyst and patient creating a narrative together. The patient’s verbalizations are a narrative performance out of which the analyst selects some aspects to retell the story based on her “precritical assumptions,” theories, and ways of understanding. Because other narratives are always possible, there are no objective psychoanalytic data that compel definite conclusions, and the chosen narrative is always subject to revision and new interpretation as analyst and patient "co-author a script.” The role of the patient becomes greater as she becomes a more reliable interpreter. The essence of psychoanalysis is the construction of narratives, and there is nothing beyond the narration that can be used to adjudicate analytic truth. While narrations cannot be regarded as objective or definitive, they are useful.

Well aware that his position may be construed as solipsistic, Schafer (1983) attempts to answer such an objection with his view that psychoanalytic constructions are subject to the rules of verification, coherence, consistency, and completeness. The interpretation that fulfills these criteria and fits the events outside the analysis is preferred to alternatives that do not.

Spence (1982) bases his hermeneutic position on a detailed criticism of analytic reasoning to show that the analyst has no claim to “historical truth,” knowledge of events as they occurred. Spence argues that the patient’s experience is not directly accessible to the analyst because (1) the patient
must use language to mediate feelings and thoughts, and language can never capture the experience itself, and (2) the patient is asked to associate freely, making her communications elusive and unclear. The analyst inevitably uses the “haze of his own experience” to “fill in” the missing pieces of the patient’s communications, resulting in “unwitting interpretations” that become the nonverbalized basis for additional constructions, thus multiplying distortions. Furthermore, analysts mistake created structural, linguistic similarities between current happenings and the past for an actual, causal relationship between the past and present. The “link” with the past is not a causal connection but a linguistic creation of the analyst to develop an aesthetically pleasing story.

Despite these difficulties, in his early work Spence believed psychoanalytic interpretations possessed “narrative truth,” a consistent, coherent, comprehensive account, which has both an aesthetic and a practical component. Aesthetically, a good analytic interpretation finds a “home” for an “anomalous happening” by fitting the event into the patient’s life story. Therapeutic effectiveness is a product of the linguistic and narrative closure effected by reducing life to organizing principles, rather than correspondence to actual events. Thus, according to Spence’s early view, as an aesthetic expression, the good interpretation has no more correspondence to facts than art or music; as a pragmatic statement it creates its own truth.
In his later work, Spence (1993, 1994), no longer finding rhetorical persuasion an acceptable alternative, attacks psychoanalysis for its reliance on rhetoric rather than evidence. He calls on psychoanalysis to overcome the relativity of the observer, separate out the influence of historical and cultural bias, and found psychoanalysis on evidence from the “bottom up,” rather than from “top down” theoretical bias, in order to become a science.

A recent version of the relativist position originates with the relational model of psychoanalysis. Analysts of this school argue that the psychoanalytic situation is a relational matrix mutually constructed by analyst and patient (Mitchell, 1988). From this viewpoint, the analyst’s embeddedness makes it impossible for her to perceive the relationship from “outside,” so the analyst’s understanding has no claim to special knowledge or objective truth (Mitchell, 1993). Analysis is a meeting of two subjectivities, neither of which has any greater claim to the truth than the other (e.g., Stolorow et al., 1987).

A version of the relational epistemological position is Hoffman’s (1991, 1998) social, or dialectical, constructivist paradigm, a paradigm he contrasts to positivism or objectivism, the view that therapists are “capable of standing outside the interaction with the patient, so that they can generate rather confident hypotheses and judgments ...(p. 165) about the patient as well as about their own participation in the process. Hoffman’s paradigm is based on the concept that interpersonal experience is distinguished from knowledge of
the physical world by its inherent ambiguity. In Hoffman’s perspectivist epistemology,

the personal participation of the analyst in the process is considered to have a continuous effect on what he or she understands about himself or herself and about the patient in the interaction. The general assumption in this model is that the analyst’s understanding is always a function of his or her perspective at the moment. . . what the analyst seems to understand about his or her own experience and behavior as well as the patient’s is always suspect . . . (Hoffman, 1998, p. 136)

Hoffman concludes that “analysts working in this model would assume . . . that their own particular ways of understanding their contributions would be skewed in keeping with their personal participation in the process” (p. 138).

Nonetheless, Hoffman opposes his epistemological position to unqualified relativism: “ambiguity and uncertainty do not connote the disappearance of an objective reality and the rule of unqualified relativism. On the contrary it is objectively the case that experience is intrinsically ambiguous” (p. xxii). In oppositition to “radical relativism,” Hoffman believes in an “objective framework within which constructive activity takes place,” consisting of universal characteristics of human experience (p. xxiii). Hoffman goes on to claim that these universal features of human experience “exist no less ‘objectively’ for being functions of human construction and perception than do facts which exist independent of such activity. . .(p. 22). Furthermore,
despite the fact that alternative interpretations are always possible, “some interpretations may be said to fit the patient’s experience more than others” (p. 165).

Relativism, while attempting to avoid the pitfalls of objectivism, also has weaknesses. First, this epistemological position is as self-contradictory as the objectivism it seeks to replace, because the claim of relativism is not treated as relative to any perspective but rather as an absolute, a form of knowledge the relativist claims does not exist. To be consistent, the claim of relativism must be viewed as a relative position, but then it would not have the truth the relativist claims for it. Consequently, relativism cannot be stated without contradicting itself. The same may be said of perspectivism. To claim that the analyst has a perspective on truth assumes knowledge of a reality on which one has a perspective, in contradiction to the perspectivist view of truth.

Secondly, if, according to relativism, all interpretations are relative, there is no basis for judging any interpretation as more valid than any other, and psychoanalysis is reduced to solipsism in which all truth claims are equal and psychoanalysis has no claim to knowledge of any sort (Orange, 1992). Realizing this pitfall, each version of relativism offers criteria by which to adjudicate among interpretations. Schafer (1983) contends that all interpretations and constructions are subject to the constraints of coherence, consistency, verification, and completeness. The problem with this solution is
that once verification is set forth as a criterion of interpretive validity, a reality beyond the narrative is assumed as a criterion against which the narrative is evaluated. Furthermore, Schafer does not provide any basis for his other three criteria. Either the more coherent interpretation of the data is nearer the truth, or there is no basis for this preference. The only alternative is to make criteria for adjudication among interpretations a matter of personal taste not subject to justification, in which case truly “anything goes,” and Schafer’s effort to differentiate his position from solipsism fails. Furthermore, Schafer’s criteria of coherence, consistency, verification, and completeness are treated as transcendent, universal criteria of knowledge in direct contradiction to his relativistic epistemology. To avoid lapsing into a solipsistic “anything goes” position, relativism invokes absolute principles it claims do not exist.

Spence’s solution was to justify analytic understanding on the basis of aesthetic appeal and rhetorical persuasiveness. The problem here is that many patients enter treatment with accounts of their problems and lives that possess considerable aesthetic appeal and persuasiveness, but maintain symptoms and character pathology. According to Spence’s criteria, no analysis should be necessary because the patient already possesses the narrative truth that analysis provides. Furthermore, charismatic leaders and demagogues simplify life into organizing principles and create their own truth, the two sources of efficacy Spence attributes to psychoanalytic
interpretation. Therefore, Spence’s early position cannot differentiate psychoanalysis from other forms of rhetorical persuasion, such as religious or political zealotry. His views result in the reduction of psychoanalysis to the provision of “useful fictions.” The untenability of Spence’s position is reflected in his statement that “imaginary interpretations achieve truth status” (Spence, 1982, p. 171). An “imaginary interpretation” by definition is an interpretation concocted by the imagination, a fantasied production, as opposed to an interpretation based in reality. Spence criticizes the interpretations he calls “imaginary” for lacking evidential basis. After Spence argues for the lack of truth value of such interpretations, to call them “true” in any sense is a blatant contradiction of his own position.

Spence’s more recent viewpoint is subject to the same pitfalls as any objectivist position (see pp. 113-116 above). In his first position, he found psychoanalysis valid despite its lack of evidential truth, whereas in his later view, he found the flaws in psychoanalytic knowledge neither acceptable nor necessary.

Hoffman states with the absolute certainty of objectivism that objectivity is not possible because the analyst’s participation in the process “skews” her perceptions. Hoffman claims to know that interpersonal experience is ambiguous, and the analyst is a continual participant in the process; again, these statements are treated as absolute knowledge in
opposition to perspectivism. If the analyst cannot be certain because of his participation, how can Hoffman be certain about human experience given his participation in it? According to Hoffman's epistemology, participation in the human process should render objective knowledge impossible. But he does not treat his view of human experience or the analyst’s knowledge as uncertain; he sees it as objective knowledge. If there is some basis for his claim, then he has undermined his paradigm, and if there is no basis for it, then he is wrong. Hoffman's judgment of the analyst’s fallibility is founded on a type of knowledge he regards as impossible. Furthermore, to judge any experience as “skewed” is to assume knowledge of reality against which the experience is assessed.

In fact, Hoffman attempts to separate himself from “radical relativism” by asserting objective knowledge of a “pre-existing world” independent of social consensus and universal characteristics of human experience. If Hoffman does have such objective knowledge, why does the analyst not have equal claim to objective knowledge of the patient? His paradigm is built on the concept that the analyst, as a participant in the process, cannot claim knowledge of what goes on. Nonetheless, he claims objective knowledge of a “pre-existing world,” its inherent ambiguity, and universal experience—despite the fact that he participates in this very world. By laying claim to objective knowledge, Hoffman is adopting a stance of certainty outside his own participation, the impossibility of which is the basis for his
constructivism. In the same way, Hoffman insists that some interpretations fit the patient’s experience better than others, but the analyst’s “skewed participation” should render such a judgment impossible. Hoffman’s “qualified relativism” does not work because once he acknowledges that objective knowledge is possible, the stance of standing outside of participation and knowing reality is assumed as a possibility in direct opposition to constructivism.

In reviewing Hoffman’s work, Richard Moore (1999) points out that to define an external reality at all departs from the constructivist paradigm, and Hoffman’s claim of universality implies that as a theorist he is able to see beyond the influence of culture and history and, in particular, that his ideas about human nature, on which he bases his views, are not themselves constructed. While these ideas are quite reasonable within a positivist framework, it is hard to find any foundation for them in a constructivism that has claimed to disdain any “preestablished given or absolute.” (p. 100)

Moore’s conclusion is that Hoffman has unnecessarily abandoned the constructivist paradigm in order to avoid radical relativism.

Moore’s solution is to develop a pure constructivism undaunted by radical relativism. He proposes as the standard for mental health “a fairly explicit, but as yet undeveloped, notion of an optimal process of construction” (p. 155). Clinical technique, then, would be focused on facilitating a joint
construction of reality, “rather than correcting a deficient process of adherence to an objective reality” (p. 155). The focus of analysis, then, “is not on correcting individual constructions, but on understanding through participation, and thereby modifying, the process of construction” (p. 156). From this viewpoint, internal conflict is regarded as “a deficiency in the processes of construction that... may produce internal conflict when [these processes] fail to assimilate adequately a more diverse potential reality” (p. 156).

This brief summary of Moore’s outline of a pure constructivist clinical model is enough to show that he makes judgments that belie his “pure constructivism.” To make a judgment of “optimal construction” implies a stance outside the constructive process in opposition to constructivism. The very judgment of “a deficient constructive process,” cannot be made within the constructivist paradigm. Any criteria Moore would apply to make such judgments can have no place in his “pure constructivist model.” Further, his statement that deficiency leads to conflict by failing to integrate a “diverse potential reality” contradicts his constructivist model, because if such a reality is not yet constructed, it cannot exist according to Moore’s constructivist view of reality.

As we have seen, rather than examining the nature of the psychical for the methods that best fit its investigation, the objectivist imports methods
from the natural sciences and assumes their relevance to psychological science. Relativism sees the error of such an unjustified application, but assumes that the only alternative is a relative view of reality. The root of the problem, then, is that relativists share with objectivists the assumption that the only knowledge is objective knowledge. Realizing that objectivism is untenable, these theorists adopt a relativist epistemology that inevitably faces the logical conclusion of solipsism. Then, faced with having to yield all claims to psychoanalytic knowledge, the relativist proposes criteria for interpretive validity designed to avoid the conclusion that every interpretation is as valid as any other. Such criteria either do not work, as in the case of Spence, or contradict relativist epistemology.

Objectivism and relativism share the belief that the only knowledge is objective knowledge; the difference is that the objectivist believes that such knowledge is attainable in the analytic process, whereas the relativist does not. Surprising as it may seem, both objectivists and relativists accept the positivist principle that only the objectively verifiable is valid knowledge. However, if one does not adopt this positivist view of knowledge and the nature of science, then the failure of objectivism to provide a foundation for psychoanalysis does not vitiate psychoanalytic claims to knowledge. A path is opened for the possibility of another type of knowledge, a uniquely psychoanalytic form of knowledge that is not objective but has equal claim to validity.
TOWARD A HUMAN SCIENCE MODEL

To apply objectivist criteria to psychoanalytic interpretations is to assume that psychoanalysis is an observational science that aims, like all observational sciences, to discover relationships among observable facts (Ricoeur, 1970). However, the analyst’s task is not to find relationships among observables but to discover meaning and motivation through the medium of speech. Ricoeur points out that this distinction is absolutely fundamental because without a firm grasp of the unique nature of the psychoanalytic field of investigation psychoanalysis cannot be grounded as a legitimate scientific endeavor.

Psychoanalytic inquiry, as an effort to uncover meaning and motivation of an experiencing subject, is a human science in Dilthey’s (1923/1979) sense. The Geisteswissenschaften, or sciences of the mind, have as their subject matter human experience as opposed to nature, which is the subject of the Naturwaschten, or natural sciences. As Dilthey pointed out, human sciences are interpretive, or hermeneutic. A hermeneutic science is a discipline that attempts to find the meaning or motive in a class of human events, such as the historian’s investigation of historical documents to ascertain the motive of historical actors. In Dilthey’s view, a hermeneutic discipline is a science the methods of which involve rules of interpretation, not observations or their manipulation.
Psychoanalysis is a paradigmatic hermeneutic science because its target is the meaning of experience to the patient as expressed through speech. Because observations cannot uncover meaning, objectivist methods are inapplicable to psychoanalytic inquiry. In addition, the inapplicability of objectivist methods is immediately demonstrable by the fact that people do understand each other in ordinary human discourse without recourse to the methods of objective science. Psychoanalytic method and logic of justification involve the rules for interpreting from what is said to what is meant. It follows that the criteria for interpretive validity come from the rules for interpreting speech.

Husserl’s (1925/1977) phenomenological investigations showed that we are able to understand others because we have had similar experiences ourselves. The very fact that we can speak to each other of our experiences and understand each other indicates an essential human sameness of experience. When I tell anyone, even a positivist, that I had a dream, the other understands what I said. This understanding is won not by objectivist methods but by using one’s own dreaming experience. We can understand the other because we have enough similar experience to put ourselves imaginatively into the other’s experience and know what the other means.

What must be emphasized here is that although our understanding of others is not objective, neither is it relative. When a child says “I’m going to
play baseball,” the statement is not interpretable relative to each listener. It means the child is leaving with the intent of playing a certain game with certain rules. That meaning is not dependent on the interpretation of the listener. Anyone who thought that the child was going to sit on a park bench would not understand the meaning of the statement. The fact that such meanings are grasped without “objective” evidence indicates the existence of subjective knowledge, knowledge of meanings and motivation understood in their immediacy, what Dilthey calls verstehen.

The subject of meaning takes us beyond the dichotomy of objectivism and relativism. As the hermeneutic philosopher Hans Georg Gadamer (1976) has pointed out, meaning is neither “objective,” subject to observable proof, nor relative to the viewpoint of the observer. The meaning of speech inheres in the speech act, but it requires listening to be brought to completion (Gadamer, 1976; Bernstein, 1981). In this way, Gadamer intends to show us that meaning lies beyond the relativist-objectivist distinction. Any act of speech, like any historical document or other form of human behavior, is not interpretable in any way the observer or listener chooses, but interpretation by an other is required to complete the act of meaning. Although interpretation is limited by the meaning that inheres in the speech, there is no objective way to arrive at meaning. Knowledge of meaning is subjective knowledge. Relativism does not distinguish between the subjective and the subjective-relative because it presumes all knowledge to be objective.
Borrowing a phrase from his teacher Heidegger, Gadamer has pointed out that the myth of objectivism is that we can somehow get beyond our “world horizon,” the context of our experience. Some relational theorists have used Gadamer’s thought to justify the relativist view that the analyst’s understanding is limited to a given viewpoint. In fact, Gadamer was as opposed to relativism as he was to objectivism. The fact that our horizon is part of our experience does not mean that we cannot understand another world horizon. In fact, Gadamer points out that we do just that: understanding the other is what he calls a “fusion of horizons.” Gadamer pointed out that far from being imprisoned in our language, the very essence of language involves a transcendent function. Language is open and continually changing with new experience. It is this openness of language that allows for the fusion of horizons, the understanding of the other.

Similarly, Gadamer sees and appreciates the multiplicity of viewpoints in any understanding of the other. There are typically several ways to interpret human data, whether the evidence be historical, anthropological, or psychological. The self possessing inherent multiplicity, any particular experiential moment can be viewed from different vantage points. As we have seen, Schafer concluded from this fact that the analyst’s knowledge is relative, but this conclusion does not follow any more than the fact that many different correct statements may be made about a chair means that the perception of the chair is relative. Different aspects of self experience can be highlighted at

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any given moment, just as a number of different truthful statements may be made about a chair. The fact that several different interpretations accurately reflect an aspect of self experience does not vitiate the truth of any particular interpretation.

If we cannot find any corresponding experience of our own with which to grasp what we are being told, we are mystified, and if we wish to understand, we ask questions about the meaning in an effort to find something that we can grasp from our own experience. If our dialogical inquiry is successful in establishing this common ground, we then build by a series of inferences to arrive at understanding. This process consists of a kind of reasoning, an empathic reasoning that is the basis for psychoanalytic reasoning. As Strenger (1991) puts it, “. . . analytic reasoning can be broken down into thought processes which every human being performs constantly. The analyst’s implicit knowledge about the appropriateness of behavior, thought, and emotion is not that far removed from the ordinary sensibilities of mature members of a culture” (p. 93). Psychoanalytic understanding, then, is no more and no less than a highly sensitized refinement of the empathy used in everyday communication.

Similarly, the understanding of unconscious motivation is built on everyday human interaction. For example, we notice that every time Joe buys something, Henry buys a better, more expensive brand of the same item.
When Henry denies that he feels any competition with Joe, we do not believe him; we believe his pattern of behavior. In so doing, we ascribe an unconscious motive to Henry. We can be certain of our interpretation because we know what it is like to be competitive and even how it feels to not want to acknowledge our competitiveness. It is this ordinary understanding of motives on which psychoanalysis builds its more complicated, depth understanding of human motivation. The difference between the analyst and everyday interaction is that the analyst uses the unique methods of psychoanalytic inquiry to ascertain why Henry is so competitive with Joe and why he cannot see this transparent motivation.

In the psychoanalytic arena, both Kohut (1959) and Waelder (1962) put the foundation of psychoanalytic understanding in everyday human interaction by defining its method as empathy and introspection. When Kohut defined empathy as vicarious introspection, he adopted the view that the source of psychoanalytic knowledge of the other is the analyst’s experience that allows him to put himself in the patient’s place and see the world from the patient’s viewpoint. Kohut pointed out that without empathy and introspection inquiry is limited to either externally-observed behavior or the somatic realm, neither of which is the domain of psychological facts. By defining psychoanalytic tools as empathy and introspection, Kohut grounded the discipline as a self-sufficient domain. In this way, Kohut applied at the clinical level what Husserl founded on the philosophical level; empathy is the
unique method of understanding the other and all findings of a science of the other result from it.

These considerations show that the postmodern scientific paradigm cannot be the basis of psychological science as has been advocated by Toulmin (1986). According to this philosopher, the recognition of the dependence of the observed on the observer in modern physics issues in a postmodern scientific paradigm that can be applied to psychoanalysis. In this paradigm, however it may differ from its classical counterpart, the attitude of the scientist remains one of abstracting from experience to quantify observed data. For this reason, the postmodern scientific paradigm can never be used as a basis for a science of the experiencing subject. Unfortunately, Kohut could not resist the temptation to attempt to found the psychoanalytic method on postmodern science. By arguing for the justification of the empathic and introspective methods on the basis of the postmodern recognition of the dependence of the observer on the observed, Kohut attenuated the self-sufficiency of psychoanalysis he had achieved by defining the field as the domain of empathy and introspection. This move is unnecessary once psychoanalysis is defined by empathy and introspection because these tools define a self-sufficient method of understanding the other.

Richard Rorty (1980, 1981), a contemporary postmodernist philosopher, attacks the belief that knowledge can be founded. Rorty takes
the postmodernist insistence on the dependence of the observed on the observer to the conclusion that truth is whatever is perceived at a given time. Consequently, for Rorty, “truth” is whatever consensus is achieved at the moment and is subject to change with shifting consensual agreement. Like all relativists, Rorty contends that his views do not mean that any opinion is as good as any other. However, as with all relativists, his abdication of any basis for truth claims leaves him unable to provide criteria by which to adjudicate among conflicting truth claims. His contention that not all opinions are equal requires a transcendent category, such as reason, to adjudicate among truth claims. His denial of such categories leaves him no way to avoid solipsism.

The dependence of the observed on the observer so emphasized by relativists such as Hoffman has its foundation not in any paradigm of the natural sciences but in the intentionality of consciousness (Husserl, 1913/1931). Because consciousness intends an object and the world can be known only via our experience of it, neither the world nor consciousness can be conceived of without the other. This mutual dependence does not mean that perception is “relative,” but that the world and consciousness are “cogiven” (Husserl, 1931/1969). Indeed Husserl, who illuminated this connection, showed that our concepts of reality and fantasy, as well as all other acts of consciousness, are built into the structure of consciousness. We decide that something is real rather than fantasied when the experience fits a rational coherence. The fact that we know the world only through our experience of it,
rather than somehow “relativizing” our knowledge of the world, is the very structure of any such knowledge.

Any interpretation that fits the clinical data is epistemologically valid, but among the possible interpretations, the decision of which is used at any given moment is a clinical judgment. Good clinical technique requires the analyst to choose the interpretation that has the most transference meaning, affective resonance, and utility for the patient. Relativists such as Schafer confuse this clinical judgment with the epistemological validity of interpretation. The fact that no "particular interpretation is compelled by the data” only means that there is more than one possible accurate interpretation, the choice of which is made for clinical reasons, not that the analyst’s knowledge is “relative."

Relativism fails to see that transcendent categories are built into understanding. The relativist cannot even state his position without appeal to such categories. Analogously, objectivism, to claim its own position, relies on subjective knowledge that it does not believe exists. This is why both relativism and objectivism are contradictory: they rely on the type of knowledge they claim does not exist. This type of knowledge allows us to understand each other and is the basis for psychoanalytic knowing.

As the science of understanding the other, psychoanalysis uses the
method that befits its object of investigation. Thus, Kohut’s definition of the psychoanalytic method as one of empathy and introspection does not make psychoanalysis a “soft science” of imprecise methods as charged by objectivists, such as Holzman (1985), but defines the very nature of the science of the other and fits the method to the subject of investigation.

When we ascribe a motive or meaning to the other, we judge its validity by what it explains, how it fits, the other’s actions and behavior. The subject matter of psychoanalysis is precisely the meaning of experience. It follows that coherence is the criterion for interpretive accuracy, and interpretations that do not fit the self experience are inaccurate, just as in ordinary discourse to call a generous person “selfish” does not fit and is, therefore, inaccurate.

For example, the analyst who hypothesizes that her patient sabotages her successes out of excessive guilt due to an oedipal victory, derives from the patient’s experience of mother, father, and guilt an explanatory principle by which she hopes to understand the meaning of success and positive experience, their connection with guilt, and related phenomena. The interpretation is accurate to the extent that it makes intelligible the patient’s pattern of ruining successful experiences. If analytic material arises that does not fit this explanation, it must be abandoned or modified.

It is a strength of relativism that it tends to use coherence as the
criterion of interpretive validity. However, relativists do not see that they contradict their relativism by its espousal because coherence is not relative but a transcendent category. As we have seen, the relativist is unable to account for why an interpretation that “fits” is preferred to one that does not. We can now see why: coherence is the criterion for reality. The basis of the principle of coherence is that rational fitting together is the criterion for reality (Husserl, 1913/1931). *Narrative* coherence is an insufficient criterion for interpretive validity, as we saw above. An interpretation does not simply make a story, it makes intelligible that which had been unexplained. The interpretation that best fits is preferred due to its approximation to the reality of the patient’s experience and ability to articulate the previously nonverbalized aspects of it. Other interpretations are always possible, but their validity must be argued on the basis of their ability to account for the unintelligible.

Unlike relativists, objectivists see that if psychoanalysis is to be a legitimate science, it must have a concept of reality and be able to make truth claims. Objectivists see the importance of criteria for truth, but they have the wrong ones. Relativists have the right criteria, but do not see that their standards for interpretive validity are transcendent, defining reality and contradicting the relativist position. The human science model adopts the relativist’s way of understanding analytic material, but in a nonrelativist fashion.
Interpretations of motives are valid to the extent that they can account for actions, that is, the extent to which behavior and actions fit the motive. The interpretation that does not fit is a "blind constitution" (Husserl, 1913/1931) and must be abandoned. The elucidation of individual principles from which the meaning of behavior can be derived is the psychoanalytic understanding of motivation. If other behavior does not fit the interpretation, it must be modified, abandoned, or supplemented with other principles.

This human science criterion does not mean that psychoanalysis can avoid the responsibility of demonstrating its effectiveness compared to other therapeutic methods. However, any such investigation must be kept clearly separate from the validity of: (1) psychoanalysis as an interpretive science; and (2) any particular interpretation.

Psychoanalysis adds to the ordinary experiencing of others the finding that others’ motives, although in principle understandable, are often hidden from view. The uncovering of meaning and motives outside of awareness, but accessible in principle, is the unique subject of psychoanalytic investigation. To achieve this end, psychoanalysis uses a specialized method of depth exploration: free association, dream interpretation, and transference. Thus, the science of psychoanalysis may be defined as the systematic, depth investigation of previously unknown meaning and motivation in the other resulting from a unique method of inquiry. These uniquely psychoanalytic
tools are technical refinements of ordinary empathy and introspection.

The human science model provides the means for psychoanalysis to pursue its unique search for truth freed from blind faith in objective truth, a faith that has fostered a reductionistic self-misunderstanding and created obstacles to analytic progress. The abandonment of this faith does not damage the analyst’s claim to knowledge, as implied in both relativism and objectivism; rather, it allows the analyst to appreciate the uniqueness of the understanding of others and to conduct psychoanalytic inquiry with criteria befitting its object of investigation. Only by recognizing the distinctive character of human science can the rich uniqueness of psychoanalytic understanding be appreciated and the full potential of psychoanalytic science be realized.

References


Freud (1895/1966) dreamed of grounding his theory of the mind in the neurological science of his day. His project for a scientific psychology was never realized because 19th century neuroscience could not account for higher mental functions. Today, empirically based theories of neurological organization and development are coming close to actualizing Freud’s dream: a beginning unification of the brain and the mind (Edelman, 1992). Dynamic Systems Theory (see Thelen & Smith, 1994) is the vehicle that unifies body, mind, and behavior into a single operating system. It describes how living systems self-organize and transform themselves into increasingly complex entities as well as how these systems interrelate with one another and with their environments.

As a root paradigm for organization and change Dynamic Systems Theory enables an integration of many diverse psychoanalytic theories and practices, permitting a robust understanding of human development and of the techniques required to change both normal and pathological
organizations of the mind (Miller, 1999). While preserving the essence of psychoanalysis as a method for changing the unconscious pathological elements that organize maladaptive behavior. Dynamic Systems Theory changes the focus of analytic treatment from the recovery and reconciliation of repressed or dissociated memories, wishes, and fantasies to the active restructuring of the mind within the context of the therapeutic interaction. From this perspective it is the analyst’s active engagement of the patient that initiates change in a patient’s mental organization.

The idea that a patient’s psychopathology is affected by the analyst’s behavior is not a new one, having roots in both the American and British schools of psychoanalysis. What is new within modern and postmodern psychoanalysis is the pivotal role of transference-countertransference enactments in the therapeutic process. The postmodern psychoanalytic enterprise is focused on understanding and working with the elements of enactment (Maroda, 1998). These elements include the centrality of the interpersonal and intersubjective relationship between the patient and the analyst and their coconstruction of meaning, the importance of context and of the here and now in determining the content and form of the patient’s and the analyst’s self experience and of the transference-countertransference dialogue, the pivotal role of affect and state in the therapeutic process, the pervasive influence of the analyst’s countertransference, and the interaction of dynamic memories, dissociation, and here and now experience in evoking
the multiplicity of self-states that define and fracture the therapeutic dyad (Aron, 1996; Bromberg, 1996; Davies, 1996; Hirsch, 1996; Stem, 1997).

Though postmodernists recognize the centrality of these interactive processes for understanding the development and expression of a patient’s mental states, when it comes to changing these mental states they focus on transforming the mental contents that determine these states in the patient through reflective understanding (Levenson, 1996). Postmodern psychoanalysts continue to see interpretation as the mutative force in treatment. The goal is to make conscious the unconscious mental contents and associated self-states that contribute to an enactment through their transformation into verbal symbols for self-reflective manipulation (Stem, 1997). Postmodern analysts continue to rely on changing psychic contents through reflective understanding because postmodern theories do not include a model of the mind or a paradigm of development and change that describes how to effect alterations in psychic content and self-states other than by the conscious reconfiguration of verbal symbols. Consequently there is a split in postmodern psychoanalytic theories between an orientation on process in how the patient and analyst come to know and understand one another and a focus on psychic content and its self-reflective manipulation in what the analyst does in helping a patient change.

A new school of psychoanalysts (Beebe & Lachmann, 1998; Clyman,
1991; Fonagy, 1999; Lichtenberg, Lachmann, & Fosshage, 1992; Lyons-Ruth, 1998; Miller, 1996, 1999) posits a resolution to this problem by proposing that psychic contents and their associated self-states can be changed through altering the nonconscious mental procedures that organized and maintain these contents and states. Their approach is grounded in dynamic-systems-inspired research and theory that suggests that the mind is organized and self-states regulated by nonconscious procedures that self-organize in interaction with other minds, other human beings.

This chapter reviews the neurobiological, cognitive-developmental, and attachment research and theory underlying this approach and then presents the implications of this perspective for psychoanalytic practice. The principal thesis of the chapter is that it is the activity of the analyst on the patient that induces a patient to reconfigure the implicit mental procedures that organize his or her mind and regulate self-states.

**DYNAMIC SYSTEMS THEORY**

Dynamic systems theory explains how physical, biological, and social systems self-organize and how these systems change from one state of organization to another (see Butz, 1997, for a review). The theory posits that living entities self-organize through the co-operative action of elements in an environment that are attracted to one another. As the elements join together
their ways of joining determine the structure and function of the entity they form. The act of coupling transforms the elements into an ordered and stable system of co-operating elements which returns to the environment energy and information that is the product of this transformation. A living system comes into being and continues to exist through the exchange of energy and information with the environment from which it emerged.

Within its environmental context a system prefers a particular organizational state or a set of organizational states that it cycles through. These preferred states represent the dynamic attractors of the system. Attractor states are the states to which cooperative, sustaining elements are drawn. The path taken by the system from one preferred state to another defines its developmental trajectory through time—a trajectory that is extremely sensitive to the initial conditions of the system’s formation for its direction. Systems compete for sustaining resources in their econiche. In this competitive environment co-operation between systems increases the likelihood of survival and, consequently, fosters the development of increasingly novel, complex, and adaptive structures.

Living systems transform themselves into more complex and adaptive forms in both continuous and discontinuous ways. Continuous evolution involves the transformation of a system into a more complex form while maintaining its overall stability. Complex systems maintain stability during
periods of growth because earlier organizational structures are used as the templates for subsequent development and because these systems self-organize hierarchically. Each succeeding level of complexity builds upon that which proceeded it. Development is also constrained by the environment. Living systems structure themselves in relationship to the environmental forces impinging upon them. They internally model these exogenous forces by creating homeostatic, regulatory mechanisms that enable the system to maintain stability as these impinging forces change.

Complex adaptive systems can transform themselves into qualitatively new organizational forms through a process of discontinuous change. External (environmental) or internal (systemic) pressure on a system can cause the system to pass from a state of ordered stability to a state of chaotic instability. In the chaotic state the components of the system are relatively free to interact with one another to form new combinations. The move from order to disorder irreversibly alters the trajectory of the system, enabling the system to organize itself in a qualitatively new way. This nonlinear dynamic is the source of rapid, discontinuous change in system states.

**NEUROBIOLOGY OF THE HUMAN DYNAMIC SYSTEM**

Human beings are complex adaptive systems that self-organize and develop according to the principles just described. The human brain self-
organizes through interacting with the social and physical world. Perception, action, cognition, and emotion are rooted in the dynamic process of pattern formation. Patterns of neuronal firing reflect the experience of acting in and perceiving the world. The patterns that form the concepts which structure the mind grow out of the bodily experience of interacting with the physical and social surround and serve to make sense of it. The body, brain, and mind together form a single dynamic system. The characteristics of this complex adaptive system reflect the social and physical environments out of which it has emerged and to which it has to adapt.

Following Edelman’s theory of Neuronal Group Selection (1987), categories of experience (i.e., concepts) self-organize through multimodal correlations of neuronal patterns in real time. For example, in forming a concept of mother an infant visually scans the mother’s face, smells her milk, feels her skin with its lips and body, and experiences its own body in a particular position in relationship to mother’s. Each of these independent sensations of the same object, mother, is neuronally patterned in its own sensory area of the brain, called a first-order mapping. These individual mappings are then remapped on top of one another to create a second-order neural map of the object. The concept of mother, the second-order map, emerges from the real-time correlation of these independent samplings of the same object. The correlation of two or more qualitatively different glosses on the same perceptual information in real time creates our concept of an object.
Concepts are not stored in particular locations in the brain. Rather, categories of experience are bursts of synchronized, mutually reinforcing neuronal patterning that emerge in the context of ongoing activity. In that these second-order maps are activity dependent, what we perceive depends in a precise time-locked fashion on what we do.

Second-order maps perceptually categorize objects in the environment in what Damasio (1999) and Schore (1994) call convergence centers, located in the frontal, orbitofrontal, temporal, and parietal areas of the cerebral cortex. These convergence center maps are synaptically linked to the subcortical hedonic centers of the limbic system (the brainstem, reticular formation, hypothalamus, and amygdala) which measure and represent changes in the internal states of the body. Damasio conceptualizes the representation of the body's internal states as the protoself. The integration of the protoself with the second-order maps of objects links the actions of objects on the self to changes in the states of the self. The synaptic interaction of these subcortical hedonic centers, which control homeostatic, appetitive, and consummatory needs as well as emotional reactivity, with the cortical representation of external stimuli creates affectively toned, state-dependent neural maps. Edelman (1987, 1992) proposes that these state-dependent categories of experience, which he calls value-category memory, influence the perceptual categorization of external stimuli by valuing or selecting certain stimuli over others in order to satisfy and regulate the needs of the individual.
The experience of objects causing changes in the body is, for Damasio (1999), the birth of core consciousness: feeling the feelings of being affected by the environment. Similarly, Edelman (1992) conceptualizes core consciousness as the recategorization of lived experience in terms of value-category memory, which he calls the remembered present. The awareness of the self-feeling is the essence of core consciousness. It is a context-dependent experience of the self interacting with the environment.

Damasio (1999) and Edelman (1992) suggest that core consciousness is itself the object of recategorization. This recategorization creates higher order, extended consciousness and self-reflective awareness that is often mediated by mental images, words, and symbols. It comes about in the following way: repeated interactions with the social and physical environments selectively forms patterns of neural activity into stable attractor states. These implicit, nonconscious firing dispositions reflect past interactions with specific objects and contexts. The dispositions or attractor states form longterm autobiographical memory. When these autobiographical memories are activated by an individual interacting with objects or contexts that are similar to those which formed the attractor state, their activation influences the perceptual categorization of the here and now. The recategorization of core consciousness in terms of autobiographical memory adds a sense of personal history to the experience of the here and now as well as provides a model upon which to create expectations about the outcomes of
actions and about future events. It also creates a sense of self with a past and a future, liberating the experience of self from the here and now constraints of core consciousness. And, with the abilities to symbolically represent declarative (autobiographical, semantic, and episodic) memory, to manipulate these symbols, and to reason about mental contents consciousness is expanded to include imagination, creativity, and a higher order sense of self that is often thought of as conscience.

The correlation of longterm declarative memory circuits with second-order maps, linking perceptual categorization of objects with value-category maps of the body, creates global, superordinate neural patterns. These superordinate maps not only influence the organization of their subordinate maps, but the subordinate mappings simultaneously influence the composition of these global mappings, creating reverberating, mutually influencing neural circuits. Thus, the mind and body form an emotional or state-dependent system. Perception, thought, action, and bodily experience form an integrated, mutually reinforcing dynamic system that is itself a reflection of the system's interaction with specific environmental contexts.

Since perceptual categorization and global mappings are altered by ongoing activity, memory in a dynamic systems model results from a process of continual recategorization (Edelman, 1987). Memory is not only inexact but messy as well. By its very nature memory is procedural and involves
continual motor activity and repeated rehearsal in different contexts. Because of the new associations arising in these varied contexts, because of changing inputs and stimuli, and because different combinations of neural groups can give rise to similar output, a given categorical response in memory can be achieved in several ways (Edelman, 1992). Thus, memory is not rigid or fixed, but highly dependent on the whole context of the current situation and the history of the remembered category. Each memory is dynamically constructed from many, but not all, of the previously facilitated connections, and, as a dynamic attractor, a memory may also pull in associations not previously included in that category. Because categories of experience are probabilistic and context-bound, the memories that are based on these categories are fluid and inexact (Thelen & Smith, 1994).

Behavior too is messy, fluid, and highly context-dependent when looked at from the level of what a person does in a specific context. Yet, from the perspective of the individual organism behavior may appear predictably regular and ordered. From a dynamic systems perspective global order (i.e., a general category of experience) and local variability (its contextual expression) are tied together in a way that gives context a special status. Thelen and Smith (1994) posit that context—the immediate here and now—effects what we know and how we act in three ways: (1) Context makes global order in that global order is the history of perceiving and acting in specific contexts. It is through repeated here and now experiences that global order is
elaborated. (2) Context determines global order in that context selects the concept or behavior to be used. (3) Context adapts global order to fit the task at hand. Context makes, selects, and adapts what we know because knowledge is only manifest in a real-time task. Since global order is made by and made manifest in the details of the here and now, it is fundamentally always context-dependent.

ATTACHMENT RELATIONSHIPS AND SELF-ORGANIZATION

Every person is a self-organizing system that creates his or her own states of brain organization. These organizations are initially formed and subsequently developed into more coherent, complex, and adaptive states through coupling with another self-organizing system, another individual. The environment within which human beings self-organize is their attachment relationships to other human beings. A major function of the attachment relationship is to promote a synchrony of biological, behavioral, and self systems within and between the individuals that constitute this environment.

Schore (1994) and others (Emde, 1990; Stem, 1985; Tronick, 1989) posit that the coupling of human systems is first and foremost an emotional joining between two independent selves. A mother and infant, for example, form a system of contingent responsivity in which they exchange biologically
significant information about each other’s state-of-being through the emotions they express. This dynamic state sharing creates an organized dialogue between mother and infant in which both partners match states and then simultaneously adjust their social attention, stimulation, and arousal in response to signals from the other. In exchanging this information about their subjective states, mother and infant together constitute a dynamic system in which their individual homeostatic systems are open, linked, and accessible to regulation from the other.

The critical emergent property of the mutual regulation of emotion between mother and infant is the creation of a singular dyadic state of organization. Tronick (1998) thinks of this shared state as a dyadic expansion of consciousness in which the participants’ individual states of consciousness (i.e., brain organization) become dyadic and expanded to incorporate elements of consciousness of the other in a new and more coherent form. The mother-infant system contains more information, is more complex and coherent, than either the infant’s or mother’s state of consciousness alone. When this dyadic state of consciousness is achieved there is a restructuring and change in the present and past mental organization of both the infant and the mother.

The creation of this dyadic state of consciousness requires a reciprocal mapping of some of the elements of each partner’s state-of-being onto the
other partner’s brain. Though reciprocal, this mapping process will be illustrated from the perspective of the infant in a mother-infant pair. Schore (1994) posits that mutual mapping occurs when the infant’s bodily states are changed by the mother’s regulation of the child’s autonomic nervous system. During attachment experiences the mother resonates with and then modulates changes in the infant’s arousal levels and, consequently, in its energetic state. This experience-dependent process influences the creation and stabilization of the neurological circuitry that links the infant’s cortical maps representing external objects with the sub-cortical maps representing bodily experience.

The mother’s selective attunement to the infant’s self-states functions as an agent of natural selection in shaping these circuits, thereby influencing the emergence of the infant’s sense of self. This selective shaping of the neural circuitry enables the infant’s brain to self organize into increasingly complex forms which are functionally attuned to the contexts in which they were reinforced.

For example, in studying the dyadic structuralization of the brain, Dawson and her colleagues (Dawson et al., 1999a, 1999b) found that in comparison to nondepressed mothers depressed mothers more often matched negative states with their infants than they shared positive states. Their interactions with their infants were insensitive and noncontingent (e.g.,
unsolicited tickling, poking, and touching). Depressed mothers responded to their infant's bid for attention by withdrawing, holding or moving the infant away, or by rejecting contact. They were also less likely to repair interrupted interactions and to right dysregulated states.

The infants of depressed mothers were less affectionate and less likely to touch their mothers than the infants of nondepressed mothers. They were more aggressive toward mother and more demanding of her attention. They tended to be withdrawn, less active, and to exhibit diminished positive affect. They experienced negative emotions and poorly regulated states of arousal more frequently than did the infants of nondepressed mothers.

Dawson’s EEG recordings of the study subjects showed that depressed mothers amplified the neuronal circuits in their infants involved in the experience of negative affect while failing to amplify the neuronal circuits involved in the creation of positive affect. The noncontingent, insensitive, and nonreparatory behavior of depressed mothers failed to develop the neurological circuitry their infants required to regulate emotional experience and control behavior. Children and adults whose EEG patterns match those of Dawson’s infants of depressed mothers have difficulties with affect regulation, impaired social perception and judgment, and low self-esteem (Schore, 1997).
The stabilization of these experientially selected neuronal circuits may be thought of as the attractor states of the self-system, memories inherent in the reverberating circuitry itself, that can maintain the system’s organization by acting as adaptive homeostatic regulatory mechanisms that allow for stability in the face of external variation. Of particular importance in the regulation of emotional states and in adapting to changes in the social surround, posits Schore (1994, 1997), are two cortical-subcortical circuits: the excitatory (sympathetic) limbic circuit, which is involved in the generation of positively valenced motivational states, and the inhibitory (parasympathetic) limbic circuit, which stimulates negatively toned states. These two circuits join with circuits from virtually all other areas of the brain in a convergence zone in the orbital prefrontal cortex of the right hemisphere. In this center, the perception of an environmental stimulus is emotionally tagged with a positive or a negative valence and an adaptive response, either energy expanding or energy conserving, is initiated. In this way are changes in the external environment appraised, internally modeled, and adapted to in personally meaningful ways.

Social appraisals and adaptations are accomplished at levels beneath conscious awareness by multimodal sensory scanning of the environment, and the attractor states formed act as nonconscious biases that guide behavior. The set of attractor states created regulate affect and motivation, maintain self-organization through emotional equilibrium, and store internal
working models of interactions with others that contain information about state transitions and resolving emotional disequilibrium. These attractor states and the neural circuits from which these states emerge are a person’s procedural memory for maintaining self-cohesion in interaction with the environment.

Since the attractor states formed are dynamically assembled, the system is capable of rapidly changing between states as new external or internal conditions destabilize the current organization thereby allowing a new interpretation to form. The chaotic variability of this open self-regulatory system enables it to adapt flexibly to an ever-changing environment. In that these regulatory procedures and their emergent attractor states are constituted by the right hemisphere, emotional homeostasis and social adaptation are achieved principally through bidirectional right brain to right brain nonverbal communication of emotional information between the individuals who are forming an adaptive system (see Schore, 1994, for a review).

EMPIRICAL VALIDATION

This dynamic systems model has been validated by attachment studies (Main, 2000; Schore, 1997). Different types of attachment dynamics have been shown to produce different types of internal working models.
Caregivers who contingently and flexibly respond to their children create synchronized states of autonomic homeostasis in which sympathetic and parasympathetic components operate reciprocally enabling the children to organize and to regulate self-states, especially under stress (Schore, 1997). These securely attached children have a system of regulatory procedures that can adaptively change in response to environmental perturbations, yet retain continuity. Their internal working models are open to forming a dyadic homeostatic relationship with another human being. Their interactions with others are collaborative and reciprocal.

Children who experience frequent attachment disruptions, are chronically exposed to stressful states, or have interactions with an emotionally unresponsive or misattuned caregiver generate nonsynchronized states of autonomic homeostasis in which sympathetic and parasympathetic components can not operate reciprocally, making it difficult for these children to organize and regulate self-states (Schore, 1997).

Mothers of children who have insecure resistant/ambivalent attachments have been shown to be insensitive to their children’s signals and unpredictable in their responses to them (Main, 2000). They have difficulties regulating their own emotions, are intrusive, and exhibit self/other confusion. These ways of relating encourage hyperarousal in their children, expanding the sympathetic system while diminishing the inhibitory parasympathetic
system. Biased toward states of high arousal these children have difficulty inhibiting their emotions and controlling their negative thoughts (Schore, 1997). They underregulate themselves and tend to hyperactivate their attachments systems when stressed so as to have others aid in reducing anxiety and distress and in reinforcing positively valenced emotions. They are so focused on their attachments, exhibiting clinging and controlling behaviors, that they cannot disengage from the others when these others are the source of the child’s distress (Main, 2000).

Children with insecure-avoidant attachment styles have their inhibitory, parasympathetic circuits reinforced in interactions with mothers who are rejecting of their child’s attachment, adverse to tactile contact, emotionally withdrawn, and interactively noncollaborative (Main, 2000; Schore, 1997). These children are biased toward reduced emotionality and states of low arousal. They tend to overregulate themselves, have low accessibility to negative memories, avoid emotional contact with others, and are overly self-reliant. Under stress insecure avoidant children regulate their emotional states by deactivating their attachment system, closing themselves off to the influence of others.

Internal working models embody the procedural memories that mediate affect regulation, self-esteem maintenance, social adaptation in times of stress, and relations with others. The implicit regulatory procedures that
comprise these models are transmitted from caregiver to child, with the child developing a unique model for each specific caregiver (Main, 2000). The models have been shown to form general dispositions, superordinate attractor states, that mediate attachments with others over the life span.

Longitudinal studies by Waters et al. (2000) and Main (2000) show that under ordinary life circumstances working models remain stable over decades, but they are open to change when significant life events change caregiver behavior toward the individual. Pietromonaco and Feldman Barrett (2000) conceptualize a person's attachment style as an “attachment trajectory” that occurs over one's life span. Interactions with the primary caregiver early in life lay the basic set of regulatory procedures which is then elaborated in complexity and diversity by relationships with subsequent attachment figures. Studies by Hazan and Shaver (1987), Main (20(H)), Mikulincer (1995), and Pietromonaco and Feldman (1997) found that securely and insecurely attached adults exhibit the same implicit regulatory procedures as do their childhood counterparts. When they are distressed, secure, avoidant, and anxious/ambivalent adults deploy their attachment systems in the regulation of self-states in the same way as the children with a matching attachment classification. Mikulincer (1998) and his colleagues (Mikulincer, Orbach, & Iavnieli, 1998) have also shown that in adults the implicit regulatory procedures that make up their internal working models are subject to modification by alterations in the behavior of attachment
figures toward the individual or by changes in the context in which the attachment behavior occurs.

**IMPLICATIONS FOR PSYCHOANALYTIC PRACTICE**

In order to change how a patient organizes and regulates self-states, relates to others, and interprets lived experience, the implicit procedures by which these states and concepts are neurologically encoded must be altered. The process by which these neurologically based procedures and their emergent organizations of self are transformed is the same process by which these dynamic organizations were constituted and sustained: through the regulation of self-experience within the adaptive context of an individual's attachments to significant others. It is, therefore, through the analyst's engagement of a patient's attachment system that the internal working models that organize and regulate self-experience and coordinate it with another are made manifest and open to modification.

The analyst facilitates the unfolding of a patient's attachment system by the ways in which the analyst responds to the patient in the process of coordinating their individual self-states into a single dyadic system. Furthermore, it is in the process of forming and transforming their dyadic system that the analyst influences the implicit procedures that structure the patient's internal working models. The patient and the analyst mutate their
jointly constructed system, and their individual working models, into increasingly adaptive forms in the course of simultaneously adapting to one another through the contexts of meaning that define their connection.

**TRANSFERENCE-COUNTERTRANSFERENCE ENACTMENTS AS VENUE OF TREATMENT**

As the patient and the analyst synchronize their states over the vicissitudes of their interactions, their jointly constructed dynamic system grows in complexity and depth, accumulating a set of ways in which the patient and the analyst typically interact. These patterns of interaction recursively and thematically structure their relationship, forming a latticework of attractor states for understanding and relating to one another. If we define transference as the states of the patient that emerge from these typical ways of interacting with the analyst and countertransference as the states of the analyst that emerge from these recursive patterns, the venue of working on the implicit organizing procedures that issue these states is in the transference-countertransference dialogue.

The interpersonal, role-responsive (Sandler, 1976) nature of coordinating states makes psychoanalytic treatment a series of transference-countertransference enactments. Enactments are the actualization (Sandler, 1976) within the patient-analyst dynamic system of the affective states, beliefs, and expectations generated by the assimilation of the analytic
interaction to the activated internal models of the patient and the analyst. Based on implicit social appraisals of their own and the other’s reactions and behavior, the patient and the analyst work to make the other conform to their internal models (psychic representations) of how reality should be. In this way intrapsychic experience is rendered interpersonally, making the procedures that organize subjective experience, and the meaningful embodiment of that experience in personal beliefs and expectations (Dorpat & Miller, 1992), the basis of the negotiations between the patient and the analyst in the coconstruction of their dynamic system; a system that weaves individual subjectivities into an evolving, complex intersubjective matrix. Enactments are thus the intersubjective container or context of meaning within which the implicit organizing schemes of the patient and of the analyst are coordinated in terms of their here and now interaction. It is on this interpersonal organization and the meanings that emerge from this interaction that psychoanalytic interventions operate.

THE REAL-TIME, CONTEXT-DEPENDENT NATURE OF THE ANALYTIC INTERACTION

Analytic treatment focuses on the states that emerge within transference–countertransference enactments. From the patient’s perspective, these states are the product of the recategorization of the patient’s past experience with significant others, including the analyst, in
terms of the feelings and values activated in interaction with the analyst. The here and now context selects the internal working models and associated general dispositions of the patient to fit as best as is possible the specific features of the current moment with the analyst. The patient then adapts or repattems the implicit regulatory procedures underlying these models and dispositions to fit the here and now context, creating states that are a unique reflection of the patient’s interaction with the analyst. These states are a real-time response to the activity of the analyst in relation to the patient. It is the analyst’s activity—be it the analyst’s ways of modulating the patient’s emotions, attending to disruptions in their connection, or interpreting the meaning of the patient’s behavior—that call out and then influence the implicit procedures that organize the patient’s adaptation to the analytic interaction.

Reciprocally, the states of the analyst are his or her adaptive response to the patient’s behavior. The analyst’s capacity to understand the patient’s experience and to respond appropriately reflects the degree to which the analyst’s internal working models have remained open to the patient’s influence. To be effectively resonant with the formation and transformation of the patient-analyst system, the analyst’s behavior must reflect his or her genuine and authentic experience of the patient. The dispositions and actions of the analyst must be allowed to reorganize freely to fit the here and now moment with the patient.
The analyst’s responses and activity cannot be scripted or programmed. They must be allowed to emerge naturally in response to the quality of analytic interaction. Stem (1998) has aptly likened the analyst’s therapeutic behavior to musical improvisation: the analyst responds authentically and immediately to the feelings and meanings evoked by the here-and-now encounter with the patient, while allowing his or her implicit self knowledge, training, understanding of the patient, and adherence to the transference-countertransference themes to inform his or her spontaneous behavior.

PSYCHOANALYTIC INTERVENTIONS

The therapeutic action of psychoanalytic interventions occurs in the process of forming, maintaining, and transforming the patient-analyst dynamic system. Interventions are activities by the analyst that impact the implicit regulatory procedures that a patient uses in adapting to the behavior of the analyst.

In coordinating their individual working models into a dyadic dynamic system, the patient and the analyst work to understand and adaptively respond to one another. This process of mutual adaptation requires that the patient and the analyst continuously exchange information about their moment to moment states-of-being. To this end the patient and the analyst consciously voice and nonconsciously express their emotional reactions to
the ideas and feelings exchanged between them. They then consciously and nonconsciously attempt to coordinate their own state with what they have perceived in the other by altering their own experience to match that of the other or by influencing the other to match, validate, or complement their internal state through the emotions expressed in their behavior, voicing, and statements.

The achievement of a coordinated state constitutes the formation of a working dynamic system. It is a jointly constructed intersubjective state of shared consciousness within which the mind of the patient and the mind of the analyst are expanded into more complex, coherent, and adaptive forms by the inclusion of aspects of the other’s experience. The reciprocal mapping of elements of each participant’s experience onto the brain of the other provides the pair with the means to reformat their existing neuronal maps, and, thereby, to recategorize the experiences these maps embody to reflect the experience of the therapeutic relationship.

The analytic relationship is in a constant state of movement as patient and analyst negotiate the issues and events that define their connection. Coordinated states give way to miscoordinated states, attunement to misattunement, and union to disunion. So in addition to the ways in which the patient and analyst form and maintain their dynamic system, the ways in which both the patient and the analyst work to repair disruptions in their
connection, understand empathic failures, and right dysregulated states are incorporated into procedures that constitute and transform their dynamic system. These reparative procedures also reformat the neurological patterns employed by the patient and the analyst in reconstituting their individual and shared dynamic systems.

CORRECTIVE EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES AND THE PSYCHOBIOLOGY OF INTERVENTIONS

Given that the coordination of states between the analyst and patient is primarily accomplished through the exchange of affective information, the ways in which the analyst metabolizes and feeds back to the patient the affective energy between them provides the embodiment or experiential context in which all psychoanalytic interventions operate. How the analyst manages his or her own emotions and those of the patient influences how the patient feels in the transference-countertransference dialogue at any particular moment. For example, in the process of coordinating their emotional experience the analyst’s empathic resonance with and modulation of a patient’s affective state may help the patient better co-ordinate his or her sympathetic and parasympathetic reactions to their exchange, thereby enabling the patient to better control certain emotions. Alternatively, the analyst may facilitate a patient’s formulation and experience of emotions that have not been within the patient’s range or repertoire by expressing and
holding a particular emotional response to their interaction long enough for the patient to physiologically resonate with the feeling, thereby creating the neural circuitry to recreate that feeling in similar circumstances. Likewise, the analyst can help a patient form procedures for ameliorating negative or disruptive emotional states by resonating with these states and then ratcheting downward to within tolerable levels the shared emotional state. As the co-constructor of the patient’s affective experience, the analyst’s emotional reactivity and emotional holding can act as a scaffolding for sustaining emergent organizations of feelings within the patient.

The reformatting of the cortical-subcortical connections that result from these affectively based interventions within the context of meaning provided by the transference-countertransference dialogue enables the patient to reinterpret and to assign new meanings (i.e., recategorize) to the models of attachment activated by the here-and-now interaction. For example, the analyst’s emotional resonance with and amplification of the patient’s positively valenced states generates amplified levels of vitality affects that bathe in positive feelings the patient’s internal representations of him or herself and of the analyst, as well as the procedures of mutual interaction and regulation that bind them. The formulation of this new and secure attachment bond with the analyst revises the activated attachment scheme, and the associated memories and beliefs about the self and others, in light of the analyst’s reactions to the patient. The analyst’s emotional reactions and
selective attunement to a patient’s states influences how the patient organizes and interprets both here and now as well as past events.

These affectively directed interventions are effective because they operate in vivo on experiences that are in the process of being formed. They aim to effect alterations in the ongoing procedures that instantiate emotional states and interpretively categorize the patient’s interactions with the analyst. As such, these interventions are corrective emotional experiences.

A primary way that the analyst accesses a patient’s subjective experience and attachment strategies is through grappling with his or her own feelings and reactions to the patient. The analyst’s body is the primary instrument for psychobiological attunement (Damasio, 1999). The implicit, right brain to right brain regulatory communications between the patient and the analyst create bodily states that reflect the affective experience of the analyst in relationship to the affective experience of the patient (and vice versa). So it is first through the analyst’s somatic sensations and affective states that he or she begins to apprehend his or her own as well as the patient’s adaptation to their interaction, and it is initially with these feelings that a response to the patient begins to take form. The analyst’s visceral response is then colored by the associations, memories, and internal working models activated by these states. If the analyst becomes self-reflectively aware of these gut feelings and associations, he or she can formulate a
consciously considered response or linguistic encoded interpretation to the patient (Damasio, 1999; Edelman. 1992).

The analyst’s attention to his or her subjective, bodily based states and their associated ideational material is particularly important in the interactive regulation and repair of a patient’s primitive, intensely negative, and disorganized states (Ogden, 1994). Schore (2002) observes that when the analyst resonates with a patient’s negatively valenced state, the analyst experiences increased negative arousal in him or herself. The internally amplified negative state throws the analyst’s right brain into a state of disequilibrium as the analyst tries to manage both his or her own negative feelings and those of the patient. If the analyst cannot successfully autoregulate his or her own negative states, the analyst’s will feed back to the patient unmodulated negative affect in his or her tone of voice, facial expression, or verbal interpretation. As a result of this stressful communication from the analyst, a pathological attachment scheme is activated in the patient representing a misregulated self interacting with a misattuning other. The patient instantly accesses an insecure attachment model which activates autoregulatory procedures for dealing with interactively generated stress. The patient-analyst dynamic system becomes increasingly unstable as both the patient and the analyst each amplify the negative affective state.
Though the repair of this mutually generated dysregulated system requires participation by both the patient and the analyst, it most often falls upon the analyst to initiate the repair. Schore (2002) notes that in order for the analyst to maintain a reparative holding environment while under intense interactive stress, the analyst must resist the homeostatic impulse to regulate his or her state of right-brain disequilibrium by shifting into a left-hemispheric-brain state. If the analyst fails to initiate a right-brain autoregulatory procedure and shifts into a linear, left-brain mode, he or she is likely to make premature verbal interpretations that amplify the misattunement between him or herself and the patient.

In order to create a therapeutic holding environment, Schore (2002) posits that the analyst must instantiate a right-brain regulatory strategy in which the analyst can detect, recognize, monitor, and regulate the bodily states that are evoked in reaction to the patient. While continuing to be open to the patient’s communications, the analyst attunes to his or her sensory and affective reactions to these communications, holding onto these sensations long enough to allow the feeling states and their associated autobiographical memories and images to enter consciousness. In this state-dependent recall, the analyst’s implicit procedural memories and regulatory strategies can be summoned to regulate the here-and-now negative state that binds the patient and analyst. It is in this transitional state (Winnicott, 1953) of reverie (Ogden, 1994) that the implicit procedural schemes employed to regulate the
analyst’s own affect can be interactively made available to the patient’s right brain for use in regulating the patient’s own bodily states (Schore, 1994).

It is how the analyst interacts with a patient that shapes the patient’s internal working models and the implicit procedures with which self-experience is organized and regulated and relations with others are made and maintained. The analyst’s ways of repairing ruptures in their emotional connection, righting dysregulated states, becoming intimate, dealing with anxiety and fear, expressing and responding to anger and disappointment, playing, and joking, all influence the patient’s procedures for maintaining self-states and for being in the world with others as the patient modifies these procedures to fit the analyst’s behavior.

The analyst’s behavior is not just responsive in relationship to the patient. The analyst also initiates interactions with the patient that require mutual adjustment of their regulatory schemata. Like the patient, the analyst has attachment needs and states of being that require specific regulatory responses. Even in the most self-aware analyst, many of these regulatory needs are not consciously known because they stem from the analyst’s unconscious social appraisal of the here and now analytic interchange. The analyst’s behaviors may be experienced as implicit commands to the patient to meet his or her regulatory and attachment needs. Indeed, as Bacal (1995) notes, if these needs are not met by the patient, the analyst’s adaptation to
their interaction and his or her analytic abilities may be compromised. Though the patient will adapt his or her implicit regulatory schemes in addressing the analyst’s needs, the analyst will in turn remodel his or her implicit procedures and attachment models to conform to the procedures and models the patient employs in responding to the analyst. Change always involves mutual and reciprocal, though not symmetrical, adaptation—no matter who initiates the process.

**RECATEGORIZATION—EXPERIENCE-BASED INTERVENTIONS AND INTERPRETATIONS**

Psychoanalytic treatment, from the perspective proposed here, does not function to recover or correct repressed memories, wishes, or fantasies. Rather, psychoanalysis enables the patient to recategorize memories, desires, and beliefs in terms of the feelings, values, and ideas experienced with the analyst. The implicit procedures activated to organize and interpret an interaction with the analyst bring with them autobiographical memories, concepts, and beliefs that have been associated with these procedural schemata in the process of their formation and subsequent elaboration. As the patient modifies these procedures in response to the analyst’s behavior, the memories and beliefs associated with these states may be experienced in a new affective light, re-evaluated and reinterpreted, or brought into a new alignment with related memories, concepts, and beliefs. This is an active but
not necessarily a conscious or self-reflective process. The recategorization of memories is a nonconscious process that attains symbolic status only when the patient’s self-reflective awareness is activated (Edelman, 1992).

The analyst’s activity can also effect alterations in the patient’s self-representation, self-reflective capacities, and abilities to use psychological, motivational, and subjective experience in understanding his or her own and others’ behavior. In forming a dyadic system, both the patient and the analyst construct mental models of the other in reference to themselves and then communicate these mental representations to the other. The externalized representation is processed by each of them as an object impinging on the self, and their self-representation is adapted to that object in the process of recategorizing the emotional experience of their here and now encounter. Thus, for example, if the analyst understands the psychological motivations of a patient and addresses these motivations in the course of interpreting an aspect of their interaction, or expresses this understanding in his or her affective responses or in how he or she behaves toward the patient, the patient is compelled to reconcile the analyst’s representation of the patient with his or her current self-state. The patient works to accommodate his or her self representation to the image of the patient proffered by the analyst by altering the implicit regulatory schemata that determine the patient’s self-concept in relationship to his or her subjective experience and to the analyst’s experience and representation of the patient.
Though the process of reconciling the analyst’s representation of the patient with existing self-states, beliefs, and autobiographical memories is usually a nonconscious procedure, as a conscious process it can enhance a patient’s ability to reflect on his or her own mental states and those of the analyst (Benjamin, 1988; Fonagy, 2000). The analyst’s capacity to think about and hold in mind a patient’s affective and psychological states allows the patient to experience and explore the analyst’s mental representation of those states. The scaffolding provided by the analyst’s construction of the patient as an intentional, motivated individual enables the patient to think about himself or herself as a psychological being who is motivated by intentions, wishes, and feelings. Thinking about the self in these psychological ways creates the implicit procedures required to use mental states and intentions in reasoning about the self and others.

From the perspective articulated above, in which the patient reformulates the implicit procedures that organize the self and other schemata and recategorizes their content in light of the analyst’s representations of the patient, verbally encoded interpretations are functionally identical to interventions. They both initiate a process within the patient of reconciling his or her internal representations of self and other with those proffered by the analyst. Ogden (1994) has recognized the functional similarity between the interventions that occur during enactments and interpretations by labeling the former “interpretative action.”
Verbal interpretations are similar to interventions in that they represent and express the analyst’s experience of and ideas about the patient’s motivations, emotional states, conflicts, and beliefs, as well as provide the patient with insight into the analyst’s subjective experience, motivations, conflicts, beliefs, and psychological states (Aron, 1996). The injection into the patient-analyst dynamic system of the analyst’s subjective experience and interpretations of his or her own and the patient’s internal life, via verbal interpretation or intervention, pressures the system to adapt to this information and motivates the patient to not only reconcile his or her regulatory procedures with those of the analyst, but also to co-ordinate his or her subjectivity with the subjectivity of the analyst. This process of reconciliation and coordination involves both parties as the patient and the analyst negotiate the emotional states engendered by meanings attributed to the analytic interchange (Dorpat & Miller, 1992). Out of this process of negotiation emerges a more complexly differentiated yet integrated intersubjective relationship between the patient and the analyst.

Verbal interpretations differ structurally and neuropsychologically from the general class of interventions discussed above in that they are a left-brain activity in which nonlinear experience is rendered linear via verbal symbolization. The process of verbal symbolization breaks the natural, nonlinear bonds between the elements that constitute an experience, recasting the experience in a linear, cause-and-effect form. Verbal
interpretations are, thereby, distanced from here-and-now emotional experience. As symbolic representations they require a patient to engage left-hemispheric processes to decode the communication and assimilate its meanings to the appropriate schemata. Though much of this processing is done nonconsciously, verbal interpretations focus a patient’s consciousness on what the analyst is saying, thereby engaging the patient’s self-reflective attention. Thus verbal interpretations tend to move patients (and the analyst) from whatever here-and-now state of being they are experiencing to a self-reflective state that is about an experience, real or imagined.

In this reflective, analytic frame of mind the patient can logically reason about his or her experience and its current and historical determinants. The patient can also explore the analyst’s inferences about the patient’s inner life, motivations, and behavior as well as reflect on his or her thoughts about the analyst’s psychology and motivations. This self-reflective consideration of the subjective elements of the patient’s interaction with the analyst promotes the development within the patient of a theory of interacting minds (Fonagy, 2000) that is required for the patient to recognize and co-ordinate his or her subjectivity with that of the analyst (Benjamin, 1988). The patient and analyst can then “analyze” together the nature of their interchange, reflect upon the meanings generated, and formulate new ways of interacting.

These left-hemisphere-dominant analytic processes are, however, much
more complex and difficult to work through because self-reflective analysis, mutual exploration, and verbal interpretations employ language to represent and to communicate ideas. Language imbues the experience it refers to with cultural, social, and gendered meanings much more than do more experience-near enactments and interventions. Thus, the task of analysis requires the additional deconstructive process of culling personal experience from the social, cultural, and gendered biases inherent in the representations of that experience (Stem, 1997).

In order for these left-hemispheric, verbally mediated processes to effect change in the self and interpersonal schemata (neural networks) that are organized by the right hemisphere (Damasio, 1999; Schore, 1994, 1997), verbal interpretations and analytic dialogue must be made within the affective context of the here-and-now transference-countertransference enactment of the attachment bond between the patient and the analyst. The adaptive context created by the activated self-and-other schemata permits the higher-level categorizations produced by the left-cerebral activity to influence and transform the second-order mappings that organize and interpret self-experience constituted by the right hemisphere (Edelman, 1992). Thus the timing of verbal interpretations is very important. They must be emotionally resonant with the patient’s here-and-now experience to impact the networks that organize and interpret that experience, but, as noted above, they cannot be made so early that they remove the patient and
analyst from the experience that will be the referent of the interpretation. I have found that verbal interpretations and mutual analysis work best when they follow on the heels of an enactment. At this point in the therapeutic process, what Stem (1998) calls a “now moment,” the feelings and meanings that have emerged from an enactment are available for recategorization in ways that have an immediate and tangible effect on the patient’s experience of him or herself and of the analyst.

In conceptualizing verbal interpretations as forces that impinge on the self and initiate recategorization of self-experience, verbal interpretations can be understood as a class of interventions that, although structurally distinct from interventions as left-brain as opposed to right-brain activities, function in the same way as other interventions: to transform the structures that organize experience in ways that enhance the adaptive fit between the patient and the analyst.

CONCLUSION

Dynamic Systems Theory casts psychoanalysis as an activity-dependent, experientially based treatment in which the analyst’s behavior toward the patient produces changes in the ways in which the patient organizes and interprets self-experience and relates to others. By specifying how the analyst effects alterations in the neurologically based procedures that organize and
transform a patient’s mind and self-states, Dynamic Systems Theory resolves
the postmodern conundrum of how to alter psychic contents and their
attendant self-states through the interpersonal and intersubjective processes
that create and sustain the patient-analyst interaction. In addition to bringing
interpretation and self-reflective analysis under the same procedural
umbrella as interventions and enactments, a dynamic systems approach
unites interpersonal, intersubjective, and intrapsychic processes a into single,
reciprocally influencing system.

References


INTRODUCTION

When a passionate love affair ends abruptly, each lover is left to gather up the real pieces of the breakup that occurred so much more rapidly than they could realize. To hold onto the elusively real story, the lovers’ minds may work overtime as they attempt feverishly to catch up to the facts that have passed them by. They think back to their first encounter, to their growing attraction to each other—as if to confirm for themselves that they were drawn together by irresistible excitement. They remind themselves of how they became intimate and declared “I love you” while staring into each other’s eyes. Or did they? She seemed to mean what she said, or did she? Hesitantly, he then begins to tread down the memory path of the breakup. He painstakingly retraces the steps of how their love turned sour, and reenacts scenes in his mind of how the full bloom of passion gave way to complaints about her need for space. No matter how many times he goes over it, it does not make sense. He still cannot believe what happened, and he is still not sure
whether he imagined her saying “I love you” or not. So he tries to catch the
tail of real events one more time . . .

Aloneness is a subtle destroyer of the sense of the real. In the privacy of
our own company, our minds play tricks on us. When good things turn to bad,
we reflexively curl inward, creating a self-enclosed mental world of doubt and
uncertainty in the process. What seemed so real and true before no longer
seems so anymore.

Most discussions of self-consciousness are concerned with the acute
sense of embarrassment and shame that a person feels when made suddenly
conscious of his or her own nakedness. In this chapter I would like to examine
self-consciousness as an ongoing stance of narcissistic self-enclosure that has
the dual functions of both using the mind to diffuse anticipated threats from
the outside world, and of taking up the caretaking slack for significant others
who were not emotionally available.

Due to the previous use of the obsessional defense of undoing, self-
conscious individuals are continually at risk of undoing or “deconstructing”
their memories and perceptions of their experiences, leaving their sense of
what is real mired in doubt. Chronic doubt makes it difficult to establish a
secure basis from which to act in the world and pursue a fulfilling life. From
this point of view, self-conscious individuals are searching for a reality that
endures beyond their own creative and destructive powers, one that is not subject to their own making and unmaking of it. Finding a holding environment of an enduring reality enables such persons to relinquish the caretaking vigilance of consciousness and is crucial to both the creative and mourning processes.

Certain postmodern ideas, rather than being part of the therapeutic solution, may themselves reflect the problem of self-consciousness. The concepts of constructionism and deconstruction, for example, may be viewed as abstract concepts that parallel and extend the defensive processes of doing and undoing. Furthermore, to the extent that the concept of intersubjectivity between analyst and analysand is rooted in the imaginary perspective of a third person, it also is more an abstraction than an accurate depiction of how each individual sees himself and the other within the analytic relationship. My critique here is based not so much on the philosophical truth or falsehood of these ideas as it is on their lack of psychological completeness to describe how people think and feel. To the degree that these abstract ideas reflect and perpetuate the problem of self-consciousness, I question their therapeutic usefulness.

TRAUMA AND DISILLUSIONMENT: THE RUPTURE OF INNOCENCE

One essential constituent of healthy development lies in the capacity of
the child to retain some sense of integrity or organismic wholeness as she proceeds through life. Initially, the mother’s meeting of the infant’s “spontaneous gesture” establishes a synchrony and then a mutuality between what is created and what is found, as well as a fluidity between a wish conjured up and a wish fulfilled. This fluidity fosters a sense of continuity or what Winnicott calls “going-on-being.” The philosopher Henri Bergson (1889) refers to this unconscious sense of continuity as “duration.” This sense of continuity of being or duration now underlies the child’s innocence.

Innocence refers to the child's elemental conviction that he is welcome in a world that is benignly disposed toward himself. It is a constructive illusion that enables the child to place his wellbeing trustfully in the protective arms of parents waiting to receive and care for him. Innocence thus consists of an unconscious, carefree sense that no matter which pathway one creates for one's developmental quest, the responsive home of a receptive audience is to be found at the other end.

Implicit in this reliance on the receptivity and protection of others is an unconsciousness of impending threat. It is precisely this unawareness or innocence of evil that insulates an illusory sphere of going-on-being from which the child can play and explore care free. In relatively healthy development, this naturalistic buffer of innocence gives way only gradually to a consciousness that still is fundamentally rooted in the child's psychosomatic
unity.

What occurs then when a child's innocence is disrupted before its time? What happens when any number of impingements, frustrations, traumas, or prolonged separations evict a child from his private Garden of Eden? Here is Winnicott's (1967/1971 a) description of a baby's experience of being separated from his mother as the time of her absence is extended: “In $x+y+z$ minutes the baby has become *traumatized* . . . . Trauma implies that the baby has experienced a break in life’s continuity . . .” (p. 97).

When the internal compass of a hoped-for image of the mother breaks down, the guiding purposefulness of searching gives way to the aimlessness of mental disorientation. The infant’s experience of absence may become increasingly flavored by a desperate *fear* of not finding the mother rather than by the *wish* to find her. This state of being is so unbearable that Winnicott (1967/1971 a) suggests “primitive defenses now become organized to defend against a repetition of unthinkable anxiety” (p. 97). This shift of wish to fear also may become the basis for a lifelong pattern in which a person seeks to avoid the anxiously anticipated worst instead of pursuing a hoped-for best. Trauma ruptures the illusory space that binds the innocent core of the child's continuity of being. It is the defensive reaction to trauma, however, with its foreclosure of further openness and vulnerability that seals off any possibility of restoring innocence to anything resembling its original
form. Perhaps it is this combination of trauma and defense, of rupture and foreclosure that lead Winnicott (1967/1971a) to say “after ‘recovery’ from $x+y+z$ deprivation a baby has to start again permanently deprived of the root which could provide continuity with the personal beginning” (p. 97).

**INTROJECTION: USING THE MIND TO CO-OPT THREAT**

As human beings elaborate on their experiences of trauma, they transform the meaning of those experiences in memory. When these meanings are projected on to the imaginary canvas of the future, the residual transferential afterimages of trauma come to form an anticipation of threat out of the reflected shadow of past disillusionments. Just as the Garden of Eden was spoiled after its inhabitants ate from the Tree of Knowledge, so, too, once a child is evicted from his unselfconscious state, there is no turning back; no matter how much he may endeavor to make it so, genuine innocence, once lost, is not retrievable. Never again will he be able to engage the world without some mental vigilance. The future, now and forever, will be circumscribed to a greater or lesser extent by a fearful bracing for the dangers that have been transferred to its blank screen. As Adam Phillips (1995a) says: “In fear we assume the future will be like the past... Fear, in other words, makes us too clever or at least misleadingly knowing... In fear the wish for prediction is immediately gratified; it is as though the certainty—the future—has already happened” (pp. 58-59).
The child adapts to the rupture of his innocence by taking the matter of his biopsychological survival into his own hands with the aid of counterphobic defenses. Whereas phobia entails a retreat from danger, counterphobia, in contrast, involves a movement toward precisely that which is most threatening. It is a means of adaptively rendering passive into active, of defending by taking the offensive.

Mike is a 44-year-old married man with two young children who has suffered from lifelong symptoms of anxiety, depression and fears of death. Sometimes his death anxieties have been so great that, paradoxically, he entertains thoughts of suicide to escape them. Mike's history is replete with experiences of physical abuse at the hands of his father. On a number of occasions, Mike's father, without warning, would slap him across the face. He recounted that this arbitrary doling out of violence at a moment's notice often occurred at the dinner table. Once Mike proudly displayed a model ship to his father that he had worked on for two months, saying, "Look, this is the Santa Maria." His father responded by smashing the boat and saying, "Now, it's junk."

Recently, Mike disclosed that his fears of death intensified when he was less depressed, as if he were "bracing for impact." Indeed, he said the worst way that he could imagine dying was to be run over by a car without forewarning. He said he could not tolerate the idea of being unaware of when
he was going to die. I suggested that perhaps his fears of death had less to do with death per se and more to do with a fear of being re-exposed to the impact of his father’s fits of violence. To counter his lack of preparedness for his father’s unpredictability, Mike is braced for impact at every moment through his self-deadening symptoms of depression. If he deadens himself first, how can anyone harm him? It is only when he entertains the possibility of a better life that he is filled with terrible death anxiety over his vulnerability to his father’s envy and violence.

In *Project for a Scientific Psychology*, Freud’s (1895/1966) early notions of the ego originating as a defensive buffer against unpleasure suggest a counterphobic means of adapting to frustration. He suggests that insofar as unpleasure remains the only means of education, the adaptation-seeking ego learns about reality by introjecting frustration. Unlike the relatively simple coping mechanisms of fight or flight, introjection is a rather ingenious means of gaining ego mastery or control over an external threat. It gives the appearance that frustration is being accepted, but without letting its meaning penetrate too deeply. Wearing the mask of the enemy in this way enables the child to co-opt and inoculate himself again the full potency of a traumatic experience by titrating the degree to which it is internalized. In speaking of the neurotic, Ferenczi (1909/1980) describes introjection as a “kind of diluting process by which he tries to integrate the poignancy of free-floating, unsatisfied and unsatisfiable unconscious wish impulses” (p. 47).
Out of the child’s mandate to ensure his own survival emerges a pragmatic soul that ensures that the blank face of nothingness be avoided at all costs. Rather than wait indefinitely for a wished-for mother to materialize, for example, the infant attempts to gain mastery or a type of ownership over the frustratingly real mother by bringing her into the “area of omnipotence” (Winnicott, 1960a/1965a). The child imposes his own introjective structure upon his experiences of impingement by creating what Winnicott termed a mental False Self devoted to the care of the mother’s needs. This attempt to introject and co-opt the frustratingly real mother, however, carries with it a heavy cost to the child’s integrity and sense of continuity, as is implied in the distinction Winnicott (1960b/1965b) makes between the True Self and the False Self. Thus, the very same protective mechanisms that enable a person to adapt or to adjust to the exigencies of his environment and survive may also tear apart mind from body.

Winnicott (1949a/1975a) observes:

Certain kinds of failure on the part of the mother, especially erratic behavior, produce over-activity of the mental functioning. Here, in the overgrowth of the mental function reactive to erratic mothering, we see that there can develop an opposition between mind and the psyche-soma, since in reaction to the abnormal environmental state the thinking of the individual begins to take over and organize the caring for the psyche-soma, whereas in health it is the function of the environment to do this. (p. 246)

The precocious intensification of mental activity now may become a
primary means by which anticipated threats may be engaged and diffused ahead of time. Through the immediacy of forethought, the future is reached instantaneously. From an early age, a child learns to use his mind to cover up his emotional nakedness so that he is never caught off guard again. The cultivation of precocious mental activity, based on the transference fear of retraumatization, is tinged with a mistrust of all things spontaneous and unpredictable. Romanyszyn (1989) calls this defensive style of thinking “the mathematical.” He refers to the mathematical as the “projection, in advance of the appearance of things, of precisely how those things are to appear” (p. 78). This counterphobic process of leaping into the future is an attempt to subject the helplessness of undergoing trauma to the omnipotence of mental control.

ON THE OUTSIDE LOOKING IN: DISSOCIATIVE DEFENSE AND UNDOING

For the traumatized child, there is no middle ground between life and death, between the perfection of surviving intact and the error of disintegrating extinction. Because the sudden rupture of innocence may be experienced as a psychic dying, the dread of re-experiencing this mortifying sense of acute shame infuses the child with a perfectionistic morality of survival. For the precociously developed mind, born out of the ashes of a dead innocence, a good enough environment is no longer good enough. Thus, Winnicott (1949a/1975a) notes, “the mind has a root, perhaps its most important root, in the need of the individual, at the core of the self for a
perfect environment” (p. 246).

In taking up the caretaking slack for traumatic disruption, individuals develop the omnipotent conviction that they are both capable of and solely responsible for the construction and deconstruction of their experiences. In this sense, such persons may reconfigure the objectivity of a traumatic event into the subjectivity of a self-created experience. As Winnicott (1960a/1965a) states, “There is no trauma that is outside of the individual’s omnipotence” (p. 37). A sexually abused girl may wonder to herself whether it was really she who seduced her father and brought the molestation on herself. A physically abused boy may be convinced that the beatings he receives are punishments for his badness. The bereaved, too, not acknowledging the finality of death, may assume an inordinate burden of control over bringing the dead back to life. In taking omnipotent control of their experience, such individuals seek to undo the undoable: to sweep away all vestiges of the trauma in the future so as to restore a “perfect” flow of being.

Thus, if the unconscious had a purposeful plan, with the time-traveling acrobatics of the mind at its disposal, it would be one far more ambitious than the mere quest for mastery. The attempt to gain omnipotent mental control over a traumatic experience, as reflected in the shift from passive to active, may have the primary aim of undoing the traumatic wound, so as to begin
again perfectly. During the very same moments that a person suffers a traumatic experience, he may already be attempting to reverse the course of events. In shifting his center of gravity from body to dissociated mind, an individual gains a sense of distance from himself and thus can foster the illusion that he has annulled the flow of time at the site of the wound.

Consciousness thus brings the unpredictable dynamics of the self-in-process under omnipotent control by dividing the unfolding, indivisible flow of time into discrete segments of past, present, and future. Winnicott (1949b/l 975b), in discussing the aftermath of birth trauma, describes the counting and cataloguing function of mental activity. Henri Bergson (1889) has noted that it is through this quantifying function of consciousness that a notion of space is formed. Once the past is no longer viewed only as an indistinguishable aspect of the seamless, irreversible flow of lived time, but has its own discrete, reified space that becomes fixed in consciousness, it may become subject to the magical manipulations of primary process thinking.

Now, through the counterphobic leap of forethought, the sequence of events and images of a person's life may be halted and reversed. By mentally locating oneself in the future, an experiential sense of distance from oneself is created—a self-conscious sense of being on the outside looking in. With this shift in perspective from inside to outside, everything that was in is out and that which was out is in, and what was future is past and what was past
becomes future. Beginnings are endings and endings are beginnings; one can go backward as easily as forward, and that which has been lost can be retrieved. Shifting from body to mind and from present to future is not unlike leaping out of a bus moving in one direction and hopping on another bus moving in the opposite direction. In so doing, one may retrace one’s steps to use a wrong (reenacting of trauma) to undo a wrong (trauma) and make a right (a perfect new beginning). It is through the counterphobic magic of precocious thinking and undoing that a person may leap from a mortal body, necessarily anchored in one place at one time, and refigure the traumas and disillusionments of the past into a perfectible brave new world in the future. By means of a dissociative stance of being on the outside looking in, time as well as space can be turned inside out and transformed into the ground of a fresh start.

Loewald's (1980) concept of repetition as a “passive reproduction” of an earlier event fits the person who cannot actively digest the overwhelming quality of his traumatic reality. Ultimately, the problem of passive repetition reflects the fact that the individual is attempting to find the ground of a new beginning from within the insulated safety of his own self-enclosure. In this sense, the ambitious omnipotent fantasy of undoing reflects the desperate straits of aloneness in which the person finds himself. It is precisely because of the isolating quality of self-enclosure that an individual’s sense of omnipotence remains unmodified, and his fantasized false self starts to undo
and begins again to continue unabated. Repetition is self-perpetuating because one searches for a sense of the real where it cannot be found—through one’s own mind’s eye.

**SELF-DISRUPTION AND THE DECONSTRUCTION OF ONE’S SENSE OF REALITY**

Getting lost in an omnipotent world of one’s own making and unmaking carries with it a whole host of problems. When children suffer, they often are not aware of what is triggering their emotional pain, let alone able to convey it in words to someone else. Without another person to provide solace and validate the event of their suffering, children may be forced into the involuted position of watching over themselves and bearing witness to the reality of their own experience.

Schneider (1977) emphasizes that a “disruption” to an initially unselfconscious person always triggers a reflexive movement of consciousness, or self-consciousness. The undivided self in action gives way to the doubled self. As a reflex brought about by a sudden, rude awakening to the unconscious, self-consciousness is a defensive stance designed to shelter rather than reveal the deepest strata of the self. Lacking the foundation of relationship between mind and body, self-consciousness is the semblance of self-awareness without its essence; it is an involuted hyperconsciousness superimposed on but not integrated with the body. In a sense, the child’s
mind curls instinctively inward in an attempt to care for its own injury. From this viewpoint, the narcissistic vehicle of self-consciousness or mental preoccupation with oneself is an attempt to take control of one’s survival and wellbeing.

As Winnicott (1949a/1975a) notes, under abnormal circumstances, “One can observe a tendency for easy identification with the environmental aspect of all relationships that involve dependence, and a difficulty in identifying with the dependent individual” (p. 247). Looked at another way, the mind reacts to the disruption as it would to loss, whereby it takes up the slack for and identifies with the lost object in its attitude to the self. Thus, in *Mourning and Melancholia*, Freud (1917) says “The shadow of the object fell upon the ego, so that the latter could henceforth be criticized by a special mental faculty like an object, like the forsaken object” (p. 249).

Although the child may seek to escape from the helplessness of the body to the omnipotent refuge of mental activity, previous experiences of trauma must inevitably pervade the activity of thinking, which now becomes anything but an autonomous ego function. Russell (1993) uses the metaphor of a camera attempting to photograph its own injury to describe a person’s attempt to testify to the reality of his own experience. He suggests that because “the photographic perceiving and recording apparatus itself is damaged while it is being built. . . [a] camera cannot photograph its own
injury” (p. 518). Self-consciousness, bom of disruption, will be necessarily tinged with the frustration of that disruption. Thus, Rank (1936) notes that in self-consciousness, “consciousness turns from an organ of pleasure in the service of wish fulfillment into an organ of pain” (p. 244). The problem now is that as Phillips (1995b) writes:

Because the mind comes in afterward—or after the trauma—it always runs the risk of being a preemptive presence. The mind object, that is to say, has always unconsciously identified with the traumatic agent (or rather, event) that first prompted its existence. The mind that attempted to repair—to compensate for—the trauma becomes the trauma itself; (p. 238, original italics)

In this regard, curling in on oneself self-consciously tends to freeze or inhibit the spontaneous movement and expressiveness of the body. Whether it be a teenager stuttering while speaking with a person to whom he is attracted, or an athlete who “chokes” because of thinking too much, self-consciousness paralyzes and distorts whatever it casts its gaze on. Romanyshyn (1989) says this anatomical gaze “isolates the body from its living context or situation and fragments the body which it sees” (p. 115). Self-consciousness, bom of dissociative defense, is not grounded in the substantive reality of the body. To the extent that self-conscious individuals are not inhabiting themselves and life is not being lived from within, they do not have a corpus of lived experience to fall back on for a sense of certainty.

Through the mind’s eye, doubt is sown and cultivated as self-conscious
persons become less certain that what happened out there actually did happen. The derealizing process of involuted thinking works against their quest to prove that their trauma was not just a figment of their imagination but a real event. Within the enclosed isolation of their own minds, they chase the tail of the real, but never quite catch up because they are looking for something that can only be found outside of themselves. Pervaded with doubts, the mind is an uncertain witness to its own experience.

To return to the metaphor of the camera attempting to photograph its own injury, I would suggest that although the photographic apparatus is damaged, these individuals nevertheless, through the use of self-consciousness, attempt to photograph their own injuries. However, because of the nature of the involuted mental equipment, when the photography is developed, it is dreamlike and blurry. In a desperate attempt to develop a clear picture of a real injury, they snap the picture again and again, typically with the same faulty equipment, typically to no avail, and therefore repeatedly.

The problem then with holding the conviction that one has omnipotently created one’s own reality is that a real world that is constructed can just as easily be deconstructed or reduced to subjective experience, where it is but a figment of one’s imagination. Once individuals reduce the objective events of their lives to their constructions of them, they begin to
lose any sense of a substantive reality beyond their control. For example, when losing a loved one to death or suffering through the breakup of a romantic relationship, such people may find it too painful to re-imagine a passionate love that was shared with someone who is no longer there. In detaching defensively from their desire to remember and restore the good, they also lose an essential sense of the relationship as real. In their own mind, they have analyzed or deconstructed the relationship to such an extent that they may have doubts as to whether the intimacies they exchanged really occurred or whether they were hallucinatory products of their wish-filled imaginations. From within these dizzying, derealizing circles of their own making, such persons now have the impossible task of proving the objective existence of their own experience. From this point of view, Descartes’ famous dictum “I think, therefore I am” could be amended to: “I think, therefore I think I am.”

A person’s aim in objectifying his experience is made difficult by the fact that he has placed his own narrative stamp of memory on his suffering as soon as it occurred. To secure a witness to his experience and transform it into an objective event, he attempts continually to reenact the original scene of the trauma. For the traumatized person embroiled in the repetitive drama of undoing and reconstructing in memory, however, it may not be easy to discern the difference between trauma as his intended, omnipotently created experience and trauma as an objective event independent of his omnipotence.
Perhaps it is for this reason that many analytic patients are uncertain about the accuracy of their memory when they complain about their parents’ actions. On one hand, they may wonder whether they were really victimized by a father's ridicule or a mother’s intrusiveness. On the other hand, to the extent that their sense of omnipotence is never fully modified, even in later years, they may take undue mental responsibility for any problems that occurred in their interactions with parents, especially if there were no witnesses to arbitrate reality for them. Such individuals, tormented by a perfectionistic sense of omnipotence that knows no bounds, often drive themselves mercilessly to do more, always more, to please the parent.

“THIS MAY JUST BE MY FANTASY, BUT . . .”: SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE INHIBITION OF CREATIVITY

To the extent that a central feature of an observing consciousness is to analyze an object into its constituent parts, self-consciousness has a deconstructive effect on the constructed holism of our creations. Thus, Rank (1936) viewed excessive self-consciousness as a hallmark of neurosis because of its inhibiting effects on the creativity central to psychic growth. The created products of our self-revelations, both verbal and nonverbal, that provide us with a sense of kinship to other persons become subject to the nihilistic doubts cast by the second-guessings of self-consciousness. When our creative animus is thus paralyzed, it is difficult to construct a bridge of generalizability
from our unique experiences to the lives of others. Caught in an internal web of our own making, we become locked in an involutional prism of wondering whether our experience is nothing but our experience. In this most isolated of worlds, we lose a sense of belonging to something real beyond our self-preoccupations.

Sometimes we are too smart for our own good, as the lasers of self-consciousness penetrate our illusions with annihilating skepticism, leaving the machinery of our creativity exposed in its deadened parts. We may then question the usefulness or accuracy of our perceptions to such an extent that our creations are shadowed constantly by an anxiety of collapsing into the trivial (reinventing the wheel) or the idiosyncratic (ideas as reflective of only one’s own experience). This either/or anxiety of being just one of many or of being relegated to the isolation of one’s unique experience itself reflects the traumatic rupture to the relationship connecting self and other.

It is disheartening to hear trainees, inundated with the doubletakes of self-consciousness, preface their contributory remarks at case conferences and seminars with the disclaimer, “This may just be my fantasy, but.. When the generalizing relational glue of creative insight is undone and reduced to the individual psychopathology of hallucinatory fantasy, it is difficult to find one’s place within the common fabric of human experience. Self-consciousness thus leaves each of us with our own set of unique experiences
in a lonely internment of self-doubt.

To the extent that the concept of intersubjectivity between the analyst and the analysand is conceived from an imaginary third person’s point of view, it, too, is an abstract manifestation of self-alienation, of the self-conscious stance of being on the outside looking in. The idea of intersubjectivity thus asserts that the transference-countertransference matrix is constructed from the personal histories and particular experiences of each “subjectivity” within the analytic relationship. Thus, the perceptions or assertions of each participant within the relationship, especially when they come into conflict, would have to be self-consciously deconstructed to discern their sources in one’s own experience. I am concerned that this sort of analysis of the transference-countertransference matrix by means of deconstructing the constructions of each participant only perpetuates the problem of self-consciousness.

The multitude of meanings that can be imposed retroactively on prior experience is so malleably dependent on the shifting actions, moods, purposes, and will of the person in the present that it is easy to second-guess the real existence of that experience. Because it is at the beck and call of such impermanence, where only doubt is certain, the meaningful distinctions between one person’s experiences and ideas and those of others may degenerate into the meaningless relativity of randomness, whereby one
interpretation is as good as another. What are we to do, for example, if at the same time that we hold to the abstract principle of a pluralistic respect for and tolerance of different ways of conducting psychoanalysis, we also believe that a colleague may be harming patients because of his or her strict adherence to a certain clinical theory?

When the two participants in the analytic relationship have a conflict between them, each person, at least momentarily, believes his or her position is the correct one; otherwise, he or she would believe differently. In this sense, the respective positions of both participants are not just relative to each other, reducible to their particular experiences; they are also absolute in that they are created products in their own right. There is “my point of view” and all those who agree with it are within my area of omnipotence, and “your point of view” and its adherents that lie outside of the controlling reaches of my omnipotence. We may start out with these absolute positions, and then if the boundaries to our respective positions are flexible and permeable enough, we may, through dialogue, negotiate a transitional space between us in which we let the other affect our position.

To the extent that the psychoanalytic process itself consists in a deconstruction of behavior into the latent rearguard parts of hidden motives, it always has run the risk of inducing self-consciousness instead of selfawareness. Rank (1936) thus was led to make the provocative comment,
“Neurotics have long since been where psychoanalysis would like to take them.” When the creation of a symptom is viewed as a compromise formation between various constituent parts of the psyche, and consciously held positions are consistently reduced to their unconscious determinants, we risk disrespecting the integrity and dignity of the freedom of will inherent in the creative process, even if the final product is a neurotic symptom.

Indeed, perhaps many patients are seeking to escape the treadmill of deconstructing objective events, ideas and opinions into so many relative elements and differently experienced perspectives that keep them trapped in isolation. Instead, they may attempt through the creative process to elaborate their experiences into the memorable status of something real and objective, something that has its own existence independent of their own subjectivity. If the artistic process consists in creatively elevating one’s experience through its dramatization into an objective event, then the neurotic creates an illness of symptoms in a dramatic attempt to objectify his unwitnessed experience of trauma. Because this illness is an involuted work of art with a very private language, however, its artistic aim of objectification remains ever-elusive. For this reason. Rank (1936) describes the neurotic as an artiste manque (a missed or failed artist). In effect, the neurotic misses as an artist because his attempts to emerge from his insulated self-preoccupations through his psychological symptoms are so indirect that they never find their sought-for audience. The therapeutic task for such patients now entails discovering a
reality beyond their omnipotent control in order to confirm that their experience is not merely a dreamlike figment of their imagination. The finding of an enduring holding environment to which they can entrust their care facilitates a mourning process in which they can relinquish their tenacious hold on their own experiences.

**FINDING AN ENDURING REALITY BEYOND ONE’S CONTROL AND LETTING GO**

For patients who have long been fixed in their self-enclosed isolation, the experience of being understood by someone outside of their omnipotence is indispensable before they can become convinced that they no longer have to be solo travelers in their lives. The analyst’s freedom of choice in responding to patients is fundamental to her acquiring a credibility as a witness to the patient’s story. The credibility of the analyst, lying beyond the controlling reach of the patient, facilitates the patient’s task of objectifying his experiences, thus enabling the patient to come out of his selfenclosure.

Sometimes rather than lend themselves to the depths of spontaneous interactions with patients, some analysts may assert a control over the frame, setting, and technical rules that circumscribe the treatment. In a general, formal sense, analysts, equipped with their foreknowledge of psychoanalytic technique, may enter an analytic session ahead of time, before the session makes its actual appearance. With their correct technical principles in hand as
a protective buffer, they can counter the phobia of sinking into an unpredictable intimacy of being alone with a person in need. The self-conscious calculatedness of using empathy as a technique, for example, may detract from its essence of a spontaneous generosity that is freely given. The underlying love that motivates emotional understanding or an identification with the experiences of others cannot be prescribed.

Instead of negating their individuality in order to prepare themselves for the role of the patient’s created object, analysts can best lend an objectivity to the patient’s experience by retaining their own personhood.

The patient, because of his history of defensive isolation, must be able to find the grounding of the analyst’s personal center of gravity in order to use it creatively. Thus Winnicott (1969/1971b) says, “The object, if it is to be used, must necessarily be real in the sense of being part of shared reality, not a bundle of projections” (p. 88).

The readymade quality of the analyst’s empathy, when it is prepared ahead of time for general usage, is ultimately empty because it lacks a personal credibility. The analyst’s ministrations by technical rote may be viewed by the patient as an infantilizing love akin to pity that has been coerced omnipotently out of the analyst rather than having been offered voluntarily. Because the patient may not believe that these “canned”
expressions of care originate outside of his omnipotent making, they have an unbelievable, hallucinatory quality. And a love that becomes unreal because it cannot be believed also cannot be internalized. For love to be credible, it must be personal and real, that is, it must come from an analyst who is acting out of her own freedom of will, beyond the controlling reaches of the patient’s omnipotence. The analyst’s freedom to be herself provides a sense of the real for the patient.

To the extent that we all live in the burdensome shadow of an omnipotent sense that we create and are responsible for all our experiences, good and bad, there is a relief in knowing that some things cannot be helped, that it is out of one’s hands. In speaking of the sense of the real, then, I am referring to the experiential dimension of realization: at one end of the continuum is the hallucinatory, crazy-making sense that the discovered world is a created figment of our imagination; at the other end of the continuum is the conviction that we are finding a solid world of others that is not controlled by us. If we take Winnicott’s notion of omnipotence seriously, then mourning involves the relinquishment of a fantasized omnipotent hold on the making and unmaking of one’s experiences to an enduring reality beyond one’s omnipotence.

What facilitates this mourning process of letting go? The mourner’s giving of his possession to a world outside of his control can be viewed as an
act of generosity. Perhaps what inspires this sort of generosity involved in mourning more than anything else is the person’s trust that there is an environment out there that cares enough to hold and testify to the actuality of his experiences if he drops or gives them away—a realm world that endures beyond the subjectivity of his whims.

Here trust entails that a person locate a place for himself in an awaiting world beyond the one he has created. Only then can he emerge from the absurdity of self-relation and form a meaningful relationship with a real other. In the ongoing quest for meaning, we may say that a universal dynamic of the human condition involves a search for this transcendent reality that lies beyond one's omnipotent grasp; for some, the culmination of this search to the limits of one's powers may be found embodied in the absolute being of God, while for others it may lie in the fundamental otherness of a different person. It is this resonating otherness of freely acting human beings that allows people to serve as effective containers for one another. The feeling of being contained allows people to return to their primary task of being themselves. They can then get to the crux of mourning: to accept their wishes, while simultaneously relinquishing the omnipotent burden of fulfilling those wishes themselves.

In speaking of a therapeutic holding environment then, I am describing a relationship that overcomes the patient’s sense of self-insulation and
meaningless isolation by enabling him to feel that he belongs to the analyst. Once the analyst's credibility as a freely willing other (credibility of the absolute) has been established, the degree to which she resonates with the experiences of the patient also gains her credibility as one who understands (credibility of the relative). Taken together, both types of credibility help provide patients with the conviction that they are revealing and giving the care for their experiences away to an enduring posterity rather than to the oblivion of deaf ears. Finding and securing a real ground of being inspires a movement of generosity on the part of the mourner that enables him to relinquish his internal possession.

A number of years ago I saw in treatment an acutely suicidal 40-year-old man. Charles, who, along with his other problems, struggled with the cancer of his beloved girlfriend as well as her subsequent breakup with him. In his early sessions he would walk in and before even sitting down would exclaim, “I don't care; I don't care; I just don't care anymore.” He would then launch into obsessional tirades in which he ragefully disavowed his girlfriend’s significance to him, interspersed only rarely by wistful, dreamlike reminiscences of better times they had shared together. There was some quality of tenderness, however, in these brief instances of remembered intimacy that prompted me to believe that Charles had rewritten history so bitterly that he had taken away something precious from himself.
Sensing that he was killing off experiences of passionate love once shared with his girlfriend, I said that no matter what has happened since, no one could take away the genuine intimacies he had exchanged with her at one time. They were not part of a dream but a reality that had existed and would always exist, and one to which I could now bear witness because of his communicating it to me. His obsessional rage subsided immediately, giving way to bittersweet tears as he said rather proudly, “we did have something pretty good, didn’t we?” As Charles revealed precious memories of intimacy in my presence, memories that in his self-enclosed isolation were always on the brink of being bitterly unraveled, he infused those intimacies with the meaningful breath of real life, if only for a moment. In a romantic, but powerful, psychological sense, that brief moment, once revealed and alive, lives forever.

References


Postmodernism and Psychoanalysis: A Heideggerian Critique of Postmodernist Malaise and the Question of Authenticity

M. Guy Thompson, PhD

Thinking begins only when we have come to know that reason, glorified for centuries, is the most stiff-necked adversary of thought.

Martin Heidegger (1927/1962)

In the past decade or so the term postmodernism has captured the attention of a generation of artists, intellectuals, authors, and professionals to such a degree that the term has even crept into the comparatively sober psychoanalytic literature, the last place one would have expected to find it. Yet any marriage between the psychoanalytic treatment perspective with its painstaking, laborious pace, and postmodernism, with its premium on the arcane and fashionable, is unlikely, if not altogether illogical. What would a genuine postmodern psychoanalysis entail if indeed such were possible?

In addressing this question I will explore how postmodernism insinuated its way into the contemporary cultural milieu, examine where the basic threads of the postmodernist impulse originate, and assess its impact on
the theory and practice of psychoanalysis. I will show that the postmodern perspective originated with Nietzsche and that contemporary characterizations of it represent a comparatively superficial and ultimately nihilistic departure from its original inspiration. I then examine how Heidegger situated the essence of Nietzsche’s arguments into his own depiction of the human condition, and the role that both Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s respective conceptions of authenticity play in their philosophies.

NIETZSCHE’S IMPACT ON THE POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVE

Although postmodernism was only recently introduced into philosophical debate (by Jean-Francois Lyotard, 1993), it is commonly acknowledged that the concept itself alludes to a sensibility that has haunted Western culture since the 19th century, beginning with Nietzsche. The fact that Nietzsche was hardly known or discussed by philosophers until Heidegger brought him into prominence adds to the mysterious manner in which postmodernism emerged as a force in contemporary culture. Indeed, many of the tenets that form the corpus of Nietzsche’s philosophy are basic elements of the postmodern perspective. Yet postmodernism is not a philosophical school that one can simply adopt or reject but a movement in culture that, like the object of psychoanalytic inquiry, sneaks upon us unawares, as though we had hardly been conscious of its presence.
Nietzsche was unusual in that he didn’t write systematic narratives on epistemology or metaphysics, but instead wrote in aphorisms that resemble the pre-Socratic philosophers whom Nietzsche fashioned himself after. One of the reasons Nietzsche (1967) rejected questions about the nature of truth and reality was because he believed the foundations of philosophy should be overturned in light of his observation that God is dead and that we are alone in the universe without an ultimate purpose or reason. Nietzsche’s antifoundationalism is a core of both his philosophy and the postmodern perspective. Whether or not one follows Nietzsche in his rejection of God and religion, modern and postmodern philosophical thought is characterized by an explicit avoidance of talk about God or reliance on religious belief as a foundation for what we know of our existence.

Nietzsche's (1994) real target in his attack on Christianity was not God specifically but the reliance on any authority that presumes to tell us how we should live our lives. In Nietzsche’s estimation, anyone who needs such values to guide his or her actions is simply being dishonest (or “inauthentic”) with himself. Similarly. Nietzsche also rejected the worship of science and progress, which he viewed as palliatives for the masses that serve to keep them in line and save them the trouble of assuming responsibility for their lives.

Like Schopenhauer and Montaigne, Nietzsche was also a sceptic and
denied our capacity to know anything except our own experience—and even that is open to doubt. In contrast, most philosophers begin with a core of beliefs that are taken to be self-evidently true, such as the existence of a physical world. Such beliefs may be reasonable, but proving them, as many sceptics have demonstrated, is virtually impossible. The problem with such beliefs (i.e., metaphysics), though innocent enough in themselves, is that they lead to other assumptions that are equally impossible to prove but are nonetheless employed to “explain” things that are impossible to know, such as the “contents” of the unconscious. Ironically, Nietzsche is credited as one of the original proponents of the unconscious, but he used it as one of his weapons against science, which Nietzsche accused of pretending to explain everything. This anomaly implies that some conceptions of the unconscious are consistent with scepticism whereas others are unabashedly dogmatic. Nietzsche had a high tolerance for ignorance and accepted that most things in life are impossible to explain and needn’t be explained in order for us to live our lives to the fullest.

A favorite target of Nietzsche’s scepticism was the Enlightenment, a cultural era that began toward the end of the 17th century. Though there is considerable debate as to what the Enlightenment was and whether we are still living in it, it has had a critical impact on the role science and politics currently play in society. Nietzsche rejected the values of the Enlightenment and Enlightenment philosophers such as Descartes who held that the capacity
to reason is the basis of what makes us human. Although the capacity for rationality has been championed by philosophers since Plato, Descartes was the first philosopher who wedded the scientific application of reason to every facet of Western society, making it a cultural phenomenon (Ariew, Cottingham, & Sorell, 1998). Other Enlightenment philosophers such as Rousseau emphasized the relation between reason and political progress. Like Descartes, Rousseau believed that humans are rational creatures whose capacity for reason makes them autonomous in their decision-making, manifested in the free and informed selection of political candidates in electoral democracies. Kant emphasized the relationship between reason and ethics. According to Kant, Enlightenment values gave Europeans an unprecedented source of self-confidence in the pursuit of scientific, political, and moral progress.

If the Enlightenment can be said to embody one value above all others, it is epitomized by the belief in "progress." This value in particular defines the Modern era, more or less consistent with the Enlightenment. Following Darwin, the belief in progress assumes that all living organisms are in an inexorable process of evolution, but humans, given their capacity for reason, are alone able to influence the course that science and society follow. The Enlightenment’s inherent Utopianism derives from the conviction that society will inevitably improve from one generation to the next and that scientific breakthroughs will make our material existence easier and, hence, more
satisfying. Nietzsche rejected this assumption and countered that in other respects our lives are actually getting worse, because the more passionate side of our existence obeys neither science nor reason and is even suppressed by them, a view that anticipated (or perhaps influenced)

Freud’s views about civilization. Moreover, each and every human being has to come to terms with the same problems that have beset human existence since the beginning of recorded history: How to be at peace with ourselves, how to live with others, and how to make the most of what life has to offer. In Nietzsche’s opinion, our capacity to reason is not as objectively reliable as Enlightenment philosophers claimed, because humans are driven by passion, the source of which is usually unconscious.[1]

Another component of Nietzsche’s scepticism is his historical relativism, which is consistent with his perspectivism. Relativism argues that all so-called truths are relative to a time and place and thus are not eternal or objective, but highly personal and fluid, whereas perspectivism is based on the idea that truth is wedded to the perspective of the person who promotes it. Because everyone’s perspective is different, not merely from one person to another but from one moment or situation to the next, each of us abides by different truths at different times and occasions, so the task of ever knowing ourselves and others is constantly unfolding. Another, more contemporary way of putting this is that reality is what we interpret it to be and that our
interpretations are more indebted to our passions than our reasons. Nietzsche’s view that knowledge is culture-bound has also influenced contemporary philosophers of science, such as Paul Feyerabend (1999) and Thomas Kuhn (1962).

Yet another target of Nietzsche’s assault on the Enlightenment was Descartes’s belief in the “self.” Disturbed by the rising influence of scepticism among thinkers of his generation, Descartes set out to determine at least one irrefutable truth that could resist sceptical doubt, which for Descartes was: I am certain I exist because I am capable of asking myself this very question, thus proving that there is a mind that can question its own existence, if only my own. Descartes’s cogito ergo sum led Western culture toward a radical egocentricity that instantly transformed every individual’s relationship with the world into a “problem” that needed to be solved. His next step was to imbue the self with qualities that define permanent aspects of a given individual’s “personality.” The Enlightenment definition of selfhood thus became rooted in the myth of a stable core in one’s self-identity that defines who each person is. Nietzsche categorically rejected the concept of a stable ego and attributed its existence to nothing more than a trick of language. Because we are accustomed to use the personal pronoun in grammatical forms of address we foster the myth that there is indeed such an entity as an “I” or a “me,” what Nietzsche termed linguistic determinism. Just because we can say all sorts of things about ourselves and others grammatically—such as
“Jane is a jewel” or “Harry is a jerk”—we take these expressions to contain a truth about the so-called person in question that simply isn’t so. Nietzsche’s scepticism helped him to realize that none of us can ever know ourselves or others with much accuracy, let alone certainty. Though we think, for example, that we know people when we love them, our love frequently blinds us to qualities in that person that are available to anyone else. This is only one example of how transitory and impressionable our belief in our own and the other’s self can be.

Perhaps Nietzsche’s most radical assault on the Enlightenment was embodied in his moral scepticism. The Enlightenment held that some moral principles are eternal and consistent with what it means to be civilized, that because humans are rational they are capable of learning what it means to be moral and, with sufficient effort, to become so. Once God was out of the way Nietzsche was in a position to argue that there is no ultimate foundation for morality and that the only morals that exist are arbitrarily chosen by a given society. History has shown that each era alters its perspective as to what our scruples should be, each assuming its values are more “enlightened” than the last, a view that was zealously embraced by Enlightenment thinkers. This assumption, however, assumes that humans are free to behave in whatever manner the current morality tells them to. Though Nietzsche blamed most of these assumptions on Christianity, it doesn’t matter what one’s views about religion are for Nietzsche’s message to be compelling. One only has to take a
peek at today’s headlines to confirm that the world in inhabited by countless “moralities,” each claiming some form of ascendence over the others, many of which are rooted in one religious belief or another. But even among those who reject religion there is a tendency to embrace a set of moral principles in dogmatic fashion, then condemning those that opt for a different set of values than their own. Nietzsche observed long before Freud that humans are duplicitous by nature and, hence, pretend to live their lives by one set of ideals while surreptitiously embracing another.

Nietzsche proposed to overcome these examples of moral hypocrisy by situating his philosophy in a pre-Socratic ideal that was in opposition to the subsequent Christian era that has dominated the Western world since the Roman Empire. In Nietzsche’s estimation pre-Christian Greeks lived their lives passionately and spontaneously and exemplified a Dionysian spirit that was subsequently suppressed by the weaker, more “democratic” Athenians. (Nietzsche conjectured that Christian culture subsequently derived its Apollonian values from post-Socratic Athens while suppressing the more passionate Dionysian values that were rooted in Spartan and other pre-Socratic cultures.) He concluded that Modern Man is afraid of life and protects himself from his fears by overvaluing his Apollonian (rationalistic) nature at the expense of his Dionysian spontaneity. While both qualities are aspects of every individual, Nietzsche argued that Western culture has emphasized the Apollonian to its detriment, culminating in what he foresaw as the collapse of
Western civilization, though in hindsight we have adapted handily to our moral hypocrisy by situating both qualities in neurotic compromise formations.

**THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVE**

So what impact has Nietzsche’s philosophy had on postmodernism? Perhaps the principal problem in addressing this question is that nobody knows exactly what postmodernism means. Although there is a tendency among contemporary authors to depict the postmodern perspective as antithetical to modernism, there is little agreement as to what even modernism entails. For some authors it appears to be interchangeable with the Enlightenment, while for others it is a 20th-century phenomenon that originated with modern art and architecture, influencing currents in 20th-century thinking that are in some respects consistent with postmodernism and in other respects in contrast to it. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger, for example, have been accused by most postmodernist thinkers of being rooted in the so-called modern era, though they have contributed to what has subsequently emerged as the postmodernist perspective.

As I will show later, the attempt to situate postmodernism in contrast to modernism is both misleading and unsupportable. It is more accurate to say that virtually all postmodernist thinkers are united in their condemnation of
the “progressive” element of the Enlightenment, including such precursors as Nietzsche and Heidegger, who deserve the credit for having inspired this perspective in the first place. The term “modern” is confusing because it has been used in a variety of ways, sometimes in concert with the Enlightenment and sometimes in opposition to it. Moreover, some of the Enlightenment thinkers who are regarded as having ushered in the modern era, such as Descartes, were opposed to scepticism whereas others, such as Montaigne, were avowed sceptics. These are only some of the reasons why the term “modernism” is too complex to use interchangeably with Enlightenment values. Moreover, if there is one trend that epitomizes the postmodernist perspective, it is not its antimodernism but its scepticism. For my purposes, postmodernism is inextricably connected to the modern era, which for practical reasons originated in the 20th century.

I shall examine the sceptical dimension of postmodernism shortly, but before doing so I shall review those aspects of Nietzsche’s philosophy that presaged the postmodernist perspective. These can be listed as:

a) An opposition to authority characterized by an antifoundational bias.

b) An inherent scepticism that permeates both Nietzsche’s philosophy and postmodernism, exemplified by the rejection of absolute truths and any viewpoint that verges into metaphysics.
c) A perspectivist orientation which holds that truth is wedded to the perspective of the person who promotes it.

d) A moral and historical relativism based on the view that all so-called truths are relative to a time and place and, hence, neither eternal or objective but highly personal and fluid.

e) A decentering of the subject that rejects the conventional notion of the self or ego as autonomous and in possession of its own volition.

f) An emphasis on surface instead of depth, a position which holds that there is no depth to the personality, as such, because we are what we do, not what we take ourselves to be.

g) An emphasis on language that permeates all the features of postmodernism listed above, deriving from sceptical doubt as to the accuracy of what language is capable of revealing about ourselves and the world in which we live.

h) An opposition to Enlightenment values epitomized by the “grand narratives” of utopian thinkers such as Hegel and Marx, and the notion that civilization is in a constant state of “progression” toward an increasingly beneficial future. Whereas Nietzsche was unequivocal that such progress has an unforeseen corrupting effect on our capacity for authenticity, postmodernists are equivocal about the role of technology and even embrace it as an essential component of the postmodern era, embodied in the cinema, television, media, and computer sciences. But whereas Nietzsche retained a romanticism about the superiority of Greek
culture, postmodernists reject romanticism as an artefact of the Enlightenment.

So, was Nietzsche a postmodernist? It is evident from the above that there are important differences between Nietzsche’s philosophy and contemporary postmodernism. Yet all of the principal proponents of postmodernism, such as Michel Foucault (1986), Francois Lyotard (1993), Jacques Derrida (1978), and Jean Baudrillard (1983), have been profoundly influenced by Nietzsche. But Nietzsche also enjoyed an equally profound impact on phenomenology and existentialism (e.g., Heidegger and Sartre, respectively), philosophical movements that are in opposition to postmodernism. Perhaps the principal difference between Nietzsche and postmodernist thinkers is the former’s conception of authenticity, which postmodernists passionately oppose. This dispute is so central to my argument that I will examine it in more detail below, including Heidegger’s contribution to postmodernism and the role that authenticity plays in Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s respective philosophies.

HEIDEGGER’S CONTRIBUTION TO THE POSTMODERN PERSPECTIVE

As we have seen, Nietzsche played a decisive role in the development of the postmodern perspective, yet little would have been known of Nietzsche’s importance had it not been for Heidegger, who brought Nietzsche into contemporary debate with his first major publication, Being and Time (1962).
Moreover, many elements of Heidegger’s philosophy were derived from Nietzsche, including Heidegger’s critique of authority, his sceptical bent, his moral relativism, his decentering of the subject, his emphasis on the hermeneutic dimension of language and, perhaps most importantly, his rejection of Enlightenment values, though there are many features of Heidegger’s philosophy that are not indebted to Nietzsche and even more antithetical to the postmodern perspective than was Nietzsche. It is nevertheless surprising that postmodernists such as Lyotard, Foucault, and Derrida are dismissive of Heidegger’s role in the emergence of postmodern thought. According to Sim (1999), “Postmodern philosophers argue that, although Heidegger developed a number of strategies by which he endeavored to escape from the era of modernity, he could never finally extricate himself from his own age” (p. 276). Yet Sim acknowledges that despite the postmodernist’s aversion to Heidegger’s emphasis on ontology and his preoccupation with the nature of Being,

[H]e systematically exposes the inscrutability of Being as that which eludes our modes of thought. At the very least, Heidegger’s relentless attempts to undo the conceptual knots in the history of the philosophy of Being began the destruction of metaphysics which was to be taken up by deconstruction and other postmodern strategies, (p. 276)

Moreover, Derrida and Lyotard have implicitly acknowledged their debt to Heidegger, and Derrida attributes the inspiration for his deconstructive method to Heidegger’s “destruction” of Western metaphysics. So why is
Heidegger not embraced as a forefather to postmodernism and, even more paradoxically, why is he branded an agent of modernism? The answer to these questions is fundamental to how the contemporary postmodernist perspective is conceived and explains why Heidegger as well as Nietzsche are not wholeheartedly embraced as postmodernist thinkers. The answer appears to boil down to Heidegger’s ontological perspective and the role of authenticity in his philosophy. One must also consider Heidegger’s scathing critique of modern technology as a source of contention among postmodernists who embrace the “techno-arts” as celebrated in film, television, and the media, all targets of Heidegger’s assessment of 20th-century values. And finally, though one would expect scepticism to serve as the glue that would bind contemporary postmodernists to both Heidegger and Nietzsche in common cause, we shall find that the kind of scepticism that influenced the postmodernists is of a different color from that which guided Heidegger and Nietzsche in their respective philosophical outlooks.

Postmodernists tend to confuse Heidegger’s emphasis on ontology with the traditional form of metaphysics that they reject: the notion that there is a reality behind or underneath appearances that we can never know but can think our way to by virtue of our capacity to reason. In fact, Heidegger’s entire philosophy is a rejection of metaphysics, substituting in its place a conception of ontology that the American postmodernist philosopher Richard Rorty (1991) has applauded for its inherently pragmatic sensibility. Moreover,
Heidegger argues that our contact with the world is not mediated through reason but is given to us directly, by virtue of our capacity to experience the world (as Being)\(^3\) in a manner that avoids intellectualization,\(^4\) whereas postmodernists typically reject *experience* as an artefact of the modernist conception of autonomy and selfhood. In fact, Heidegger conceives ontology as a *non*rationalistic form of thinking that he characterizes as meditative, a form of thinking that scientists and academics alike have dismissed in preference to a manner of thinking that is essentially theoretical and calculative, i.e., rational. But if meditative thinking isn’t rational, what kind of thinking does it entail? J. Glenn Gray (1968) suggests it is helpful to first consider what Heidegger does not mean by meditative thinking.

\[^3\] Meditative thinking is, in the first place, not what we call having an opinion or a notion. Second, it is not representing or having an idea (*vorstellen*) about something or a state of affairs . . . . third, meditative thinking is not ratiocination, developing a chain of premises which lead to a valid conclusion . . . . [Meditative] thinking is not so much an act as a way of living or dwelling—as we in America would put it, a way of life. (pp. x-xi)

Moreover, according to Macquarrie (1994), “Meditation [for Heidegger] suggests a kind of thought in which the mind is docile and receptive to whatever it is thinking about. Such thought may be contrasted [for example] with the active investigative thought of the natural sciences” (pp. 77-78). In other words, meditative thinking (which bears a striking resemblance to Freud’s conception of free association) hinges on undergoing an *experience*
with thinking, free of intellectual gymnastics. In comparison, Heidegger characterizes calculative (i.e., rationalistic) thinking as a byproduct of the technological age in which we live. Though its roots go back to Plato, its impact on modern culture became decisive with the scientific revolution that was inspired by Descartes in the 16th century. The tendency to perceive the world in the abstract and conceptual manner that calculative thinking entails took an even sharper turn in the 20th century, with the birth of the computer era and the technological innovations that have developed over the last hundred years. Though it would be misleading to conclude that Heidegger was opposed to science, there’s no denying he believed science has overtaken our lives to such a extent that we have forgotten how to think in a nonscientific manner. One of Heidegger’s most famous statements about the status of contemporary science is that “science does not think!” and that the thinking science employs is an impoverished variety that is thought-less, or thought-poor. These arguments are both complicated and subtle because, on the one hand, Heidegger agrees with postmodernists more than they are prone to acknowledge whereas, on the other, the areas of disagreement are more radical, including their respective attitudes about values.

With the exception of the postmodernist rejection of authenticity, nowhere is the disagreement between Heidegger and contemporary postmodernists more pronounced than in their respective views about technology. Whereas postmodernists reject values in principle and argue that
we have no way of determining, for example, whether technology and science are good or bad, Heidegger argues that the role technology has played in our lives since the industrial revolution has been detrimental to our humanity. Because postmodernists reject the argument that there is a human nature to protect or endanger, their assessment of technology is relatively benign, or neutral (with the possible exception of Lyotard’s concern about technology’s deleterious effects on culture). Heidegger was among the first philosophers to bring our attention to the manner in which technology has become a tool of the modern era, epitomized by American capitalism and the totalitarian system of the Soviet Union.

Heidegger’s critique of technology is so startling that it has been sorely misunderstood by many of his critics. Much of the postmodern era is identified with the electronic transmission of images and information via film, television, and computer technology, recently morphing into a global village that is transmitted over the Internet. Reserving judgment on this cultural revolution, postmodernists have avoided casting aspersions on the negative aspects of these innovations and see themselves instead as merely chronicling its development. In contrast Heidegger and Nietzsche before him were less enamored of science and its technological appendages and alarmed about the direction into which modern (and postmodern) man is heading. Heidegger’s concern was not with technical innovations themselves, whether they be weapons of mass destruction or the latest medical breakthrough, but
with an element of *modern* (as opposed to ancient) technology that diverged from the simple tools that served human beings in earlier epochs: its sheer magnitude.

Indeed, the source of capitalism’s recent success is rooted in the discovery that if manufacturers were to sell their products in larger quantities they could lower the prices charged to consumers and increase sales, thus eliminating their smaller competitors and increasing the market share (and profits) for their investors. Whereas Heidegger would look at the way the typical Hollywood movie is obliged to hypnotize its audiences in order to sell vast quantities of tickets and hence maximize profits (thus undermining the artistic quality of the product in the process), the postmodernist is interested in the medium of film itself and the narrower question as to how the experience of watching movies affects the viewer. The former is concerned with the corrupting impact of mass technology on our culture, whereas the latter brackets such questions and instead examines how the medium serves to “construct” the viewer’s psyche.

The 20th century witnessed one industry after another—e.g., groceries, clothing, vehicles, medicine, etc.—evolve from a collection of small, family-operated endeavors into international conglomerates, whose size has the power to destroy smaller, independent businesses in their wake. The masses support such measures because these products come at bargain prices and
thus raise their living standards. Such technological innovations, however, don’t merely change the way we conduct business; they also affect the quality of our lives, not materially, but spiritually and existentially. The easy manner in which the attack of September 11, 2001 on the World Trade Center in New York, for example, nearly destroyed the international tourist industry demonstrates how precarious the world economy has become, rooted in the cultivation of profligate spending. Our postmodern culture is increasing the pace at which we work and commute to and from the workplace to a frenzy, making it increasingly difficult to take the time to ponder the subtle mysteries of our existence and what purpose our all-too-brief lifespans should serve.

As we devote more of our time to making enough money to support the materialistic lifestyle to which we have become accustomed, modern technology grows like a cancer that carries us ever more quickly toward a future that is as alluring as it is ominous, toward what Nietzsche and Heidegger feared would be the collapse of civilization. Like Nietzsche, Heidegger harked back to an earlier era, epitomized by the early Greeks, when life was relatively simple and relationships were comparatively straightforward and enduring. Postmodernists dismiss such sentiments as signs of a decaying romanticism that they associate with the Enlightenment, an era in which the German Romanticism that influenced both Nietzsche and Heidegger was in ascendance. But Heidegger cannot be so easily dismissed as a romantic or a modernist because the quality of life he warns is endangered
is not a moral issue but an ontological one. It is not a question as to what is right or wrong but which is most ostensibly human. This is probably the most contentious source of disagreement between Heidegger and postmodernist thinkers and the reason why Heidegger’s conception of authenticity is so controversial.

**POSTMODERNISM AND AUTHENTICITY**

Although Heidegger was the first philosopher to employ “authenticity” as a technical term, both Nietzsche’s and Kierkegaard’s respective philosophies are sources for this component of Heidegger’s philosophy. For Nietzsche, authenticity characterized the person who is not afraid to face up to the fundamental anxieties of living. Such an individual is embodied in Nietzsche’s conception of the Ubermensch, usually translated into English as “overman” or “superman,” who would come to grips with his fears and overcome the weight of his or her existence by accepting reality for what it is, unbowed and unafraid. Such a person would permit the Dionysian aspect of his being to dominate over his more rationalistic and repressive Apollonian side.

Postmodernists have rejected Nietzsche’s ideal as merely the latest edition in a long history of such mythic figures (e.g., the Marxist proletarian, Freud’s perfectly analyzed individual, or Sartre’s existentialist hero) that fails
to take into account the severe limitations that human beings must contend with and ultimately accept. While there is some truth to this assessment of Nietzsche’s hero, one would be mistaken to construe Heidegger’s authentic individual as nothing more than a 20th-century edition of Nietzsche’s Ubermensch. One of the principal differences between Nietzsche’s Ubermensch and Heidegger’s notion of authenticity is that for Heidegger there is no such person who epitomizes the “authentic hero” in juxtaposition to people who are inauthentic. Authenticity is characterized by Heidegger as a specific act or moment in any individual’s life where the context in which a situation arises offers an opportunity to behave authentically or not. Moreover, the concept is so central to Heidegger’s philosophy that it is difficult to appreciate what authenticity entails without an understanding of his philosophical outlook. Space doesn’t permit me to summarize Heidegger’s philosophy, but suffice it to say that, unlike Nietzsche, Heidegger was not talking about an ideal person who would some day emerge to replace the stereotypical contemporary neurotic, a view that is moralistic as well as pathogenic. Instead, Heidegger argues, all human creatures are inauthentic by their nature, but sometimes behave authentically when they rise to the occasion. Of course, we are challenged to do so virtually every moment of our lives, but are usually too distracted to notice. So how do we manage to act authentically in spite of our condition and, more to the point, what would doing so entail?
In order to understand what authenticity entails it is necessary to know what it means to be inauthentic. Carman (2000) observes that there are two distinct depictions of inauthenticity in Heidegger’s magnum opus. *Being and Time* (1962), that appear to contradict each other but in fact are complementary. Both are aspects of “fallenness” (*Verfallenheit*), a fundamental component of inauthenticity, characteristic of the individual who sells out to public opinion in order to curry favor or success. A central theme throughout Heidegger's early work is the relationship between the individual and society and how this relationship sets up a tension that the individual, contrary to Nietzsche, never entirely overcomes. This is because humans are existentially isolated from one another and, in their loneliness, crave the comfort of feeling at one with others, not unlike the “oceanic” experience Freud describes in *Civilization and Its Discontents* (1930). For Heidegger and Nietzsche alike, this sense of belonging is an illusion. We spend all our lives searching for a feeling of communion only to find our reward is always one more step out of reach. This quest is inconsolable, says Heidegger, because the only way of approximating this feeling—short of falling in love—is by abandoning an essential aspect of what we are about: our personal integrity. Hence, one version of “falling” into inauthenticity describes the human condition from which we cannot escape, whereas the other version becomes manifest when a person *tries* to escape his isolation by capitulating to social incentives to do so. Yet, if we are condemned to *be* inauthentic as a
fundamental facet of our existence, how can we also be granted a choice in the matter, to choose not to be so on certain occasions? In other words, how can one become authentic if one is fundamentally inauthentic?

A good example of the inherent difficulty in recognizing this distinction was Heidegger’s own fall into inauthenticity when he joined the National Socialist Party in Germany in the 1930s, when he believed he was giving his soul in service to his country. Because sacrifice is an essential aspect of authenticity, Heidegger believed he was behaving courageously and resolutely when he embraced the Nazis. Later, shortly before his death, Heidegger characterized his disastrous excursion into politics as an incidence of inauthenticity, an insight that only came to him in hindsight. In other words, one cannot necessarily tell when one is behaving authentically or inauthentically in the moment of doing so. After the fact, Heidegger could recognize he was mistaken to believe that National Socialism (or for that matter, any political platform) could serve as a vehicle for authenticity. Like so many others, he was caught up in the feeling of being at one with the German people and even saw himself as an instrument of National Socialism’s future success, short-lived though this expectation turned out to be. Because any act necessarily exists in time, it is necessary to give one’s actions the time they require to reveal, in their unfolding, what those actions were about, after the fact (a fundamental tenet of psychoanalytic investigation). Thus Heidegger’s conception of authenticity offers little in the way of
reassuring, external markers that can discern the motives one is serving at the moment action is taken, because our motives are always, to a significant degree, hidden.

Both Nietzsche and Heidegger recognized the terrible sense of anxiety that lies at the bottom of our inauthenticity, but Heidegger was more adept at characterizing the precise features of this dread for what it is, the experience of being alive. Instead of trying to flee from our anxieties by suppressing them we can choose to listen to what they tell us about ourselves. Heidegger realized that because there is no ultimate foundation for our values or our behavior, we can never feel at home in the world. Yet because we are thrown into a world that is not of our choosing, it is up to us to determine what meaning our lives will have. The inauthentic individual, like the neurotic, is incapable of accepting the anxiety and hardship that our everyday existence entails. Instead, he complains about his lot and the unfairness of the hand that is dealt him. For Nietzsche and Heidegger alike, the ability to accept life on its terms, to suffer the day-to-day blows that are impossible to avoid or escape, brings with it a reward that only authenticity can offer: the experience of genuinely coming into one’s own.

Like original sin, we live in inauthenticity as a matter of course, but we also aspire to rise above our base motives by struggling against the temptation of blindly following the herd. Though Heidegger was instrumental
in our era’s recognition of the illusory nature of the self, he argued that because the self is impressionable it is imperative to find a way home, without selling ourselves short. This task is made difficult because it is impossible to know from one moment to the next what our motivations are, and whose motives we are, in fact, serving. It is easy to see why Heidegger’s conception of authenticity is so troubling to Marxists (e.g., Habermas and Adorno) who scorn the very concept as a dangerous delusion. If no one can set definitive standards for what authenticity entails, then how can one ever know whether one is merely acting from ambition at the expense of everyone else? Ironically, this criticism is more descriptive of Nietzsche’s characterization of the Ubermensch and its proximity to nihilism, and even of the postmodern perspective that is dubious of political and moral values in principle. Yet Heidegger’s critics argue that authenticity is just one more universal value that Heidegger, despite his rejection of modernity, succumbed to. But Heidegger would counter in turn that authenticity is not a value per se but depicts those moments when the individual is able to resist the illusion of ever finally belonging to a “good” greater than one’s own. If there is a value here it is the value of facing reality.

Heidegger’s depiction of authenticity has no foundation other than the individual’s conscience, for better or worse. In order to be one’s own, honestly and authentically, one is obliged to suffer the isolation and loneliness that follow when we refuse to compromise our personal values for
material or popular gain, as epitomized by political “correctness.” For Heidegger, postmodernism is antithetical to a philosophy of authenticity because it embraces inauthenticity as a matter of course. Any perspective that lives on the surface while rejecting a depth to one’s deliberations, that celebrates a conception of selfhood which changes as easily as the channels on television, that dismisses traditional values such as conscience, honesty, and goodness just because we lack immutable standards against which such values can be assessed, and whose apparent purpose is to find fault with any pronouncement that aspires to be positive by staking a position of one’s own is a perspective that celebrates inauthenticity at every turn. As such, it is a nihilism that feeds on everything that preceded it while applauding itself as the latest intellectual fashion. Such a perspective, though rooted in a scepticism of sorts, is nevertheless a form of scepticism that is fundamentally alien to the kind that Nietzsche and Heidegger delineate.

THE SCEPTICAL DIMENSION TO NIETZSCHE’S AND HEIDEGGER’S RESPECTIVE PHILOSOPHIES

If Heidegger’s conception of authenticity represents the most glaring difference between his philosophy and postmodernism, the differences in their respective debt to scepticism are not so easy to determine. All postmodern thinkers agree that postmodernism is rooted in a sceptical perspective, epitomized by its rejection of ultimate reality, knowledge, and
truth. But there are many kinds of scepticism, so if postmodernists are sceptics, so are many other philosophers who preceded the postmodern era, including Nietzsche, Heidegger, Berkeley, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Bayle, Hume, Montaigne, Wittgenstein, Santayana, and Kierkegaard, and even Shakespeare. Although some commentators have characterized the postmodern turn as a paradigm shift in 20th-century philosophy and culture, scepticism has been around for ages, going back to the pre-Socratics. Even in ancient times there were divisions within the sceptic camps that separated, for example, the Pyrrhonian (or “Therapeutic”) sceptics, many of whom were physicians, from the Academic sceptics, who resided in universities and occupied themselves with abstract questions about the nature of truth and knowledge. In order to assess the relevance between the sceptic tradition and postmodernism it is necessary to know more about the history of scepticism and why Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s identification with the sceptical tradition is so foreign to the one that postmodernists employ.

The word “sceptic” comes from the Greek skeptikos meaning thoughtful, reflective, so the notion of “doubting,” per se, is not intrinsic to how scepticism began. Whereas modern sceptics, including postmodernists, reduce scepticism to a radical capacity for doubt, Mates (1996) argues that the term “doubt” appears nowhere in Sextus Empiricus’s writings, except in some mistranslations of his text into English. For some reason, modern sceptics have made philosophical doubt the cornerstone of their depiction of
sceptic inquiry, whereas Mates argues that the characteristic attitude of the ancient Pyrrhonists was one of aporia, “of being at a loss, puzzled, stumped, or stymied” (p. 5). Hence, unlike doubting, aporia doesn’t imply understanding, a principal feature of postmodernism, which claims to understand, for example, what is wrong with modernism. Like the psychoanalyst today, the ancient sceptics sought to inquire into the nature of experience by abandoning prejudice and claims to ultimate knowledge (such as, How can I conduct my life so that I can be certain of the outcome?).

According to Hallie (1964), “Scepticism [was] the hope of living normally and peacefully without metaphysical dogmatism or fanaticism” (p. 7). Groarke (1990) adds that traces of the sceptic attitude can be seen as early as Democritus and Socrates (circa 450 BCE), when the Greeks crystallized three philosophical trends that were subsequently incorporated into the sceptical outlook: (a) an anti-realist bias; (b) the turn to a more personal attitude about truth; and (c) the development of philosophy away from epistemological concerns and toward a practical means of relieving mental anguish by achieving equanimity—all this before the so-called postmodern paradigm shift, 2500 years later! The sceptics believed that most philosophers were of little use to the common man and, like Socrates before them, devoted their efforts to exposing the fallacy of what philosophers claimed to know. Instead, the sceptics viewed philosophy as a therapy whose purpose is to engender the ability to live in harmony with the world.
Scepticism proper is attributed to Pyrrho of Elis, who lived around 300 BCE, during the time of Alexander the Great. After Plato’s death the sceptics assumed control of his Academy and transformed it into a forum for philosophical debate. These Academic sceptics, however, diverged from the original. Therapeutic sceptics by becoming increasingly abstract and epistemological in their preoccupations, similar to the current difference between research and clinical psychologists. The subsequent fracture of scepticism into two camps, however, made it even more influential and the movement continued to flourish until after the middle of the fourth century CE, when it was apparently suppressed by Christianity. Scepticism subsequently resurfaced in 1562 and became the philosophical rage in Europe by serving as an indispensable tool for intellectual debate. Erasmus, Montaigne, Mersenne, Gassendi, and Descartes are only some of the philosophers, scientists, and theologians who were either influenced by the sceptic method of inquiry or, in the case of Descartes, committed to refuting it.

The impact of scepticism on the Enlightenment was considerable, but it also splintered into the same opposing camps that characterized the schism between the ancient Therapeutic and Academic sceptics. Most of these modern sceptics immersed themselves in debates as to whether it is possible to know anything by contriving arguments that are impossible to prove or disprove, such as the “brain in the vat” scenario. How do I know, for example,
that my brain is not in a vat on Alpha Centauri and my experiences and beliefs are being produced by direct electrical and chemical stimulation of my brain by advanced intelligent beings? This form of scepticism is interested neither in therapy nor in people’s happiness, but preoccupies itself with the impossibility of knowing anything.

Though contemporary critics of scepticism dismiss it because the rejection of truth itself offers little in the way of practical gain, such objections are the consequence of lumping all sceptics together, overlooking the distinction between Therapeutic and Academic traditions. Sceptics who limit themselves to questions of epistemology, as we saw earlier, become proponents of nihilism, whereas sceptics who follow the Pyrrhonian tradition are occupied with the inherently practical task of obtaining relief from mental suffering. The latter observed that the unhappy person suffers because he is constantly searching for “answers” that he believes can be obtained from experts or theories. The sceptic counters that peace of mind comes not from obtaining ultimate truths but by recognizing that embracing such truths is what made him neurotic in the first place. In other words, the sceptic argues that people become neurotic because they assume the worst whenever they encounter a loss or prolonged hardship; thus their anxiety derives from their conviction (i.e., “knowledge”) that all hope is lost and that their future is bleak. Yet experience tells us that momentary failure often leads to unexpected opportunity, if only we can abandon our negativistic convictions that we
know what the future will bring. This was the principal insight that drew Nietzsche and Heidegger to the sceptics in the first place, a tradition that is neither modern nor postmodern but, if anything, pre- or a-modern.

Thus the rejection of all values, whether personal or therapeutic, is the principal difference between the scepticism that was embraced by Nietzsche and Heidegger and the version that inhabits contemporary postmodernism. But by rejecting personal values as well as universal ones postmodernists have thrown out the baby with the bathwater, to use a tired phrase. To claim, for example, that truth is not absolute but relative, that moral values are not necessarily universal, and that no authority is beyond reproach doesn't necessarily imply that categories of truth, values, and authority are pernicious to philosophical debate and consideration. Indeed, it is precisely because these categories are no longer absolute that we are obliged to debate them in order to determine which values we will choose to live our lives by. These are the questions that become manifest when considering the impact postmodernism has had on psychoanalysis and whether its influence is a step forward or, alternatively, into the abyss.

**POSTMODERNISM AND PSYCHOANALYSIS**

The conventional perception is that postmodernism has influenced recent trends in psychoanalytic theory and technique, including
hermeneutics, social constructivism, relational theory, and intersubjectivity, that in turn constitute a paradigm-shift in traditional psychoanalytic thinking. This view is predicated on the assumption that Freudian psychoanalysis is rooted in an outdated, modernist view of the human condition based on a one-person paradigm that is derivative of a Cartesian egocentrism. Like the postmodern phenomenon itself, the label postmodern has been applied retrospectively to developments in psychoanalytic theory that were in evidence long before postmodernism emerged as an identifiable philosophical perspective. Generally speaking, any psychoanalyst who can be said to have challenged Freud’s sexual model has been enlisted as representative of a new and postmodernist departure, including such disparate analytic thinkers as Sandor Ferenczi, Melanie Klein, Michael Balint, Ronald Fairbaim, D. W. Winnicott, Wilfried Bion, Heinrich Racker, and Jacques Lacan. This list of analysts, distinguished for having disagreed with Freud on this or that matter, continues to grow in the form of so-called contemporary Kleinians, contemporary representatives of the British Middle School, and contemporary French and South American psychoanalysts. This group has been joined by contemporary American psychoanalysts who are avowedly anti-Freudian and, hence, in opposition to ego psychology, a perspective brought to recent prominence by the late American analyst Stephen A. Mitchell, an erstwhile representative of the interpersonal school before conceiving (with Jay R. Greenberg) the relational perspective.
The relationship between postmodernist thinking and the recent emergence of anti-Freudian theories in America is unclear. Increasingly, proponents of relational or interpersonal perspectives, including but not limited to followers of Bion, have suggested that the “two-person” model is consistent with the postmodern turn in American and European cultures. I shall assess the validity of these claims below. In so doing, however, it would require more space than I have available to examine the efficacy of each psychoanalytic school in turn and assess whether and to what degree each has adopted postmodernist principles. Instead, I examine the relationship between postmodernism and Freudian psychoanalysis and describe those aspects of Freud’s model that anticipated the postmodern perspective and those aspects that are antithetical to it. I then review aspects of Freud’s model that are not necessarily consistent with postmodernism but are faithful to elements of Nietzsche’s philosophy as well as Heidegger’s. In conclusion, I leave it to the reader to determine whether postmodernism offers anything of substance for the future of psychoanalysis and whether the claims of two-person psychology are as innovative as its proponents assume.

I don’t believe anyone would disagree with the observation that Freud was a creature of the 19th-century fascination with everything scientific and that he passionately embraced science and its empirical proclamations. Yet Freud also possessed a sceptical temperament that was continuously at war with his scientistic aspirations. I have documented the extent of Freud’s debt
to scepticism elsewhere (Thompson, 2000a, b) so I won’t go into it here. Scepticism notwithstanding, there are features of Freud’s basic theory that are antithetical to the Enlightenment’s reliance on science and the certitude it aspired to, including: (1) his conception of the unconscious; (2) his adoption of the interpretative method; (3) the free association method; (4) analytic neutrality; and (5) the observation that it is impossible to affect a patient’s condition through appeals to rational argument or coercion. All five criteria of Freud’s theory are, as Barratt (1993) observes, postmodern in spirit. Moreover, all five are also sceptical, though it isn’t clear where Freud obtained his insights or how. It has been documented that Freud was acquainted with the writings of Montaigne (Gilman, Birmele et al., 1994) and that he was familiar with Nietzsche’s philosophy (Lehrer, 1995), both of which were imbued with a sceptic sensibility. But even if Freud made all his “discoveries” himself, as he claimed, it is reasonable to assume that he was predisposed to them due to his familiarity with scepticism, via one source or another. Thus, all the essential elements of Freud’s psychoanalytic discoveries are consistent with the postmodern perspective as well as ancient scepticism. I shall now review the connections between Freud’s discoveries and scepticism.

1. Freud’s conception of the unconscious: This is a concept of mind that contemporary scientists emphatically reject. Although Freud wasn’t the first to employ such a concept (von Hartmann and Nietzsche had already discussed the notion at
length), it was a radical concept when offered and brought considerable abuse against Freud from his medical, scientifically trained colleagues.[8]

2. Freud’s adoption of the interpretative method: Freud’s interpretative method follows from his conception of the unconscious. It considers that the patient’s speech acts are overdetermined and, as with Nietzsche, indicates that language is essentially metaphorical, so the meaning of what individuals say must be interpreted according to the context in which it is offered. Virtually all schools of psychoanalysis retain this model and have built on it, though Lacan and the hermeneutic school have been prominent in rethinking what interpretation consists of.

3. The free association method: Barratt (1993) and others argue that Freud’s novel conception of the free association method is antithetical to an empiricist view of data-gathering and presaged a central tenet of the postmodern perspective, the view that language is more complex than previously imagined and that much of our communication with others occurs unconsciously. The so-called revolution in the postmodern critique of language (as consisting in language games) was anticipated by Nietzsche and is a feature of Heidegger’s conception of language, which in turn influenced Lacan.[9]

4. Analytic neutrality: Freud’s conception of neutrality continues to be a source of controversy and contemporary analysts who are identified with the relational perspective (and sympathetic
with postmodernism) show a surprising antipathy to this technical principle, due to its alleged authoritarianism, i.e., the analyst’s silence imbues him with an aura of aloofness that places the patient in a one-down position. In fact, this is the feature of Freud’s treatment philosophy that was intended to constrain the analyst’s authority, not inflate it. By Freud’s definition, neutrality means nothing more than to adopt an attitude of sceptic, open-ended inquiry and never to impose one’s views on the patient, but rather to allow patients to arrive at their own solutions in their own time—antiauthoritarianism in its essence.\[10\]

5. The observation that it is impossible to affect a patient’s condition through appeals to rational argument or coercion: Although this is not a technical principle, as such, this observation permeates the entirety of Freud’s treatment philosophy and underlies all his technical principles. Although Freud began his medical career learning methods that were rooted in 19th-century empirical medical practices, he had the flexibility to profit from his errors and gradually abandoned conventional psychiatric methods in favor of what evolved into psychoanalysis. Whether Freud came upon these innovations on his own or derived them from others (e.g., Brentano, Schopenhauer, Montaigne, Nietzsche, and Plato and Aristotle), they are consistent with what are currently touted as features of postmodernism.

I have enumerated aspects of Freud’s basic treatment philosophy that are both consistent with and anticipated elements of postmodernism, but
what about those aspects of Freud’s treatment model that continue to be rooted in Enlightenment values, as his critics allege? There is little question that while Freud’s treatment philosophy was a farsighted and monumentally influential method of relieving human suffering and revolutionized the way we currently conduct therapy, many of Freud’s more fanciful theories were based on little more than his penchant for speculation and were often offered in a dogmatic fashion, sometimes alienating him from his most passionate disciples. The manner in which he offered interpretations to his patients was also frequently dogmatic, and Freud had a tendency to construe any rejection of his interpretations as resistance. Moreover, Freud’s initial goal was to “cure” mental illness unequivocally in a manner that is reminiscent of the grand narratives found in Hegel, Marx, Kant, and other Modern philosophers. On the other hand, Freud’s theories are not essential to his psychoanalytic method, which generations of innovators have subsequently demonstrated, so why fault him on his theory when one can substitute it with another, without sacrificing the principles on which the method relies? Moreover, Freud was never satisfied with his theories and revised them throughout his lifetime, whenever his experience indicated that reconsideration was warranted. In this, Freud was a tireless sceptic and toward the end of his life (1937/1964) came to the radical conclusion that a psychoanalytic cure of neurosis or any other form of suffering is impossible, due to the fluid nature of the human predicament and our sensitivity to unforeseen circumstances
that are liable to upset our equilibrium.

Indeed, the question of theory was not only a problem for Freud but continues to bedevil contemporary psychoanalysts as well. Were Freud a sceptic through and through he would have recognized that theories are superfluous to the psychoanalytic instrument he fashioned and he would have concluded that the aim of analysis is not knowledge but peace of mind. Yet, how many contemporary psychoanalysts (even postmodern thinkers) have abandoned theory, even those who claim the search for knowledge is an artifact of the Enlightenment? There continues to be something suspiciously dogmatic about contemporary psychoanalytic theorizing, whose alleged virtue is its “superiority” over Freud’s. But who, in the end, is able to judge who is right? It would serve the postmodernists well to take a page from the ancient sceptics who recognized that if knowledge is in the eye of the beholder, then it behooves us to abandon dogmatic claims entirely, including our self-certain condemnation of those with whom we disagree. Because the language and sensibility of postmodernism are essentially a French phenomenon, it shouldn’t be surprising that of all the psychoanalytic schools in the world it would appear to have had the most influence on the French, principally Lacanians but spilling over to other French analysts as well (e.g., Kristeva). Though Lacan’s theories continue to be fashionable in academic circles, his impact on American psychoanalysts has been minimal, even among those analysts who are sympathetic to postmodernism.\[11\]
Unlike the French, the American analysts most taken with postmodernism tend to emphasize matters of technique over theory. Elliott and Spezzano (1998), for example, suggest that the work of Irwin Hoffman is postmodern due to his lack of certainty about what is going on between himself and his patients, in contrast to analysts who are more invested in determining what is allegedly happening in the unconscious of the analyst and in the unconscious of the patient. This is a point well taken and consistent with the sceptical outlook in contrast to the dogmatic assertions of previous generations of analysts. Similarly, the work of Schafer is said to be consistent with the postmodern perspective when Schafer questions whether patients should be characterized as “deceiving” themselves simply because the analyst sees it differently. Of course, these features of Hoffman’s and Schafer’s respective work could just as easily be characterized as existentialist in nature, so they are neither necessarily nor essentially postmodern. Elliott and Spezzano argue, however, that just because postmodernism embraces a relativistic and perspectivist framework (they maintain that “genuine” postmodernism only embraces perspectivism, a view that is inconsistent with the prevailing literature on the subject), that doesn’t necessarily imply that one interpretation is just as good as any other, a frequent criticism among analysts who reject postmodernism. Thus Elliott and Spezzano conceive of a form of “mitigated” postmodernism in contrast to the more radical position of so-called New Wave French psychoanalysts, a softening of the more extreme
European applications of postmodernism that is common among American analysts who identify with the relational perspective.

**THE QUESTION OF INTERPRETATION**

As noted earlier, the question of interpretation is of fundamental importance to Freud’s conception of psychoanalysis, as well as to contemporary relational, intersubjective, constructivist, hermeneutic, and postmodernist perspectives. Freud was not alone in his tendency to treat interpretations as pronouncements from the gods, as though he could divine the truth of the matter by virtue of his superior intelligence. Indeed, most psychoanalysts have tended to treat interpretation as translation from the patient’s utterances into a given theory of underlying reality instead of a means of “opening up” an otherwise closed area of discourse. It is surprising, however, that contemporary hermeneutic and constructivist models would imply that this more sceptical, allegedly postmodern take on the handling of interpretation is something new. Many of the existential psychoanalysts from the 1950s and 1960s (who were also critical of Freud in this respect) came to the same conclusion after integrating Heidegger’s philosophy into their clinical perspective, evidenced in the publications of R. D. Laing (1960, 1969 [1961]), Ludwig Binswanger (1963), Medard Boss (1979), and a host of European psychoanalysts.\(^{[13]}\) Laing noted, for example, that Heidegger’s conception of everyday experience *already presupposes* an act of
interpretation that, in turn, elicits one’s capacity for getting to the heart of the matter, a conception of interpretation that has been noted by hermeneutically oriented psychoanalysts such as Donnel Stem (1997), derived from Heidegger’s former pupil Hans Georg Gadamer. In Laing’s (Laing, Phillipson & Lee, 1966) words:

Our experience of another entails a particular interpretation of his behavior. To feel loved is to perceive and interpret, that is, to experience, the actions of the other as loving . . . . [Hence] in order for the other’s behavior to become part of [one’s] experience, [one] must perceive it. The very act of perception land hence experience] entails interpretation, (pp. 10-11) [Emphasis added]

In other words, everything analytic patients experience is the consequence of interpretations the patient has already, instinctively given himself which, in turn influence what a given patient is capable of taking in during the course of the analytic journey. What the analyst says to a patient is never actually “heard” in the way the analyst necessarily intends it to be, because it is unconsciously interpreted and, hence, experienced by the patient according to his or her interpretative schema, a culmination of everything an individual has previously endured and understood by such experiences in the course of a lifetime. In other words, analytic patients experience the world according to a personal bias that is resistant and often impervious to anything a patient encounters that contradicts it, such as an analyst’s interpretations. The dogmatic nature of a person’s views, held together by a lifetime of
neurotic impasse maneuvers, helps explain the difficulty patients experience when invited to question their most basic assumptions. Since both analyst and patient are always already instinctively interpreting everything each says to the other (but without necessarily realizing they are doing so), what is actually heard by each and in turn experienced is impossible to grasp directly, because every account of a person’s experience entails the use of words that, when uttered, are immediately translated by the listener into a schema that the individual, whether analyst or patient, either wants to hear or expects to. This constantly changing interplay of speech, recognition, and misunderstanding accounts for the extraordinary difficulty analysts experience in their endeavor to converse with their patients and, in turn, understand them, because every attempt at communication is at the mercy of the patient’s originary experience, the source of which is notoriously opaque. Because I can never know what a patient’s experience is, I can only make a calculated guess as to what it might be, based more or less entirely on what the patient tells me.

Analysts who were influenced by Heidegger’s hermeneutic theory of language often focus on the patient’s tendency to deflect the analyst’s efforts at understanding by resorting to self-deception and even overt deception. Analysts, in turn, are similarly prone to self-deception and subtle forms of coercion, a point exhaustively investigated by Laing (Thompson, 1998). For Heidegger, this characterizes merely one example of inauthenticity, which
was developed further by Sartre (1981) as well as Laing (1969). More recently, psychoanalysts who were influenced by Gadamer’s development of hermeneutics are more likely to emphasize the difficulties encountered with any attempt at communication, and view the analytic situation as that of “unraveling” the inherent complexities of speech acts as they occur. The postmodern rejection of this thesis is based on the claim that self-deception is a myth because there is no standard of truth against which one is able to deceive and because there is no “self” to lie to. This criticism is also raised against Freud, who believed his patients were harboring secrets, so that the goal of analysis is one of determining what those secrets are. The fact that neither Heidegger, Gadamer, nor postmodernist thinkers believe that truth is objectively verifiable, however, doesn’t negate the proposition (adopted by both Freud and Heidegger) that human beings are prone to deceive themselves about the nature and content of their experience, no matter how unreliable or objectively inaccurate one’s experience may be. What counts is that patients believe in the veracity of what they deceive themselves (and others) about, so the resulting conflict is between opposing inclinations “in” oneself, which are in turn derived from a cleavage in the individual’s relationship with the world. It seems to me that in their rejection of the premise of self-deception postmodernists have taken the terms “self,” “deception” and “truth” literally, mistaking the organizing principle of subjectivity for a materialistic notion of the self.
Even the concept of resistance has become so controversial that some analysts (e.g., Schafer) have cast doubt on its efficacy altogether. Whether such views are consistent with postmodernism and how practical they are clinically I cannot say. There is an increasing tendency among analysts identified with the relational perspective to characterize the analytic relationship as one between equals, more or less collaborative in spirit, thus minimizing the tension that has traditionally characterized the patient’s transference to the analyst. Yet none of these innovations are new, nor are they derived from the postmodern turn in contemporary culture. Matters of technique have been debated since the beginning of psychoanalysis, and there is a long history of disagreement between analysts who advocate a more authoritarian posture and those who opt for a “user-friendly” variety. While some analysts believe that technique should follow theory, others argue that practice is a creature of experience, a more sceptical position. I remain doubtful that recent so-called innovations in technique are anything new, whether or not they are consistent with the postmodern perspective. Psychoanalysis is such a flexible instrument that what finally matters is the person who employs it, not which theory or technical regime the analyst is educated to follow. Indeed, I would think this observation—that neither theory nor technique is essential to psychoanalysis—is postmodernism in its essence.

**WHAT IS THE MATTER WITH POSTMODERNISM?**
If there are positive components of postmodernism, what about those aspects of the postmodern turn that are irrelevant or even deleterious to the purposes of psychoanalysis? There is an expanding hegemony in the psychoanalytic world evidenced by a movement toward standardization that parallels similar developments in global commerce, the Internet, and the rapid disappearance of smaller, less orthodox psychoanalytic schools and organizations. The so-called global village, a quaint notion when the world was divided between the United States and the Soviet Union, now has the aura of a prison that encroaches on individualism and deviancy, if not eradicating them entirely. The decentering of the subject, while a compelling notion in theory, has fashioned a conception of the world not unlike that of the 1999 movie *The Matrix*, where individuals have become illusions, controlled by a vast network of computer intelligence in a not-too-distant, postapocalyptic future run amok.

In similar fashion, psychoanalysis has lost whatever edge it once enjoyed as a subversive element in society. Now it is part of the establishment — indeed, a tool of the “mental health professions,” whose conception of psychic deviancy is listed in a manual of diagnostic nomenclature that is the bible of every psychoanalytic practitioner.[14] There is something ominous about the American conception of treatment, where mandatory universal licensure is all but inevitable, where any day now confidentiality between
patient and analyst will become an artefact of the past, along with other Enlightenment values that are suspect in an era of paranoia and suspicion. What role has the postmodern turn played in these developments? Does it question the efficacy of such values, or does it encourage them?

This is a difficult question to answer, because by rejecting universal values altogether the postmodern wears the mantle of an observer, neither cheering nor condemning cultural mores. Perhaps this version of neutrality can be reconciled with a perspective that decries authenticity in principle, but the postmodern abhorrence of authenticity is both surprising and telling—surprising because the authentic individual is not susceptible to the rewards of the people, and telling because it alerts us to the likelihood that, in its (alleged) rejection of values, postmodernism adopts values after all, but in the form of an anti-individualism that is ultimately suicidal. Indeed, there is something missing in the person who claims to be postmodern: for lack of a better word, a heart. With no leg to stand on, even its own, postmodernism as it is currently envisioned appears to define itself as a paradigm of spiritual emptiness, a cul-de-sac that is impervious to either passion or purpose. Having abandoned any vestige of selfhood or history, it depicts a world that is, perhaps contentedly, finally alienated from its own alienation.

A culture that rejects any semblance of authority or tradition cannot help but impact the role that psychoanalysis aspires to. Psychoanalysis has
always been the champion, par excellance, of the individual, a respite from the forces in every culture that demand obedience to the values adopted en masse. In this, psychoanalysis has offered a means to extricate oneself from such values (or at least to hold them in question) and to follow the beat of one’s own drum, authenticity in its essence. Will psychoanalysis, like the culture at large, become a vehicle of the postmodern sensibility, or will it remain true to its original purpose, that of reconciling the individual to the muse of his own conscience?

Even if authenticity can be dismissed by postmodernism as just another value—whether universal, in the Nietzschean sense, or personally chosen, in the Heideggerian—psychoanalysis needs to advocate some sort of value that is, if not intrinsic to itself, then at least to the practitioner who wields it.

References


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**Notes**

[1] Nietzsche, however, used the idea of the unconscious descriptively, not topographically.

[2] Admittedly, Nietzsche was “in the air” in early-20th-century Vienna, and Otto Rank, who read passages of Nietzsche’s work to Freud’s circle, was the principal source of Freud’s acquaintance with Nietzsche’s philosophy. But Nietzsche was not a principal subject of philosophical debate until much later, when Heidegger cited Nietzsche as an important source of his thinking.


[5] It soon became obvious to the Nazis and Heidegger alike that the two had virtually nothing in common, and the more the Nazis learned about Heidegger’s philosophy the less they wanted any part of it. This was the reason they soon went their separate ways (see [www.freepsychotherapybooks.org](http://www.freepsychotherapybooks.org))
Safranski, 1998, and Ott. 1993, for more on Heidegger’s association with National Socialism).


[7] In fact scepticism, properly speaking, can be more aptly depicted as an outlook or perspective than a philosophy, since much of what sceptics question are the assumptions that philosophers employ.

[8] See Thompson (1994) for a thorough discussion of Freud’s aversion to the science of his day and the many parallels between his thought and Heidegger’s.


[10] I have written extensively on this to show that so-called classical Freudian technique originated with a group of American psychoanalysts in the 1950s and is fundamentally contrary to Freud’s model. For more on this misunderstanding see Thompson (1996a; 2000b).


[13] See May, Angel, and Ellenberger (lids.) (1958) for a comprehensive selection of European psychiatrists and psychoanalysts who were influenced by Heidegger in the post-World War II era.

[14] Notable exceptions are a smattering of Lacanian and Jungian institutes in Europe and North America, the phenomenologically oriented Philadelphia Association in London, and some affiliate organizations of the International Federation for Psychoanalytic Education (IFPE), based in the United States.
One might think the importance of the past would be an embarrassingly unnecessary topic for a psychoanalytic audience. Freud made so much of the significance of history for each individual, as well as the repeated emphasis he put on the story of the early development of psychoanalysis itself, that one could suppose that there would be no need to pursue the point. But Freud did take a somewhat special approach to life histories, singling out for example the critical importance of early traumas, with the idea that once they were reconstructed neuroses could be overcome; and he, as well as his supporters, polemicized so early about the origins of his "movement" that it has taken considerable subsequent effort to come up with alternative narratives. Further, he tended in principle to isolate clinical material from social realities in a way that can now be considered ahistorical. Nobody has followed up on his commitment to the inheritance of acquired characteristics, nor his fascination with Egyptian archeology; but it is more than antiquarianism on our part to insist that there were historically significant aspects to his work (including his interest in telepathy) that are apt to be passed over today.
The main problem we have to confront now seems to be that storytelling itself appears to some to be the central enterprise with which psychoanalysts are concerned, as if old-fashioned truth could afford to take a backseat clinically. For no matter how impossible it may be to approach a God-like omniscience, without some such ideal goal of the truth history is in danger of becoming merely a weapon in partisan warfare. Propagandizing, as well as the possibilities of suggestion, are so common an occurrence that we need to think of trying to construct many kinds of barriers against them.

An immense amount of the world’s great literature has had to do with the past and how we conceive it. Poets and novelists have come up with a host of imaginative reflections on the subject. Objectivity has itself come under a cloud, and not much deserves to survive of Freud’s frequent use of the image comparing his therapy with surgery. (The current fashionable reliance on classification and diagnoses like those in DSM III & IV can show how little modesty we have learned since early-20th-century psychiatry.) Psychoanalysts have been on stronger ground for being among those whose central concern is with memory, including the perils of avoidance as well as the vagaries of recapturing lost time. Historians themselves, whose professional subject matter so many different kinds of amateurs have trespassed upon, only relatively rarely seem willing to pause in reflecting on the broadest generalizations connected with their field; consequently even the word “historiography” seems offputting to most, about as attractive-
sounding as “bibliography.”

My own approach to the importance of the past starts by hinging on the question of power, which has generally been considered the key concept in political science, the subject in which I was professionally educated. Machiavelli and Hobbes both put power so at the center of their respective approaches that it was subsequently hard for political thinkers to dodge it. Yet the study of politics remains one of the human sciences—like psychoanalysis. The difference is that political life is concerned with the outside world, where success is considered the great objective; while psychoanalysis, also simultaneously an art as well as a science, is centrally preoccupied with the inner world in which failure deserves to be respected. For me psychology and politics have been complementary disciplines that can add to each other; the external world should belong at least within the broadest scope of a psychologist’s concern, just as fallibilities and weaknesses ought not to be scornfully brushed aside by political observers.

Power as a subject has never attained much legitimacy within psychoanalysis. It is true that in “Analysis Terminable and Interminable” Freud did rely on the writer Anatole France’s liberal maxim that “when a man is endowed with power it is hard for him not to misuse it” (Freud, 1937/1964, p. 249). Freud also could acknowledge the legitimacy of the question of whether psychoanalysis could cause harm: “if a knife does not cut, it can not
be used for healing either” (Freud, 1916-1917/1963, p. 463). But on the whole it would be others, unsympathetic to the revolution in ideas Freud initiated, who would point out the power elements within psychoanalytic practice. Wielding authority ought not to be automatically suspect, although authoritarianism is another matter. Rousseau, a great leader in the history of education, once famously proposed the paradox of “forcing” people to be “free,” an idea that foreshadowed many of the ethical dilemmas implicit in later psychological thinking.

If I were starting out as a young man today, it might no longer be as necessary to point out the abusive possibilities within so-called classical psychoanalysis, now evidently a rare enough procedure; but the main object of contemporary legitimate concern could be the ease with which striking power can unknowingly be wielded by naive enthusiasts for so-called biological psychiatry. (A variety of different schools of thought, including existential analysis and an interpersonal approach, should not be compressed into the arbitrary dichotomy between psychoanalysis and biological psychiatry [Havens, 1973].) Drugs whose side-effects are only partially known (or that are addictive) are too often being prescribed—even to children—without enough adequate knowledge of the complex human beings being treated. (A potentially lethal drug such as lithium can be recommended, for ambulatory patients, on the basis of a telephone conversation [Fieve, 1975].) Technical diagnoses are being bandied about, and heredity made
central, as if we were living a hundred years ago and no one had ever criticized the drawbacks to such a highly formalistic approach (Roazen, 1998, chap. 2).

The past should be a central concern; unless we understand history we are left surrendering to the present. Imagine what it would be like to think politically without any memory of World Wars I and II, or the Vietnam War, for example. Or how would we like to be without knowledge of the ways in which civil liberties can be threatened in time of war? And yet some such strictly contemporaneous approach is all too common in clinical fields. One central temptation that needs combating is the assumption that whatever is must be right. I am suggesting that the main way of avoiding the implicit premise that we are living in the best of all possible worlds is an awareness of the past. Although analysts at least pay lip service to historical sequences, in virtually every psychoanalytic training center I know about, Freud's writings are extracted from their intellectual context so that they are read in isolation from whatever opponents he might have been trying to contest. In psychiatry too, practitioners are encouraged to think in terms of technique rather than the values and beliefs of the past.

To take an example: the history of dentistry does not bear the same relation to the work of today's dentists as the history of psychotherapy does for contemporary practitioners of that different craft. Every field has its
hidden as well as its open sectarianism. Even dentists, however, would acknowledge that we in the United States go in for orthodontics in a way that is unique in the modern world. In general we must try to get people to see that suffering and pain are to a large degree defined culturally, mediated by social expectations. It is not necessary to join in any simplistic antipsychiatry movement in order to acknowledge that different societies look on human problems in culturally characteristic ways.

In America, for example, we need to be especially aware that we are likely to be misled by our traditional faith in progress. If one were knowledgeable enough in comparative cultures it would be possible to write about the manner in which different countries construct their past in distinctive ways. Although it can be perilous to engage in conjectures concerned with the subject that used to be known as “national character,” the speculative dangers that might be involved are worth risking, given what we can expect to learn.

A famous literary example would be Henry James's study of Nathaniel Hawthorne, in which James sympathized with how the young artist was confronted with “the coldness, the thinness, the blankness” of early-19th-century American life. James was writing in 1879, after having taken up permanent residence in England three years earlier. James was convinced that “later in life” Hawthorne had felt, after he had “made the acquaintance of
the denser, richer, warmer European spectacle,” that “it takes such an accumulation of history and custom, such a complexity of manners and types, to form a fund of suggestion for a novelist.” James’s words enumerating “the items of high civilization, as it exists in other countries, which are absent from the texture of American life” have become famous:

No State, in the European sense of the word, and indeed barely a specific national name. No sovereign, no court, no personal loyalty, no aristocracy, no church, no clergy, no army, no diplomatic service, no country gentlemen, no palaces, no castles, nor manors, nor old country-houses, nor parsonages, nor thatched cottages, nor ivied ruins; no cathedrals, nor abbeys, nor little Norman churches; no great Universities nor public schools—no Oxford, nor Eton, nor Harrow; no literature, no novels, no museums, no pictures, no political society, no sporting class—no Epsom nor Ascot!

James did not seem to realize how narrow his own snobbism was going to make him appear subsequently; instead, he felt that “the natural remark, in the almost lurid light of such an indictment, would be that if these things are left out. everything is left out” (James, 1956, pp. 34-35).

James thought he had found in Hawthorne a writer after his own heart, and was able to quote him along his own preferred lines. Hawthorne had once written:

No author, without a trial, can conceive of the difficulty of writing a romance about a country where there is no shadow, no antiquity, no mystery, no picturesque and gloomy wrong, nor anything but a commonplace prosperity, in broad and simple daylight, as is happily the case with my dear native land. (James, 1956, p. 33)
Although at the time James may have been helping to introduce Hawthorne as a writer, by means of James’s long "critical essay," from our own point of view it is difficult to believe that James could ever have so misunderstood Hawthorne’s achievements. For Hawthorne had inherited the distinctively American version of Puritanism, as obsessed with the sins of the past as one could imagine. Hawthorne was hardly the ideal spokesperson to pick for “a commonplace prosperity,” and I suspect that Hawthorne could have been ironic when he wrote about the “broad and simple daylight” supposedly characteristic of his “dear native land.” *The Scarlet Letter* (1850) was not only in gloomy contrast to such a simple-minded outlook, but deeply rooted in the Salem past. *The House of the Seven Gables* (1851) also demonstrated Hawthorne’s convictions about how history powerfully influences the present. Hawthorne's earliest short stories, or “tales,” from the 1830s demonstrated his belief in human rootedness; he filled his writings with almost doom-filled atmospherics associated not just with the heritage of the American Revolution but of the New England version of Puritanism. As late as 1879, Henry James could, somehow, still think that "history, as yet, has left in the United States but so thin and impalpable a deposit that we very soon touch the hard substratum of nature. . ." (James, 1956, p. 10), but I think that in general Hawthorne was a writer among those least likely to support James’s point of view.

Even if James was demonstrably wrong in what he had to say about
Hawthorne, he may have nonetheless been onto a sound comparative point about America. When one thinks of the whole revolutionary period itself, the Founding Fathers proceeded to reason in a peculiarly antihistorical manner. Madison, Hamilton, and Jay, for example in the Federalist Papers, tried to appeal to universal principles about human motives. In their defense of the new Constitution they were proposing to proceed with full confidence in the power of reason and reflection. Although they took for granted dissatisfaction with life under the Articles of Confederation, it is striking that they did not make an appeal back to the long historical experience they had had as colonies of Great Britain.

We have been so peculiarly fortunate as a country that we almost do not notice the way others have found it necessary to ablate their pasts (Roazen, 2002b). In Japan, for example, the post-World War II offices of General MacArthur have been allowed to disappear. Italians have been apt to have a blind spot when it comes to the Mussolini period. In Germany the break occasioned by the Hitler period has left in its wake both guilt and cynicism about the past. (At the same time Germans publish facsimile editions of books on a scale that we would never dream of producing.) The collapse of the Soviet Union has left a series of countries having to come to terms with the problem of who in their pasts might have collaborated with dictatorial regimes. In Budapest recently I was impressed by how they had preserved, in a park outside the city run by a commercial freelancer, huge relics of their
Stalinist past; within the city itself a slab of the Berlin wall had been donated by a Germany grateful for Hungary’s opening of its gates to refugees at a critical moment. Hungary may be an exception that defies many of the historiographical rules I have tried to explicate. But the historical experience of the rest of the world has been so much more textured with tragedy than that of America that it is hard in spite of everything not to think that Henry James was onto something when he developed the theme of American innocence.

I do not wish to dwell here on the momentous events of September 11, 2001. But it seems to me that before then we felt uniquely protected in an unrealistic way; thirty billion dollars a year on intelligence spending still left us vulnerable and exposed. It was not just a massive failure in intelligence, but also a characteristic American avoidance of even the dirty-sounding word “spying,” in preference to the neutral sounding and idealistic concept of “intelligence.”

Abroad, in older cultures, art restorers are more likely to be aware that fixing up deteriorating frescoes, for example, must inevitably mean changing the painting to something different from what it now is, or for that matter, what it once was; but the decision to leave it alone simply invites a different sort of change. Federico Fellini made a film about Rome (*Fellini’s Roma*, 1973) in which an archeologist watching over digging for construction witnessed an
ancient chamber being penetrated; the excavators of a tunnel broke through into the remains of a Roman villa. Its walls were brilliant with frescoes; but the painted faces were the faces of the modern interlopers, and the colours, as the air of today seeped in, faded and disappeared. Fellini had a fine European sense of irony about history.

In the midst of 19th-century England’s romance with evolution Lord Acton once declared that “Progress [is] the religion of those who have none” (Himmelfarb, 1970, p. 179). Now technology itself does in fact progress, but we in America have hardly been moving upward and onward ever since the Pilgrims landed on Plymouth Rock, or the Founding Fathers organized our Constitution. It is true that our national cultural myths do encourage such a naively progressive orientation; and the Supreme Court, for instance, tries to maintain a kind of seamless connection between us and the past, so that we can appear to be living under an 18th-century document which has been adapted for current times without any discontinuity.

And it is characteristic of us to think in terms of what the historian David Brion Davis has recently called generational chauvinism—that ours is somehow inherently superior to previous times. Some degree of presentmindedness is inevitable, and today’s concerns do inevitably shape what interests us. But it ought to be clear that any progressive approach to history means that we ourselves are certain to be soon left behind in the
rubbish-heap that such an outlook entails. A few short years from now any fool will be able to look back and see us as prejudiced and dumb. (A cyclical view of history can of course be equally misleading.) We ought to have the foresight to see that relying on any chauvinistic hindsight based on a strictly developmental perspective is bound to be deadly—even to our own best efforts.

Just as we must never allow ourselves the complacent assumption that everything now is the best of all possible worlds, so we must acknowledge that it is in the nature of ideals to be permanently at odds with reality. Norms must be at odds with facts, and we should not take it for granted that some incoming tide will automatically lift us onto higher ground. The way to improve things is always to be chasing after ideals that are in principle unattainable although they remain inherently desirable. It is the tension between what ought to be and that which is that helps motivate us to action. So neither conservatism nor utopianism suits the full reality of the human condition (Hartz, 1990).

There has undeniably been progress in the field of dentistry, but how securely can we say exactly the same for psychotherapy? Every clinical encounter is, I believe, simultaneously an ethical one (Lomas, 1999); and in the world of moral values we encounter choices whose merits cannot ever be proven one way or other. I am not suggesting that in philosophizing
everything is either relativistic or equally up for grabs. But at the same time science cannot hope to settle things in a way that could, in principle, make everyone equally satisfied. Morality inevitably gets us into a murky area that is, at least for some, unsatisfactory in its ambiguity and cloudiness; but I think we are better off acknowledging the reality of ethical dilemmas, and how values can be inherently at odds with each other. This is a point that my supervisor and tutor in political theory at Oxford, Sir Isaiah Berlin, liked to expand on (Berlin, 1998).

Taking certain medication can be at the expense of creativity, and antidepressants are known to be hard on the sexual drive; but how can we calibrate the pros and cons of what can be gained as opposed to what is likely to get lost? Practitioners of rival psychotherapeutic schools have had contrasting moral outlooks, and it is characteristic of American optimism not to want to weigh the disadvantages of so-called progress. The better educated one is the more likely that choices get made in an informed context. One of the reasons why the history of controversies in psychoanalysis has held my attention is the extent to which such quarrels were about rival conceptions of the good life (Roazen, 2002a).

How we ought to live, and the best ways of organizing society in order to promote objectives that we might have in mind, are bound to be questions that civilized people are able to disagree about. Much of world philosophy has
been concerned with competing outlooks on the good life. Alfred Adler, to
give only one example, was a socialist, and it can be no accident that
psychologists whose testimony was relied on by the US Supreme Court in its
1954 Brown decision on desegregation traced their intellectual ancestry back
to Adler; nor can the Menningers be proud of how their family refused to
cooperate in undertaking that historic lawsuit against a Topeka school board.
In general, by becoming acquainted with the past we should be better able to
come up with sophisticated judgments; there is little in human affairs that is
really new under the sun. The history of ideas is a rich subject precisely
because it offers concrete examples of how people under different social and
political conditions have chosen options that might enlighten us about our
own situations.

The past is gone, and is, at best, only partially recoverable. The future,
though, is almost completely unknown, and a matter largely for prophecy. To
reiterate: as we try to live in the present the main resource we have for
challenging that which exists has to come from our knowledge of the past. It is
history that provides us with the enlightenment with which we can deal with
what we encounter. It is not only concepts from history that can help us but
also examples of how people have lived. The explicit teachings that Freud or
his early disciples may have promoted can be supplemented by the complex
examples of their lives. How people behave is at least as instructive as what
they preach. Psychoanalysis became a profession that was, almost uniquely,
open to women, and Freud was defying a younger generation in Vienna when he ignored the views of those opposed to allowing female practitioners to be full members of his psychoanalytic group (Roazen, 2000a).

Within psychoanalysis itself there has naturally been a tremendous amount of attention given to Freud himself. But biographical accounts of Freud have often been unusual and unspoken vehicles of partisanship. Vested interests have added to this acrimoniousness, and rival groups of interested parties have used observations about Freud’s life for the sake of promoting their own points of view. Students of Freud need to be alert not just to the “spin” he could put on his own life, but to the variety of biases that inevitably enter into accounts of Freud’s life. But however critical of him one might be, nobody could contest that he was a highly educated intellectual full of ideas, and that he succeeded in attracting to him a fascinating group of people whose lives, whatever one might now think of the merits of what they proposed, have to be seen, I think, as models of interesting originality. In talking about the early days of psychoanalysis, or the struggles of Freud’s tortured genius, one is not dealing with the uninteresting sort of bureaucracy that, let us say, we confront with today’s International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA).

Any organization with approximately 10,000 members has to be a completely different matter than a narrative connected with the tiny group of
people involved, for example, with the early strife between Freud, Jung and Adler. I mention these names because they are so intimately associated with the central founding myths of the discipline. My own approach has been that of an outsider willing to reconsider all past professional difficulties. As an intellectual historian I have found this a rich field precisely because there were, when I started out some forty years ago, so many examples of central figures who were neglected, ignored, or misunderstood. Filling in some of the silences seemed an intellectual adventure in keeping with Freud’s own stated aim of correcting amnesias. Challenging collective family romances, and rearranging various lineages, was in keeping with what intellectual historians are supposed to be doing.

At the outset of my work the early editions of Freud’s letters were being regularly bowdlerized. When in my *Freud: Political and Social Thought* I put an entry called “censorship, by Freud family” in the index I helped make, I naively thought that would attract attention (Roazen, 1968/1999). It was only with the publication the next year of my *Brother Animal: The Story of Freud and Tausk* that when I cited a particularly shocking example of a suppression in a letter from Freud to Lou Andreas-Salome that I put an end to such tendentious tampering (Roazen, 1969/1990). (That is the reason why correspondences in this field are now called “complete.” There is a downside here, since although a book of letters between Helene Deutsch and her husband Felix might be a good idea, the German publisher I have consulted on
the matter hesitates to bring out anything less than all the letters, fearing accusation of partisanship.) The English page proofs of the correspondence between Freud and Lou Andreas-Salome had to be withdrawn from circulation, and the book finally came out with those critical key words of Freud's reinstated. I felt I was then launching a scholarly torpedo, but that was my youth; even so I am afraid I have fairly regularly continued to drop little scholarly bombshells, not fully aware of how provocative I think it is the job of a political philosopher to be. The Jung family still has to face up to all sorts of private papers not yet released, such as the extensive existing correspondence between Jung and his wife.

Right now I am still continuing at the same old game, although we are in a different phase of scholarship. The editing of the Freud-Ferenczi letters was so unsatisfactory and inadequate that, with the English edition of the Freud-Binswanger correspondence, I have inadvertently slowed things down by suggesting to the publishers pre-publication editorial changes. And I have worked hard on the revised edition of the Freud-Abraham letters in order to help ensure that the editing is more up to what I consider scratch. I wish there were many others who could also actively share in this academic “pulling up of socks,” so that in the future students of the history of ideas would have a better and a more truthful appreciation of what occurred in the past.
Forty years ago Freud himself was not widely considered a legitimate field of inquiry within my field of political science. A career in political theory could have been advanced more readily by attention to the ideas of Locke, Hobbes, Rousseau, even Thomas Aquinas or Augustine. In the years since I started out American political science has been moving even closer to economics, and away from political theory or the outlook of a professional pioneer such as Harold Lasswell, who was once closely connected with people such as Karen Homey and Harry Stack Sullivan. And yet I like to think that the central points in past political theorists were concerned with ideas about human nature which have been newly contested within psychoanalysis (Roazen, 2000b).

To some extent sectarianism has thrived within psychoanalysis precisely because of these fundamental clashes between alternative visions of the good life. The more uncertain the field, the more fanatically held convictions can be. And the fragility of the acceptance of the field can mean that it seems unpatriotic, if not treasonable, to march independently. But history is not supposed to be written solely for celebratory purposes. Historical cheerleading is not something that interests me.

History writing at its best is inherently subversive and upsetting. No authoritarian political regime has ever been able to tolerate genuine historical research. To burrow in the past means at least potentially to attack
the established present. When Peter Gay subtitled his biography of Freud “A Life For Our Time,” he was being presentistic; a journalistic tag-phrase that no doubt helped sell copies of books revealed the lack of proper detachment. To write in order to make analysts feel good about themselves would be to betray the obligation of the historian to disturb the present by means of the past for the sake of the future. So Gay could leave the name of Wilhelm Reich out of his text entirely, since the story associated with Reich would have complicated the narrative purposes of prettifying the history of psychoanalysis for today. (Oddly enough a recent excellent biography of Freud, the critical best we have had, has also succeeded in avoiding the apparently dread name of Reich [Breger, 2000].) Trade unionists are entitled to want histories that promote their cause, just as corporations or famous families can appoint (and pay) scholars to present them in the best possible light. The supports that come from having joined the crowd are apt to be greater than the rewards for being willing to go against the grain.

As I look back on my own work, I remember how traumatic it was for me to be assailed in two full-length books by Kurt R. Eissler, the founder of the Freud Archives, and to find out that Anna Freud also viewed me as a “menace.” (Three decades ago that particular party had a lot of powerful allies.) Yet I like to think that I am capable of being even-handed when I recently felt shocked to find how Anna Freud’s position in England seems to have been swamped by those analysts who now ignore what she tried to
accomplish. Anna Freud was so singularly lacking in political talent (or perhaps committed to altruistic surrender) that she put her mind to a “defense” of her father more than to securing her own position. Kleinianism is as curiously triumphant in Britain as Lacan has been successful in having an impact in France. These are as much cultural matters as tales of comparative national politics. One of my earliest interests in this subject was the story of the reception of Freud in different national cultures—England and America, for example.

As the years have passed, and I have grown more familiar with a wider range of countries and their individual traditions, my original focus has been extended as well as broadened. But there are bound to be losers as well as winners in a tale as rich as the history of psychoanalysis; for instance, to cite the ill-understood example of Wagner-Jauregg, a contemporary of Freud and the first psychiatrist ever to win a Nobel Prize, seems to me a matter of course and not any sign of “antipsychoanalytic” bias. Someday scholars will also present accounts of the receptions of lithium, lobotomy, shock treatment, family therapy, self-psychology and goodness knows how many other movements within psychotherapy.

To work with the past means, I think, to engage in a kind of anthropological field work. It is culture which defines what we should be trying to get at; different eras naturally define things in their own special way.
The study of great literature—which is how I would characterize Freud's achievement—challenges us to get beyond today's conventional ways of thinking. The history of science itself is self-correcting, but even after all of Freud's works may appear to have been beached in an intellectual Smithsonian they should retain their artistic unity. To examine any such texts involves our trying to comprehend the special orientations the past has to offer; this means an opportunity not only to get outside of ourselves, and into the minds of people different from us, but thanks to that intellectual voyage there is a possibility of returning with an enhanced perspective on how we think now. History should not be undertaken either for the sake of enhancing our own sense of superiority or for the purpose of moralistically denouncing past ways of proceeding. The more educated we become the better able we should be to maintain critical distance toward today's ways of thinking. I am afraid that most psychoanalytic articles in our professional journals, which characteristically proceed by citing bibliographies of past literature, are constructing mythical bridges to the past—a procedure for establishing false continuities that unknowingly legitimates the status quo now.

To be fair to the past means to respect human variety, without insisting that everything valuable in history must necessarily lend support to how we proceed now. How we ought to live should be an open question, requiring tentativeness and a sympathetic imagination on our part. In my own early work I found it a convenient short cut to interview psychoanalytic pioneers;
even after all these years I am still assimilating the significance of what I once learned (Roazen, 2001). The human context for ideas can be an essential road to understanding. Works of psychotherapeutic interest do not fall from the sky of abstract philosophical reasoning, but rather arise from the complex struggles people have in dealing with enduring human mysteries. I do not fear that the latest fashions in psychiatric classification will exhaust the complexities of human motives. It is not necessary for any of us to be Luddites about psychopharmacological developments, or the thinking that encourages them. But I do find demeaning the way diagnoses of patients can be used for the sake of pigeonholing; some things in life are unfixable, and need to be lived through. The human soul has triumphed before over such excessive rationalism as seems today so psychiatrically fashionable. (I find it puzzling that Otto Fenichel, whose giant textbook can be seen as a handbook of old mistakes, should be attracting contemporary interest. If one yearns for encyclopaedic knowledge Henri Ellenberger would seem to me far more admirable [Ellenberger, 1970].)

If one were presenting these ideas about the importance of the past in any other national setting, it would be necessary to adapt things radically. I once gave a talk in Paris entitled "What is wrong with French psychoanalysis?" (Roazen 2000c) and the place was mobbed. The French are used to serious intellectual exchanges, especially on the level of moral theory, even if one suspects that part of the price for that sort of vitality is a lack of
conviction that civilization exists outside Paris. (The Chinese can be even more frustratingly self-confident because their ancient culture predates ours.) Unfortunately, the French can be crassly anti-American, as in the way they have been apt to dismiss the growth of ego psychology as a mere matter of conformism.

In work as in life one makes choices, hopefully doing the best one can. If I have learned anything from my studies, it is how essential in all the human sciences can be the injunction to guard against fanaticism. One of the best characterizations of how Freud's mind could work can be found. I think, in Solzhenitsyn's novel *Lenin in Zurich* (Solzhenitsyn, 1976). Splitting a movement, reducing it down to its hard core in the faith that the future will redeem such purity, does remind me of Freud's way of proceeding before World War I. At least in the short run he prevailed against his opponents. And elsewhere that tenacious Bolshevik-like spirit has brought others remarkable psychoanalytic rewards. In the long run, however, I have a perhaps mistaken faith that the more modest people, those humble enough to allow themselves to be at least for a time forgotten, will also succeed in getting a hearing. So it is in behalf of those who have, for one reason or another, been neglected or unfairly treated that I have tried to work.

My coming of age in the 1950s meant that intellectual history—the power of ideas—was a live central faith. Max Weber writing on the role of the
Protestant ethic in promoting capitalism seemed a powerful answer to any dismissal of the central significance of the life of the mind. Marxists then had a way of dismissing the so-called superstructure, just as psychoanalysts could be high-handed about “rationalizations.” But Freud too had staked his basic claims on the idealistic foundation that the way we think about things can be an independent variable in how we choose to live. Lord Keynes concluded his path-breaking *The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936/1957) with words that became indelibly etched on my mind:

> the ideas of economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood. Indeed the world is ruled by little else. Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of a few years back. I am sure that the power of vested interests is vastly exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas.

Keynes right away went on in the same paragraph:

> Not, indeed, immediately, but after a certain interval; for in the field of economic and political philosophy there are not many who are influenced by new theories after they are twenty-five or thirty years of age, so that the ideas which civil servants and politicians and even agitators apply to current events are not likely to be the newest. But, soon or late, it is ideas, not vested interests, which are dangerous for good or evil. (Keynes, 1957, pp. 383-384)

(I am unable authoritatively to support the hunch, but a guess is that Keynes was in this paragraph, so stylistically so at odds with the rest of the
book, still competing with his great old friend and rival Lytton Strachey. In his book on Queen Victoria, Strachey had first written the final memorable paragraph, and then proceeded to write the rest of the text. This point does not appear in the otherwise excellent standard biography of Keynes [Skidelsky, 1983, 1995, 2002].

I hope Keynes was right about the long-run weakness of “vested interests.” But I must confess that no matter how important intellectual history may be in preparing for the future, it has its own inherent fascination. Still, remember also that Nazism was an idea, and combating it was no easy matter for liberalism. The mind is superior to the body only up to a point. A faith in the autonomy of the human spirit, at least politically, goes back as far as John Milton.

I believe that studying the past is truly an end in itself, a legitimate part of trying to become a cultured person. The ideal of living an examined life is an ancient Greek one. Books that recreate something where before there was nothing succeed on their own terms. The pursuit of knowledge does constitute, as a practical byproduct, a challenge to power, yet remains I think intrinsically self-justifying.

References


Beyond Neutrality: The Curative Function of the Analyst
Self-Disclosure in the Psychoanalytic Situation

Arnold Wm. Rachman, PhD, FAGPA

ESTABLISHMENT OF STANDARD PSYCHOANALYTIC TECHNIQUE

During the first decade or so of psychoanalysis its founder, Sigmund Freud, established what he called “technical recommendations for clinical practice.” The publication of Freud's technical papers, from 1911 to 1919, established a standard of classical psychoanalytic technique (Freud. 1911/1958a, 1912/1958b, 1913/1958c, 1914/1958d, 1915 [1914]/1958e, 1919[1918]/1955). He formulated 10 general ideas: (1) method of free association; (2) phenomenon of transference; (3) unfolding of unconscious motivation; (4) phenomenon of resistance; (5) removal of infantile amnesia; (6) issue of acting out; (7) development of insight; (8) technique of interpretation; (9) working through process; (10) principles of neutrality.

Unfortunately, Freud’s authoritarian style (Fromm, 1959) and the politics of psychoanalysis (Roazen, 1975) combined to turn these
recommendations into “taboos” in clinical functioning. Freud was more aware of his error in emphasizing the negative than were his conservative followers when he said:

... the “Recommendations on Technique” I wrote long ago were essentially of a negative nature. I considered the most important thing was to emphasize what one should not do, and to point out the temptations in directions contrary to analysis. Almost everything positive that one should do I have left to “tact”... The result was that the docile analysts did not perceive the elasticity of the rules I had laid down, and submitted to them as if they were taboos. Sometime all that must be revised, without, it is true, doing away with the obligation I had mentioned. (Jones, 1955, p. 241, italics added)

Freud was the first to deviate from his own technical recommendations. As I have pointed out in another context, he began a technical revolution when he changed his own functioning (Freud, 1919 [1918]/1955. He also encouraged his favorite pupil, Sandor Ferenczi, to experiment with the analytic method (Rachman, 1997a). There remained, however, one dimension of the standard procedure which was inviolate, analyst self-disclosure.

THE TRADITION OF THE ANALYST AS “OPAQUE”

Growing out of Freud’s original conceptualization of the analyst as surgeon (Freud, 1912/195Sb) and following the technical recommendations for the analyst to maintain a sterile field, analyst self-disclosure was considered “not pure psychoanalysis.” In the traditional orientation, the
analyst functions as a “blank screen” onto which the analysand can project the childhood neurosis. The psychoanalytic situation, in the Freudian framework, is essentially a laboratory for the reliving of the childhood neurosis, through the transference, created in the here-and-now between analyst and analysand. Any form of analyst self-disclosure contaminates the transferential field. It is only through the maintenance of a sterile field in the transference that the analyst can be confident the analysand is projecting parental distortions. Only then can interpretations present insights into the recreation of the childhood neurosis in the transference distortions with the analyst.

Freud recommended that the analyst not reveal his own emotional reactions or discuss his own experiences (Freud, 1912/1958b, pp. 117-118; Freud, 1913/1958c, p. 125; Freud, 1926/1959 pp. 225, 227; Freud, 1940 [1938], p. 175). Freud was very clear about his negative view of an analyst who revealed any kind of personal reaction during the clinical encounter:

The doctor should be opaque to his patients and, like a mirror, should show them nothing but what is shown to him. In practice, it is true, there is nothing to be said against a psychotherapist combining a certain amount of analysis with some suggestive influence in order to achieve a perceptible result in a shorter time—as is necessary, for instance, in institutions. But, one has a right to insist that he himself should be in no doubt about what he is doing and should know that his method is not that of pure psycho-analysis (Freud, 1912/1958b, p. 118, italics added)

Unfortunately, this strong recommendation against the use of analyst
self-disclosure initiated a tradition such that any technical advance of which
his conservative followers would disapprove would be damned with the idea
of being “not pure psychoanalysis.” Growing out of Freud’s conceptualization
of the analyst as “opaque to his patients,” and the technical recommendation
for the analyst to maintain a sterile field, analyst self-disclosure was, perhaps,
the deviation considered most unacceptable to classical analysis.

We now have some interesting data on Freud’s actual clinical practice
regarding analyst self-disclosure. Lynn and Vaillant (1998) studied 43 of
Freud’s cases as revealed in published and unpublished sources, both by
Freud as well as his analysands. The findings indicated a discrepancy between
Freud’s theoretical recommendations about analyst self-disclosure and what
he actually practiced: “. . . in all 43 cases, Freud deviated from strict
anonymity and expressed his own feelings, attitudes, and experiences.
Freud’s expressions included his feelings toward the analysands, his worries
about issues in his own life and family, and his attitudes, tastes, and
prejudices” (Lynn & Vaillant, 1998, p. 165). What is more, Freud breached his
recommendations against influencing an analysand through directiveness.
The findings in this area were: “. . . in 37 (86%) of these cases . . . Freud
breached his repeated recommendations against directiveness by the analyst
. . . Freud’s directiveness spanned this entire period [1907-1939] and was as
much of his work in one time as in another” (p. 166).
Lynn & Vaillant concluded that Freud's deviations from anonymity and directiveness to analysands clearly counterindicated the recommendations for opacity he so stringently championed in his writings. Freud's actual clinical behavior, it can be argued, gave his analysand's a view of the real Freud, not the transferential Freud.

CONTEMPORARY TRADITION AND ANALYST SELFDISCLOSURE

Although there has been a re-evaluation in traditional analysis of the issue of analyst self-disclosure, it is still bogged down, I believe, in the taboos of yesterday. Arlow (1969) echoes the classical position. He says that when there is less interference in the internal processes of the analysand, there is more willingness to acknowledge that incoming data are a function of wishful thinking and unconscious preconceptions. The more the analyst encourages realities about him/herself through self-disclosure, the more difficult it is for the analysand to acknowledge his or her own transference fantasies. Sechaud (2000), in a discussion of analyst self-disclosure in the traditional framework, emphasized such negative aspects as: “the dangers . . . of satisfying the exhibitionistic needs and tendencies of a narcissistic analyst; . . . the incapacity for self-control in an analyst’s incompletely structured personality” (p. 164). Sechaud did indicate some positive factors in analyst self-disclosure when the analyst is free of perversion. In this instance, analyst self-disclosure provides direct emotional communication that reduces intellectualization;
facilitates a reduction of idealization of the analyst when the situation allows for or requires it; introduces some elements of livable symmetry into the correct frame of the asymmetrical analytic setting; reveals some elements of the analyst’s personal psychic situation. But Sechaud did emphasize a very cautious use of self-disclosure: “. . . in the hands of an inexpert or disturbed therapist fit] can be like a ‘Kalashnikoff’ (a submachine gun) or a scalpel in the hands of a child!” (Sechaud. 2000. p. 164).

One of the most flexible and forward thinking discussions of analyst self-disclosure within traditional psychoanalysis has been presented by Renik (1995). He seems to have developed a unique position, in which he acknowledges a connection to tradition: “. . . self-disclosure by an analyst burdens the analytic work” (p. 468), yet he aligns himself with the most liberal analytic dissidents, when he also states: “If an analyst places primary emphasis on the importance of healing interactions within the treatment relationship, as opposed to the pursuit of insight, there is no reason for the analyst to strive for a posture of anonymity” (p. 475).

Renik (1995) presents a meaningful discussion of the subject of anonymity and idealization of the analyst. He argues that analytic anonymity actually contributes to the idealization of the analyst within the psychoanalytic situation. Anonymity, which was intended to protect fantasy, ironically turns out to “promote irrational overestimation of the analyst” (p.
478). He makes the bold statement that: “a policy of ‘nondisclosure’ and maintenance of the ideal of an ‘anonymous’ analyst has permitted us implicitly to solicit and accept idealization even while we are ostensibly involved in ruthless analysis of it” (p. 479).

I fully agree with the implications of this argument that only if we are to deconstruct the authority of the analyst can we be assured that our clinical interaction is not based on the exercise of power, control, and status. In the next section I will examine how the issue of the analyst’s authority was of prime concern to Ferenczi and his development of a democratic atmosphere in the psychoanalytic situation, which deconstructed the orthodox framework of analyst as sole authority.

Since the early 1990s, with a return to a focus in psychotherapy and psychoanalysis on the intersubjective experience between analyst and analysand, the issue of neutrality, anonymity, and transference distortions has undergone revisions. Analysts who accept a relational orientation have moved much further along the self-disclosure continuum. Anonymity is an irrelevant issue for Hoffman (1983) because he emphasizes the importance of the fact that the analyst’s personality is always present in the clinical experience. There is no distinction in his framework between realistic and distorted transference because he believes the analysand unconsciously chooses an interpretation which best suits his/her needs. In this system there
is no anonymity for the analyst because the analysand is recognized as being as much an interpreter of the analyst’s experience as the analyst is an interpreter of the analysand's experience.

There is also a new view of the analytic encounter, which emphasizes mutuality. I have called this analysand-informed psychoanalysis (Rachman, 1997a, 2000, 2002). Speaking from a relational framework, which is informed by Ferenczi’s ideas, Aron (1991) illustrates this new view:

I often ask patients to describe anything that they have observed about me that may shed light on aspects of our relationship . . . . I find that it is crucial for me to ask the question with the genuine belief that I may find out something about myself that I did not previously recognize . . . . [I]n particular I focus on what patients have noticed about my internal conflicts. (Aron, 1991, p. 37)

Aron's application of Ferenczi's discovery of mutual analysis is a far-reaching clinical activity. One needs to emphasize that an empathic approach would follow the analysand's need for self-disclosure by responding to an inquiry or an observation of a verbal or nonverbal communication of confusion (Rachman, 2002). With this concern in mind, Greenberg (1991) offers the following caution: “My technical prescription . . . is not to confess but to follow the often more difficult path of maintaining an awareness of the plausibility of the patient's perception” (p. 70).

Renik (1995) is also concerned with intruding upon the subjective
experience of the analysand with self-disclosure:

... I am not advocating imposing one's thinking upon a patient, but I am suggesting that one's thinking should be made available. The point of an analyst presenting the analyst's own view makes the analyst's way of operating, like the patient's, a legitimate subject of joint inquiry. The psychoanalytic situation is one of what I would call complete epistemological symmetry: That is to say, analyst and analysand are equally subjective, and both are responsible for full disclosure of their thinking. I think the great majority of successful clinical analyses require that at certain points, the analyst, like the patient, accept the necessity to defect from his or her own preferred ways of preceding and to bear a measure of discomfort. (Renik, 1995, pp. 482-484, 486-488)

Without acknowledging Ferenczi's technical innovations, he is describing the process of mutuality (Ferenczi, 1932/1988): “Faced with a clinical dilemma, an analyst should feel at least as ready to seek consultation from the patient as from a colleague” (Renik, 1995, p. 492). What is more, Renik connects mainstream psychoanalysis with what Ferenczi suggested 60 years ago (Ferenczi, 1932/1988): “... [We need to] begin to establish a mechanism for self correction by inviting our patients to point us as collaborators, even in questioning our methods (including our decision about self-disclosure)” (Renick, 1995, p. 492).

THE "RESISTANCE" TO ANALYST SELF-DISCLOSURE

We need to examine what can be termed the analytic community’s resistance to accepting analyst self-disclosure as part of the analytic process.
Rosenblum (1998) makes an excellent point when he says that: “. . . the resistance reflects an idealization of Freud who maintained that the avoidance of selfdisclosure was necessary for the development and resolution of a transference neurosis” (p. 538).

But it is not just the Freudians who have this resistance to analyst selfdisclosure. My own experience has demonstrated that contemporary alternatives to Freudian analysis also have the same resistance. One such example occurred when I presented a paper at an international conference on Self Psychology. The chairman, discussant, and senior members of the association were all critical of my view on self-disclosure, suggesting that it took away from the focus on the subjective experience of the analysand. Interestingly enough, younger members of the audience did not share their view, feeling that analyst self-disclosure was an empathic way of being.

FREUD'S CONFUSION OF TONGUES

Freud’s “confusion of tongues,” that is his difficulty in distinguishing between affection and sexuality, due to his own sexual issues, may be at the heart of his prohibition of analyst self-disclosure. There are several landmarks in the development of this prohibition. The first is contained in the famous paper which introduced the concept of “abstinence” (Freud, 1915 11914]/1958e). Freud developed the concept of abstinence on the basis of his
concern that young male analysts would satisfy the romantic longings of their female patients. With this concern in mind, he wrote: “The resolution of transference is made more difficult by an intimate attitude on the doctor’s part…” (Freud, 1915 [1914]/1958e, p. 118).

Several analysts have suggested that Freud’s conceptualizations on abstinence and neutrality may have developed as a result of his unconscious attempt to suppress his erotic feelings toward women patients (Rosenblum, 1998; Stone, 1961; Schachter, 1994).

There is some credence to the idea that the conceptualization of analyst anonymity was originally a function of Freud’s conflict over his erotic feelings. There are indications of the validity of this hypothesis in Freud’s clinical behavior. Freud’s moralism with Ferenczi occurred when Freud became convinced that Ferenczi was having sexual contact with analysands, when it was reported to him that Clara Thompson said: “I am allowed to kiss Papa Ferenczi, as often as I like” (Ferenczi, 1932/1988, p. 2). Alarmed at the alleged sexuality, Freud wrote Ferenczi the famous “kissing letter”:

. . . You have not made a secret of the fact that you kiss your patients and let them kiss you . . . why stop at a kiss? . . . And then bolder ones will come along which will go further to peeping and showing . . . petting parties . . . the younger of our colleagues will find it hard to stop at the point they originally intended, and God, the Father Ferenczi, gazing at the lively scene he has created, will perhaps say to himself: maybe after all I should have halted in my motherly affection before the kiss. (Jones, 1957, p. 197)
Freud’s hysteria over Ferenczi allowing Clara Thompson to kiss him had nothing to do with sexuality or erotic contact. It was, in actuality, Ferenczi’s “relaxation therapy” (Ferenczi, 1930) intended to provide reparative therapeutic measures to individuals who suffered childhood trauma (Rachman, 1998b). Thompson was a victim of sexual abuse by her father (Ferenczi, 1932/1980c, p. 3). Ferenczi decided to provide Thompson with the opportunity to have a passion-free therapeutic experience with an affectionate father (Rachman, 1993a). In actuality, Thompson initiated the kissing experience and Ferenczi agreed to it to provide the therapeutic measure to aid the recovery from the confusion of tongues trauma. This type of trauma, which Ferenczi was the first to identify, refers to the emotional disorder which is activated by parental/authority abuse fueled by narcissism and inauthenticity (see pp. 226-227 below, for an outline of the confusion of tongues trauma). Freud’s suppression of his own longings for erotic expression prevented him from distinguishing Ferenczi’s affectionate response to Thompson from sexuality.

Roazen (1990) has suggested that the greatest taboo in psychoanalysis is speaking about Freud’s analysis of his own daughter Anna. It is reasonable to assume that in analyzing his own daughter’s oedipal complex Freud would be exploring his daughter Anna’s erotic longings for her father. Freud’s willingness to analyze Anna is an indication of his “emotional blindness,” being unaware of the seduction dimension of this enterprise. In fact, this
analysis could be characterized as a confusion of tongues trauma (Rachman, 1996). Anna spoke “the language of tenderness and love.” Freud spoke “the language of passion.” Any discussion of sexuality with his daughter contaminates his child’s privacy to have oedipal desires for him. This sexualizes the interaction. He created the issue of sexuality as the central topic, but then disavows that he has an interest in it.

At the deepest level of understanding the analyst must struggle to cure his/her own COT trauma in order to work through his/her pathologic narcissism and become emotionally and interpersonally available to the analysand. Any analyst suffering from the incest trauma or severe physical or emotional abuse needs to reach the basic fault of these traumas to be able to work in the zone of authenticity. There has been a suggestion that Freud did suffer a childhood seduction from which he was dissociated (Kriill, 1986) which may be at the bottom of his moralism with Ferenczi and emotional blindness with his daughter (Rachman, 1996).

FERENCZI'S POSTMODERN VIEW OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

In the present discussion, Ferenczi’s postmodern ideas are imbedded in the way he deconstructed the issue of the analyst’s anonymity. As I have discussed, the psychoanalytic situation was constructed as a standard clinical situation with rules determined by the analyst to create a neutral, objective
tabula rasa, onto which the analysand projected manifestations of the childhood neurosis. Analyst anonymity was intended to create a sterile field of observation, uncontaminated by the analyst’s personality.

Ferenczi realized that there was a crucial dimension within the clinical interaction that influenced the entire analytic process, namely, the presence of empathy (or tact, as it was first used) (Ferenczi, 1928/1980b). By listening to the subjective experience of the analysand, at the level of listening with the “third ear” (Reik, 1949), he discovered that the response of the analysand was determined by the manner, style, and level of responsiveness of the analyst. For the first time, the analysis was informed by the analysand’s subjective experience. What was formerly considered the inviolate standard of being “opaque” to the analysand was deconstructed to now mean the need for authenticity. This was especially necessary when there was a disturbance in the analytic relationship. Ferenczi observed that being opaque communicated emotional distance and unresponsiveness. Instead of “blaming” or “shaming” the analysand for wanting or needing a real or genuine response from the analyst, he searched his own functioning to see if he had contributed to the interpersonal difficulty. Even if he hadn’t, he realized that the analysand needed an empathic rather than an interpretative response.

What informed Ferenczi of the need to respond with authenticity rather than remain opaque? After all, he was the leading practitioner of Freudian
analysis in Eastern Europe (Rachman, 1997a, 2002). Ferenczi realized that difficult cases (severe neurotic, narcissistic, borderline and psychotic disorders) were difficult because the Freudian standard of interpretative interaction had one meaning for the analyst and another for the analysand. Ferenczi’s use of clinical empathy informed him of the need for analyst authenticity, because trauma survivors indicated they were emotionally injured or retraumatized by persistent interpretative behavior (a finding Kohut verified over fifty years later). New meaning was created by paying attention to the “phenomenology of the relationship.” The focus shifted in the Ferenczi paradigm from the intrapsychic experience of the analysand to the subjective experience between analyst and analysand. By deconstructing the traditional analytic text, Ferenczi derived meaning from the "immediate experience" within the psychoanalytic relationship. The data of analysis was no longer confined to the analysand’s reaction to the analyst. The field of inquiry, dialogue, and process was deconstructed into a two-person relational experience.

DECONSTRUCTING THE OEDIPAL THEORY: NEW MEANING IN THE CONFUSION OF TONGUES (COT) THEORY

It would be helpful, at this point, to discuss the theory that Ferenczi developed to create new meaning for the psychoanalytic situation. The Oedipal theory of neurosis (Freud, 1905/1953, 1916-1917/1963, www.freepsychotherapybooks.org 417
1924/1961) was deconstructed into the confusion of tongues theory (Ferenczi, 1933). Ferenczi believed that the global meaning established in the oedipal theory did not take account of neurosis caused by trauma, whether physical, sexual or emotional. By the time he developed the COT theory he had specialized in trauma cases for at least half his clinical career (Rachman, 1997a). Neurosis and more severe psychological disorders develop when parental narcissism takes precedence over the child’s developmental needs. The COT paradigm is characterized by narcissism which drives parents to satisfy their own needs, whether they be dependency, power, dominance, perversion, sexuality, etc. There is little or no awareness of the traumatizing effect the parental behavior has on the child. Two different languages are spoken, leading to a confusion of tongues. The child speaks the language of “tenderness,” the phase-appropriate, developmental need for tenderness, affection, nurturance, physical touch and love. The parent speaks the language of “passion,” driven to fulfill his or her own needs, in an “emotionally blind way.” Caught in their own narcissistic webs, the parents are unaware the child experiences their passions as intrusion, betrayal, manipulation, abusive, or even demonic (Rachman, 1993b).

As the abusive experience continues, the child is overstimulated and the self begins to fragment. In order to prevent psychosis and complete disintegration of the self, a series of mechanisms develop to help the individual cope with the confusion of tongues trauma:
a) A dissociative process ensues as the child valiantly struggles to reduce being overwhelmed by removing her/himself from direct emotional and interpersonal contact with the abuser and the disturbing feelings, thoughts, and details of the abusive experience.

b) The child's capacity to speak the language of tenderness, or any language related to her/his experience is interrupted. In fact, language fails to maintain a self-soothing function.

c) A state of being tongue-tied predominates. Memory, self-reflection, insight, and understanding are impaired. A form of elective mutism takes hold. The child develops the language of silence; it cannot, will not, speak of the abuse.

d) The individual's sense of reality is compromised since the authority defines the abusive experience in the language of love. Yet the child senses it is the language of passion that is being spoken. Caught in the developmental need for love and affection, the child accepts the adult’s version of reality: e.g., passion is love. The individual loses a grasp on reality, as well as a willingness to trust her/his own intuitive powers and psychic wisdom.

e) A sense of victimhood overtakes the individual as he/she feels overpowered, dominated, controlled, used as an object. A sense of separativeness and independence is shattered.

f) An encapsulation of the self occurs. A fugue state predominates where the individual is lost in an inner world of hurt, despair, fantasy, and a sense of helplessness. The individual
behaves in a ritualistic, automatic way, easily captivated by a domineering, manipulative person who is reminiscent of the parental abuser.

DECONSTRUCTING THE PSYCHOANALYTIC SITUATION

Ferenczi deconstructed the psychoanalytic process by writing anew text for clinical interaction between analyst and analysand. There was a shift from an analyst-centered to a mutually constructed dialogue and process. The confusion of tongues paradigm which gave new meaning to the individual’s experience in the parental/child relationship had implications for the analyst/analysand dyad as well. Retraumatization, that is, the individual re-experiencing aspects of the childhood confusion of tongues trauma, was seen as occurring in the clinical interaction of the psychoanalytic situation. In the oedipal view of transference, meaning is created from the analysand’s projection onto the analyst of his/her perception and feelings of parental authority, colored by the childhood neurosis. New meaning was available when the text of the psychoanalytic situation was conceptualized to be an experience of mutual analytic partners, if you will, constructing the narrative of the analysis in unison (Rachman, 2002).

Fundamental to the creation of the narrative of the analysis is the analyst’s contribution. A crisis in the relationship, which is inevitable, occurs when the analyst's pathological narcissism impedes emotional openness and
honesty. Ferenczi termed this “clinical hypocrisy” (Ferenczi, 1933/1986) indicating the analyst was acting like the abusive parent of childhood. The parent blames the child, not taking responsibility for their contribution to the relational crisis. When the analyst’s clinical hypocrisy prevails, an enactment of the confusion of tongues occurs. It is then that Ferenczi gave further meaning to the psychodynamics between analyst and analysand by encouraging a two-person relational view of the analytic process. A two-person experience of the analytic process encourages analyst self-scrutiny. It is only through the analysis of the countertransference that the analyst confronts his/her pathologic narcissism. The curative function for the confusion of tongues trauma is predicated on the analyst’s capacity to become more authentic. Emotional honesty is curative because it repairs the neurotic experience of childhood when parental authority blamed the child for any difficulties in the relationship. Rather than reinforce emotional dishonesty, defensiveness, evasion, and unauthentic interpersonal contact, the analyst struggles to examine his/her contribution to the relationship crisis, take responsibility for his/her contribution, and then give voice to that contribution. In this way, the analyst finds his/her authentic voice in the analytic dialogue.

Each analyst, in this new view of the analytic encounter, must conquer his/her own childhood neurosis where inauthentic parental relations limited his/her ability to maintain an authentic voice. As I have outlined, parental
inauthenticity encourages a confusion of tongues experience at the level of emotional trauma. In order to fulfill the curative function of analyst authenticity, judicious self-disclosure is introduced (Rachman, 1982, 1990, 1993a, 1997b, 1998a, 2000a; Rachman & Ceccoli, 1996). I have made a distinction between conspicuous and judicious self-disclosure.

CONSPICUOUS SELF-DISCLOSURE

Conspicuous self-disclosure is not curative because it is the analyst’s narcissistic expression of his/her own needs. Such disclosures are disguised as tenderness, but are actually self-serving. In this way they maintain the trauma of childhood. A trained psychoanalyst who perceived himself as active, open, flexible, and humanistic, initiated a dialogue with a male analysand in a group therapy setting focused on his alleged fear of intimacy. The analysand had reported a change of heart in buying an apartment, which meant postponing moving in together with his girlfriend. It was then that the analyst conspicuously self-disclosed that he too had had the problem, when he was younger, of being unable to commit himself to a woman. The analyst did not explore the reason behind the analysand’s change of heart. Rather, he blurted out: “Don’t make the mistake I made and lose the woman. You are afraid to make a commitment.” What was presented as curative was actually retraumatizing. The analyst continued with the explanation that his self-disclosure was intended to provide the analysand with the emotional benefit
of the analyst’s experience. As such, the analyst saw himself as the wise, fatherly, parental surrogate trying to prevent his "son" from making a serious mistake. However, because the analyst was more interested in confronting this individual with his self-disclosure than in struggling to understand the analysand’s subjective experience, the self-disclosure produced a rupture in their relationship. It did not provide any curative function of the confusion of tongues trauma. The analysand was enraged with the analyst self-disclosure, feeling that the content, manner and presentation was intrusive, manipulative, and controlling. He told his analyst: “You are not my father, I don’t have to take this from you.” The analyst became increasingly more aggressive when the analysand rejected his interpretations about fear of intimacy and commitment. This led the analysand to feel misunderstood, blamed, and abused. The analyst would not yield, insisting he was doing this for the sake of the analysand, saying: “I want to save you from the emotional difficulties that I had created for myself.”

The confusion of tongues trauma became the predominant dimension within this clinical interaction. In the context of a group, the disturbing interaction was witnessed by three other male members (as well as four female members). The analysand and the three other male members terminated their therapy with the analyst at the end of this group session. When the confusion of tongues trauma erupted, the analyst and analysand spoke different languages. The analysand spoke “the language of hurt,
rejection, and betrayal,” the analyst spoke “the language of intrusion, blame, and shame.” The analyst, because of his narcissistic need to convince the analysand he was fearing intimacy and commitment, could not focus on his abusive behavior and lack of empathy. It was more important to get the analysand to affirm his message than it was to observe the damage the analyst’s behavior was having on the analysand and group. Such parental/authority “emotional blindness” and narcissistic fulfillment is the fundamental psychodynamic of the confusion of tongues trauma.

**JUDICIOUS SELF-DISCLOSURE**

Authenticity in the psychoanalytic situation is best exemplified by analyst self-disclosure which is judiciously practiced. I have translated Ferenczi’s original attempts at analyst self-disclosure into a contemporary relational view which focuses on empathy as the emotional compass (Rachman, 1993a, 1997b, 1998a, 2000a; Rachman & Ceccoli, 1996). The most fundamental consideration in the clinical practice of analyst self-disclosure is the meeting of the analysand’s need for authenticity. There are analysands who, by virtue of their childhood trauma, characterized by severe parental inauthenticity, make it clear they need and want analyst self-disclosure to aid in the reparative process of the confusion of tongues.

One day, without any warning, an analysand who I shall call Michele
erupted in a confusion of tongues retraumatization. It was a snowy day in January and I wanted to protect a recently purchased area rug which I valued, so I placed some plastic over it. I had a session with a couple before seeing Michele. During this session, there was no issue of the plastic covering over the area rug. But, as soon as Michele entered the consultation and saw the plastic rug covering he immediately went into a rage. For about fifteen minutes he ranted and raved. As he paced up and down, still not sitting down, he said the following: “Who do you think you are! Boy, do you have problems! You are a sadist. Dr. Rachman. (He then walked toward a picture I have displayed of Sandor Ferenczi.) “You have betrayed your mentor, Ferenczi. Do you think he would do this to me?” (Rachman, 2000, p. 300).

I was not prepared for this “emotional holocaust,” although there were other moments in the analysis where Michele had become enraged with me. Usually, I waited patiently for his rage to subside while I silently attuned to his subjective experience. Then, I would begin an empathic verbal exploration of his feelings. In this session, he was more willing to attack me than explore our interpersonal crisis. He made it clear, in this first quarter of the session, that I had done something to him that was unbearable. When I recovered from the emotional attack, it was clear that I had to take responsibility for contributing to the crisis, whether or not I understood the psychodynamics of the crisis. I then said the following to him:
I regret I have done something that is causing you so much difficulty. Michele, you have expressed rage in our sessions many times. I would like you to consider talking to me about the anger you are now having so we can begin to understand it. I know you are dedicated to making progress. Continuing to rage at me, without understanding what is going on, will not help you feel better about yourself and your life. (Rachman, 2000a, p. 301)

My intervention was clearly soothing since Michele immediately stopped raging at me, sat down, caught his breath, and prepared himself to discuss the crisis. He finally revealed why my behavior had retraumatized him. Plastic covers were an integral part of his family living situation as his mother covered all the furniture in plastic. He experienced the covering of the furniture as a formal rejection of him. Michele interpreted the plastic covers as his mother’s greater concern for her furniture than for him. He felt she never concerned herself with him as much as her furniture. The plastic covers became a symbol for the narcissism, emotional distance, lack of nurturance, but, most importantly, the abusive way he was treated in his family.

Since Michele was an incest survivor, abusive treatment was a crucial issue. He had reported childhood sexual seduction by both his mother and father. Sexual and emotional abuse had defined his life. It wasn’t until he was in his 40s that he could move out of the parental apartment and begin to have a separate and productive existence (Rachman, 1999).

When he saw the plastic covering on my office rug, he experienced me as “the plastic mother,” who was more concerned about my office than him.
Since we had been uncovering his emotional and sexual abuse over several years, the process of reconnecting his feelings to his childhood experiences had developed. His rage now was available to him when he felt abused. It is also true that he is hypersensitive to feeling abused. In his daily life, he can become enraged with the words and deeds of anyone, whether they are relatives, friends, or strangers.

It should be noted that his perception of abuse and his anger are in the borderline to psychotic range. All the more, therefore, that Michele needs authenticity from the analyst. I also needed to admit that I caused his retraumatization by covering the area rug with plastic. As I apologized for causing him difficulty, I gathered up the plastic covering and threw it away. It seemed clear to me that if this plastic cover, which was intended to do something positive, had, in fact, created a trauma, it should be removed. In actuality, I was the unwitting retraumatizing agent. Realizing this, the mandate was to create a reparative therapeutic measure (Rachman, 1998b) from the relational rupture. I believe Michele was correct. The plastic which was introduced by me to preserve an object I cherished (a newly bought Chinese area rug) should not take precedence over Michele’s feelings of hurt, rejection, and abuse.

Michele was very appreciative of my genuine regretfulness and action which attempted to reverse the traumatic moment. When I threw away the
plastic cover I told Michele that I had made an error, which I wanted to reverse. He became calmer and introspective. He said he was grateful to me for my desire to help him with his trauma. He began to explore the understanding that the analyst’s behavior was different from his mother’s.

My self-disclosure that I had made a mistake and wanted to rectify it served a curative function. Over the course of the sessions to follow, Michele indicated to me the following insights: his rage reaction was exaggerated by his childhood trauma; initially, he could not emotionally distinguish the analyst from his mother; he was developing insight into his abusive childhood experiences and the development of rage. He reported, during the ensuing months, a reduction of anger and rage in his everyday interpersonal contacts. For the first time, he also began to have dreams in which his mother became a central focus.

THE CONFUSION OF TONGUES BETWEEN ANALYST AND ANALYSAND

Ferenczi made it clear that when there is a retraumatization, it is by definition a two-person experience. In deconstructing the analytic situation into a mutual analytic process, Ferenczi discouraged the idea that the authority of the analyst was infallible (Rachman, 1988). The analyst’s mandate is to take responsibility for the relational crisis, not to assume it is only a transference manifestation. Even if it were a matter of transference, the
analysis of the relational crisis is a function of both members of the therapeutic dyad. Ferenczi encouraged analyst authenticity by saying:

Ferenczi described his own personal struggle with authenticity at a moment in the analysis when his interpretations were met with “rebuffs.” He then had to deal with the experience of being told he was wrong, and with a feeling of rejection: “I need hardly tell you that my first reaction to such incidents was a feeling of outraged authority. For a moment I felt injured at the suggestion that my patient or pupil could know better than I did” (Ferenczi, 1931/1980d, p. 130).

Ferenczi’s profound understanding of the function of clinical empathy led him to recognize the necessity for a two-person psychology: “Fortunately, however, there immediately occurred to me the further thought that he really must at bottom know more about himself than I could with my guesses” (Ferenczi, 1931, p. 130, italics added).

The intervention that completes the deconstruction of the psychoanalytic situation and creates a new text for the psychoanalytic
dialogue is for the analyst to add his/her contribution to the clinical interaction: “I therefore admitted that possibly I had made a mistake, and the result was not that I lost my authority, but that his confidence in me was increased” (Ferenczi, 1931/1980d, p. 130).

In my clinical interaction with Michele, when he reacted as if I had become the abusive mother of his original confusion of tongues trauma, I attempted to follow the example of Ferenczi, by realizing that Michele was in the position to define the psychological meaning of his traumatic reaction that had initiated a confusion of tongues between us. I was speaking “the language of narcissism,” concerned with aesthetics, beauty, and practicality. Michele was speaking “the language of rejection, betrayal, and hurt.” Empathy as curative of the confusion of tongues trauma necessitated that I hear and respond to his subjective experience, not ask him first to understand mine. What would have been even more traumatic, and would, perhaps, have caused a psychotic break, would have been any attempt I made to “blame” Michele for his anger. This could have occurred if I went into an interpretation of his rage as an intense maternal transference reaction. For analyst self-disclosure to serve as a curative function, the analyst must be willing to analyze his/her own functioning without feeling a loss of status, power, and control within the psychoanalytic situation.

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Cutting the Symbiotic Bond: A Challenge to Some Female Developmental Mythology

Doris K. Silverman, PhD

Feminists and feminist psychoanalysts have upbraided, denounced, and discarded many aspects of classical theory. There is much in traditional Freudian theory that warrants this. In many ways we are in an evolutionary period in our thinking about female development. We can say that even so-called classical ideas have not remained constant as they frequently evolve, responsive to the changing times and especially to the feminist movement.

For example, we are more mindful of how in small and large ways our psychoanalytic culture can discipline us into upholding traditional views so that they become integrated as accepted theory. Such views manage to become institutionalized, and thus the chronic need of minority voices to revolt against the natural pulls of the dominant positions. Foucault (Silverman, 2003), a revolutionary theorist and historian-philosopher, teaches us that a seemingly enlightened expansion of knowledge can counterintuitively offer subtle control over our thinking. We need to be vigilant about scanning our belief systems so that they do not become
A view through the lens of anticonservatism may be a particularly felicitous way to explore some traditional conceptualizations of female sexuality and development, some of which have become almost foundational in our psychoanalytic literature. By this I mean that there is a continued use of certain constructs that organize our theoretical perspective and clinical understanding, and that with time they have become foundational.

As one example, I plan to discuss the concept of symbiosis. This concept is consistently utilized to understand early infant experience, and also it is particularly stressed in describing the mental life of early childhood for females. By “symbiotic” I am referring to the traditional way that psychoanalysis has conceptualized it, namely, as an experience of a merged relationship. It is the emotional sense of the temporary obliteration of the boundary between the self and the other. Freud, (1930/196 lb) commented: “An infant at the breast does not as yet distinguish his ego from the external world as the source of the sensations flowing in on him. For the infant the breast and the ego are one. Only gradually does the infant learn about the reality of their distinctiveness.” Mahler (1968) cited Anna Freud’s (1960) description of merger in infant psychic life in which an “object is drawn wholly into the internal narcissistic milieu and treated as part of it to the extent that self and object merge into one” (Freud, 1960, p. 56). Mahler wrote:
"This corresponds to what I name the symbiotic dual-unity stage of primary narcissism" (Mahler, 1968, p. 221).

Symbiosis is conceptualized as a normal stage of infant development spanning the second to the third month of life until the fifth or sixth month of life. Much of the psychoanalytic literature accepts the infant’s experience of merger and fusion as a natural developmental stage. (In fact a scan of the articles in PEP CD-ROM on the concept of symbiosis indicates that most psychoanalytic writers support such a concept. It is rarely challenged. Some contemporary feminist psychoanalysts continue to theorize its importance for understanding female development (Benjamin, 1995; Chodorow, 1978, 1994; Elise, 2001; Kristeva, 1980; however, for different views see Brody, 1982; Klein & Tribich, 1981; Harrison, 1986; Lachmann & Beebe, 1989; Peterfreund, 1978).

I am not discarding the concept of symbiosis. I believe it to be a powerful and pervasive fantasy in psychic life. It can be found in literature, art and mythology. Freud described it as characteristic of men’s love. The German writer Walter Benjamin (Coetzee, 2001) wrote in his journal: “Every time I’ve experienced a great love I’ve undergone a change so fundamental that I have amazed myself. . . . A genuine love makes me resemble the woman I love.” It is frequently written about as an aspiring or enthroned aspect of sexual intercourse. There is a humorous literature about merger experiences
among marriage partners. In addition, it is found in people’s description of their meditation practices (Silverman, Lachmann, & Milich, 1982; Silverman, Lachmann, & Milich, 1984a; Silverman, Lachmann, & Milich, 1984b). Oneness and merger fantasies have been experimentally demonstrated to strengthen some performances, reduce symptoms, and allow for adaptation-enhancing fantasies and behavior (Silverman, Lachmann, & Milich, 1982). Tallis (2002) summarized Silverman’s work on the therapeutic properties of a merger fantasy. Silverman used a well-controlled research design and he labeled his work, “subliminal psychodynamic activation (SPA).” Using a subliminal merging stimulus, Silverman showed consistent beneficial effects for individuals suffering from schizophrenia, depression, anxiety, addictions, and eating disorders. In addition more general positive effects have been reported. “These include easier self-disclosure, better rapport with others, increased assertiveness . . . improved memory and improved academic performance” (Tallis, 2002, p. 159). Kohut’s (1977) view of a lifelong need for a self-object has as a significant feature this experience of merger with the self-object providing functions that the person can not supply. Thus, I am not challenging the potential of symbiosis to increase a sense of well-being and effectance, although at the other end of the continuum it can lead to a temporary or more ongoing sense of a vanishing self, one completely dominated or incorporated into the other. In the latter form, when such needs/wishes are pervasive and persistent, the more maladaptive end of the
continuum is seen. Nonetheless, I grant the power and importance of such symbiotic fantasies. However, such acceptance is quite different from positing a ubiquitous early symbiotic phase of development.

In its more extreme form, symbiosis is particularly theorized to be relevant in women's psychopathology (unless one considers a man's falling in love and merger as a sickness! See Freud, 1914/1957). As early as 1940, Reich wrote about the “extreme submissiveness” in some women (Reich, 1940, p. 85). She described one of her patients commenting: “The walls between him [her husband] and me do not exist any more. I feel what he feels; I even think what he thinks. We are one person...Reich describes many of her women patients’ experiences in this way and she refers to them as “the magic of the unio mystica” (p. 88). Reich understood this wish as dominated by the lost union of early childhood due to early frustrations and/or loss of the mother. “It is like relapsing to a time in which the ego is about to be formed and when the boundaries between the ego and the outer world were still blurred and only painfully experienced in moments of frustration and tension” (Reich, 1940, p. 92). A view of the merged neonate led to the depiction of corresponding needs in nursing mothers and was accepted in various forms as characteristic of females and pathologized in its excessive form. Chodorow (1978) accepted the concept of a merged, symbiotic state for infants. Later Chodorow (1994) modified her more universalizing stance; nonetheless Kulish (2000) in her summary article on femininity commented
that Chodorow’s “point about the possible differential effects of separation from a same versus a different-sexed parent is a powerful one, and it is a major contribution to psychoanalytic thinking about feminine development” (Kulish, 2000, p. 1361). The lessened differentiation between mother and daughter extends the sense of oneness characteristic of the symbiotic stage.

I suggest that the early symbiotic stage is a seriously questionable phase. I maintain that when an experience of symbiosis exists between mother and infant it is a result of a maladaptive attachment relationship. Such a potentially pathological interaction has been established dyadically, based on the mutual needs of both participants. The evolution of merger fantasies concomitant with this patterned interaction is a likely developing scenario for some. Thus, my thesis is that when an adult patient gives expression to merger wishes, such fantasies are not a regressive retreat to an early symbiotic phase but, rather, they are based on an earlier dyadic adaptation.[1] In those instances where symbiotic fantasies occur, they are later developing.

Rethinking the concept of symbiosis is important because its acceptance affects our views about how female development is conceptualized and understood and then how psychoanalytic treatment of women is conducted. Continued conceptualization of symbiosis and its implications supports a mythology about females which I plan to explicate.
I offer now some psychoanalytic history and present a wider cultural frame that might help to explain the persistence of the notion of an early symbiotic phase, and I provide research data that challenges the existence of this stage. The second part of the paper is more speculative. Here I discuss some implications of the entrenched view of an infantile symbiotic stage and the shaping of the culture and especially women’s lives that evolved from this particular perspective.

**PSYCHOANALYTIC HISTORICAL VIEWS**

Historically, beginning with Freud, analysts have written about the wish to return to the blissful experience of being the baby at the breast, that is, the fused or symbiotic experience of the infant. For Freud it was characteristic of the early narcissistic stage in the infant’s life. During this period there is a tension between energy directed toward objects and that which remains in the ego-id (Freud 1923/1961 a). “The highest phase of development of which object-libido is capable is seen in the state of being in love, when the subject seems to give up his own personality [that is, he is merged] in favour of an object-cathexis” (Freud, 1914/1957, p. 76). The child’s first love relationship would be an overvalued, idealized one where the self is submerged in the other.

Ferenczi (1913) addressing this early phase of the infant’s life described
the magical boundarylessness of the infant in which the gratified baby imputes omnipotence to the caregiver who anticipates her needs during her initial stages of life. The baby’s mind has been read and her needs gratified. Mahler (1967; Mahler et al., 1975) elaborated on the view of a naturally occurring stage of symbiosis with the baby experiencing a merged omnipotence (Kramer & Aktar, 1988). (Infantile omnipotence, like symbiosis, is a construct in need of attention and discussion, however, it is not the focus here, but see Peterfreund, 1978). Harrison (1986), summarizing psychoanalytic views on symbiosis comments, “The assumption of an original state of mother-infant unity is now widely accepted as a fact of individual psychic development” (p. 16). For example, Kristeva (1975), a contemporary feminist, eulogizes the event between mother and daughter. Her description of the early mother-daughter experience is one of blissful fusion. Here, we are in the land of her semiotics, where the early, archaic, nonverbal dominates. She believes this is the realm of the early infant fused experience. Eventually the child will be thrown out of paradise because language, the role of the symbolic, the entrance symbolically into the rational and reasonable world of what Lacan calls the law of the father, occurs. Females, in their same-sex orientation with mother, are assumed to be more prone to remain entrenched in a symbiotic orbit or need a paternal presence to wrest them from it.

“Blissful,” “magical,” “paradisiacal” are often the terms used to designate a symbiotic experience. It hardly captures the effects of an immature state
system which leaves some infants, some of the time, fussy and irritable, unable to sleep and at times difficult to soothe (Silverman, 1981).

FURTHER CULTURAL INFLUENCES

This discourse on the concept of symbiosis may be further illuminated by an excursion that places it within a larger frame; one that briefly comments on economic, cultural, and social-historical considerations. Later, I will address feminist historical influences. I suggest that the concept of symbiosis carries particular significance in view of our culture’s emphasis on individual autonomy (Silverman, 1987a, 1987b).

According to Sampson (2001; see also Cushman, 1990) some economists and historians have long claimed that the focus on the autonomous individual versus the collective individual (a more interdependent-person-other relationship) is understood as a West-East divide. Western civilization, with its growth of industrialization, called for the “kind of sharp person-other boundaries that are found in Western individualism, whereas more settled agriculture in the East historically has demanded interpersonal skills and thus favored the less distinct-other boundaries of collectivism” (Sampson, 2000, p. 1425). Sampson believes powerful religious views, especially the development of the Protestant ethic contributed to the emphasis on individuality. It extended the Greek view of
self-sufficiency and led to Christianity's emphasis on the individual (Sampson, 2000; Cushman, 1990). Descartes’ enlightenment view also contributed to a Western emphasis on the autonomous individual with a bounded mind.

Of course, Kuhn (1962) has discussed how the very questions scientists raise and explore are embedded in their social context and reflect their cultural values. Thus, our psychological and psychoanalytic perspective has focused more on the individual than on the social system in which he or she is embedded.

A variety of factors, therefore, contribute to our Western culture’s favoring and fostering autonomy in our children (Silverman, 1987a, 1987b). Mahler’s (1967, 1968) work was shaped by and contributed to the shaping of the idea of the increasing autonomy of the child from her mother. This was Freud’s view as well, especially for the male child.

The baby’s clear dependent needs, I suggest, pushed the idea of a blissful “unio mystica” back to a permissible early stage of life from which the infant must extricate herself, only to remain longing for such a state.

It would not be unreasonable for the reader to suggest that a critique against symbiosis is fashioned in the light of a continued Western emphasis on self-containment and individuality, now being extended back to early infancy, replacing a merger experience. However, I do not stress the
autonomous self. It will shortly be clear that my substitution for symbiosis is the idea of an interdependent self.

A more collective view, or what I have referred to as a relational view (Silverman, 1994a)—others have called it an intersubjective perspective—involves two subjects, each with a relative degree of individuality. (In the case of the infant and her mother, naturally tilted toward greater selfdelineation and differentiation in the mother.) These two are interdependent entities, each contributing a unique, individual voice to the interaction. Each plays a special, singular role in contributing to the formation of the other; the baby teaches the parent how to parent her, while the parent informs and shapes the baby. This is a view I will be elaborating on in describing early infant development and in challenging the concept of symbiosis.

Of course, the retention of what I believe are outmoded concepts continues to exist when psychoanalytic theory addresses developmental issues in general. In order to set the stage for a discussion of infant-mother and particularly female infant-mother symbiosis, I need to present data that have emerged from empirical studies of infants. These ideas, supported by these data, are not necessarily new, but I hope offering them will set the stage for understanding my further objections to the concept of an early symbiotic stage.
CURRENT VIEWS ON INFANT DEVELOPMENT

I provide a brief overview of contemporary views of infancy, which informs my subsequent analysis of symbiosis. There is by now significant acknowledgment of the importance of the dyadic engagement for the growth and development of the infant (Silverman, 1981, 1991, 1992, 1994b, 1998, 2001). It is an interactive regulatory system that is necessary for the survival of the infant and for the important engagement of the mother’s needs as well. Simultaneously, with interactive regulation, the infant develops and maintains self-regulation; that is, optimal self-regulation occurs when the infant engages in effective interactive regulation and vice versa. Important developmental achievements occur during mutual participatory experiences. In fact, it is only in the fifth month of the infant’s life that she can become more attuned to the objects in her world and begin to explore these with interest. The faces of the caregivers are far more salient prior to this time. Initially, disjointed, inconsistent interchanges probably predominate, but eventually an increasingly co-ordinated interconnection develops. Such repetitive interactions between infant and mother become patterned and it is such a pattern that becomes internalized. These internalized arrangements are mental models, or what psychoanalysts refer to as representations.

The baby and each of her caregivers are eventually organized in different interactions, and these unique structured interactions are
individually represented. I offer the idea of two different early representations because researchers have stressed the salience of context. When the context is altered, it is a new and different experience for the infant (Fischer & Pipp, 1984; Beebe, personal communication). Thus, mother and infant and father and infant have different interactional experiences and their internalizations are distinctive within the child. Early in development, therefore, the baby has a particular internal representation for each parent. This evidence suggests that it does not occur sequentially (first mother, then father). This is important, because it sets the stage for a different way of conceptualizing the role of each; that is, both are importantly represented in the infant’s mind, from early in development. Such a conceptualization eliminates the need for one (the father) to help extricate the child from the other (the mother). Of course, if the pattern of interaction is dominated by a mother who insists on exclusivity, or is intrusive and dominating, for example, it sets the stage for less than optimal structured representations, which may be repaired through different interactional patterns with father.

The importance of fathers, as distinct from mothers, for key developmental experiences is frequently asserted. They are typically viewed as “role models for boys and relationship models for girls . . .” (Silverstein & Auerbach, 1999, p. 403). However, in a meta-analysis of 172 studies, the findings offered point to “few significant differences in the ways that mothers and fathers treated girls and boys” (Lamb, 1997). Lamb also concluded that
“very little about the gender of the parent seems to be distinctly important” (p. 10). Parental differences in play have also been asserted repeatedly; that is, fathers play with their offspring and mothers engage in caregiving and nurturing. This is especially commented on (but not only) in relation to infants. Fathers do spend a greater proportion of their time with their children in play, but in “absolute terms, most studies suggest that mothers play with their children more than fathers do” (Lamb, 1997, p. 5).

However, these data are not to be confused with how the infant experiences herself or himself. They do not address subtle, nonconscious cues between infant and caregiver. We now know that a considerable amount of learning occurs through nonconscious communication. Thus, on a gross behavioral level significant differences in childrearing practices of mothers and fathers are negligible; however, tacit interactive cues can communicate a sense of being a girl as opposed to being a boy. Knowing how (procedural knowledge) in contrast to knowing that (declarative knowledge) informs a young child's experiential understanding. From her interaction on an automatic level (procedural knowledge) with caregivers a little girl can intuit she is a girl. It will take the little girl much longer to know that it is because of genital differences (de Mameffe, 1997). Although they can know implicitly that they are girls, they do not necessarily understand that (declarative memory) they are not boys. (By age 2½ to 3 most children can say whether they are a boy or a girl (Egan & Perry, 2001). It takes a number of additional
 years (until 6 to 7) before gender constancy is achieved.)

CHALLENGES TO THE CONCEPT OF AN EARLY SYMBIOTIC STAGE

Thus, I am presenting a view of the infant as a unique individual, with her own trajectory of development, with an early slowly developing sense of gender and, what is germane to this section of the paper, with a differentiated sense of self. The self is not highly developed or articulated, but there appears to be, starting at birth, a beginning awareness of self as different from other (Stem, 1985, 2000). Of course, infants’ mental states cannot be observed directly, but they can be inferred. Zeedyk (1996), in her summary of the literature on intentionality, has described the following pertinent cues about the infant’s intentional behavior that demonstrate recognition of difference between the infant and her external world:

- anticipation of the outcome of an action; persistence; selecting from among alternative actions those which are appropriate to a goal; correcting for errors; stopping when the goal is attained; evidence of surprise as manifested through facial expressions; and demonstrating a preference (Bruner, 1973; Frye, 1991; Harding, 1982; Piaget, 1952; Wellman, 1977; Willatts, 1984). (Zeedyk, 1996, pp. 421-422)

Many researchers are in agreement about such cues and believe these are appropriate cues to measure intentionality.

There are many sources contributing to the idea of the infant’s initial
differentiation from the mother. It may be seen in the infant’s early imitation of the other’s facial expressions, tongue protrusions, hand gestures, as well as vocalizations. The literature on intentionality, that is, an inferred view of goal-directed behavior on the part of infants is, for many researchers, there at birth. That is, the infant recognizes the outside world, has intentions, and is frustrated when he or she cannot achieve the goal. (For a review of those who maintain that intentionality exists at birth or shortly thereafter see Zeedyk, 1996.) Researchers have devised subtle and sophisticated ways of testing for intentionality. Butterworth and Hopkins (1988) argue for goal-directed behavior as reflected in the newborn’s open mouth prior to arm movement when the hand was brought to the mouth. Rovee and collaborators (Fagen & Rovee, 1976; Rovee-Collier, 1983; Rovee-Collier, Morongiello, Aron & Kuppersmith, 1978; Rovee-Collier & Sullivan, 1980) have shown the infant’s increased kicking when items on a mobile are reduced and crying when the number of items are greatly reduced (e.g., from 10 to 2). Infants can learn strategies to activate a visual and aural display and show joy when successful and anger when frustrated (Lewis, Alessandri & Sullivan, 1990). Other evidence of intentionality, as well as a sense of the other and the external world are found in such experiments as the baby sucking to hear a voice (De Casper & Fifer, 1980), sucking to control a visual display (Kalins & Bruner, 1973), and accuracy in arm reaching—to name just a few. There are a series of communicative behaviors that begin at birth and increasingly develop that
demonstrate the infant’s early interest in the other. Even in utero the infant prefers human voices (De Casper & Fifer, 1980). The infant is highly responsive to social stimuli, preferring the human voice to other sounds, recognizing the mother by sight within a few days (Bushnell, Sai & Mullin, 1989) as well as by smell (Cemoch & Porter, 1985). Infants can distinguish between social and nonsocial conditions by responding differentially (Legerstee, 1992). Many parents recognize their infant’s decreased crying as they approach her. Lamb and Malkin (1986) have experimentally demonstrated that this pattern is established by the first month and that by five months of age babies will cry when they are not picked up.

Such theorists as Brazelton (1982; Brazelton, Koslowski & Main, 1974), Trevarthen (1977, 1979, 1980, 1993), and Tronick (1981; Cohn & Tronick, 1988; Gusella, Muir & Tronick, 1988) believe that intentionality is “fundamentally an emotional, interpersonal phenomenon and that infants are born with an innate capacity for it, which evidences itself within their early social interactions” (Zeedyk, 1996, p. 429). According to Travarthen, it is particularly apparent in social communication. Both infants and their mothers engage in protoconversations with turn taking, and adjustment to each other’s cues, all this occurring smoothly much as it does in adult conversations. In these conversations both mother and infant demonstrate intentionality, and each engages and disengages from this conversation.
Whereas such data may suggest uniformity of response on the part of mothers in their caretaking role, the idea of uniformity is more apparent than real. While some attachment theorists do maintain a biological, evolutionary understanding of the attachment system (Bowlby, 1969; George & Solomon 1999), Bowlby remarked that, “Because of a human’s capacity to learn and to develop complex behavioral systems, it is usual for his instinctive behavior to become incorporated into flexible behavioral sequences that vary from individual to individual” (Bowlby, 1969, p. 160). In such a system, from both the baby’s and the parent’s point of view, some behaviors are favorable for attachment and others are antithetical for attachment (Bowlby, 1969; George & Solomon, 1999).

I have presented this rather extensive view of the presence of an early and discrete experience of the self in order to call into question the notion of early-stage symbiosis. Whereas there are different developmentalists’ positions on the existence of goal-directed behavior immediately or shortly after birth, or later in the first year, the controversy is not about the infant’s symbiotic status.

**THE ATTACHMENT SYSTEM**

Rather than assume, therefore, the inevitability of a merged experience between infant and mother, from which the male child must disidentify or the
father must extricate the female child, I suggest that when such a scenario dominates the initial dyadic experience it may foreshadow problematic attachments. Hints of potentially maladaptive attachments can be seen during the first year of life.

Attachment researchers have highlighted such troubled attachments and have demonstrated their prominence by the end of the first year of life. Whereas the categories of secure and insecure attachments are understood as stylistic patterns, the extremes of insecure attachment, and especially those infants demonstrating a disorganized attachment, flag concern about the potential development of pathology (Lyons-Ruth, 1999; van Ijzendoom, 1994; Main, Tomasini & Tolan, 1979). In addition, an analysis of parental discourse addressing the nature of the parent’s attachment to her own mother, as represented in the Adult Attachment Interview, predicts the type of attachment relationship the parent will establish with her offspring (van Ijzendoom, 1994), especially if she is securely attached to her own mother (George & Solomon, 1999). I am underscoring the significance of the categories of attachment between mothers and infants. When mother and infant demonstrate a seemingly fused, symbiotic relationship (mother as frequently intrusive, impinging on her infant, overly attentive—not permitting Winnicott’s “spontaneous gesture”), it should highlight concern about the potential maladaptive patterning of this interaction.
Mismatches or nonmatches between mother and her infant are more common than not (Gianno & Tronick 1985; Beebe & Lachmann, 1994). One would anticipate that those mother-infant pairs demonstrating a pattern of symbiotic connection (a high degree of impingement) would also show a pattern of infrequent mismatching. This appears to be the case with vocal rhythm co-ordination (vocalizing and turn-taking) between mothers and their infants monitored in face-to-face interactions (Jaffe et al., 2001). Highly co-ordinated matching of vocal rhythm and turn-taking were found with those infants labeled most insecure and/or disorganized in their attachments. Overly close monitoring of the other reflected what the researchers called” high tracking” or interactive vigilance. Thus, such overly close monitoring of mutual interaction, although intrusive, becomes the characteristic interaction pattern for infant and mother. Once it is established, it does not allow the child to develop and rely on inner cues and to provide for an adaptive self-regulatory system. I would understand such a patterned interaction as an outgrowth of the mother’s difficulty in differentiating herself from her child and in her child’s accommodation to the mother’s needs. This results in the child’s experience of a lack of her own personhood. However, the high tracking ability of the infant suggests the infant’s early differentiation from her mother and her vigilant alertness to the cues of the other. Initially, this interaction pattern is not a merged fantasy experience but a mutual, powerful accommodation. Along with such an attachment pattern there are likely to
develop fantasies of merger, especially when the child experiences a loss of her personhood.

Some similar findings have been reported in adult studies. Gottman (1981) found that close vocal tracking of one’s marital partner was found in more disturbed marital couples when compared to less disturbed couples. West and Sheldon (1988) report on the anxiously attached caregiving style of some adults. Such adults are chronically in the caregiving mode, readily anticipating the needs of the other. Levy and Blatt (1999) specifically talk about the reversal of the child-parent dyad, in that the child becomes the maternal figure to a mother who needs a symbiotic relationship.

Of course, a pattern of impingement needs to be distinguished from language mothers may use in describing the intimacy and attunement they experience with their babies. In fact, as I will shortly describe, the discourse of infant researchers may well have been misunderstood as supporting a notion of symbiosis. A second caveat is in order. Although a midrange of interactive responsiveness appears optimal for 12-month infant attachment, it should be understood that such a view must be contextualized. By that I mean contextualization is a sensible issue when one is aware of the complicated road traveled by infant and mother pairs to arrive at a reasonably healthy outcome for the child (Thelen & Smith, 1995). Thus, high tracking during the first year of the infant’s life may be altered when the
infant walks or talks. The mother, for example, may temper her “vigilance” when other means of communication are available between the two.

Whereas contemporary infant researchers do not subscribe to the view of an infant in a normal symbiotic phase, they use language that psychoanalysts can mistakenly interpret as supporting an idea of an early symbiotic stage. Examples of this are the attunement between mother and infant as discussed by Stem (1985), the intersubjectivity that exists that Trevarthen (1977, 1979, 1980) has described, the security of attachment based in part on the sensitivity of the mother to her infant’s needs explored by Ainsworth et al., (1978). Although, such concepts remain independent of the idea of symbiosis, they may also have mistakenly contributed to the acceptance of symbiosis. Researchers initially thought that those mothers who tracked most carefully produced more attuned and attached babies. It was only subsequent research (e.g., Jaffe et al., 2001; Gianino & Tronick, 1985) that began to more carefully delineate the nature of such attunements and discovered these more maladaptive attachments.

PROBLEMS WITH THE MODEL OF MERGING

First, we can think of the concept of symbiosis as our genetic “mythology.” Primarily, it offers us a skewed view of early infant life and it shapes our considerations of normal development and pathological
regressions. By the latter, I mean that when symbiosis is theorized clinically there is a tendency toward a particular developmental tilt in understanding such material, that is, in regression back to the first few months of life (Mitchell, 1988). If psychoanalytic theory flies in the face of what we learn about development. I believe the theory needs alteration and updating.

Second, maintaining that there is a developmental stage of symbiosis with its necessary “extrications” results in a linear view of development, and a universal similarity in stages for all of us. A linear view of development has had many challenges (see Silverman, 2001, 1981, 1998 for overviews). Those viewing even seemingly linear systems of development such as motor skills (Thelen & Smith, 1995) call universality in development into question. An intensive, proximal view of such development demonstrates its variability and individual uniqueness. There are highly individual patterns for each of us. As we all end by establishing such skills as walking, talking a gross view of development can seem, but is only apparently, linear.

Third, rather than a universal stage of development, individuals follow a unique and complex road. Children must negotiate a range of regulatory and adaptational challenges, and the nature of the established patterned interaction that evolves will facilitate or impede the management of their life conflicts (Lyons-Ruth, 1999). Our theories must incorporate the understanding of variability and complexity in development. Lastly, symbiotic
fantasies should not be conceptualized as a regressive retreat to an earlier merged experience. Rather, fantasies that develop along with particular patterned interaction might entail merger.

**FEMALE SYMBIOSIS**

Symbiosis is especially seen as relevant for infant females. The gender similarity of the girl to her primary caregiver has led to the view that the little girl's separation and individuation is more of a problem than that of the little boy. The line between close, warm, affectionate reactions between a mother and daughter and a symbiotic relationship is often blurred, allowing for the idea of symbiosis. Our psychoanalytic literature has contributed to such blurring. For example, Adler (1989) believes that Mahler's (1968) symbiosis, Erikson's (1959) basic trust, Gitelson’s (1962) diatrophic functions. Stone's (1961) mother associated with intimate bodily care, and Winnicott's (1968) holding environment are all addressing the early phase of treatment that is “undistinguishable from Kohut's self-object transferences” (Adler, 1989, p. 550). I believe these concepts refer to different infant experiences. In addition. Kohut's understanding of an individual's experience of a needed self-object occurred in the context of knowing the distinction between self and other, and also experiencing a merger fantasy.

Pine maintains that the concept of an early infant symbiotic stage is still
useful (Pine. 1990a, 1990b). Although he acknowledges that infants are differentiated from their mothers, he attempts to rescue symbiosis with his belief in “moments” in the infant’s experiences. I believe his idea about boundarylessness and merger in the infant-mother experience contributes to further blurring between language and subjective experience. I will also raise other concerns about Pine’s position with regard to this early stage.

Pine believes such moments of merger occur when the infant has nursed, is falling asleep, and “melds into the mother’s body” (Pine, 2001), or in moments of intense mutual eye-to-eye gaze, as well as during other intense moments, but also in quiet, calm times when the "infant is being carried in the mother’s arms while she is in motion, the infant moving with her body, the two of them in complete synchrony” (Pine, 1990, p. 239). These are instances of “many moments when the subjective reality of the infant’s experience may be one of merger or boundarylessness” (Pine, 1990, p. 239).

Pine’s idea of the infant’s “melding” or “falling into the mother’s body” begs the question. His choice of "melding” and "falling into” is not necessarily an accurate account of either the infant’s or mother’s experience. It is his choice of language that supports a concept of merger. Whereas some mothers may describe such a bodily experience between their babies and themselves, it remains questionable whether this is the infant’s or the mother’s experience. Pine has acknowledged the importance of merger fantasies for
some mothers. This may well intensify their early interactions, shading and coloring the experience for the infant so that intrusive preoccupations and lack of self-definition become salient for the child.

The intense experiences Pine highlights also need to be questioned. I would concur that when mother and infant engage in intense gazing, or overly concordant cooing and babbling, it sets the stage for experiences of merger, but I would understand it as potentially maladaptive (see p. 241, above). Infants, not mothers, regularly disrupt the gaze experience. If it were so gratifying to produce the important boundarylessness experience, they would be less likely to avert their gaze as they regularly do. In addition, babies at two months of age can make quite adequate discriminations about emotional interactions between themselves and their caregivers (Legerstee, 2001; Moore, Cohn & Campbell, 2001). Infants rely on and expect social reciprocity as early as 2 months of age (Moore, Cohn & Campell, 2001). When social reciprocities are discordant (intense, intrusive) it leads to defensive behavior such as turning away, withdrawing, losing body tonus, or shutting down. In contrast to Pine’s position, frequent moments of intensity would not necessarily highlight normal moments of merger.

Pine also invokes the quiet, soothing moods of being carried or held as merger experiences for the infant. I would understand these states as a result of mutual-regulatory experiences between mother and baby. Such states exist
alongside of self-regulatory experiences of calm and impending sleep. Whereas we cannot rule out a subjective experience of merger, I maintain it is a construct from useful clinical work that is superimposed on an infant’s self-regulating state.

FEMINIST HISTORY

In this section of the paper I am speculating about historical and cultural factors that may have contributed to the idea of infant-mother merger. I believe these factors are worth entertaining because they lent and continue to lend credence to the view of females as inherent nurturers, as less differentiated when compared to males and thus more vulnerable to fusion experiences. Further, I make inferences about how such features have shaped both our cultural values about women and influenced our psychoanalytic perspective. Women, I maintain, often responded by behaving in conventional ways that reflected these cultural goals.

The feminists of the early 20th century in Vienna stressed the powerful libidinal nature of the mother-infant experience and that the mother’s intimate relationship to her child was one of the most gratifying experiences that a woman could achieve. Some of the important feminists at the time were involved in their own psychoanalysis, for example Emma Eckstein and Bertha Pappenheim (Anna O). These women undoubtedly influenced and were
influenced by the then psychoanalytic theoretical Zeitgeist. Some of the leading feminists of the day advocated that strong, passionate feelings can be expressed through the outlet of motherhood. Gret Meisel-Hess, an Austrian feminist, spoke for increased sexual liberation for women (Buhle, 1998). She was concerned with the insufficient ways available for the discharge of their libidinal desires. She suggested that the problem could be solved through motherhood. Sexual discharge could be achieved through the act of childbirth, nursing, and love for the baby. Helena Deutsch also supported the idea of parturition as the “acme of sexual pleasure” (Buhle, 1998). Bertha Pappenheim, another feminist who spearheaded both sexual and political reforms for women, voiced the belief that motherliness is the “primary feeling for women” (Buhle, 1998, p. 59).

Although early feminists were interested in providing outlets for women’s sexual desires, psychoanalytic theory of that time had another focus and both the mother’s role and her needs in relation to the baby were minimized. Because the theorizing was about the development of the psychic life of the baby, the emphasis was typically on the infant’s needs and desires. The hot, intense discourse about libidinal gratification associated with birth and nurturing set the stage for fantasies and activity around the blissful experience of oneness with the baby. The belief in the mother’s concentrated investment with her child might then have led to the assumption that it reflected the need of the baby. Here, for example is Chassegueut-Smirgel's
(1976) scenario about the infant. She assumes that a child’s wish for a “fusion with the primary object” (p. 348) is a lifelong goal. She maintains that the infant “senses within himself a gap which he seeks to fill throughout his life ... the gap left in his ego cannot be closed except by returning to a fusion experience with the primary object” (p. 348). Chasseguet-Smirgel’s language captures the symbiotic longing of the child and later the adult. Thus Aruffo (1971) argues that “The woman’s desire to nurse the baby, to be close to it bodily, represents the continuation of the original symbiosis not only for the infant but the mother as well” (p. 114). Supposedly, such a condition of joyous beatitude was one that all of us wished to reexperience. Those women not likely to manage such feelings might well feel atypical and/or abnormal. Theorizing that symbiosis is indispensable leads to the following classical scenarios: Women can recapture and satisfy this important longing in their roles as mothers by ministering to the baby what the baby needs, an experience of fusion. Men can recapture it in refinding an opposite-sex love object where fantasies of fusion with the breast-mother are re-experienced.

A belief in the baby’s experience of a symbiotic union simultaneously places all women within a similar orbit of desire. This reduces a host of variable experiences within women. Furthermore, it highlights what Trad (1991) has commented on, .. the mother-infant relationship as being ideal is virtually universal, transcending the boundaries of culture and geography. . . . And yet buried in that image of perfect harmony and bliss, other forces of a
dark and destructive nature may be present as well” (p. 33). Many feminist authors have written about the mixed emotions stirred by mothering (see Rich and other feminist writers as mentioned in DiQuinzio, 1999).

Furthermore, woman as nurturer continues a stereotypic division of labor for the sexes, men as “agentive”—assertive, dominant, relatively directive, daring, etc.; women as “communal” (Eagly & Wood, 1999; Macoby, 1998)—caregiving, nurturing, interpersonally facilitative, accommodating, cooperative, working to maintain social harmony, etc.

Thus, childbearing and childrearing, while inevitable in the first instance, are sociologically organized in the second. Silverstein & Auerbach (1999) have studied a sizable group of male parents (men actively involved with their children) from 10 different subcultures within the USA. They found that there is a need for a dual set of parents because of the emotional and practical stresses of raising children and that the satisfaction of that need contributes to the most positive outcome for children. However, they comment:

Neither the sex of the adult(s) nor the biological relationship to the child has emerged as a significant variable in predicting positive development. One, none or both of those adults could be a father (or mother) . . . the stability of the emotional connection and the predictability of the caretaking relationship are the significant variables that predict positive child adjustment. (Silverstein & Auerbach, 1999, p. 398)
In an earlier paper (Silverman, 1987a) I commented on a study that demonstrated that despite fathers assuming the major caregiving role, children appeared more deeply connected to their mothers. Since then there has been considerable additional research highlighting the potentially socialized nature of empathic, attuned infant care and the possibilities for the alteration of such patterns when men are committed to child rearing.

Lamb, for example, raised the question about whether mothers are more natural caregivers than fathers are. He undertook such an investigation (Lamb, 1987). He studied the father’s and mother’s behavior toward their newborn infants but found no differences in the parenting behavior; neither the mother nor the father proved to be “naturals” in parenting. However, when parents were studied after a year, mothers who had far more interactions with their babies (became more familiar with the baby’s signals, rhythms, etc.), were then found to be the superior parent. However, when fathers are the primary caregivers they are as competent and sensitive in their role of caregiver as are mothers (Lamb, 1997).

Until such data from the above studies are contravened, we need to put aside the great emphasis on inherent biological sex differences and the idea that pregnancy and childbirth generate strong instinctual nurturing needs that contribute to the creation of a mother-infant symbiotic dyad.
This is an important consideration to integrate, because a view of women as being naturally endowed to function as providers, nurturers, and caregivers continues to reinforce a hierarchical patriarchy, or what might be thought of as sympathetic prejudice. Here I am considering the roles of hostile and benevolent sexism in our society (Glick & Fiske, 2001). Hostile sexism refers to a variety of negative, contemptuous, and denigrating attitudes toward women. It is easy to experience and label. Benevolent sexism, on the other hand, is more subtle. It paints particular qualities of women in a benign and positive light, and yet at the same time reinforces stereotypes and thereby tacitly limits women's strivings in other domains. The authors describe benevolent sexism “as characterizing women as pure creatures who ought to be protected, supported and adored and whose love is necessary to make a man complete” (Glick & Fiske, 2001, p. 109). This idealization of women simultaneously implies that they are weak and that they are probably best suited for conventional gender roles such as nurturing and childcare. The authors indicate that men who have such a view see it as “cherishing” (p. 109) a woman, and many women are appreciative of these views. Some men endorse both hostile and benevolent sexism because they are directed at different stereotypical women. Women who are “good” fall into conventional gender roles as wives, mothers, and caretakers. “Bad” women who defy this conventional role—career women and feminists— are seen as potentially usurping male power and are victims of hostile sexism (Glick & Fiske, 2001, p.
This is not the only depiction of “bad women” in our society. Women are also demonized as seductive psychopaths and cold-hearted villainesses. One can see such stereotypes in contemporary films such as The Last Seduction, Body Heat, Black Widow. The mythic image of Medusa is in this category as well.

There are a variety of social and psychological contributors to the antagonism toward those engaged in nonconventional gender roles. One theme, however, that I am developing is the early and ongoing belief on the part of both sexes that blissful happiness for women can be achieved beginning with the opportunities for merger that babies provide. “Bad women” are thwarting “natural” experiences. Such a strong cultural influence is difficult to resist, especially for females.

Societal constraints appear to have a more negative effect on girls than on boys (Egan & Perry, 2001). Girls are less able to tolerate behavior that is inconsistent with their gender role (i.e., gender conformity is consistent with communal behaviors such as “intimate exchange, cooperation, and efforts to maintain social harmony,” p. 453). Such pressures are felt by the fourth grade of girls’ school life and negatively affects their adjustment (Egan & Perry, 2001). The opportunity to explore more agentic forms of behavior
(dominance, daring, competitiveness, see Macoby, 1998), while available to girls, may make them feel that they are being inconsistent with their gender, and when there is pressure from parents and or peers they are made anxious.

Coupled with this finding, shyness is far more accepted in little girls than in boys. Parents are more likely to reward shyness in their daughters. In addition mothers “are more affectionate and tender to their shy daughters” (Coplan et al., 2001, pp. 465-66) and shy daughters have, in general, more positive interactions with their parents. Thus, more reticent behaviors, as well as engaging only in communal activities, can potentially foster gender conformity and inhibit females from engaging or striving for more agentic activities that offer societal prestige and lead to a sense of effectance.

Shyness must also be differentiated from wishes for solitude and aloneness. Such needs are somewhat contradictory with an emphasis on communal aspects. The belief in women's yearning for merger, the stereotyped emphasis on her communality, can tilt the interpretation of her insistence on solitary time and activity as reflecting a woman's pathology (Burke, 1997). Maintaining that women are less differentiated and more communally oriented than men also underscores the potential to pathologize women's desire for solitude.

Since women are typically rewarded when they are “good,” many of the
above features that I have described—their increased difficulty in resisting gender conformity, their tendency to maintain more communal roles rather than agentic forms of behavior—reinforce conventionality. When woman engage in more customary femininity it is also protective. It thwarts potential attacks of hostile sexism, thereby strengthening their more stereotyped orientation.

Women, too, can underscore their unique position with the idea that only women are capable of producing children and forming intense, fused bonds with their offspring. The dyad can then extrude or erect barriers against male inclusion, providing women with familial power that they do not have in the larger society. There is some support for this notion. When men have indicated their wish to be more involved with their children, “between 60% and 80% of women do not want their husbands to be more involved than they currently are” (Lamb, 1987, p. 20). Lamb suggests as well that greater paternal involvement may threaten the power relationships within the family.

SUMMARY

In this paper I am challenging the concept of the infant’s early experience of a symbiotic stage. I substitute for it the longterm developmental need for an interdependent, intersubjective, or relational perspective. I offer
empirical data to oppose the entrenched psychoanalytic notion of an early symbiotic phase. I provide some cultural, social-historical information that might have contributed support for the concept of symbiosis, especially when psychoanalysis was in its initial stage of theory formation. I discuss some of the problems for our theory that result from an adherence to a concept such as symbiosis. I also address the social-psychological limitations that arise from a continued focus on the exclusive domain of women’s nurturing and communal qualities that follow from a use of the concept of symbiosis.

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**Notes**

[1] This point of view raises the challenging question about the concept of regression, which I am not discussing in this paper. However, for a rigorous disputation of this concept see Inderbitzin and Levy (2000).
As I now understand my practice, psychoanalysis is a spiritual-existential discipline involving a process of discourse that heals the fractured relations of our psychic realities. That is, psychoanalysis is a discursive performance addressing the contradictoriness and the conflicts that operate between the dimensions or various components of our “bodymind.” This definition encompasses the three distinguishing features of psychoanalytic discourse as a “postmodern” practice.

First, the “shibboleth” of the repressed unconscious, our governance from “elsewhere” and the inevitable fractionation of the human subject as constituted in its “encounter” with castration and death. (My exploration of these notions of “castration” and “death” will occupy this paper.)

Second, the libidinality of our embodiment, which creates pervasive and ongoing contradictoriness between the identities or positions of our narrative life as structured by repetition compulsion, and the kinesis of desire that is always “otherwise” than narration—that is, the bodymind’s contradictoriness
between the compulsive repetitiveness or “judgmentalism” of our “mental constructions” and the spiritual energies of our “sexual body.” (For reasons which need not be explored here, I shall use the term “judgmentalism” to include the decisions involved in any representation.)

Third, the processive notion of healing as an ongoing discourse that cannot abolish the pain and loss involved in being human, but that reorients us to these inevitabilities in such a way that we become able to bear our suffering while retaining our capacity for happiness. This third aspect follows from the first two, and expresses the interminability of psychoanalytic process (which is not the same as suggesting that the relationship between a particular psychoanalyst and a particular patient should not have a beginning, a middle, and an end).

From his earliest writings, Freud knew that the twin “discoveries” of the “repressed unconscious” and of the “sexual body” comprised the revolutionary impetus of his discipline. However, throughout his clinical career, there is a gradually unfolding awareness of the significance of his notion of “resistance,” which we might define as the tenacity with which we cling to our suffering, because of our mind’s refusal to bear the pain of our “castration” and “death.” And, as is well known, it is with a contemplation of the “interminability” of healing that Freud’s writings leave off, and so it is at this critical edge that our contemplation of the “postmodern” character of
When I write that psychoanalysis “heals,” I do not mean that it unifies, homogenizes, or obviates contradictoriness and conflict, but rather that it diminishes the obstructions to flexibility and fluidity between the body-mind’s dimensions and components. When I describe this process as a discursive performance, I intend to emphasize that the condition of psychoanalytic healing is free-associative expressiveness, which is an ethical process that unlocks or opens the bodymind’s relations within itself, releasing us from the governance of repetition compulsion. (I distinguish here and elsewhere between “ethicality” as a cracking opening of judgmentalism to what is otherwise, and “morality” as a procedure of arbitration between judgmental positions.)

Although the body is always indirectly at issue, psychoanalytic discourse works and plays more directly with what we might call “the mind’s relationship to its own expressions.” Practicing psychoanalysis does not necessarily shift the mental content of our enunciations—our identities, positions, and stories—so much as it invites a profound shift in what we might call our mind’s “attitude” toward itself and toward what is otherwise than itself, that is, the nature of its attachment to the content of its own utterances.
This issue of “attitude” is not so much a matter of epistemology as of ontology and ethicality. That is, psychoanalytic healing occurs not so much through epistemological procedures arriving at formulations about how our mind operates, nor so much through ontological procedures of a relationship that coaches me toward a revised assimilation of my narratives of love and hate—the identifications, positions and stories, by which I conduct my life. Rather, psychoanalytic healing occurs most profoundly through an ethical process that opens or releases me to listen to myself as a compassionate witness—and not as an advocate attached to, and strenuously invested in, the productions of my judgmentalism. Thus, psychoanalysis invites us not so much to acquire faith in new knowledge—the security of which would, in any event, prove spurious—nor to trust in the “goodness” of our psychoanalyst, but rather to accept the inevitable condition of our life as “unknowing,” and to dissolve whatever obstructs the process of living fully in this life as it is. This is not so much a discipline of the “head” as of the “heart,” and of what Arthur Efron (1985) has felicitously called the “sexual body” of our libidinality. Psychoanalysis is a process of meditative dancing through the plane of our thoughts and our feelings.

Engaging the psychoanalytic process addresses and heals our fractured bodymind. but it does not cure it. Through psychoanalytic practice, we find that inner unification is not possible, absolution unattainable, immortality unavailable, and the painfulness of life inevitable. There are no foundations
and there is no ultimate state of harmony to be achieved. Rather, life offers us the spiritual-existential choice to struggle uselessly against the truthfulness of this, or to participate joyfully in the process of living with this truthfulness. Engaging the discipline of psychoanalytic discourse holds us to the moment-by-moment encounter with this choice, challenging us to move ourselves out of the suffering that is caused by our delusional avoidances both of life's painfulness and of life's passions. Psychoanalytic healing is a working-and-playing process that alleviates suffering by enabling us to live in the enjoyment of what is. In any event, unavoidable and inevitable—which is, as Freud tried to describe in various terminologies, our “castration” and our “death.” At least, this is my opinion—and I will now describe briefly how I arrived at it, and in what sense it is “postmodern.”

**PARADOXES OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY**

We are all patients for life. Our choice is to commit ourselves to the processes of healing our lives, or to paralyze ourselves by living under the governance of repetition-compulsion. I like the term “patient” since it comes from the Latin, *patio*, which means “I suffer.” I came to psychoanalysis—serendipitously—because, like everyone else, I was suffering.

I was 20 years old at the time, and in the midst of a mental breakdown for which I was hospitalized. Mercifully, I was admitted to a longterm
treatment facility that was run on psychoanalytic principles (the Cassel Hospital located just outside of London and funded as an experiment by the British National Health Service). Although there were indeed bars on the windows (a grim reminder of the facility’s former incarnation as a famous hospital “for nervous and mental diseases”), there were no drugs, no electroshock, no behavioral modification, and no locked doors; just a daily regimen of community service, group therapy, and individual psychoanalytic appointments. I stayed almost a year, as an inpatient, in what was one of the more painful periods of my life, but one of its greatest blessings.

In this treatment I came to realize to my astonishment that almost all the stories that my reflective consciousness had generated about me, and my relationships—narratives about love, hate, and the sexual body—were fabrications. Perhaps they had enabled me to survive childhood emotionally, but they had become incapacitating. These realizations were shattering and, in many senses of the word, enlightening. The treatment affected my body. For example, I had been chronically constipated in childhood and adolescence, but in treatment I came to have regular, easy and pleasurable bowel movements (and have done so, more or less, ever since). The treatment affected my capacity to work. For example, I had always been a “not so bright,” solidly B-grade student in school, but I came to develop scholarly interests, won a full stipend for graduate studies at Harvard, authored some rather “heady” publications, and proceeded for three decades to labor
energetically along my chosen career path with some success (although episodic pseudostupidity and an imbalanced approach to my worklife are still daily challenges). The treatment affected my attitude toward my own psyche. For example, from stumbling inhibitions, I came to enjoy my imagination (although my readiness to engage this enjoyment fluctuates). And the treatment slowly but surely affected my capacity to feel loved, loveable, and loving, as well as to be sexually ecstatic (although here there is still so much more progress I wish to make). In short, the realizations generated in this treatment were profoundly freeing, without seeming to imprison me in new co-ordinates.

It was not that I left this treatment with “better” stories about myself. Rather, my psychoanalyst, and the environment of asylum, provided me with experiences of safety, freedom and intimacy that gradually facilitated my relaxing into the understanding that my storytelling capacities are always both transiently “adaptive” or self-protective, and intractably figmentive or “delusional.” I left this treatment determined to continue my psychoanalysis, determined to become a psychoanalyst, and determined to understand the functioning of our mental productions—how the fabric of our reflective consciousness is always both repressive and a disguised "returning” of the repressed.

Subsequently, along with two lengthy periods of full psychoanalytic
treatment and graduation from an accredited institute, the scholarly dimension of my trajectory involved studying psychoanalysis through self-directed reading in philosophy. This culminated in two books (Barratt, 1984, 1993). The first, rather laborious, text trekked through Cartesian-Kantian epistemologies, through Hegel toward the post-Hegelians, via hermeneutics, the romantic traditions, and phenomenology, into dialectics as well as the post-Nietzschean and post-Heideggerian responses of the late 20th century. The second, rather less forbidding, journey appraises the constitution of the mind as a system of signs, and the issues of temporality and desire in relation to the way these signs appear to enable us to “make sense.”

This adventure is "postmodern” and tries to illuminate the extent to which Freud promulgated an inherently "postmodern” discipline of discourse. In my opinion, the notion of the postmodern is merely shorthand for whatever might succeed the interrelated convictions of all “modern” philosophies. These “convictions” have been characterized by Timothy Reiss (1988) as the “analytico-referential episteme” and can be understood both as a culmination of the metaphysics of presence (as illuminated by deconstructive writings in the debates of post-Hegelian and post-Heideggerian philosophy), and as an accretion of western patriarchal acculturation (as illuminated by feminist critique, particularly in France since the late 1960s). These “modern convictions” include the notions: that knowledge can have absolute foundations; that unity of knowing and being is
achievable, if not now then, in principle, ultimately; that time is a singular, linear dimension; that harmony operates holistically or universally; and that the body is an instrument beholden to the mind (or, at the very least, locked into a “master/slave” dialectic with it). Whatever “postmodern” is, it is not programmatic. Rather, the postmodern is an impulse, a critical indictment, and a realization of the terminality of all that is “modern”—an intimation of whatever will come as this analytico-referential episteme collapses, which it now seems to be doing.

Today I comprehend psychoanalysis, which I practice and in which I am a patient, both through my readings in poststructuralist philosophy (which mostly means the deconstructions of Jacques Derrida and his followers, as well as the writings of Emmanuel Levinas, Luce Irigaray, and others), and through my experiences with Buddhist meditation (as well as the philosophies of yoga and tantra). I understand psychoanalysis as the process that, by privileging free-associative discourse, brings the human subject into confrontation with the abyss inherent within it, the inherency of our “castration” and “death.” Psychoanalytic process frees us to be—what some Buddhists call—a compassionate witness to our chattering mind’s repetition-compulsive judgmentalism, and to understand this chattering as a futile reaction against the inherency of our emptiness. I have called this futile reaction the “narratological imperative”—the compulsive repetitiousness of our mental constructions as an effort to build-over the abyss inherent within
Free-associative interrogation, rather than repositioning us within the prison of an intractable attachment to our own judgmental productivities and capabilities, deconstructs this attachment (cf. Barratt, 1988, 1990, 1995, 1999). This is a spiritual-existential undertaking, conducted with the ethicality of compassion, appreciation, and grace. In sum, psychoanalysis does not offer us an “improved” autobiography—one that can be judged to be more “Real, Proper, Right, True, and Effective”—rather it emancipates us from our attachment to our own autobiographical preoccupations.

THE HUMAN SUBJECT AND ITS CONSTITUTION

As is well known, a problem with “psychoanalysis” today is that there is a multiplicity of theories and terminologies with little concordance, scant coherence, and less than convincing philosophical articulation. In this context, I prefer to resurvey the groundwork of the discipline, rather than presume a common language of discussion.

Let us consider the human mind as a fabric of representations, and of rules that govern the formation and transformation of representations. The content of these representations, whether literal or figurative, can be threefold. They may appear to be about the self, about something or someone other than the self, or about a linking affect/action. Representations cannot
be established singularly, so typically they appear in constellations with self-aspects, other-aspects, and affect/action-aspects. Indeed, much psychotherapeutic clarification (which is an ingredient of every psychoanalysis) involves parsing or translating the complex ways in which representations that appear to be about the other may reflect something about the self, affects that appear to be about the self may reflect something about the other, and so forth.

Along with all these matters of representational content and transformation of content, the human mind has a highly significant feature, which we know to be the result of our linguistic competences (that is, the way in which our thinking is constituted by “second-order” symbolic systems). This feature is the reflexive maneuvering of representational expression that permits us to reflect on our own representational contents. For example, not only to represent a “me” (self-aspect) that is enjoying typing (action/ affect-aspect) on this keyboard (other-aspect) for you to read (another other/ action aspect), but also to reflect on the manner in which these representations have just been performed or enunciated by an “I” and an account of them has just been reflexively inscribed “in my mind.”

Note that, on reflection, I am aware that I enunciated these representations. But “I” did not author them. In actuality, I am not capable of creating a representation de novo, nor am I capable of specifying the rules of
representational transformation that I appear to be able to use (but which in a certain sense “use” me). The human subject is subject-ed to language, rather than possessing language as an instrument of its use. Following the structuralist insights of Jacques Lacan and others, we know that representational productivity and the rules that govern it are, so to speak, given to me from “elsewhere.” The “I” merely traces their enunciation in words, images, or actions.

But here is the salient point: When I enunciate representations—or more accurately track their enunciation—I always “know” there is an “I” inscribed along with the enunciatory procedures. The “I” is attached to all three types of representation (self, other, and affect/action), and it seems, so to speak, to make the manifestation of the representation “hang together” (as you will see, I intend the pun). Yet we are philosophically confused as to the sense in which this “I” means I exist or have “being”—for example, it might mean that “1” am existing without necessarily being a substantial entity or existent—herein lies all our Cartesian and post-Cartesian confusions. Three issues concerning this “I” seem especially interesting.

First, it may be that this “I” hangs utterances together in some sort of “(quasi)unification” and permits us to maneuver self-reflectively, but on reflection we find, to our metaphysical horror, that it is as empty as an abyss. Not only does it merely enunciate rather than produce its meaningfulness, it
adds nothing to the substance or content of the representation to which it is attached. This “I” is, to borrow Leszek Kolakowski’s phrasing, a “black hole” (Kolakowski, 1988).

Second, we come to realize that the “I”—like the experience of the “now” and the “is”—is a trick of the representational system. This “system” is not produced by the “I,” but conveys the “I” along its pathways of enunciation. The “I,” the “now.” and the “is” all prove to be concomitantly “empty.” “Now” has no meaning in cosmological time (the time studied by physicists). Rather, it is a phenomenological experience precipitated by the narratological structuring of our representations. Narratives are always organized between a beginning and an end. Representations are always, figuratively or referentially, both commemorative and anticipatory. They appear to represent, to re-present, the presence of a past-present and a future-present (to echo Augustine); and somewhere in between there supposedly hangs the present-ness of the present, a “now” that “is.” From Hegel to Derrida, via Husserl, we have been shown how the here-and-now of the present absents itself in the moment of its designation. The “point” of “I-now-is”—like the geometrical point that appears to be “there” but has no extension—“realizes itself” only repetitively in perpetual penultimacy or deferral, always disappearing as the differance in which presence cedes to absence. (Here I shall employ the Derridean term for philosophical reasons that are explicated in my 1993 book, but which cannot be reexamined in a brief paper such as
Third, as complex as this might seem, it explains the uniqueness of psychoanalytic discourse. Several ways of talking psychoanalytically intimate this point. We can discuss the alienation or estrangement of the energies of our sexual body in the formation of our judgmental faculties. Or we can discuss the way in which consciousness is always a “returning of the repressed,” such that it always expresses disguisedly what it represses from its reflections on itself. Or we can discuss the prevalence of human malice, our seemingly intractable resistance to love and our attachment to suffering, despite the context of bountiful provisions and of beauty. But all these discussions of the unique insights of psychoanalysis into the human condition point toward the way in which our representational reality is motored by repetition compulsion. That is, the way in which our mental functioning organizes itself as if it could avoid what Buddhists call “emptiness,” what Derrida calls the differance, and what I shall call the “castratedness” and the “deathfulness” that is inherent to the constitution of the human subject as “I.” (To discuss the relatedness of these notions would require a dissertation on which we cannot here embark.)

**WHAT IS CALLED “CASTRATION”**

There can be no doubt that Freud grasped the significance of what he
called “castration” in the formation of our experience. He wrote that the “castration complex” has “the profoundest significance in the formation of character”—that is, the personality of both men and women. Yet he may have been confused over the full implications of his discovery, for he is less decisive whether this “complex” involves the ubiquity of fantasies about genital mutilation, or something equally ubiquitous but more abstractly powerful and “symbolic”—or both. Even those of us who acknowledge the profound significance of Freud’s discovery have often perpetuated the confusion over its implications. There are many questions to be addressed on this issue, but as a preliminary I think it may be helpful to distinguish three “levels” of meaning.

First, the "castration complex" implies that experiences of our self are always forged in the crucible of our individual, often long forgotten, fantasies—if not actualities—of genital mutilation. Freud assumed both the priority of visual experience, and that we are “hard-wired” to interpret difference in terms of domination and defect: Boys are more visibly protuberant than girls, “more” means “better,” and the “less” must be a defective version of the "more.” It may be empirically true that we all tend to think this way, and that such visual interpretations of childhood have, by way of their repression, a lasting impact on our experiences of gender and sexuality. However, it remains an open question whether this dynamic of human development is necessarily so—whether visibility has to be so impressive, and whether we
are capable of considering differences in terms other than domination and defect.

Second, the “castration complex” implies that these concrete fantasies of genital mutilation are the prototype of a general system of myth-themes about diverse matters such as bodily lack, helplessness, retribution and subjugation. It implies not only that our mind is virtually incapable of constructing difference in terms other than domination and defect. It also implies that our experiencing of “my basic self” as “my own body” is always complexly cast in terms of individual narratives that can only unfold around culturally inscribed and repetitiously iterated myth-themes about our psychological relations with the symbolic and imaginary functions of “the mother’s breast” and "the father’s penis."

To express this another way: All psychological development unfolds in our encounters with the “law of laws,” which is the law of incestuous boundary—the foundational law of prohibition and taboo—and these are articulated in the context of our specific experiences with maternal and paternal sexuality. Our entire descriptive psychology is richly endowed with accounts of separation-individuation struggles, pleasure-punishment sequences, oedipally triangulated conflicts, and so forth. And all these can be comprehended as permutations of the way in which the human subject is inducted into the fantasy-systems that precede it and that determine the
possible contents of its experiences. Such fantasies are central to the formation of all personhood—that is, the formation of our mental functioning and our set of identifications, positions or stories, as men and as women.

Third, inherent to and going beyond these content-full and psychologically descriptive aspects, the “castration complex” implies something profoundly existential and poignantly spiritual. Our “castration” means that the “I” of human experience—both of men and of women—is irreparably insufficient or inadequate, precisely because “I” am never actually the author of what I take to be “my own meanings.” This is akin to what has been called the “basic fault” of the human condition. Here Lacanian theorizing has developed the indispensable notion of the “phallus.” This phallus (like Shiva’s Lingam, or the Word of Yahweh) is the abstract point-of-origin that makes possible the meaningfulness of representationality, the ultimate author from which other meanings are merely derivative. Our human condition is such that the “I” articulates meanings that I can never author, and thus “I” am deluded when I believe that I speak (have spoken, or ever could speak) from the position of the phallus. We may delude ourselves that the penis is somehow phallic, but it is not, and so in this most powerful and profound sense, both men and women are always already castrated.

This is why I prefer the term “castratedness” to “castration.” As was hinted earlier, the ubiquity and universality of human castratedness means
that “I” can never achieve mastery over my own life’s narratives, and my chattering mind will never actually prevail over anything despite all its pretensions and delusions to the contrary. The human “I” is irreparably inadequate and insufficient.

**WHAT IS CALLED “DEATH”**

Human subjectivity is both castrated and deathbound. Although questions about death, loss, and absence infuse Freud’s work from his earliest pre-1900 theorizing on the primacy of repetition in the formation of the subject, through his 1920 writing on the “death drive,” to his final formulations, he is provocative on the question of the relationship between fear of death and other fears. For example, he suggests as late as 1926—some years after his description of the *fort/da* experience—that our “ego” only comprehends “death” by analogy to its own “castration.”

These provocative insights are associated with widespread confusion about the implications of death in human psychology. We can divide the contemporary world of psychoanalytic theorizing according to which “root metaphor” of human tearfulness is held to be most profoundly operative in the formation of our representational life. For example, there are “schools” that describe individual development in terms of our fearfulness of loss of integrity, mutilating punishment, or “castration” (implying that our “ego
organization” can only conceptualize “death” as a sort of mega-castration). This view of the re-presentational origins of mental life usually takes Freud’s writings of 1923 and 1926 as its authoritative texts. And there are “schools” of psychoanalysis that depict how individuals develop though their fearfulness of destructiveness and annihilation, or “death” (discussing “castration” only as a fantasy derivative of this more basic fearfulness by which our “ego” comes to operate). This view of the origins of our representational life often takes Freud’s 1920 text as its inspiration. And then there are many schools that offer no explanation of the origination of our “ego’s capacities to represent,” and thus decline to subscribe to either “root metaphor.” Instead, they merely deploy notions such as “fear of abandonment” and “loss of love.” These notions are descriptively compelling, but conveniently sidestep deeper questions as to why being abandoned or unloved would be formatively threatening in a manner that impacts on the structuring (as distinct from the content) of our ego organization’s representational capacities.

Perhaps some of these controversies and difficulties stem not only from confusion over the different levels of meaning that accrue to the notion of “castration,” but also from some confusion over the way in which “death” could possibly be an impactful psychological experience while one is still living (that is, how can it be that we live in the fear of an experience that we have never experienced?). There are many questions to be addressed here,
but as a preliminary I think it may be helpful to distinguish three “levels” at which “death” might have psychological meaning.

First, there is “death” as the terminus of our life’s narrative. Although this is the most common idea of death, it is perhaps not so significant for our psychological development (in the sense of the structuring or origination, rather than the content, of our representational life). Death, in this sense, is not something experienced, and hence not something that could have a formative impact on our representational life. Rather, it is a forceful and frightening anticipation based on our emotional experience of the loss of others, and the anticipatory recognition that this too will somehow happen to “me.” These ideas about my mortality may shape my life’s conduct—“I am getting older, soon I will die, I want to do such and such while I still can”—but my death, the loss of myself to myself, remains un-re-presentable. In this context, we both fear and deny our death (in the manner described by Ernest Becker and many others). We “know” that every narrative has a beginning, a middle, and an end, so we “know”—by an abstractive extrapolation—that our own life will have its definitive closure. But since we cannot actually experience the ending of our own experience, this is a sort of profoundly “incomprehensible,” yet terrifying, narratological “knowledge.” Such knowledge is acquired comparatively late in the psychological development of our representational capacities and through our abstractive and extrapolative understanding of life as narration. And we may note here that
there is perhaps a sense in which this “knowledge” is scarcely acquired at all; for (except as an ending that is to be denied) death does not exist in the prevalent magical thinking animating many of our narrations.

Second, there is “death” as the destruction of our ego organization’s functional capacities and representational constructions. There is ample evidence that every ego experiences this sort of traumatization in the course of its development. This is not death in the sense of the termination of experience, but “death” as our potential to—in the vernacular—“lose it.” Our ego organization is able to experience the loss of its own functionality, the loss of representations of others, and the loss of representations of self. These losses imply the dissolution or destruction of representational coherence, constancy or consistency, and are usually related to what is interpreted as our potential to be overwhelmed by our “aggressive drive,” or our “innate destructiveness,” and our “primordial envy.” The potential for our ego organization to “lose it” in this traumatic manner perhaps provides us with a “death-like” experience that has profound repercussions for the development of its functions and its representational activities.

Third, inherent to and going beyond both the narratological notion of life’s termination and the experiential destruction of representationality in the traumatization of our ego’s organization, there is “death” as the inherent “emptiness” or differance of the “I” of the subject. We have already mentioned
this notion of the subject’s “death” as something profoundly existential and poignantly spiritual. This is “death” not as the way in which the existence of the human subject is narratologically bounded by its own nonexistence, but rather the inherency of “death” in the midst of the life of the subject itself—”death” as essential to the eventuation of every act of representation. As Tsongkhapa, the influential Tibetan scholar, wrote some six hundred years ago, “unborn emptiness . . . is both the center itself and the central path . . . emptiness is the track on which the centered person moves.” When our “ego” observes itself maneuvering through the passage of free-associative enunciation, when the subject’s reflectivity becomes mobilized, or when we develop our capacity to be what Buddhists and others call the “compassionate witness” to ourselves, there is an intimation of this “emptiness” or difference of the “I-now-is.” The “I” cannot formulate its own “emptiness,” but it experiences the intimations of this abyss within itself. This is death not as something that circumscribes the life of the subject, not as something toward which the subject is bound, but as an inherency that binds the subject to its representational repetitiveness.

This is why I prefer the term “deathfulness” to “death.” The ubiquity and universality of human deathfulness offers the “I” of human experience a margin of “choice” within its representational structuration. Our fearfulness of the abyss within is, I believe, what motivates the repetition compulsion, or the narratological imperative, that determines our ego organization’s
incessant activity in constructing and reconstructing its representational world. When our “I” tightly attaches itself to the identities, positions, and stories, that are generated by this repetition compulsiveness, we remain imprisoned within our own mental devices. When our “I” is able to embrace its own deathfulness—as when the subject embraces its own castratedness as irreparably inadequate and insufficient—we are able to loosen ourselves from our repetition compulsiveness, and the process of our healing occurs. This is why I suggest that psychoanalysis is not a matter of formulating “better” identities, positions, and stories, but rather of freeing ourselves from our compulsive attachment to the production and reproduction of these formulations. This is why the mobilization of free-associative expression, the dissolution of our resistances to this expressiveness, and the cultivation of our compassionate witnessing of ourselves, are the keys to psychoanalytic healing.

THE ANTI-PSYCHOANALYTIC DRIFT OF CONTEMPORARY PSYCHOANALYSIS

In sum, we do not suffer because our narratives are “immature” according to some “scientific standard” of development, nor because our narratives are “maladaptive” according to prevailing social or cultural ideologies. Rather we suffer because, refusing to embrace our castratedness and deathfulness, we cling to the narratological imperative and to our repetition compulsiveness. Much of our hundred years of psychoanalytic
history comprises a series of attempts to avoid the truthfulness of this ancient and “postmodern” insight. The antipsychoanalytic drift of contemporary psychoanalysis avoids the challenge of postmodern impulses to return to the falsifying security of “modern” theorizing. As I have already implied, there are three principal ways in which this occurs.

First, we currently have versions of psychoanalysis that seem to have forgotten the *contradictoriness* of the human subject. This “contradictoriness” is inherent and insuperable precisely because of the castratedness and deathfulness within the representational formulation that appears most complete and whole in its identity: *I is I*. Psychoanalysis demonstrates the falsity of this identitarian foundation, disclosing its inadequacy and insufficiency. But against the rigors of this discovery, many contemporary theories appeal to deceptive images of unification and harmonization. This amounts to forgetting that the “repressed unconscious” is everywhere, and replacing this insight with ideas about a “conflict-free sphere of ego functioning,” an “integrated self,” or the primacy of transactional “intersubjectivity.”

Second, we currently have versions of psychoanalysis that seem to have forgotten the *libidinality* of the human subject. This “libidinality” is the desirousness of our embodiment that intervenes precisely in the cracking of the subject’s apparent identity. Psychoanalysis demonstrates that desire
mobilizes the subject in relation to its inherent inadequacy, “emptiness” or differance, and offers us the insight that we avoid our sexuality because not to do so requires the embrace of our castratedness and deathfulness. Against the rigors of this discovery, many contemporary theories dismiss libidinality as “speculative energetics” and discuss sexuality as if it were merely a repertoire of behaviors under the governance of our “ego organization.” In this retreat from its postmodern implications, psychoanalytic practice becomes merely a dyadic exchange of representations—a transformation of our thoughts about our feelings, or our thoughts about our bodies, rather than a movement of our sexuality that subverts the priority of these deliberations.

Third, we currently have versions of psychoanalysis that seem to have forgotten that the process of healing is far more profound and spiritually poignant than any procedure that merely installs or re-establishes identities, positions, and stories, that are more “Real, Proper, Right, True, and Effective” according to the criteria provided by extant ideologies of maturation or adaptation. Yet many contemporary theories advance these ideologies. They purport to resolve pain—which Freud knew to be impossible—rather than to offer an ongoing process of healing by which we may bear our suffering in the spirit of enjoyment.

RETURNING TO DESIRE AS THE LIBIDINALITY OF THE SEXUAL BODY
The “I” of our egotism is actually “empty,” perennially deferred, delayed or penultimate, and inherently differant within its identity. This “I” is not the illusory “Phallus” and can never be. Rather, it is always and inevitably “castrated” but refuses to awaken to this reality. So the “I” chatters over the abyss that is within . . . as if, by means of repetition compulsiveness, it could negate the deathfulness of its own constitution.

There has been something misguided about a “modern psychoanalysis” that treats “insights” as formulations about our mental life (even as interim or approximative formulations). Against this, we must learn to live with the realization that such “insights” are as delusional as the “symptoms” they replace. There is a sense in which this realization is itself the postmodern notion of “insight.” And in this context, psychoanalysis becomes my personal journey of realization that all the identities, positions, and stories generated by my reflective consciousness are fabrications, and that the identitarianism of the "I is I" can never be an absolutist foundation—because indeed, life offers no such certainties, no such security, and no such foundations. Against the modern ambition to achieve formulations about life that are somehow more “Real, Proper, Right, True, and Effective,” psychoanalysis realizes that all such formulations are statifying, that they alienate the subject from the desirous momentum of its libidinality. Against this ambition, psychoanalysis is a personal journey that loosens our repetition compulsive attachment to the products of our thinking, and returns us to the wisdom of our hearts and
of our sexual body.

There has been something misguided about a “modern psychoanalysis” that refuses to accept the inevitability of pain, and of the inadequacy or insufficiency of our “I-ness,” by confusing the penis with the Phallus, and confusing the “authoritative position” of the psychoanalyst as the locus of the phallus itself. This confuses castratedness with castration, and deathfulness with death. For example, to the extent that a psychoanalyst might effectively tell a male patient something like “you imagined you could be castrated, but you will be healed when you understand that you were not (and when you understand how much this imagining held you back),” or might effectively tell a female patient “you imagined you had been castrated, but you will be healed when you understand that you were not (and when you understand how much this imagining held you back),” psychoanalysis becomes derailed. To hold out the promise of an “uncastrated” life is as ideologically falsifying as a promise of immortality. Such a promise, although it may preserve the narcissistic authority of the psychoanalyst, imprisons patients in the repetition compulsiveness of representationality. Against the spurious safety of this imprisonment, psychoanalysis is a personal journey that libidinally remobilizes the subject in relation to the abyss that is within us.

Healing occurs when the inevitability of our irreparable castratedness and our inherent deathfulness is accepted through the loosening of our
repetition compulsiveness. This acceptance involves an embracing of our desire through the processive momentum of free-associative discourse. Libidinality cracks open the apparent seamlessness of the representational world, intimating to us that the narratological imperative can never deliver life in the fullness of our suffering. The libidinality of our desire is thus the dimension within us that subverts the governance of our bodymind by the narratological imperative of repetition compulsion. Only by moving ourselves can we free ourselves from the compulsiveness of our mental preoccupations. This movement of paradox, irony, and parody, is the prerogative of the libidinality of our embodiment. Refraining from dancing or touching, psychoanalysis discovers the healing properties of the momentum of free-associative discourse, as a momentum that brings the bodymind into an alignment of healing that can never be complete. As psychoanalysis takes us “out of our heads” and into this momentum of our hearts and our sexual bodies, it realizes this healing potential as a postmodern impetus.

References


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