The Interpersonal & Cultural Approaches

American Neo-Freudian Schools

Earl G. Witenberg

American Neo-Freudian Schools

A. The Interpersonal and Cultural Approaches

Earl G. Witenberg

e-Book 2015 International Psychotherapy Institute

From *American Handbook of Psychiatry: Volume 1* edited by Silvano Arietti

Copyright © 1974 by Basic Books

All Rights Reserved

Created in the United States of America

Table of Contents

American Neo-Freudian Schools

A. The Interpersonal and Cultural Approaches

Earl G. Witenberg

A theory is an attempt to organize a chaotic universe of observations into a comprehensible whole, and the form it takes is largely determined by the modes of thought habitual to men of its time. Thus, the belief in individualism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries is reflected in Freud's view of the individual in a fateful struggle with his instincts, and the advance of the biological and physical sciences left their imprint on his structuralization of the libidinal impulses and on his conceptualization of the power of human drives in terms of energy quanta. Similarly all psychiatric theories that depict man as an organism in interaction show evidences of a new mode of thinking that began to become persuasive at the turn of the century. In physics events were seen to be relational; man in crowds was seen to be more than man alone; and society was appreciated as more than a compact entered into by discrete individuals for their mutual benefit. Psychiatry as a study of the reciprocal processes between people could not be long in coming, and the line of its development may be seen in the work of

Durkheim, Cooley, Mead, Peirce, Dewey, Lewin, and Sapir. It reached conceptualization in the work of Harry Stack Sullivan, with its influence clearly revealed in the writings of Erich Fromm, Frieda Fromm-Reichmann, Karen Homey, Clara Thompson, and, indeed, of the whole field of psychiatry, child development, social psychology, and even of historical research.

Harry Stack Sullivan

Sullivan has been characterized by Redlich and Freedman as "America's most original modem psychiatrist." A colleague of his, William Silverberg, has stated that the only person he knew who could have done what Freud had done if Freud hadn't already done it was Sullivan.

Sullivan made one of the most comprehensive statements describing man as a biologically rooted but socially interacting organism. What gives Sullivan's work a flavor peculiarly different from that of other workers in the field are two elements that are, perhaps, specific to American thinking. Whether the influence is direct or not, it is clear that the pragmatic climate of America, noted by de Tocqueville more than a century ago and conceptualized by Peirce, James, and Dewey, has been influential in his approach. Sullivan's thinking is empirical rather than rationalistic. He is more concerned with developing formulations that will facilitate his purpose—the development of an effective therapy—than with theoretical "systems" of a

high order of abstraction. He is interested in language and linguistics in a way no previous psychiatrist has been. His close association with E. Sapir, an anthropologist interested in linguistics and communication, enriched Sullivan's formulations. The scrutiny he gives to the development of language and symbols in the reciprocal processes between the parent or culture-surrogate and the child is the most telling in any of the psychoanalytic theories. This empiricism utilizes the approach known as operationalism. His formulations are generally stripped bare of abstractions in order that they may approach testability, and if some of the color and richness of human life seems to be lost in the process, at least what is there is hopefully verifiable by means of observation.

What Sullivan did, to a degree more than any other psychiatrist of his time, was to take note of the rising belief that, as Fichte put it, "the 'I' is not a fact but an act," and to test that belief in a clinical situation. In Sullivan's view the person we commonly refer to as an individual is the result of an interplay among physiological, psychobiological, and situational factors. Physiological factors include, among others, native endowment, nutrition, disease, and physical injury. Under psychobiological factors are those that inhibit or facilitate the evolution of the person, his education and acculturation, the development of his perceptions, his emotional sensitivity to events and to people. From the first mysterious contagion between child and mother to the last personal interchange of the old man at the moment of death, the human

person is a being in process—not a fact but an act. To illustrate the dynamic nature of this view, we can contrast the common mode of speech when speaking of the person who exhibits much anxiety (or love, or hate) with the mode of Sullivan's frame of reference. The common way of thinking, which sees man as a possessor of traits, speaks of "an anxious person," whereas Sullivan might say that he is a person who under such and such circumstances experiences anxiety with others. And by others Sullivan would include fantasied persons and various distortions of the other. Situational factors include those actual interpersonal opportunities that reflect the interplay of the culture and its participants, the changing institutional setting of life, and the opportunity for new experience.

Leston Havens has remarked that Sullivan has "secretly influenced all of American psychiatry." Not so secret is his influence on such writers as Arieti,- Burnham, Chrzanowski, Green, Tower, Rioch, Weigert, Searles, Spiegel, Stanton, Schwartz, and Will.

The Basic Needs: Satisfaction and Security

Tension of Needs

Crucial in the development of a personality is the nature of the interaction between the parent and the infant in regard to the tension of needs or drives. From birth onward the infant experiences tensions of needs.

There are tensions caused by physiological needs, both general and zonal; there is the tension of the need for tenderness; there are also tensions caused by the needs for curiosity, focal attention, activity, and mastery. Also there is the innate capacity for the tension of anxiety. Sullivan conceptualized tension as an intrinsic potential for action of organisms consisting of energy transformation so that the organism may maintain itself, that it may maintain a balance among various subsystems or organ systems, and it may maintain an equilibrium between its internal and external environments. Human experience may be said to consist of the enduring influence of this tensional history on the present and the future.

General needs are needs for food, breathing, and sleep. The zonal areas are oral, anal, vestibulo-kinesthetic, retinal, and genital. All these needs arise in the internal physicochemical milieu and are experienced centrally as tension. As a result of such tension the infant makes certain movements, such as crying, at first toward the universe at large and later toward the more specific agents who, experience has shown, may relieve his tension. If his efforts are successful in producing actions by others that result in the satisfaction of his needs, his tension abates, and he experiences the state that Sullivan terms "euphoria." Early experiences of such tension may be caused by anoxia, with increase in respiratory ventilation as a means of reducing tension, or by hypoglycemia, with the resulting tension causing sucking movements as a signal to the mothering person that a need requires

satisfaction. The entire collection of tensions that requires intervention of a mothering person may be summated as the infant's need for "tenderness."

It can be seen that the appeasement of these primary needs requires interaction with others. From the moment of birth the parents are the agents through whose acts the child's needs are either satisfied or denied, and in the process of such satisfaction or denial, one or another mode of relationship is established. It is in the evolution of the relationship with the mothering one and others during the course of development that the self-dynamism is organized. If the "satisfactions" can be achieved without the development of significant anxiety in the infant, the basis for "security" is established, and the self-system that develops is one that has the interpersonal competence to achieve the satisfaction of its needs without loss of security. If, on the other hand, the early experiences through which the self-system is developed lead to a self that lacks the interpersonal competence to secure the satisfaction of its primary needs without the repeated experience of anxiety or its substitute states, the person is said to lack security and to be mentally ill. Thus, the need to satisfy these needs or drives leads to interaction with others, and this interaction leads to the patterning of a self-system that is interpersonally competent or incompetent, secure or insecure.

The Response to Needs

There must be a conjunction between the infant's needs and the emotional state of the mothering person if the signs that signal the needs are to be heeded. To this end Sullivan postulates that the activities of the infant that signal the presence of tension within him cause a state of tension within the mothering one that, in turn, is experienced as tenderness. Thus, the tension produced by needs in the infant induces a state of tension in the mother that, felt as tenderness, causes her to take steps to satisfy the infant's needs. This is the sequence of events that occurs in the case of the fortunate infant whose signals of tension to the mother result in the feeling of tenderness uncomplicated by anxiety. The infant finds his needs satisfied without the production of anxiety within himself, and the result is the achievement of security.

The Significance of Anxiety

The results of the infant's signaling of his needs are not always quite so fortunate. If those needs upon which life itself depends are not satisfied, he, of course, does not survive. Rut there is yet another possibility fraught with disastrous consequences for him. His signals may result in the satisfaction of his bodily needs, but under emotional circumstances of such a kind that grave damage is done to his sense of security, and as a result to the development of his personality. Here Sullivan takes up the question of anxiety, which is basic in the development of the distortions of personality known as neurosis and

psychosis.

In the tension of needs the disequilibrium is physiological—there may be, for example, oxygen deficiency, dehydration, or hypoglycemia. The state of anxiety, on the other hand, results from an emotional interchange between one person and another, in this case the mothering one and the infant. If the mothering one is anxious for whatever reason (that is, for reasons totally unrelated or totally related to the signals of the infant), there may be some interference with the satisfaction of his needs, but by and large they will be satisfied. They will be satisfied, however, in an emotional atmosphere that will cause anxiety in the infant. The mechanism by means of which the infant's signals may cause anxiety in the mother may be readily imagined and will, of course, depend upon the existing personality of the mother and her state of mind at the moment. A mother beset with anxiety about a current marital problem will be anxious in the interchange with the infant. A mother with low self-esteem in regard to her womanliness will find her baby's needs threatening, since they cause her to face the very area of her anxiety. But the means by which the anxiety of the mother can cause anxiety in the infant are less easy to explain. If the infant is newborn with an as yet poorly developed perceptual apparatus, it may be difficult to understand by what means he will perceive the anxiety of his mother. In order to explain such a perception, Sullivan postulates the existence between the infant and the mother of a quality called "empathy." By this he means the emotional contagion by which

the infant may become aware of the emotional state of his mother without the mediation of any of the sense organs.

Given anxiety in the mother, the infant becomes anxious and experiences the state Sullivan terms insecurity. Thus, lack of security is the result of interpersonal deficit as the presence of security is the result of interpersonal adequacy. The presence of the tension of needs is a sign of physiological disequilibrium; the presence of the tension of anxiety is a sign of interpersonal difficulty. As satisfaction is to the tension of needs, security is to the tension of anxiety. The perception of this tension of anxiety causes the infant to become uncomfortable and to signal this discomfort, but for the infant there is no relief because the mothering one has no way of relieving it. Severe psychopathology results from intense anxiety early in life. Severe anxiety does not convey any information about experience. It erases any experience or occurrence that may have preceded or accompanied it. The most severe form of anxiety, that associated with the contents of the not-me personification, is experienced as uncanny emotion, as awe. Dread, loathing, and horror are terms associated with the state. Less intense anxiety permits a gradual realization of the interpersonal circumstances under which it occurs.

The problem for both infant and adult is not simply devising means for satisfying the tension of needs; the means for doing this alone are usually at hand. The usual problem is to alter activity in the direction of lesser rather

than greater anxiety, of greater rather than lesser security. To summarize: the drives and the ensuing tensions of the individual require the cooperation of others for their satisfaction. This makes the attempt to satisfy needs an interpersonal process, and depending upon the interpersonal competence with which it is carried on, it results in security or insecurity.

The Development of the Self-System

The self-system develops out of the interpersonal experiences the individual has with others in trying to relieve the tension of his needs or drives. He expresses his tension in interpersonal situations; and as a result he experiences feeling states through empathy, he notices facial expressions, voice tones, body tensions, and gestures of various sorts in the other person, and he is the recipient of more or less direct statements of the reaction of the other person to his needs. Raw events are not directly experienced. How and what is experienced is essentially a symbolic process that is different at different stages of development. The earliest and most primitive form of experience of the young infant is experience in the prototaxic mode. This consists of discrete, total, unrelated impressions. There is no separation of self from environment and no differential localization of the source of the impressions. It is what William James calls the world of the infant, "blooming, buzzing confusion." This is the hypothecated state of experience for the young infant. Later on in life it may be seen during the acute phase of some severe

mental disorders—functional or chemical (as in the untoward effects of psychedelic drugs).

The young infant gradually acquires a rudimentary form of perception called prehension. It is not the mothering one who is prehended first but the nipple. This is a complex image with a broad reference. There is a beginning capacity for foresight. The infant prehends crying as action that will lead to the relief of distress (this is the beginning of appreciation of the "magical potency" of vocal behavior). He also begins to prehend distinctions, say, between "good" and "bad" nipple; the former brings relief of distress, the latter brings additional distress. The development of this ability to identify differences in the environment may be construed to be the first step toward experience in the parataxic mode.

Another step on the way is the integration of data provided by more than one of the zones of interaction, for example, visual and auditory. There is no logical or causal connection to the parts into which the original global experience is broken. The parts are connected by association; there is a more or less clear appreciation of relationships among experiences—relationships of coincidence and concomitance, of similarity and difference. The crying infant who needed to be picked up bodily before he would stop crying now will cease the crying when he hears the mother's footsteps or feels her hand on his cheek. This form of experience in the parataxic mode, this experience

by concomitance and association, is the primordial form of knowing (as is the prototaxic when it recurs in major disorders). It may influence and color cognitive functioning into adulthood. The parataxic mode is the primary mode until the child learns the shared meanings of language. At this point there is the development of the syntaxic mode of experience, and consensual validation is available; the relationships are logical and causal here, not private, idiosyncratic, or governed by anxiety.

Related Appraisals and Personifications

Late in infancy the training for socialization is begun, and for the first time the infant becomes aware of the *appraisal* of himself by his parents. If a particular act is met with anxiety on the part of the parents, the infant takes his parents' reaction as an appraisal of himself and his worth. He begins to organize himself in terms of such reflected appraisals originally experienced in the parataxic mode. Impulses in himself that call forth anxiety in his parents, and hence in himself, are organized into a concept of himself that he personalizes as "bad-me"; while those impulses that do not result in anxiety but result in euphoria are organized into a concept of "good-me." Since those impulses, acts, thoughts, emotions, and fantasies that are part of the "bad-me" concept are regularly associated with the unpleasant emotion of anxiety, the individual becomes alert to all performances that result in a disturbing emotion in his parents and hence in himself. He tunes himself, as it were, to

their emotional wavelength and by focusing on that in himself that may or may not provoke anxiety, he less clearly notices other experiences of himself. As Sullivan puts it, he "selectively inattends" to those aspects of experience or of himself that are issues for his parents, and in so doing may fail to experience either the creative or destructive aspects of his experience or personality. Rut the failure to notice such aspects of experience or of the self is not a profound disturbance; if pointed out by an accepting person, the inattended part of the experience may be recovered. Selective inattention serves, then, to control consciousness in those situations that might provoke anxiety. However, some activities may be met with such intense anxiety or anger that selective inattention is insufficient for psychic safety. For such processes the method is dissociation. Dissociated aspects of the self cannot come into awareness through ordinary conscious human experience, though they may reveal themselves during crucial periods such as adolescence and menopause in night terrors, panics, and so forth. The patterns that the person develops are his self-system. This serves to limit his anxiety by controlling his awareness. It thereby allows him to function with an apparent security, but it limits his opportunities to experience the new, the novel and limits the amount of syntaxic experience. With the advent of language "good-me" and "bad-me" become fused as "me."

"Not-me" is not integrated into the self. When the acts or even the very existence of the child result in total anxious disapproval on the part of the

parents, the child is exposed to a major psychic disaster. He experiences such overwhelming anxiety that the boundaries of the self are eliminated, a state to which Sullivan applied the term "not-me." In crucial periods of later life such as adolescence, menopause, the beginning of a schizophrenic episode, in periods of overwhelming anxiety, or in certain nightmares, the "not-me" is experienced as the uncanny emotions of awe, dread, and loathing.

The Process of Socialization

During the latter part of infancy the child begins to make repeatable noises. He has been surrounded from birth with the linguistic signs and symbols of his parents and others; he experiences them in the prototaxic and parataxic modes. The child responds to these sounds actively. He also "rehearses" them subvocally and thereby begins the reverie processes that continue through life. Most thinking occurs preverbally. His first attempts at vocalization bear little relationship to the sounds heard. He thereby develops a personal language primarily in the parataxic mode; this autistic speech for some may persist into adulthood and under circumstances of extreme anxiety may become apparent. It may also become obvious in the production of poets who have access to this personal language.

If a particular sound is met with tenderness, it will be reiterated. If it is met with anxiety or displeasure, it will disappear or become covert to add to

the reverie processes. The sounds that will be reiterated are, of course, chosen by the parents as agents of their own desire and of the culture. This explains why the magic word "mama" is so often the first word chosen or alleged to be chosen by the infant for the initiation of speech. Speech is the first type of communication in the syntaxic mode. The process of verbal communication makes possible the learning of social patterns since this variety of communication is less susceptible to the emotionally idiosyncratic distortions in relationship between parent and child. Consensual validation now becomes possible. The infant is now a child and has the opportunity to learn what a word means from more than one source.

The child is now at the threshold of socialization. His signals no longer bring unqualified cooperation from his parents. He begins to learn his social role via the anxiety gradient. If the degree of anxiety provoked in him is not too great, it serves as an educational force guiding him in learning required behavior. Thus, the thwarting of a need results in anxiety that teaches how and when society permits his needs to be satisfied. The child is now on the way to becoming a civilized person. If the child is faced with great anxiety, tension will increase, and the child has the choice of facing disintegration of his patterns of organization, resorting to attempts at sublimation, or of attempting to discharge his needs symbolically in dreams or substitutive activity. With advancing age, learning by reward and punishment begins to play a more active role in the social process. The child begins to discriminate

authority figures and authority situations. If the means of enforcing the parents' authority are appropriate and the issues on which the authority is exerted are consonant with the culture, this will lead to a healthy and necessary discrimination of what sort of behavior is acceptable and what is not. To be appropriate the means must be adequate enough to be effective, not degrading to the child, and not punishment for punishment's sake alone. If the demands of the authority figures are consonant with the culture, if the child observes that the demands are approximately the same as those made by his parents on others and on themselves, he will not feel the precepts of the authorities as arbitrary or unjust. If, however, the authority is irrational and driven by anxiety, or if the modes of punishment become ends instead of means, the child may begin to protect himself by deceiving himself and his parents, by concealing what is going on within him. He may use verbalisms to avoid punishment and learn the use of "as if' performances to deceive the authority, deceiving himself in the process.

If the child's signals for the need for tenderness, approval, or affection are met with marked anxiety, being made fun of, being taken advantage of, or being hurt, instead of the tenderness he requires, what Sullivan calls the "malevolent transformation" takes place. This is a basic confusion in the relation of stimulus and response, much like turning on the hot water faucet and receiving a cascade of ice cold water. In the shower it may result only in a mistrust of plumbing, but in an area as vital as the need for tenderness,

approval, and affection, it results in much more distressing consequences. It results in the conviction that one lives among enemies and can expect no satisfaction of needs outside oneself. An additional consequence of the development of the malevolent transformation is that it vitiates the trust in others so necessary for the progressive experience of unthwarted personality development. It also results in others being repelled by the child's attitude so that the child is never able to benefit from experience with potentially kind and friendly people.

The nature of the exercise of authority by the parent over the child may be significantly influenced by the gender of the parent in question. The parent of the same gender as the child is likely to have more patterned responses in his relationship with the child. The father "knows" how a little boy should be reared with a certainty he would never assume for that mysterious creature, a little girl. His own unfulfillment may seek fulfillment in his son. Since he feels his ideas on how his son should be raised as certitude, he is less open to observing the child as he really is and hence less likely to be responsive to the child's actual needs. The result will be the exercise of authority that is fixed and irrational, and in marked contrast to that of the parent of the opposite sex. Given the tendency to the exercise of irrational and excessive authority by the parent of the same sex and excessive tenderness, in contrast, by the parent of the opposite sex, the result may be behaviorally identical to Freud's description of the Oedipus complex.

As the child advances to grammar school age, the mode of relationship idiosyncratic to his own family may, for the first time, be compared to the varieties of relationship of those outside the family. This becomes not only possible but necessary if humiliation, disapproval, or punishment by the new figures in his environment—his classmates and teachers —is to be avoided. For the first time the peculiarities and limitations of his own family are open to comparison and remedy. He comes under the influence of new authorities, teachers, recreational directors, and others whose manner of exerting authority and responding to, say, defiance may be different from his parents, particularly to the extent that his parents do not reflect the culture. At the same time the child meets others with a variety of personalities and learns to accommodate to them. In discussion with his peers, he has the opportunity to check upon the habits, values, and reactions of the significant persons of his past and present life, and by comparing them with other adults, he may come to make some value judgments about them. In questioning for the first time the infallibility of their judgments, he may revise some opinions of himself that have come from reflected appraisals. During this period competition is natural, and with proper intervention by social and school authorities, the child learns compromise and cooperation if he has not already experienced both with his brothers and sisters.

The importance of this period in the development of the personality

cannot be overemphasized. It is a time for reflection and for revision. For the first time the child reflects upon the nature of his parents and, as a result, may bring them down to life size. The altering of his view of his parents makes for revision in his view of himself. It also is a time for learning social subordination and social accommodation. Juveniles learn how to relate to authorities; they learn how many slight differences in living there are; they learn acceptable and unacceptable ways of being. They learn that what is valued outside the home may be different from what is valued inside the home. They learn from authorities other than the parents and the siblings; they also learn from each other.

So important is this time for reflection and revision, and so necessary the association with peers that makes this possible, that Sullivan states that children isolated from other children by the circumstances of geography invent realistic imaginary playmates. These playmates can have their source, however, only in personifications of the self or in storybook characters.

The opportunity for reflection and revision during this period of the child's life may be denied to him with fateful consequences for the rest of his life. If his learning of socialization patterns in the home has been very deviant from the patterns sanctioned by the community, the child is thrust into a world that will not accept him. In addition to the effect of the resulting social ostracism (disastrous enough), he loses the opportunities that may result

from experiences with his peers. He will compete, cooperate, and learn social differences defectively. If his parents disparage the children to whom he is attracted, his peers will then lose their function of providing a new view of himself and his parents. A further loss will be the opportunity for a corrective revision of his self-system to accept differences, to cooperate, and to feel secure under many circumstances.

The Need for Intimacy

During a brief period before the onset of adolescence termed preadolescence, the individual develops a great need for intimacy. This marks the emergence of the capacity for love. For Sullivan, love is a state of affairs in which the maintenance and enhancement of the satisfaction and security of another one is as important as one's own satisfaction and security. At this particular state there is a pairing, and a chum of the same sex is selected for purposes of intimacy. There is a sharing of details of living, including those private ones never previously shared. The individual then has the opportunity to see himself through the eyes of one who is like himself, who comes from the same age segment of culture, and who does not represent the authorities of society. Since the chum is perceived to be much like oneself with a community of interest and intent, the learning of collaboration proceeds. Because the individual now sees himself through the eyes of another, this period is one in which fantastic ideas about oneself may be

corrected. Preadolescence is a wonderful opportunity to learn consensual validation in a way not before possible. It also is a time to learn the nature of intimacy with its ups and downs. While homosexuality may occur, it is not the homosexual phase described by Freud, but homosexuality as an instrumentality of intimacy, a sharing of sexual "secrets." The less intimate but more leveling relationships within groups or gangs that occur at this period provide further opportunity for remedying personal distortions that may have developed. If the child is not prepared to enter this phase because of previous major disturbances, he experiences a deficit that cannot be made up later in life.

In preadolescence loneliness first assumes the power of a major integrating force. It motivates the person to move toward another, even though the movement is attended by anxiety. Driven by loneliness, one may move through the distress of anxiety to the rewards of relationship.

The Integration of Lust, Intimacy, and Security

Adolescence is ushered in by the first distinct appearance of a clearly sexual need. The tension of this need is manifested by covert processes of frankly sexual content and by awkward and misdirected approaches to persons of the opposite sex. There is a shift from the chum, and the gang diminishes in importance except as a way of gaining information about this

new lust drive. It is a period dominated by three needs that require major orientations in adaptation; serious damage to the personality occurs if the reorientations in adaptation are not successfully accomplished. The basic need for security continues; the need for intimacy, begun in preadolescence, requires a shift from the partner of the same sex to one of the opposite sex; and the need for lustful satisfaction, requiring the collaboration of another person, makes its first appearance. The need for intimacy with someone of the opposite sex, heretofore a stranger, may result in the shaking of the sense of security if the movement toward the other is done with an ineptness that provokes the reflected appraisal of disdain. If the drive for lustful satisfaction collides with a fear of intimacy of any sort, a turning toward the self, in the form of increased self-absorbing masturbation, which is not a reverie preparation for heterosexual activity, may occur. If the need for lustful satisfaction is not accompanied by a shift from the preadolescent intimacy with a chum of the same sex to an adolescent need for intimacy with a friend of the opposite sex, one of a number of unfortunate consequences may occur: fantasies of a homosexual character, coupled with security operations to prevent their being discovered; conscious homosexual reveries associated with severe anxiety; a lifelong search for the "ideal" woman or man; or a homosexual way of life. Each of these is an attempt to solve the problem of possessing a need for lustful satisfaction with an accompanying inability to dare to seek intimacy with a person of the opposite sex.

It thus may be seen that the need for lustful satisfaction may be either an integrating or disintegrating dynamism depending upon the ability or the inability of the adolescent to achieve intimacy with a person of the opposite sex without the loss of security or self-esteem. The needs that drove the infant and child into relation with others are problems that have been more or less competently solved by this time. But the adolescent now finds himself driven by a tension of need for lust that requires a degree of intimacy that he has not experienced with a new, and as yet, strange person, who is in some ways comfortingly like himself and in other ways terrifyingly, and yet happily, different. If he is able to accomplish the integration between his need for lustful satisfaction and his need for security and his need for intimacy with a girl, he creatively organizes three aspects of himself. If he cannot accomplish the integration, he has no choice but to exist in a world of partial satisfaction —now of lust, now of security, now of intimacy, never of all three. The successful experiencing of this epoch after negotiating the other developmental eras makes for true adulthood. The person is now free to grow in interpersonal situations. His experience is syntaxic. He knows himself as he is. He can then effectively utilize whatever opportunities, personal or social, there are available to him. He is able to choose rather than having only one course. The orientation in living, begun hopefully during the juvenile stage, reaches its full development. This orientation is described by Sullivan in the following way:

One is oriented in living to the extent to which one can formulate, or can be easily led to formulate (or has insight into), data of the following types: the integrating tendencies (needs) which customarily characterize one's interpersonal relations; the circumstances appropriate to their satisfaction and relatively anxiety-free discharge; and the more or less remote goals for the approximation of which one will forego intercurrent opportunities for satisfaction or the enhancement of one's prestige.

Clinical Application

The interpersonal approach to the difficulties that arise from defects in the developmental history may usefully be applied clinically by dividing the contemporary personality into three components: the active, waking self, the part of the self not immediately accessible to awareness, and the period spent in sleep. To be studied in these states of the personality are the operations of the dynamisms, those methods of the self-system for decreasing anxiety. Among them are sublimation, obsession, selective inattention, hypochondria, algolagnia, the paranoid condition, the dynamism of "emotion" (fear, anger, rage, hatred, grief, guilt, pride, conceit, envy, and jealousy), dissociation, and the schizophrenic dynamism. These dynamisms are used to a greater or lesser degree by all people; the so-called normal person uses the entire repertory at one time or another. In mental disorder the person places extreme dependence on only one dynamism and, as a consequence, effaces a large part of the range of his personality.

The use of selective inattention and dissociation as dynamisms for

avoiding anxiety has already been described. Selective inattention is troublesome only when it excludes from awareness what is relevant in an interpersonal situation. Sublimation is similar to Freud's concept; it is the unwitting substitution of a socially acceptable behavior pattern that partially satisfies the tension of a need for an unacceptable behavior that causes anxiety in collision with the self-system. It begins in infancy. A similarly common example is the use of the obsessional dynamism. It begins early in life (with the advent of language) and shows itself as a preoccupation with certain words, phrases or sentences that superficially seem to be communicative but that are used autistically. The words, phrases, or sentences are plucked from a childhood situation in which they were used to propitiate, placate, or mollify a parent or other authority figure. These verbalisms are a ritualistic performance whose purpose is to avoid other experiences that would produce anxiety. This magical performance allays anxiety with remarkable effectiveness. Sleep is usually undisturbed since there is conflict between needs and anxiety. The verbalisms or rituals substitute for anxiety. The use of the dynamism thus serves to maintain a shaky security in a frightening interpersonal field.

The theory of interpersonal relations was developed by Sullivan out of direct study and treatment of both hospitalized and ambulatory patients over a 30-year period. His contribution to the practice and theory of treatment is one of Sullivan's major achievements. It would not be possible, within the

scope of this present chapter, to cover adequately these studies. The best sources are in his "Clinical Studies in Psychiatry"; Arieti, Will, Spiegel, and Burnham have all extended and modified this approach.

The Therapeutic Situation

In psychiatric and psychoanalytic thought it has long been customary to think of people as possessed of impulses, traits, and goals operating under the forces of constructs such as id, ego, and superego, but the fact is that human beings think, feel, and act as organisms responsive to an environment. We learn nothing about the human being except as we observe and experience him in an interpersonal field. If we conclude that a man is an "angry person," we are simply using an obscuring shorthand for what we have experienced; namely, that in a series of interpersonal operations, he has reacted with anger more frequently than we deem appropriate. If we have had the opportunity to experience another human being over a long period of time and in a sufficient variety of situations, we may attempt to characterize his personality on the basis of his predominant modes of interaction. But it is important to realize that we don't describe him from the point of view of the observer alone. The so-called observer, the psychoanalyst in the present example, is himself part of the interpersonal field, both as subject and object. His very presence in the field of the patient either in fact or in fantasy affects the so-called object of his observation. Since the observer, too, is human, he is affected by the

communications of the patient. This conception of the potentially complex interaction between patient and therapist may be disquieting, for it certainly postulates a situation far more complex than the anonymous, unaffected therapist observing the patient, as supposed by classical psychoanalysis. But this view, at the same time that it renders the situation more complex, puts at the disposal of the therapist more of the relevant data, and it frees him from the inhibition imposed by classical theory of the use of his own emotional reactions in treatment.

If we visualize a consulting room containing but one patient and one psychoanalyst, from the point of view of field theory we see at once that it is rather crowded. For the patient the room is peopled with at least the following: the psychoanalyst as he is, fantastic personifications of people (the psychoanalyst distorted by the patient), potent representatives of once significant people, storybook people, and the institutions of the culture such as church and school to the extent that they are manifested in people significant to the patient. If the consulting room does not yet seem sufficiently crowded, we must remember that there are also representatives of the same listing for the analyst, though we would hope that the circumstances of his life and the remedial effect of his own psychoanalysis have made him aware of their impact on the treatment situation.

Sullivan's view that the psychoanalyst is a participant-observer, rather

than the detached observer of classical psychoanalysis, permits him to become aware of data that might otherwise be unavailable to him. Let us suppose that the patient should state that he does not like to go out of doors because he does not like to have people staring at him. If the psychoanalyst is aware of himself as a participant in the present field of the patient, it will occur to him that the next, though perhaps unexpressed, thought of the patient is that the analyst is staring at him for much the same reason he believes others do. As a result the analyst will understand the patient's anxiety or anger and make a relevant comment. He will strive to understand the presuppositions held by the patient in seeking treatment, for these will distort the psychoanalyst into a special role, be it magic helper, kind father, or the like. He will be aware of his own emotional reactions to the patient's manner and communications, first because they may give him a clue about the patient's operations, and second because his feelings, whether expressed overtly or covertly, will necessarily cause shifts in the interpersonal field in which the patient is operating.

Even the process of the initial history taking, which Sullivan believed should be extensive, is part of the interpersonal experience for the patient. It is actually the onset of therapy. Sullivan recommended that the analyst be formal, frank, and direct and that he inform the patient what he knows about him from referring and collateral sources. This procedure may allay certain anxieties in the patient about what the psychiatrist already thinks of him, as

he observes the psychiatrist relating what he already knows. It also serves as an opportunity to clarify any misinformation the psychiatrist has gathered. But most important in this stage of history taking is the clarification of the reasons the patient seeks a therapeutic collaboration at this moment in his life. The goal of the second stage of history taking, the reconnaissance, is to obtain a social sketch of the patient and his family. During this, data on his relationship with the psychiatrist will be noted (for example, the first parataxic distortion of the psychiatrist will probably be with an adult other than the parent), and tentative experiences with free association may be provided whenever the patient meets blind spots in his recollections. During the detailed inquiry the psychiatrist is particularly alert to those areas and epochs of life in which anxiety is or was a prominent feature, and he seeks to gain an understanding of the security operations that the patient has habitually used. In taking such a history the significant phenomena that arise in each epoch of life are used as the skeleton of the inquiry, and an attempt is made to determine the types of security operations used at each epoch. In infancy what was the security operation used when the need for tenderness was frustrated? During the epoch of childhood was there the ability to enter into cooperative play with others, and, if not, in what way did he cope with this inability? Are there memories or remnants of parataxic or autistic language? If socialization—as social subordination or social accommodation —was omitted during the juvenile era, what substituted for the deficiency?

Did the patient have a chum of the same sex during preadolescence? How did he handle the need for intimacy, the need for lustful satisfaction, and the need for security with a person of the opposite sex during adolescence? And now in adulthood does he have self-respect and respect for others? Does he have freedom for personal initiative? Does he have sexual performance of an adequate kind? If not, what seems to get in the way? In addition to these, his toilet training, speech habits, eating habits, competitive relationships, ambition, and so forth, are investigated. From the data secured during such a survey the analyst attempts to make a statement clarifying the issues that seem to him to have brought the patient to treatment, and by this time these may have become quite other from the reasons initially noted by the patient himself. Some clarification may be suggested concerning the underlying anxiety, and it may be possible to note some of the security operations used by the patient. Finally the goals of the collaboration are outlined in general terms.

It follows from this survey of Sullivan's theory of personality (however incomplete) that the exploration of the patient's difficulties involves an inquiry into what went wrong at each era of his life. What went wrong at any era will influence each subsequent era. If the appropriate experience was lacking, the analyst attempts to determine the reason for its omission, and how the attendant anxiety was handled. The red thread that leads to an understanding of the patient's difficulties in living is the analyst's sensitivity

to the presence of anxiety, either in its overt form or in one of its many guises. If the patient is pursuing a line of thought and suddenly shifts to another, the analyst presumes that the patient would have experienced anxiety had he pursued the original thought. He therefore notes two things: first, the moment of shift and the content of thought that was interrupted in order that the red thread of anxiety may again be taken up; second, the kind of security operation that was used to escape from the anxiety-laden path that was being pursued. He notes and follows the course of anxiety not because he is primarily interested in anxiety itself but because the presence of anxiety and the means used to avoid it lead to the possibility of discovering those areas of the self-system that have been lost to awareness through the operations of selective inattention or dissociation. For this is the essence of psychoanalysis, the rediscovery of the self-system in its entirety, to the end that with the bringing the "bad-me" and "not-me" into awareness, they may be seen as archaic and irrelevant organizations and may be exorcised as personal demons that no longer need exist or be the ultimate source of anxiety against which one adopts various elaborate security devices.

One of the great virtues of Sullivan's approach to therapy and theory is that it is operational and pragmatic. It avoids the dichotomy between theory and practice that is seen in systems that are constructs of a high order of abstraction and that must, at the same time, deal with human beings and their everyday lives. Its postulates are few, and its elasticity is great. It provides no

final answers. But what it does with a disarming simplicity is to attempt to organize the myriad facts about the personality of the human being into a useful and malleable whole. There are weaknesses in the formulations in the areas of perception, cognition, and learning. These areas have been and are under investigation by the investigators listed above. The history of science shows that no theory could do more than organize these data and show the way for additional areas to be developed, and perhaps guide improvements that will eventually make the theory inadequate.

Erich Fromm

In the work of Erich Fromm we find the insights resulting from the fusion of the individual approach of psychoanalysis and the group perspective of the social sciences. His conceptualizations are rooted in history, political theory, and philosophy as well as in clinical observations. Perhaps the area in which Fromm has had his greatest impact upon psychoanalytic thought is in his critique of the impact our contemporary social fabric has upon the personality. Writing in the tradition of dissent, with psychoanalytic experience in three segments of Western culture, he ranges over the currents of contemporary culture with a persuasive precision. He combines the findings of psychoanalysis with a scientific analysis of society and culture.

Man's Hope and Man's Fate

The problems of man that go beyond his relation to his fellow men and to his culture constitute one of Fromm's primary interests. These problems arise because man is unique in the animal kingdom. He is an organism yet he is aware of himself. His fate is to be a creature of organic nature; his hope is that his self-awareness can lead him to transcend his passive "creatureliness." In approaching the problem Fromm states certain underlying hypotheses. Man is a creature who is relatively free of instinctual regulation in the process of adaptation to the surrounding world. He has new and unique qualities differentiating him from other animals; he is self-aware; he remembers the past; he visualizes the future; he is capable of symbolic activity. What we see as progress results from the very conflict of his existence, not from innate drive; for conflict creates problems that demand solution, and each solution contains contradictions that must be faced and solved at new levels. Man, an animal, is set apart from nature, yet he is a part of nature and subject to its physical laws. This split in man's nature leads to dichotomies — contradictions that he can react to but can never annul. His reaction to these existential dichotomies are dependent upon his character and culture. For Fromm the most fundamental dichotomy is that between life and death (in this instance physical, not psychological, death). All knowledge about death leads man to realize that death cannot be escaped and hence must be accepted. It is a meaningful part of life, but at the same time it is a defeat of life. As a result of man's mortality he can never achieve all his possibilities.

Man is alone and aware of himself as a separate unique entity, and yet he needs to be related to his fellow man.

In addition to his existential dichotomies, man is faced with dichotomies of his own making. These are the historical dichtomies. For example, contemporary man has the technical means for vast material production, yet he is unable to use them exclusively for his own welfare. These dichtomies are potentially solvable through man's courage and wisdom (including self-knowledge); their contradictions call man to attempt their solution. It is this uncertainty that impels man to "unfold his powers." Only by facing the truth, by avoiding the siren voices of easy external solutions can he find meaning in his life through the unfolding of his powers. Reason, love, and productivity are faculties peculiar to man, and the development of these is necessary for a full life.

Man, the animal, is aware of himself. This very self-awareness in the body of an animal creates a tremendous sense of separateness and fright. He therefore looks for some unity and for some meaning. Responding with his mind, his feelings, and his actions, man passionately strives to give meaning to his existence. This need for orientation of himself in the world and devotion to his own existence has led him to devise answers varying widely in content and form: among these are totem- ism and animism, nontheistic systems of faith, philosophic systems, and monotheistic ones. Within this

frame of reference are secular systems, involving, for example, strivings for success and prestige, conquest and submission, that can be explained on the basis of this need for orientation and devotion. This need is the most powerful source of energy in man. Neuroses and irrational strivings can be understood as the individual's attempt to fulfill his need for orientation and devotion. Fromm sees neurosis as a personal religion differing mainly from organized religion in its individual nonpatterned characteristics. The need for orientation and devotion is common to all men, but the particular contents of the individual solution vary with differences in value and character.

Individuation in the Social Context

While men are alike in that they share the human situation and the existential dichotomies, they are unique in their way of solving historical dichotomies. The attempt by the members of a society to solve their historical dichotomies determines the patterning of personality in that society. Within the framework of social patterning there is ample range for individual variation. Fromm stresses the importance of warmth and encouragement in early childhood in the developing of personality. He points out that the character structure of the parents will largely determine the manner in which the child experiences weaning, toilet training, and sex. The atmosphere, attitude, and overall climate of feeling, training, and indoctrination in these matters counts most in childhood for personality development, rather than

the nature of routine used.

The child at birth makes no distinction between himself and the environment. It is months before the infant can separate himself from his surroundings. For Fromm the ties of the infant to the environment are primary, necessary, and enjoyable. As the infant's ability to manipulate his environment grows, his confidence and independence increase. These are fostered by the competence induced in education and training. If the process of individuation takes place at the same rate as the normal growth in competence and strength, there is no difficulty. Since there is often a lag in one or the other, feelings of isolation and of helplessness grow. With the anxiety attendant on this lag, the child, and later the adult, attempts to recapture the primary emotional ties. This process is one of the mechanisms by which the individual "escapes from freedom of the self." Man's fate and his hope is that he can never recapture the primary ties.

Along with others Fromm holds that the family is the psychic agency of society. Through its training the family makes the child want to do what he has to do. Through the agency of the family a core character structure is formed for each society or culture. The adult personality is a highly interwoven complex of inborn endowment, early experience in the family, and later experience in a social group. A constant interplay between society, the family, and the individual shapes character structure. While class

mobility, for example, will not change the character structure of the parents, attitudinal changes will be communicated to the children. Fromm emphasizes the constant interplay. No factor is considered separately; the whole constellation— the parent-child situation, the child-child relationship, the child-school interplay, and the child-external authority situation later on— has to be understood.

Varieties of Relatedness

Man has to be related to things and to people in order to live. The man who has a recognition of his true self will have a productive orientation to living. The person who has enjoyed good early relationships will have respect and love for himself, will be able to cherish and love others, and will be able to use his capacities in fruitful work. This is the productive way of living.

Too often man's relationship to the outside world is not one of loving cooperation but rather one of symbiosis. He escapes from his feelings of isolation and loneliness by entering into relationships of reciprocal dependence. The slave needs the master; the master needs the slave. Each needs the other to avoid feelings of loneliness and isolation. Each places self-aggrandizement above people or ideals.

Major social changes may occur for a multiplicity of reasons quite remote from the character of the individual. For example, changing

technological and economic forces will alter the situation with which the individual has to cope. As a result of this, his character will change. Capitalism, originating independently of psychological forces, fostered the rise of the Calvinist conscience; the growth of capitalism was made possible by the institutionalization of the psychological attitudes whose development it found necessary.

Fromm sees living as following two kinds of relatedness to the outside world—that of acquiring and assimilating things and that of relatedness to people. The orientation by which the person relates himself to the world is the core of his character. By permitting the individual to act consistently and reasonably, his character provides the basis for his adjustment to society. In discussing character types Fromm differentiates between productive and nonproductive orientation. Man, beset by the sense of separateness and fright engendered by his self-awareness, looks for a unity or meaning and does so by either progressing (productive) or regressing (nonproductive). The extreme of regression is for man to become a nonreflective animal and thereby be free of the problems of awareness and reason. This man cannot live creatively, cannot create. He, nonetheless, does not want to be, cannot be, completely passive and nonproductive. He wants to transcend life; he wants to make an imprint on the world. He can transcend his creature status by destroying and thereby triumph over life. This is another mechanism to escape from freedom of the self. There are three main ways of escaping from

freedom— automaton conformity, destructiveness, and authoritarianism. There is no wholly productive or wholly nonproductive orientation in real life; there is some of each in everyone.

Varieties of Character Types

Receptive Orientation

The receptive orientation is typified by the person who feels that all that is good or necessary is outside of himself. He needs to be loved and yet cannot love. He makes no effort to gather information on his own; he looks for answers from others. He is looking for a "magic helper." God will help him, but he does not believe that this is due to his own works. He is optimistic and helpful but is anxious when the "source of supply" is threatened. He is dependent on authorities for knowledge and support. Alone and helpless in making decisions or taking responsibility, he relies on the people about whom he has to make the decisions. He dreams of being fed as synonymous with being loved. This type of character structure is most prevalent in societies so structured so that one group may exploit another. Feudalism and the institution of slavery are examples. In America the receptive orientation manifests itself in the need to conform, to please, to succeed without effort. Twentieth-century man is the eternal suckling for Fromm, taking in cigarettes, drinks, knowledge. This character type is clinically identical with

the oral receptive type of Freud and Abraham. The difference in the concept of origin is that Fromm sees the attitude as being inculcated by the nature of the culture and the family (that is, one gets things passively), which then secondarily is applied to erogenous zones. In Freud the zonal need is primary.

The Hoarding Orientation

The hoarding orientation is based on the premise that security for the individual depends upon what he can save or own. He feels there is nothing new under the sun. He tries to possess rather than to love others. He is obsessively orderly and rigid. Fear of death and destruction mean more to him than life and growth. Intimacy is a threat. One gets things by hoarding. Fromm has shown how this character type was typical of the bourgeois economy of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

The Exploitative Orientation

The basic premise for the exploitative type is the same as for the receptive type—the source of all good is external to the individual. He cannot produce. He takes what he can by cunning and thievery. He is pessimistic, suspicious, and angry. He "steals" his ideas from others. The robber baron of feudal times, the "adventure" capitalist of the eighteenth century, and the Nazi clique are examples of this orientation.

The marketing orientation is one of Fromm's original contributions to psychoanalytic characterology. This character type is typical of our time and could only come into being in a highly organized (bureaucratized) capitalistic society. The existence of a marketplace that places value and measure upon both people and things is the main condition for its development and perpetuation. In this type there is a loss of person-to-person valuation of the individual. Purely personal qualities have no value in themselves. They are valuable only as commodities to the extent that they are valuable to others. The goal is to sell one's self. It is no longer sufficient to have integrity, ingenuity, skill, and knowledge. As there are fashions in material things, there are fashions in the desirability of personality types communicated by the mass media. In this time of social mobility and constantly broken ties between the individual and his neighbor, employer, or colleague, there is an increasing alienation of man from his own deeper feelings—an increasing superficiality accentuating man's isolation and loneliness.

The receptive and exploitative orientations enable man to relate in terms of himself through symbiosis. The hoarding orientation enables man to relate in terms of his own feelings by withdrawal or destructive means. The marketing orientation leaves man alone, alienated from his own feelings and from his fellow man. Fromm thinks this type of personality is more common in America because of its highly developed corporate structure; as capitalism

becomes more developed through bureaucratization and the heightened influence of anonymous authority, subliminal and widespread, this type will become prevalent in both Eastern and Western Europe. This type of society requires millions to live with a serious defect without becoming ill. Man is an automaton under these circumstances.

The Necrophilic Orientation

This is typified by the person who is attracted to death, decay, illness, to all that is not alive, to the inorganic and not the organic. It is not to be confused with the sexual perversion with the same name. It derives from Unamuno's description of a general in the army of General Franco; this man had a favorite motto—"Long live death!" It may be regarded as a malignant form of the "hoarding orientation" or the "anal character" of Freud. Hitler is the best known example of this. During World War I he was found in a trancelike state gazing at the decayed corpse of a soldier, and he had to be dragged away from it. Hitler's end was really what he unconsciously wished. Consciously he wanted to save Germany; unconsciously he was working for its destruction. Behavior in a social context determines any type; needless cruelty and destruction of millions of persons are manifestations of the necrophilic type. Unfortunately there are a number of people like this in society. Man, isolated and helpless, wants to transcend himself. Searching for unity and meaning he overcomes automaton passivity by becoming

destructive if he is blocked from becoming productive.

The Productive Orientation

The productive character is exemplified by the man who is able to use his own powers and to realize his own potentialities. He is free and not dependent on someone who controls his powers. He produces what he wants relatively independently of others. He is at one with his powers. All the expressions of his being are authentic; they are genuinely his and not put into him by an outside influence such as a newspaper. He is active in his work, in feeling, in thinking, and in relationship with people. Through love he can unite himself with the world and at the same time retain the separateness and integrity of his own self.

In actuality we always deal with blends of these orientations. A person of a receptive orientation will relate to one with an exploitative orientation; this is because they both need closeness to the other, in contrast to the distance from the other typical of the hoarding orientation. If the method of relating is totally nonproductive, the ability to accept, take, save, or exchange turns into the craving to receive, exploit, hoard—the dominant ways of acquisition. Loyalty, authority, and assertiveness in the productive character becomes submissiveness, domination, and withdrawal in the nonproductively oriented relationship. In other words, any orientation has a positive or

negative aspect, dependent upon the degree of productiveness in the individual.

The Social Character

There is an intimate relationship between the nature of a society and the nature of character types that predominate in that society. A society requires a predominance of human beings whose character structures are consistent with its institutions. It finds this in what Fromm calls the social character. The social character is the nucleus of character structure held in common by the members of a culture. It serves the function of molding and channeling human energy in a manner that facilitates the functioning of its society. But it is not as though man were a blank sheet of paper upon which society writes its text, for it is inherent in the nature of man that he strives for happiness, harmony, love, and freedom, meaning, and unity. Since such strivings are basic, universal, and extracultural, to speak of the socioeconomic circumstances as molding the character of man is to give only one side of the interaction. The other side of the interaction is the impact of these primary strivings of individual men upon the structure of the society and the direction in which it moves. Thus, the social character tends to be conservative and stabilizing, while that which is contributed by the impact of the individual tends to be catalytic and changing.

The inculcation of the social character into the character of each individual is begun in childhood, and, of course, the parents are the main agents utilized by the society for this task. Since the parents are hardly aware of their role and are simply doing what is natural for them, the social character may perhaps more accurately be said to be insinuated rather than inculcated into the individual. The person receives training in the social character in all of his interactions, including those associated with oral, anal, and phallic activity, since in early life these are the zones through which he makes frequent and immediate contact with his parents. Thus, in a social organization that requires precision, accuracy, and dependability in its human subjects for efficient utilization of its factories and institutions, the bowel habits taught will be those associated with regularity and dependability, not because the parents are in a state of reaction formation against their own anal eroticism, but because the culture has taught them the rewards that stem from preciseness, accuracy, and dependability and the sanctions that stem from their absence.

Fromm vividly describes some of the disruptive effects upon the individual and his society of the great changes that have occurred in capitalistic organization and technology during the twentieth century. Science and our knowledge of nature have become more abstract and more distant from the experience of everyday human beings. The act and the object of the act are alien to the doer; now the act often has a life of its own. The man who

kills a hundred or a thousand people through the pushing of a button cannot react emotionally to his act in so abstract a world, though the same man might experience feelings of disturbed consciousness were he to injure one helpless person. Man has become a thing as a result of being dependent upon powers outside of himself. He has become alienated from his state, from his work, from the things he consumes, from his fellow man, and from himself. Conformity, not variety, is the order of the day. It is not that he is in such great danger of becoming a creature of arrogant and raucous authority. From such hazards he is protected by the fact that their demands are overt. His greatest danger is his unknowing response to the autonomous, invisible authorities everywhere about him, so that he becomes a puppet without being aware of the strings that determine his every movement. Because large-scale production requires mass consumption, the individual has been taught to expect that every desire can be satisfied and no wish frustrated. Reason has been replaced by intelligence; ethics have been replaced by fairness; work is equated with toil rather than joy.

Fromm feels that by the use of knowledge gained in the fields of psychoanalysis, economics, sociology, politics, and ethics, men may become aware of the crippling effects of their society; this is one of the first steps on the road to social sanity. As a result man may be able to reassert himself so that he again occupies the central place in his own life. He will no longer be an instrument of economic aims; he will no longer be estranged from himself, his

fellow man, or from nature. But such a change must occur in all areas, not simply in the political area, or the economic area, or in a spiritual rebirth alone, or in an alteration in sexual attitudes. Societal reform must get at the roots of the difficulty.

Basic to Fromm's approach to the ills of man and his society are two premises: the first is the concept that human beings have certain needs that are primary and undetermined by culture; the second is that it is possible to know these needs here and now. He believes that the great philosophical and religious leaders of the past—Moses, Jesus, Buddha, Lao-Tse, Ikhnaton, Socrates, and others— described what are more or less the same norms, though they had little knowledge of or influence over each other. He states he has observed the same strivings for peace, harmony, love, and solidarity in his patients as was described by the great thinkers of the past.

From his experience with patients, from his knowledge of the functioning of past and contemporary societies, from his study of religious and philosophical thinkers, Fromm has endeavored to define precisely what is the character of the mentally healthy person. This is the productive, nonalienated person. He relates to the world lovingly and uses his reason to grasp reality objectively. He experiences himself as a unique individual entity and at the same time feels at one with his fellow man. He is not subject to irrational authority but accepts willingly the rational authority of conscience

and reason. He is in the process of being born as long as he is alive, and he considers the gift of life the most precious he has. The capacity for this is inherent in every man and will assert itself as long as socioeconomic and cultural conditions permit.

Treatment: Process and Goals

As yet Fromm has not written directly about treatment techniques and practices. However, he views the analytic process as a reciprocal relationship between the patient and the analyst. Within this context the analyst responds to the patient's communication with what he feels and hears, even if it is different from what the patient said or intended to say. His aim is to arrive at the patient's unconscious processes as they are going on in the patient at that time. As a humanist the analyst knows what the patient is experiencing from his own experience; he can thereby communicate this knowledge in an accepting, nonjudgmental way. Of course, the analysis of dreams, of transference, and of resistance phenomena plays an essential part in the therapeutic endeavor. Treatment is designed to increase the self-responsibility and self-activity of the patient; dependency is not fostered. There is a never-ending struggle for self-understanding that goes on after the formal analysis.

Fromm has drawn a sharp distinction between psychoanalysis where

adjustment to one's culture is the aim of the cure and his humanistic psychoanalysis where realization of one's human potentialities and individuality, which must transcend one's particular culture, is the goal. For Fromm adjustment is a person's ability to be comfortably what the culture requires although he lose his unique individuality in the process. In the traditional approach no universal human norms are postulated, but a kind of social relativism that assumes that adjustment to the criteria of the extant culture is the appropriate goal of treatment. In Fromm's approach the truly creative, productive, and life-loving unconscious forces will be brought to full awareness. The goal, then, is the transformation of the personality from its culture-bound state to its full human range.

Writing with the insights of a psychoanalyst and with the perspectives of a social scientist, Erich Fromm has extended the dimensions of psychoanalysis. In terms of his clinical experience and observations of Western culture, Fromm has described the essential relationship between the character orientations held in common by the members of a society and the society as a social organization. He has shown how the social, economic, and political organization of prewar Germany was related to the growth of the authoritarian character, and has described the relationship between the development of the marketing character and contemporary capitalistic society.

He has postulated the existence of basic human needs that are valid for all men in all cultures, and in doing this he has substituted normative needs for the relativistic needs that had long been the hallmark of much social thought. Since our culture is deficient in its ability to satisfy these basic human needs, Fromm is an eloquent and active critic of our social values and organization. Given potentially loving and creative man, who is in constant danger of being deformed by a society deficient in sanity, Fromm contends that it is imperative that the psychoanalyst be concerned not with his patient's ability to adjust to his culture but rather with his necessity to transcend it. This requires an understanding of all unconscious processes so that the individual may become free. His socio-individual point of view has permitted Fromm to cast a fresh and vivid light on the questions of love, incest, motherhood, narcissism, character, and dream theory and practice. Erich Fromm has made such serious criticisms of our style of life that the discussion of the issues he has raised will prove to be as important to our survival and our future as any of our current concerns.

Bibliography

Arieti, S., *Interpretation of Schizophrenia,* Brunner, New York, 1955.

____, *The Intrapsychic Self,* Basic Books, New York, 1967.

Burnham, D. L., *et al., Schizophrenia and the Need/Fear Dilemma,* University Free Press, Inc., New York, 1969.

Cohen, M. B., "Countertransference and Anxiety," *Psychiatry,* 15:231, 1952.

____, *et al.,* "An Intensive Study of Twelve Cases of Manic-Depressive Psychosis," *Psychiatry,* 17.103, 1954.

Fromm, E., *The Art of Loving,* Harper, New York, 1956.

____, *Beyond the Chains of Illusion,* Trident Press, Pocket Books, New York, 1962.

____, *The Crisis of Psychoanalysis,* Holt, Rinehart & Winston, New York, 1970.

____, *Escape from Freedom,* Rinehart, New York, 1941.

____, *The Forgotten Language,* Rinehart, New York, 1951.

____, *Man for Himself,* Rinehart, New York, 1947.

____, *Psychoanalysis and Religion,* Yale University Press, New Haven, 1950.

____, *The Sane Society,* Rinehart, New York, 1955.

Fromm-Reichmann, F., *Psychoanalysis and Psychotherapy,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1959.

Mead, G. H., *Mind, Self and Society,* University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1934.

Mullahy, P. (Ed.), *The Contributions of Harry Stack Sullivan,* Hermitage Press, New York, 1952.

____, *Oedipus Myth and Complex,* Hermitage Press, New York, 1948.

____(Ed.), A *Study of Interpersonal Relations,* Grove Press, New York, 1950.

Rioch, J. M., "The Transference Phenomenon in Psychoanalytic Psychiatry," *Psychiatry,* 6:147, 1943.

Sapir, E., *Language: An Introduction to the Study of Speech,* Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York,

1971.

Spiegel, R., "Communication with Depressive Patients," *Contemp. Psychoanal., 2:* 30, 1965.

Sullivan, H. S., *Collected Works of Harry Stack Sullivan,* 2 vols., Norton, New York, 1953.

____, *Personal Psychopathology,* William Alanson White Psychiatric Foundation, Washington, D.C., 1965.

Thompson, C., "From and Sullivan," in Fromm-Reiclimann, F., and Moreno, J. L. (Eds.), *Progress in Psychotherapy,* Grune & Stratton, New York, 1956.

____, *Psychoanalysis,* Hermitage House, New York, 1950.

____, "Transference and Character Analysis," in Mazer, M., and Witenherg, E. (Eds.), *An Outline of Psychoanalysis,* Modern Library, New York, 1955.

Will, O., "Schizophrenia and the Psychotherapeutic Field," *Contemp. Psychoanal.,* 1:1-29, 110-135, 1964.

Witenberg, E. (Ed.), *Interpersonal Explorations in Psychoanalysis: New Directions in Theory and Practice,* Basic Books, New York, 1973.

____, and Caligor, L., "The Interpersonal Approach to Treatment with Particular Emphasis on the Obsessional" in Wolman, B. (Ed.), *Psychoanalytic Techniques,* Basic Books, New York, 1967.