Sigmund Freud: The Vicissitudes of Narcissism

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If James's theory of the self was primarily a theory about consciousness, Freud's is primarily a theory about the unconscious. James's great contribution to the understanding of the self is his envisioning of the self as a stream, any segment of which contains and represents all that precedes it, giving the experience of self a continuity and coherence that earlier empiricists denied. Freud's great contribution to the understanding of the self lies in his unparalleled depiction of the self as a house divided, torn by conflict, the sources of which are largely unconscious—or outside of our awareness. Bringing them into consciousness is beyond our ordinary abilities. For Freud, that which we experience as self, or better, as ourself, is but the tip of an iceberg, the vast bulk of which lies out of sight and beneath the waterline.

Sigmund Freud (1856-1939) is a difficult figure to write about. He is known not accurately, but too well. Contemporary American culture has been described as Freudian or as post-Freudian, and it is certainly true that popularized and “media-ized” versions of his theories have profoundly influenced activities as diverse as literary criticism and child-raising. He has importantly contributed to the formation of what Philip Rieff (1959) called “the triumph of the therapeutic” in Western, particularly American, societies, and he has profoundly altered the self-concept of members of those societies, resulting in the emergence of what Rieff called psychological man as the dominant character type of our time. Psychological man has replaced economic man, who was himself a successor of religious man, a descendant of political man. Put differently, the classical world produced political man; the collapse of that world, religious man; the Industrial Revolution, economic man; and the 20th century, psychological man. Psychoanalysis, Freud’s brainchild, with its unprecedented emphasis on the inner life, created, at least in part, psychological man. Read any newspaper or magazine, go to the movies, turn on the television, and you will hear of projection, Oedipal conflict, psychological repression, denial, and sibling rivalry—all Freudian concepts. Freud did not write about the self per se, but he did write about the ego and about narcissism, and our present understanding of the self would be unthinkable without his contribution.

Freud was born in 1856; 3 years later Darwin published Origin of Species, a book that was to profoundly influence Freud. The year 1856 was an interesting one in which to have been born in Eastern Europe. Less
than a decade after the defeat of the revolution of 1848, it was a time of rapid change as the face of Europe was irreversibly altered by industrialization. The failure of the revolutionary movement had led to reaction, yet the revolution of 1848 was not completely futile. Governments granted constitutions and made various accommodations to an increasingly powerful middle class. Although the Austrian-Hungarian Empire was anything but democratic, reform was in the air, and not long after Sigmund’s birth the last of the restrictions on Jews were dropped, and they were granted full citizenship. The romantic movement was playing itself out, to be replaced by realism in aesthetics and in politics. Science was making rapid strides, and a scientific Weltanschauung was making inroads on the consciousness of the educated. The bourgeoisie, although in some ways mired in hypocritical respectability, was creating wealth and gaining influence. Freud was to uniquely integrate opposing strands of European culture, at once a late representative of the Enlightenment striving for classical clarity and simplicity in his literary style, admiring Goethe and Mozart, and embodying the Enlightenment values of demystification, secularism, and distrust of authority, and a late romantic, obsessively exploring the dark realms of the irrational and enacting in his own life the romantic ideal of the isolated hero defying the world. Although deeply committed to the values of scientific objectivity and rigor and empirical verifiability, Freud had a wildly speculative side that was willing to seriously consider telepathy and to philosophize about matters far removed from the realm of observation. A large part of Freud’s fascination lies in this amalgamation of classicism, romanticism, realism, and the scientific world view. As a “good European,” Freud embodied these tensions in the mainstream of European thought, but Freud was not only European, he was a Jew, and as such he suffered a certain marginality, being both a part of and apart from the general European culture. His Jewishness was just as problematic as his Europeanism. He was both one of the preeminent representatives of the Haskala—the Hebrew enlightenment—and more indebted to and unconsciously influenced by Jewish mysticism than he knew. His father had left behind his Hasidic background and become one of the Maskilim, “the enlightened ones.” Yet he read Hebrew and taught his son the Bible. Freud himself didn’t recognize these tensions in himself and in his writings, consciously adhering to science and the enlightenment; yet they clearly are there and make him a richer and more complex thinker. As both European and Jew, he embodies the conflicts of those cultures and struggles to assimilate and make intelligible the speculative, the credulous, the irrational, and the mystical by giving a scientific account of them. Freud reminds me of another of my cultural heroes, Giuseppe Verdi. Both started from modest (at best) circumstances and both achieved world eminence without relinquishing a tough, skeptical, hard-nosed common sense that cast a jaundiced eye on human affairs; neither was overly impressed by human beings.
and their pretensions, yet neither was bitter; and both retained something of their origins that kept them apart from and critical of high bourgeois culture. Both were inordinately ambitious, had a dry wit, and viewed life as tragic, being pessimistic or realistic, depending on one’s point of view; neither took power or love at face value; and in their very different ways, each taught us something new about our emotional lives.

Freud was born in Freiberg, Moravia, then a province of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and now a part of Czechoslovakia. He was born into an economically marginal, strangely constituted Jewish family living in a provincial town; his father was middle-aged, his mother young. He had half brothers as old as other children’s fathers, and his nephew, John, was a bit older than he. Jacob, his father, a not very successful wool merchant, had married once or perhaps twice before. There was also a Christian Czech woman who took care of him and to whom he was attached. Freud wrote obsessively of the troubled relations between fathers and sons, but has little to say about a son’s relationship to his mother except to say that a mother’s love of a son is the only unambiguous love with which he is acquainted. In his account of the Oedipus complex, it is a son’s murderous competition with his father, not the son’s lust for his mother, that is most salient for Freud. Freud certainly had strongly ambivalent feelings toward his father, but his idealization of his relationship with his mother is suspect. Most of his biographers believe that Amelia, his mother, was a narcissistic, self-involved person who was not emotionally available to little Freud. This is possible, but the evidence is fragmentary.

Eventually, Freud’s half brothers moved to Manchester, England, and Freud early developed a love for England and things English. The circumstances of his brothers leaving Freiberg are mysterious, as is the occasion for Freud’s immediate family hastily leaving shortly thereafter. The complex and confusing family constellation in which he grew up stimulated the young Freud’s speculations on the mysteries of conception and birth.

When Freud was 4, the family suffered some sort of crisis and suddenly departed first for Leipzig and then for Vienna. Whether Jacob Freud’s financial position had finally become desperate or whether there was some sort of trouble is not known. Freud’s father’s brother was later convicted of passing counterfeit money, and some of Freud’s biographers think that his father and possibly his half brothers may have been similarly employed—at least for a time. Be that as it may, Freud experienced leaving Freiberg as a profound loss. (Freud loved the countryside around Freiberg, remembering it as a paradise lost and retaining a love of nature all of his life.)
By the time Freud left Freiberg, he had lost a newborn brother, Julius, and seen his nurse driven from the house and arrested for theft. His brother Philip had reported the nurse to the authorities after things were found to be missing from the home. Both these events left indelible imprints on Freud. He apparently had death wishes toward his rival younger sibling, and his depressive side may have been partially determined by guilt over those wishes and their apparent efficacy. The disappearance of the nursemaid puzzled him and left him with a fear that his mother would also disappear.

The family settled in the Leopoldstadt, Vienna's equivalent of New York's Lower East Side. The family was poor, and Freud—who later stated that he hated two things above all, poverty and helplessness—never forgot the deprivations of those years. He was educated by his father and possibly in a Jewish parochial elementary school until he entered the Gymnasium, the European classical secondary school. During the Vienna years, four sisters and a younger brother were born. Probably his most important educational experience was reading the Bible. Old Testament allusions appear frequently in his dreams and much of his imagery is derived from Biblical stories. He identified with the Biblical Joseph, who was also an interpreter of dreams, and with Moses, the archetypal law-giver. Although often seen as, or more pejoratively accused of, being a pan-sexualist, Freud was at least as obsessed with religion as he was with sex, albeit from the stance of a nonbeliever. By the time he entered the Gymnasium, the family was fairly comfortable, possibly because his half brothers sent money from Manchester, where they were doing well.

Freud's secondary school career was spectacular; always at the top of his class, he was the adored darling of his family. He alone had his own room, and when his sisters played their piano, he complained that the noise distracted him, and the piano went. Throughout his life, Freud remained unresponsive to music, with the exception of the operas of Mozart, which appealed to him with their crystalline clarity, knowing insight into the vicissitudes of sexuality, and embodiment of enlightenment values, and Wagner's Meistersinger von Nürnberg with its middle-class craftsman artist hero. There is a bitter irony in Freud's enjoyment of an opera set in Nuremberg, Nuremberg became the site both of Freud's meetings with a much-loved friend and of psychoanalytic congresses. It was one of his favorite places. Nuremberg also became the site of Nazi rallies and played an important part in the rise of Nazism. The piano incident showed Freud's power within his family and the relative status of boys and girls within it. Having vanquished his infant rival, Julius (at least in his mind), back in Freiberg, Freud was now clearly the dominant and privileged personality in his home. None of his sisters nor his youngest brother, Alexander, were serious threats to his supremacy,
and he retained cordial relations with them throughout adulthood.

Freud's career cannot be understood apart from the changing status of the Viennese Jews. During Freud's life span, the Jewish population of Vienna exploded as the city attracted immigrants from the impoverished villages of the Empire and of Russia. The 1860s were a time of hope for Viennese Jews; liberalism was ascendant in politics as well as in intellectual life in general. Although the liberals maintained power by restricting the franchise through a property qualification, they reformed the educational system, secularized the government, and gave equal rights to minorities, including the Jews. Exponents of laissez-faire capitalism, they also championed rationality, professionalism, and careers opened to talent, science, and culture. Although theoretically egalitarian, in practice they were the party of the middle class, entry into which Freud and his family, along with most of the Jews of Vienna, strove.

The ego of Freud's structural model of the mind was in many ways a psychologicalization of liberalism—a rationalistic arbiter between the increasingly violent protests of the lower classes, particularly the newly created urban proletariat, in politics and the demands of instinctual energies in the psyche, and between the autocratic demands of the aristocracy in politics and the inflexible prohibitions of the internalized parents in the psyche. We shall see more of Freud's attempts to conceptualize the mind, including his structural model, in what follows.

The great slogan of Austrian Liberalism was *Weissen macht Frei*—"knowledge liberates"—a slogan cruelly and barbarically parodied by the Nazis in their sign over the entrance to Auschwitz—*Arbeit macht Frei*—"work liberates." Two of Freud's sisters were to be murdered in Auschwitz, while a third was to die of starvation in Thierenstadt, an Austrian concentration camp. These horrors were inconceivable in the halcyon days of the 1860s and 1870s when Jews in large numbers gained access to professional and business careers and came to play a dominant role in the intellectual and aesthetic life of Vienna. The Freud family had a picture of the "Bourgeoisie Ministry," a cabinet composed of middle-class professionals, including several Jews, that enjoyed a brief reign during Freud's adolescence. His early ambitions were political, and his friend and classmate Heindrick Braun became a leader of the Austrian Social-Democrats.

In a sense, Freud did have a political career, as founder, organizer, and unquestioned leader of the psychoanalytic movement. Although he thought of himself as a scientist, many have accused him of founding a
quasi-religious movement, and, indeed, the history of the psychoanalytic movement with its expulsions—excommunications for dissidence—heresy, its charismatic leader, and secret committees is reminiscent of an Hasidic court with Freud as a Zaddic, or holy man. Freud may indeed have unconsciously enacted an historical, archetypal, cultural role and cast his movement far more in the role of the Rebbe and his followers than he was aware. Of course, models for such a structure are not lacking in the broader Western tradition, and Freud had no need to revert to the Hasidic model, but his conscious identification as a Jew was strong and his unconscious identification may have been even stronger. Certainly his decision to structure psychoanalysis as an autonomous profession apart from the universities and organized psychiatry was partially determined by the need to create a professional structure and profession that Jews could enter and indeed lead without having to struggle against the barriers and prejudice of the general culture. Freud did, in fact, create a predominantly Jewish profession; however, he was aware that this threatened to undermine its universality, and he very self-consciously strove to bring Gentiles into the movement. His relationship with Carl Jung was importantly determined by this need and by his wish to have a Swiss, a Gentile, and a member of the psychiatric establishment as his successor.

In his senior year at the Gymnasium, Freud heard a lecture on what he thought was Goethe’s essay “On Nature” and was so enraptured that he decided to study medicine instead of law. Freud left secondary school with a thorough knowledge of the German classics, a reading knowledge of Latin and Greek, an acquaintance with the masterworks of antiquity, and rigorous training in science and mathematics. A linguist of considerable scope, he was to analyze patients in English, translate French and English texts into German, and get by in Spanish and Italian. Although he claimed to know no Hebrew, it is unlikely that he didn’t learn any from his fluent father or his early schooling, and he must have picked up Yiddish fairly well from his milieu. He also left school having formed the first in a long series of intense relationships with father substitutes, the first in the line being his religion teacher, Samuel Hammerschlag. Hammerschlag was a kindly humanist who interpreted scripture in terms of its human and ethical significance rather than supernaturally. Like Jacob Freud, he was an inherenter of the Haskala and a “reform” Jew. He was one of the few father surrogates with whom Freud did not eventually acrimoniously break.

Freud’s university career was prolonged. For a poor boy who needed to establish himself, Freud was strangely desultory in his studies, taking 7 years to complete the 5-year medical course. Freud’s early studies were broadly humanistic, and he was to fall under the spell of Franz Brentano. Brentano was an ex-priest and
something of a man-about-town. Brilliant and charismatic, he was a professor of philosophy and well known in Viennese intellectual circles. A philosophical psychologist, he influenced not only Freud, but also the young Edmund Husserl, founder of the philosophical school of phenomenology. Brentano was, so to speak, the grandfather of phenomenology. His best known work is *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (1874/1918). Brentano’s combination of scientific exactitude and speculative boldness had great appeal for Freud. Brentano was a believer who made belief intellectually respectable. For a time, Freud became a theist, or at least open to the possible validity of religious experience; however, this was not to last. When his involvement with Brentano came to an end, so did Freud’s “religious” phase. Brentano taught a doctrine that he called the *intentionality of consciousness*, which was an attempt to overcome or better undercut the bifurcation of reality into conscious subject and extended object that the Cartesian legacy had made almost commonsensical, however problematic, in Western thought. Brentano sought to resolve this dichotomy by demonstrating that thought always had an object, that there is no consciousness that is not conscious of something—so to speak, consciousness reached out and grasped objects in the world. The primary datum of experience is consciousness of something, not consciousness sundered from its objects, that is the result of analysis and is not the data of experience. Freud later developed a theory of *cathexis*, of the grasping by instinctual energy of objects, that is clearly indebted to Brentano. In German, Freud’s term is *Besetzung*, which means to occupy, as in a military occupation, clearly a notion with more of an aggressive connotation than Brentano’s consciousness, which connotes always being consciousness of. More of this later. Freud studied with Brentano for three terms, taking, among other things, seminars on the English philosophical idealist, Berkeley, who maintained that “to be is to be perceived.” In later life, Freud expressed disdain for academic philosophy, probably seeing Brentano’s espousal of Berkeleyan idealism as a ploy to justify religious beliefs. Most of Freud’s disdain for philosophy derived from most philosophers’ dismissal of unconscious mentation as self-contradictory. For all of his turning away from philosophy, Freud retained considerable respect for Brentano’s intellect.

The greatest influence on Freud during his university career was Ernst Briicke, who came to Vienna from Berlin to found the physiological laboratory. Briicke was a liberal in politics, a foe of the anti-Semites who were then enjoying a resurgence following a financial crisis of 1873 that was blamed on “Jewish bankers,” and a leading member of the “School of Helmholtz.” The School of Helmholtz maintained that no forces or entities other than the ordinary chemical and physical ones were necessary to explain vital phenomena, so
that biology in a sense became physics and chemistry. They stood in opposition to the Vitalists, who believed that life could not be explained without resource to extraphysical principles. Helmholtz was a brilliant and multifaceted investigator: physicist, physiologist, and philosopher of science. The scientific positivism of his school had an indelible impact on Freud. Scientific explanation called for accounts in terms of "forces equal in dignity" to those of physics and chemistry." The triumph of the Helmholtzian approach to scientific biology was hard won, having long struggled against various mystical explanations of life and of man. It was with great reluctance that Freud turned from "hard science," here meaning rigorous rather than difficult, to investigate such "fringe phenomena" as hypnosis and dreams, but he did so in the spirit of Helmholtz and Bricke, extending the subject matter while attempting to retain the method of his masters. Darwinism, which placed man firmly in the natural order, was part of the same world view, and many of the investigations of Bricke and his colleagues were aimed at gathering evidence in support of or in elaboration of evolutionary theory.

Freud became an assistant in Bricke's laboratory, where he pursued histological research. Interestingly enough for the future discoverer of the castration complex, he spent a summer at the Research Institute in Trieste dissecting 10,000 eels, looking for their testicles. He found them. He also came close to discovering the neuron. Freud's early papers were based on careful empirical research and made substantial contributions to the science of the time. In addition to his study and research, two other events played a key role in his development during his student years: falling in love and discovering cocaine.

Judging from his letters to Martha Bernays, his relationship with her was a passionate one. Among other things, he wrote urging her to try cocaine, which he had discovered to be a wonder drug. He published papers on the therapeutic efficacy of cocaine that ultimately damaged his professional reputation and recommended it to a friend and superior in Bricke's lab, Ernst Fleischl-Marxow, who had become medically addicted to morphine. The results were catastrophic, and Freud's guilt (had he unconsciously wanted to knock off another rival and open a place for himself?) about the incident is expressed in several of the dreams he reported in his masterpiece, *Interpretation of Dreams* (Freud, 1900/1953). In fact, cocaine plays a considerable role in that book. Cocaine is a potent ophthalmological anesthetic, and Freud knew this, but his friend Carl Kohler published first and received the credit for the discovery of this property of cocaine. Freud's overvaluation of cocaine was driven by his chronic depression and by his overweening ambition. He had missed fame in discovering the neuron, and now he missed gaining credit for a legitimate medical application of cocaine. In *Interpretation*, there is a dream in which Freud associates to his father's benefitting from the
ophthalmological anesthetic qualities of cocaine during a cataract operation and his satisfaction with his part in its discovery. The dream elicited a memory of urinating in his parents' room as a small boy and his father saying, "The boy will amount to nothing." Freud interpreted his dream as saying, "See, you were wrong. I have amounted to something."

At this stage of his career, Freud wanted to be a researcher in the university, but Briicke told him that there was no hope for him in that direction and urged him to finish his medical degree and enter practice. Freud later wrote that medicine was a detour for him, and that he never wanted to be a healer because he didn't harbor sufficient hatred to have to seek a career that was a reaction formation (his term for the psychological defense of turning an emotion into its opposite) to that hatred. This rejection, no matter how kindly intended, by a revered father figure must have been a deeply painful, perhaps even devastating, narcissistic wound to Freud. Be that as it may, he left Briicke's lab, belatedly qualified in medicine, and entered practice, which enabled him to marry. Before he did, he went to Paris on a traveling fellowship to study under Charcot, the leading neurologist of the day. Charcot was the next of Freud's father surrogates. He taught him to "look at the same thing again and again." Charcot was not only a famous neurologist, he also maintained a salon where the literary and artistic luminaries of the time gathered. Charcot's salon introduced Freud, for the first time, to the world of fashion. More important, Charcot took neuroses, in particular hysteria, seriously and attempted both to understand and to treat those neuroses. Hysteria was a near pandemic in the late 19th century; it is rarely seen now.

Hysterics suffer a bewildering variety of physical illnesses without physical causes; their ailments are psychogenic. Most physicians dismissed hysterics as malingerers; not so Charcot. Furthermore, he recognized psychological causality and used hypnosis therapeutically. He would hypnotize an hysterical and give her a suggestion that, for example, she could move a limb rendered inoperative by hysterical paralysis. Charcot's method worked; he could both induce and remove symptoms, at least for the duration of the hypnotic state. Here we have the genesis of a new concept of the self. Implicit in both hysteria and hypnotic phenomena is the notion that there are aspects of the self removed from awareness and that there are states of consciousness that do not communicate, that have no knowledge of other states of consciousness. Suddenly the self gains a complexity, including the possibility of disassociation into isolated mutually incommunicative realms, that earlier conceptions of it lacked.
Freud worshipped Charcot. He translated his lectures into German (at roughly the same time he was translating several of John Stuart Mill's essays, including *The Subjugation of Women*), championed his ideas in Austria, named a son for him, and wrote a highly laudatory obituary of him. Back in Vienna, Freud went into private practice as a neurologist. His practice consisted mostly of neurotics, patients no one else wanted and who were not psychotic, yet who suffered from psychological as well as organic disabilities. Freud made important contributions to neurology. His monographs *On Aphasia* (1891/1953d) and *Infantile Cerebral Paralysis* (1897/1968) are classics, the one on aphasia the first evidence of his compelling interest in language and its connection with psychopathology.

In 1885, Freud became a lecturer at the university and he found yet another father—Joseph Breuer. Breuer was a prosperous and highly successful internist with a broad range of cultural interests. He encouraged Freud, loaned him money, and most importantly told him about his treatment of Bertha Pappenheim, a highly gifted neurotic who became known in the psychoanalytic literature as Anna O. Anna, who was the first psychoanalytic patient, suffered from multiple hysterical symptoms. She had fallen ill after the death of her "beloved" father whom she had nursed during his final illness. Breuer listened to her very carefully. Sometimes he induced an hypnotic trance. If Anna recalled traumatic events associated with her symptoms and recalled them with deep feeling, they disappeared. The psychoanalytic cure consisted in "once more with feeling," as my piano teacher used to say. Breuer saw Anna every day, often more than once, and their relationship became intense. Anna, a creative patient if ever there was one, called what they were doing the "talking cure," and the talking cure became psychoanalysis and psychotherapy in general. She also called it "chimney sweeping," an illusion to the necessity of cleaning out the soot and grime of life.

Anna continued to improve as long as her sessions with Breuer continued. The cure was, at least in part, what the modern analyst would call a transference cure. Transference is the patient's projection onto the analyst and the reliving of intense emotions of love and hate first felt for parents or siblings. It is a new edition of an old book. By expressing her (repressed) emotions in the context of an intense relationship, Anna's hysterical symptoms abated. Now trouble arose. Breuer told his wife about his fascinating case and her reaction was to say, in effect "I'll handle the transference, and transfer you off this case." And she did. Breuer went on vacation with his wife, and Anna relapsed. The child conceived on that second honeymoon was to suicide 50 years later in New York City after having fled the Nazis. Breuer's sudden departure recapitulated Anna's abandonment (through illness and death) by her (ambivalently) beloved father and
was equally traumatic. Her relapse was so severe that she required several hospitalizations. Eventually she recovered and went on to a distinguished career, becoming the founder of social work in Germany. She ended her career by helping Jewish children get out of Germany just before World War II. She became and remained an implacable foe of psychoanalysis.

Freud and Breuer collaborated on "Studies on Hysteria" (1895/1955), the first psychoanalytic text, which included Anna’s case history. In it, Freud wrote that “hysterics were suffering from reminiscences,” and that “hysterics were suffering from strangulated affect.” In both formulations, the self is split into conscious and unconscious segments, and the goal of therapy is to bring the unconscious part of the self with its unconscious ideation into consciousness with the release (abreaction, said Breuer and Freud) of the unconscious strangulated affect. The cure lay in the expression and discharge of repressed energy and feeling. Primal scream therapy and its relatives are the collateral descendants of Freud and Breuer’s technique of 1895, albeit in an extreme, un-self-critical form. There is no question that we can and do have repressed powerful emotions that are in some sense “within us,” yet not available to our awareness, nor is there any question that the coming into consciousness and the expression of those emotions is therapeutic. The empirical evidence is incontrovertible. But the place and mode of their “storage” is far from clear, and there are many competing, although perhaps complementary, theories to account for these thoughts and feelings.

The mode of storage of affect is a puzzle. Both the expression and experience of affect (emotion) involve somatic (neuromuscular and hormonal) activity. How this could be frozen and stored is far from clear. It may be the case that affect as such is not repressed, but rather that the ideation (thoughts, fantasies, and images) that arouses intolerable affect is what is repressed and that, upon the bringing to consciousness of that ideation, the defended-against affect is triggered and experienced. This seems probable to me. However, there are problems with this. There is the phenomenon of “isolation of affect,” in which a thought is conscious but not accompanied by appropriate affect. When therapy succeeds, that isolated affect is experienced. Where was it? Was it “attached” to other ideation? In cold storage? The clinical data are irrefutable—we do “stuff our feelings” and sever feelings from thought. However, there is no totally satisfactory theoretical account of these phenomena.

The idea that we think and feel thoughts and feelings that we don’t think or feel is paradoxical, at least
on the surface. These phenomena argue for a self with, so to speak, more than one compartment, which are in less than perfect communication with each other. How does the conscious self know what to repress if it isn’t aware of it, or how does what Freud would later call a censor know what to censor? This is an old and still unresolved problem with Freud’s early, and possibly his late, theorizing. Although the abreaction of affect is therapeutically efficacious, Freud came to be suspicious of that efficacy, and later came much more to trust the achievement of insight (the understanding of the realm of the repressed and the defenses we use to bring about that repression) as curative, although he didn’t overrate that power, either. Most modern therapists hold that both catharsis and insight are necessary for any lasting therapeutic effect. In his characteristically acerbic manner, Freud wrote in “Studies on Hysteria” that the purpose of psychoanalytic therapy is “to change neurotic misery into ordinary human unhappiness” (Freud & Breuer, 1895/1955, p. 305). Unlike our current panacea hucksters, Freud does not promise too much, an attitude that has much to commend it.

During the same years that Freud was trying to persuade Breuer to publish Studies, containing his case history of Anna O. (Breuer was reluctant, especially because of Freud’s growing emphasis on the etiological significance of sexuality in neurosis), Freud pursued his practice, became the father of an expanding family (he had six children in all), and published a series of papers on the neuropsychoses of defense (1894/1962a, 1896/1962b) that dealt with the clarification of the dynamics (i.e., inner conflict) and etiology of neurosis, especially of anxiety neurosis. The most salient feature of Freud’s theorizing during the 1880s and early 1890s was his recognition of the centrality of sexuality and its vicissitudes in the etiology of the neuroses. Freud’s first concern was nosological, to distinguish between organic neurological illness and hysterical symptoms. He further distinguished the actual neuroses from anxiety neurosis. Freud thought that both had a sexual etiology, but that in actual neurosis it was sexual frustration, the physical blockage and lack of release of sexual substances, that caused the anxiety. Freud was not here thinking of semen primarily, but probably what later became known as the sexual hormones and the energy engendered by them. If that sexual energy was not discharged, or sublimated (i.e., expressed or discharged in some culturally valuable symbolic form), it, so to speak, went sour, fermented, and became toxic. Thus, the actual neuroses were physiological illnesses with actual (i.e., biogenic) causes and required “actual” cures—an increase in the patient’s sexual activity, an increase in the patient’s ability to sublimate, or both. The psycho-neuroses in contradistinction to the actual neuroses do have psychological causes and are amenable to psychological treatment. Freud included neurasthenia, William James’s malady, among the actual neuroses and, given
James’s long period of sexual repression, or suppression, this makes sense as at least a contributing factor to James's emotional difficulties.

In the actual neuroses, that which ferments, dements. Not much has been done with Freud’s category of the actual neuroses, except by the heavy-handed. Although lack of sexual discharge or its symbolic equivalent certainly contributes to anxiety, life is not so simple, and sex, however intrinsically desirable, has cured few neurotics. Freud knew this. In his paper on the “wild analyst” (1910/1957), he tells of the young but puritanical widow who came to him after consulting a “wild” (i.e., untrained) analyst for anxiety. The analyst told her, "Madame, you must either remarry, take a lover, or satisfy yourself.” The patient said she did not wish to remarry, and her voice trailed off. The would-be analysand fled. Freud commented, If she had either been able to take a lover or to satisfy herself she wouldn't have been a patient in the first place; so that the wild analyst's "intervention" was useless.

If not more interesting, then more influential were Freud’s accounts of the psychoneuroses. Freud’s first theory of anxiety was a toxic one: anxiety is caused by failure to discharge or sublimate sexual energy, hence anxiety neurosis is classified along with neurasthenia as an actual neurosis. Accordingly, psychological intervention alone cannot cure it. Not so hysteria, Freud’s “model” for both etiology and treatment by analytic explanation and technique. In his papers on the neuropsychoses of defense, Freud set forth his first conceptualization of the mind and its workings. In them, he depicts a process he sometimes calls defense and sometimes calls repression. In modern usage, defense is the broader term, encompassing not only psychological repression (i.e., the pushing down from consciousness to unconsciousness of forbidden wishes and desires), but also such defenses as regression, the return to an earlier developmental stage; isolation of affect, separating the feeling from the thought; splitting of various sorts, of self and object into all good and all bad, or of consciousness into mutually contradictory states or beliefs; projection of inner states, feelings, and thoughts onto others and onto the world; introjection, placing external dangers within the self so they may be controlled; denial, believing that it isn’t so when it is; rationalization, finding seemingly rational reasons to justify emotionally driven or self-serving beliefs and actions; intellectualization, overvaluing cerebration and separating it from affect; turning anger and hate against the self because directing them against objects is too dangerous; and, finally, reaction formation, the turning of hate into its opposite, love.

Doubtless there are other psychological defenses, but these are the most widely employed. Repression is
used by contemporary analysts in the narrow sense of driving out of consciousness unacceptable thoughts. Freud’s usage is not so consistent: sometimes repression means defense in general and sometimes it means the defense of repression. Freud uses the term defense in his early writings, then drops it for an ambiguous use of the term repression, only to reintroduce defense with repression as a type of defense in his last writings. Such terminological confusions are common in Freud’s voluminous output.

In the preceding paragraph, I used the term object. This has a special meaning in psychoanalytic theory. Object is of course opposed to subject, as it is in much philosophical writing. You are the object of my thought as subject. However, the psychoanalytic usage is much broader. It includes not only people, but things, concepts, and ideals; indeed, any object of my thought. The flag, God, and Sally are all objects, or can be if I think of them. More significantly, psychoanalytic objects are both the things and people out there and my mental representation of them. Hence analysts speak of internal objects, and in many ways are more interested in these internal objects (mental representations) than in the objective correlates of thoughts (external objects).

Once Freud has a concept of defense or repression, he has a theory of the etiology of the psychoneuroses, hysteria and obsessive-compulsive neurosis (to be distinguished from obsessive-compulsive disorder, which contemporary thinking views and treats as primarily an organic neurological condition). In the 1880s and 1890s, Freud’s emphasis was on hysteria. Hysteria is caused by the repressed affect pressing for discharge, in fact, by the failure of repression. If repression is successful, symptoms don’t occur; nor does emotional illness. But repression is generally not successful. Furthermore, it requires energy to keep the repressed repressed, to keep it subterranean. Repression is not a one-time act; on the contrary, the psyche (self) is a dynamic organization in which contending forces struggle toward an unstable equilibrium much as in a vector model of contending forces in physics. Symptoms are “the return of the repressed,” which find distorted (disguised) partial expression in the illness. Symptoms are simultaneously covert, symbolic representations of forbidden wishes and drives and a punishment for that expression. An emotional illness is a compromise between the forces of repression and that part of the self that desires their expression. Self is here equated with the psyche and its dynamic tensions; however, as we shall see, Freud was acutely aware of the saliency of the body as well as of the psyche in constituting the self; it is simply that the emphasis here in his early models is on the mind and its structure.
So now we have the nucleus of the theory of self (of the psyche) as consisting of a forbidding agency, a censor, and an agency pressing for discharge and satisfaction of instinctual energies. In various elaborations, this will be Freud’s model of both self and mind.

Here we must ask, “Is the mind the self?” This has been a problem throughout our study. Self theorists vary in the degree of embodiment or disembodiment that they attribute to the self. In our discussions of self, Plato’s psyche, mind, spirit, or soul was treated as a self, which is probably faithful to his intent, as was Hume’s mind as a theater that doesn’t exist. On the other hand, the extreme disembodiment of the Cartesian self was seen to be problematic. Freud is actually a monistic thinker; for him, psyche and soma are two aspects of one reality, so I think we are justified, for the time being, in treating his theory of the mental apparatus of the mind as a theory of self. Freud was a lifelong admirer of Spinoza, the metaphysical monist who believed that there is only one substance whose infinite attributes include thought (mind) and extension (body). The spirit of Spinoza’s philosophizing finds expression in Freud’s work, though he is not explicitly cited. The School of Helmholtz tended to treat mind as an epiphenomenon of matter and psychology as a branch of biology, which is a monistic point of view, even if one in which dualism is overcome by making mind derivative.

Freud eventually dropped the epiphenomenalism (i.e., the reduction of mind to body of the School of Helmholtz) while retaining its monism. His theory of anxiety is revealing. In it, he describes anxiety as a borderline phenomenon having both somatic (e.g., pounding heart, elevated blood pressure, open pupils, and sweating palms) and psychological (e.g., feelings of dread, doom, and fear) aspects. Pointing out that the somatic manifestations of anxiety in many ways mimic the somatic correlates of orgasm, Freud concluded that anxiety could be a disguised or distorted sexual expression or satisfaction of the very sexual needs whose repression was causing that anxiety. So here anxiety is both physiological, the product of toxicity caused by repression, and psychological, insofar as it is a symbolic expression in a disguised form of a forbidden wish.

As we shall see, Freud also regarded the instincts as simultaneously somatic and psychic. However, it is not vital that we consider Freud’s models of the mind as models of the self. He is a theorist who continually develops and changes, so that in talking about Freud it is always necessary to specify which Freud. In addition to his theories of mind, he has much to say about the ego in its meaning as self and the derivation of that ego from bodily experience.
Let's return to the neuropsychoses of defense (psychoses here meaning mental illness in general) and the etiology of hysteria. We are now familiar with the mental structure Freud infers from the illness, but so far I have said little about the nature (content) of the repressed. The Freud of the 1890s maintained that the content of the repressed was always sexual. It was sexual wishes and desires that were driven underground, and the etiology of the psychoneuroses, particularly hysteria, was a partial return of repressed sexuality—both sexual memories and current desires. Freud based this theory on clinical evidence. Patient after patient recovered memories of having been “seduced” in childhood by adults, often parents, or by much older siblings. Freud first took these “reminiscences” as factual; later, although he never denied that incest is a real phenomenon and indeed etiological when it occurred, he came to believe that a great deal of what his patients told him was fantasy derived from childhood sexual wishes.

By the turn of the century, Freud's technique had evolved from the recovery of traumatic memories through the use of hypnosis, which he said he abandoned for the reasons that not everyone was hypnotizable and that he was not very adept at it, to an active technique in which Freud literally pressed a patient's head to squeeze out the repressed memories, to instructing the patient to say whatever came to mind, no matter how embarrassing, inappropriate, or seemingly irrelevant or nonsensical. The latter is the technique of free association, and the injunction to say whatever comes to mind is the fundamental rule of psychoanalysis. It was suggested to Freud by a patient who essentially said, “Leave me alone.” His genius consisted, at a time when the authority of the physician was unquestioned, in listening to her and shutting up. As it evolved, free association became a powerful therapeutic tool in gaining access to the derivatives of the unconscious. It is a way around, or perhaps behind or beneath, defenses. The talking cure, as Anna O. called it, is more than a technique. It is a moral posture. It says that the individual is worthy of meticulous prolonged attention and that the inner life is worthy of our attention. Implicit in it is the belief that self-knowledge is intrinsically valuable—and it and we are worthwhile.

Psychoanalytic technique evolved further when free association became a tool in an art of interpretation that focused on analysis of transference and the resistance, two ubiquitous concomitants of every analytic session. The patient transfers feelings of love and hate toward figures in early childhood onto the analyst, and their interpretation is a means of making the unconscious conscious. As Freud said, the patient “acts instead of remembering” (1914/1958, p. 150): acts in the sense of reenacting the feelings in the present instead of remembering their origins. Resistance, another omnipresent phenomenon, is a manifestation of the patient's
defensive struggle to repudiate or keep from awareness painful repressed material. Modern analysts interpret defense before and sometimes in lieu of content.

Hypnosis, although no longer used in modern analysis, played an important role in the history of psychoanalysis. The reality of hypnotic phenomena was compelling evidence for an unconscious, or at the very least a split consciousness. It is still one of our best evidences of the presence and efficacy of the unconscious. Freud had a long-standing interest in hypnosis, which he had studied under two French pioneers in therapeutic hypnosis: Bernheim and Liebecault, whose work he translated into German.

I return to Freud’s seduction theory of the etiology of neurosis and his abandonment of it; there is much current controversy surrounding this abandonment. Some of Freud’s critics charge that he abandoned the seduction theory, which was true, either out of fear of social disapproval, which was already strong because of his emphasis on sexuality, or because it raised too many personal issues for him, either about his mother’s seductiveness or his father’s sexual abuse. Nobody accuses Freud of being consciously dishonest, but they do suggest that unconscious conflict led him away from his initial attribution of childhood seduction (i.e., sexual abuse) as the cause of neurosis. The issue is of great importance, theoretically over the existence of unconscious fantasy and the intrinsic unreliability of reality testing, and practically in treatment and in social policy. The tremendous attention that sexual abuse of children has received in the past decade, in the media and elsewhere, is a return to the seduction theory. My own view is that children do indeed have sexual fantasies about their parents and their guilt about this deepens the trauma of actually being “seduced by” an adult. Freud would have agreed with this; he never said, as his critics sometimes state, that childhood seduction and sexual abuse were not a reality, merely that it was not the universal cause of neurosis. One sidelight of this controversy that is directly relevant to our topic of the self is the increasing and now convincing clinical evidence that people who suffer from “multiple personalities” are people who have been traumatically abused, sexually and sometimes physically, at extremely early ages. Multiple personalities are defenses to cope with the traumatic disillusionment and pain of their early experience. Recovery of traumatic memories leads to reintegration of the split and isolated multiples.

There is another aspect to Freud’s early belief that the cure of neurosis lies in the remembrance of traumatic experiences. There is no other treatment that so stresses remembering, and there is no religion other than Judaism that makes a religious duty of remembrance of traumatic events. "You shall not forget that
your forefathers were slaves in Egypt and you shall teach it to your children and to your children’s children” is one of the cardinal commandments of Judaism. The Passover Seder is a dramatization of that traumatic event and the redemption from it, so that it will not be forgotten. The Jew must remember that his forefathers were slaves. Freud repudiated Judaism as a religion and consciously was an atheist who followed no religious practices or ceremonies; however, he never repudiated his identity as a Jew or his cultural adherence to Judaism. On the contrary, he was proud of it. I would suggest that the psychoanalytic emphasis on remembering as the essence of the cure was a return of the repressed or perhaps a return of the disavowed that was in part determined by the unconscious part of Freud’s identity as a Jew. This, of course, does not affect the theoretical validity or the degree of practical utility of the cure through remembering, nor does it deny the clinical inspiration for the theory. Theories, like all psychological states and products, are, to use another Freudian concept, overdetermined; that is, they have many causes. The source of an idea has nothing to do with its value; to think so is to commit a genetic fallacy. After I wrote this, I came across Yosef Hyman Yerushalmi’s brilliant and moving *Freud’s Moses: Judaism Terminable and Interminable* (1991), in which he expresses a similar understanding of the origin of some of Freud’s psychoanalytic theorizing.

Breuer, the third of Freud’s spiritual fathers broke with him over the issue of sexuality. Love turned to hate, or, more accurately, the flip side of Freud’s ambivalence toward fathers came to the fore, and Freud found it necessary to cross the street when he saw Breuer, his presence being so distasteful to Freud. There followed a period of lonely isolation during which Freud met and fell in love with Wilheim Fleiss, a charismatic Berlin internist to whom he was related by marriage. Freud was neither the first nor the last to be fascinated by Fleiss. Confident, successful, and uncritically admired by many, Fleiss was just what Freud needed. Brilliant, if erratic and eccentric in his ideas, Fleiss was receptive to Freud’s otherwise and otherwhere unwelcome theorizing. Fleiss had a mesmerizing charm and was probably more than a little crazy. His theory that all illnesses were caused by nasal disorders, the nose being a sexual organ, has found little scientific support, nor has his belief that all natural phenomena could be accounted for by combinations and permutations of the female (28-day) and male (23-day) cycles. Fleiss’s pseudoscientific numerology probably owes an unconscious debt to cabalistic number mysticism—altogether, an unlikely consort for the Helmholtzian, scientifically rigorous Freud, but the heart has its reasons, and a passionate relationship developed between the two men. Their contact was mostly through their correspondence, occasionally punctuated by congresses, Freud’s term for their anxiously anticipated meetings, a term that suggests both
grandiosity and sexuality. Reading Freud’s side of their correspondence, which is all that has survived (Freud, 1985), we get a sense of intense intellectual excitement: here are two men approaching 40 who sound like adolescents who have just discovered the world of ideas, with all the passion and excitement that goes with that discovery. Of course, Fliess’s excitement is an inference from Freud’s letters, but it certainly appears to be there. Freud’s letters to Fliess are a depiction of life of the educated Jewish middle class of late 19th-century Vienna that have all the vividness and richness of a great novel. Sentences filled with Freud’s deep love of children alternate with sarcastic comments on his academic rivals, discussion of current political events, and theoretical “drafts.” The overall effect is exhilarating. Freud’s early theories about neurosis, anxiety, and the role of sexuality are all given trial balloons in the drafts he sent to Fliess. The most extensive of the drafts is Freud’s “Project for a Scientific Psychology” (1895/1950), which he abandoned and never published. It is a brilliant attempt to give a quantitative neurological explanation of psychological states and of psychopathology. It was Freud’s last attempt to reduce psychology to physiology. Although he never abandoned the belief that a neurochemical explanation of mental events was possible, he himself turned to purely psychological explanations to account for both normal and pathological events. It is true that his psychological models and accounts retain a physicalistic basis, and much of Freud’s theorizing is based on a “hydraulic model” of forces, pressures, flows, and blockages. It is a model based on 19th-century physics. It is also true that his theorizing becomes more and more a theory about meaning, and about relationships, and becomes truly psychological rather than pseudopsychological physics.

During Freud’s almost two-decade-long relationship with Fliess, he suffered a “considerable psychoneurosis” (Jones, 1961, p. 198) himself. Freud’s emotional pain drove him to undertake his self-analysis, in which Fliess served as a sort of analyst by mail, and more important, was a transference figure eliciting all of Freud’s intense feelings of love and hate for his father. Although it is unlikely that the two men were actually lovers, there is no question that Wilhelm Fliess was the great love of Freud’s life.

In the course of his self-analysis and his relationship with Fliess, Freud “discovered” the Oedipus complex and wrote what is usually considered his most important work, Interpretation of Dreams (1900/1953a). In analyzing his dreams, Freud came to see that dreams have the same structure as symptoms. They too are disguised expressions of forbidden wishes. He concluded that all dreams are wish fulfillments. In the course of his self-analysis, he discovered much about himself: about his intense rivalry with and ambivalence toward his father; about his murderous feelings toward his infant brother, Julius; about his
drivenness; and about his narcissistic vulnerability.

The dreams reported in *Interpretation of Dreams* make a unique contribution to the autobiographical literature of the West. They expand the account of self to include a new dimension. The self asleep—at least while dreaming—now becomes an integral part of self. Descartes's questions about distinguishing dreams and waking reality as a vital component of reality testing become irrelevant, and Locke’s concern about the continuity of self during sleep is seen in a new light: dream consciousness is just as much consciousness, just as integral to the self, as waking consciousness. The injunction "Know Thyself" changes in meaning as the locus of self shifts to that which is not known, to the unconscious as represented in disguised and distorted forms in the dream. The self is now more unknown and unknowable, apart from undergoing the rigors of analysis, than hitherto believed. Freud’s technique of dream analysis is double-edged: on the one hand, it gives us a tool for knowing the self; on the other hand, it reveals a new, unknown territory that must be reclaimed before the self can be either known or integral.

Having gone public in a unique, if partial and selective, way, Freud put an important part, by his lights the most important part, of himself up for scrutiny by any and all; and indeed his dreams have been interpreted and reinterpreted in a bewildering variety of ways, both from within and from without the psychoanalytic movement. One of the most fascinating perspectives on Freud’s dreams is that of Carl Schorske (1980), who looks at their political meaning and significance and sees Freud as “regressing” from the political (adult’s) to the familial (child’s) world, from external reality to internal reality, because of the disintegration of the Austrian-Hungarian empire, its series of defeats in war, and growing dissension, corruption, and decadence; also, increasingly virulent anti-Semitism (Karl Lueger was installed as the anti-Semitic mayor of Vienna just as *Interpretation* was published) made action in the outer world increasingly futile and hopeless. Freud’s dreams do indeed have many political references, and Freud like Plato before him takes the relation between social classes as representative of, or isomorphic to, the relationships of the parts of the psyche. Additionally, Freud’s metaphors of self and mind are consistently political, and even sometimes military: defense, resistance, occupation, and drive.

Schorske interprets what Freud calls the *manifest dream*, the dream as dreamt, which Freud distinguishes from the *latent dream*, which is where his interest lies. In Freud’s theory of the mechanism of dreams (which serves as a paradigm for his theory of mind in the sense of self) the dream thoughts that are
forbidden childhood wishes, derivative of drives (instinctual energies) striving for discharge, are “converted” by the dream work into the manifest dream through the mechanisms of displacement, condensation, symbolization, visualization, and secondary revision. The task of dream interpretation is to work backwards from the manifest dream to the latent dream thoughts by listening to the dreamer’s association to each dream element. Secondary revision is the mind’s reworking of the dream material to give it more apparent sense and continuity than it possesses, that is, to give the dream a better story line. Dreams make use of current materials (the “day residue”) but always equally, or more than equally, represent in distorted form the events and desires of childhood. Dreams are always egoistic. The censor imposes the dreamwork on the latent dream thoughts so they do not arouse so much anxiety as to wake the dreamer.

Freud has now moved from psychopathology to a normal psychological phenomenon, dreaming, and found that dreams are compromise formations in just the same way as symptoms. He is now in a position to expound a general psychology, an omni-applicable account of human nature. In the years following the Interpretation of Dreams, Freud went on to apply his paradigm to jokes, art, hallucinations, religion, and culture in general, finding each to have the same basic structure as compromises and disguised wish fulfillments.

In the famous “specimen dream of psychoanalysis,” the dream of Irma's injection, Freud for the first time subjects a dream of his own to analysis. In the dream, the dreamer is in a large reception hall receiving guests, including Irma, who is a former patient who is still ill. By the time the dream ends, Irma’s continued illness is blamed on at least three other persons, including one who represents Breuer. Freud interprets the dream wish as the desire to be blameless as well as to pay back some old scores. Irma in real life was Emma Eckstein, whom Fliess had operated on for “nasal neurosis” (which was plain madness), an intrusive application of his wild theory to a human being. To make matters worse, he left the packing in, which infected (long before antibiotics) and almost killed the patient, who suffered the torments of the damned and was given psychological interpretation of her difficulties by Freud. Freud told her that her symptoms were a holding onto her illness, which was a manifestation of her negative transference to him. Freud’s dream was certainly an attempt to find himself guiltless by projecting blame for Irma’s difficulties onto others, but Freud missed the main thrust, the deepest wish, behind the dream: to find Fliess blameless in order to protect his (Freud’s) idealized love object from contamination and devaluation. Freud missed the motive power of our need for ideal objects, for perfect lovers with whom we can identify and perhaps merge. Fliess was such an ideal object
for him. If Fliess was a transference object, as according to Freud’s theory he had to be, then it was his father who was to be protected from the charge of injuring a woman. The childhood wish represented in distorted form in the dream was his wish that Father be perfect and blameless. In light of Freud’s revision of the seduction theory, one wonders what the idealized father had to be rendered blameless of. Emma Eckstein held no grudges and became an analyst herself. As far as Freud’s relationship with Fliess went, the bloom was soon to be off the rose, and the relationship between the two men became increasingly acrimonious.

In Chapter 7 of Interpretation, Freud elucidated his first model of the mind, the topographical model. In it, there are three realms, those of consciousness, preconsciousness, and dynamic unconsciousness. The descriptive unconscious includes all that is out of awareness at a given moment: that is, the contents of the preconscious and of the dynamic unconscious. The preconscious is the realm of all that is out of awareness, but that can be accessed by attention or by an act of will. The dynamic unconscious, on the other hand, is blocked from access to storage in the preconscious or awareness in consciousness by the censor. As I noted above, Freud never solved the problem of how the censor knows what to censor. Consciousness is the ego's or self's point of contact with the external world. The normal flow, the normal progression, is from outside to inside, from the senses to consciousness, but the reverse can also be true, and there can be a topographical regression in which the contents of the dynamic unconscious—the inside—find (disguised) representation in consciousness, in dreams, and in hallucinations. Regression can also be temporal to that which is earlier in development, or formal, in which structure is simplified or lost and the more articulated becomes less articulated. Topographical, temporal, and formal regression are three aspects of one process.

Consciousness is organized temporally and logically; the law of the excluded middle and the other Aristotelian logical categories are operative; and there are orderly, lawful causal connections between thoughts. Contradictory beliefs cannot be simultaneously held. Freud called this kind of sequential, rational thinking secondary process thinking to distinguish it from primary process thinking, the mode of operation of the unconscious. Unconscious thought processes are not bound by the rules of logic, contradictory propositions can exist without conflict, causal sequences are irrelevant, and all primary process is timeless, outside of the temporal order. Freud’s description of the dynamic unconscious and its primary process mode of operation is strikingly reminiscent of Kant’s self-in-itself, the noumenal self, with the important difference that Freud’s unconscious is potentially partially knowable through analysis of its derivatives such as dreams, while Kant’s noumenal self is knowable, if at all, through moral action. Of course Freud’s dynamic unconscious is, unlike
Kant’s noumenal self, not the source of morality. Quite to the contrary, it is the source of egoistic drive discharge and wish fulfillment.

Freud has now, so to speak, delineated the anatomy of the psyche, but not yet its physiology. In order to do so, he needs a driving force, and he finds it in his concept of psychic energy. Psychic energy is conceptualized as parallel to physical energy—as an underlying force equal in dignity to the forces postulated by physics and chemistry. Psychic energy undergoes vicissitudes just as physical energy undergoes transformations. In both cases, there is a conservation of energy; that is, energy, psychic or physical, can be transformed from one state or form into another, but the sum total of the available energy remains the same, that is, is conserved. Again we can see the parallelism between Freud’s theory making and the theories then in vogue in the physical sciences. Freud’s concept of psychic energy has been criticized as a metaphysical rather than an empirical scientific notion. It is seen as unoperationalizable (i.e., not measurable; an unverifiable, extrascientific conception), but its defenders view it as an explanatory hypothesis that, like many such explanatory hypotheses in the physical sciences, accounts for the data of observation without itself being observable. Those who think that the notion of psychic energy has conceptual validity point out that we no more see physical energy than we do psychic energy, and that in both cases, what we can see and measure are the presumed effects of these hypothetical forces.

Once he has the concept of psychic energy to work with, Freud sees it as manifesting itself in the form of instinctual drives. These are not instincts in the sense of prepatterned sequences of behavior, but rather are forces pressing for discharge and expression; that is, they are biological drives. Freud sees these instinctual forces as being both mental and physical, but he is most interested in their mental representations and effects—what he calls their derivatives. Psychic energy, or instinctual drive power, differentiates itself into two main classes of instincts that are conceptualized as libido and ego instincts by the early Freud and as Eros and Thanatos by the late Freud. Always a psychologist of conflict, a theoretical underpinning (or metapsychology, as he called it) that had contending forces intrinsic to it suited Freud perfectly. A dualistic instinct theory made sense of Freud’s clinical data, and it was able to account for the irrationality of human behavior. It made sense of the inner life of people as it unfolded on the analytic couch.

Each major instinct has component instincts, thus libido finds expression in orality, anality, sadism and masochism, as well as in voyeurism and exhibitionism, along with its manifestation in genital sexuality. Libido
is more like Plato's Eros than like sexual desire in the narrow sense. The *ego instincts* are the selfpreservative instincts in which aggression is implicit but not, at this stage of Freud's theorizing, explicit. Ego instincts are much like Spinoza's *conatus*, the drive that every living thing has to maintain itself. Libido and the ego instincts have different goals: libido seeks to join and to preserve the species, the ego instincts seek to preserve the individual as a separate entity. There is a sense in which libido is primordial, for Freud speaks of the ego instincts as being anadicitic—leaning up against—the sexual instincts, but this is a nuance in a dualistic system.

When Freud is talking about the ego instincts, he is talking about the selfpreservative instincts. Here Freud is talking about the self. In German, his term for ego is *das Ich*, the *I*; hence, the ego instincts are the *I* instincts. When Freud uses the term *ego* before 1923, the date of his second model of the mind, the *structural hypothesis, ego* means self in its ordinary usage. This self is the whole person, including the bodily self and the mental self. Freud disliked technical terms, although James Strachey, his English translator, did not, and when Freud said *ego* or *self*, he was not intending anything sophisticated, just the plain man in the street's notion of being a person like other persons who have a mind and body, however the two may be related. After 1923, Freud used *ego* (*das Ich*) either to mean the self in its ordinary connotation or, more usually, to mean an agency of the mind in his structural model. The reader must determine from the context which meaning is intended. Now we have two Freudian notions of the self: the topographical psyche with its instinctual energies and the whole person with all of his or her bodily and mental experiences.

In 1915, Freud wrote one of his most perceptive clinical papers, "Mourning and Melancholia" (1915/1957b). In it, we see the beginning of what was to become object relations theory. Freud looks to compare a pathological phenomenon, depression or melancholia, with a normal one, mourning. In mourning, we suffer the loss of an object and wander about like a dazed, lost child looking for a mother. In Freud's view, what the mourner must do is to introject the lost object, to in some sense make the lost object a part of self, a part of the mourner. The introjected object may be experienced as a foreign body, which indeed it is. Only after introjection can the bonds of libido that tie the mourner to the lost person or lost ideal or value be loosened. Freud says we do this by hypercathecting—investing with an overabundance of libido—each separate memory of the lost one. The intensity, so to speak, breaks the bond, almost like an elastic band being stretched until it snaps. When the last memory is hypercathected, the last band snapped, the tie to the lost object is severed, and libido is free once again to invest itself in a new object. In short, we become able to love
again. In melancholia, there is also a loss, but it is often not obvious what has been lost, and there is no working through, no freedom from the lost object achieved.

Freud hypothesized that in melancholia, a hated object is introjected, and the hatred felt for that object that is now within is visited upon the self. In the famous and strangely poetic aphorism, Freud says, "The shadow of the object fell on the ego" (1915/1957b, p. 249), ego here meaning self. Here we have a whole new notion of self, a self as an entity that can contain that which is taken in from the outside by introjection and that can project parts of itself outward onto the environment—onto the world of objects. Another way Freud views introjection is to say that "an object relation [i.e., a relation between the self and another] has regressed to an identification [i.e., an amalgamation of self and other in which the self virtually becomes the other]." Now the hatred felt for the introjected object is visited on the self, and the result is melancholia. Freud is perfectly aware that not all depressions have this mechanism and, indeed, that some are biological in nature, but he captured for all time the phenomenology of one type of psychodynamic depression—the type in which anger is turned inward.

Freud cited the grandiosity and arrogance of the melancholic that is so discordant with the self-deprecation and self-laceration that goes with melancholia as evidence that what looks like self-hatred is really hatred of an internalized other. He goes on to say a seemingly and perhaps contradictory thing, namely, that the only way the ego (the self) can give up its objects is to make them part of itself.

Indeed, "the ego [self] is the precipitate of abandoned object cathexis"; that is, the self is constructed by the identification with and introjection of those we once loved but from whom we have now withdrawn our emotional investment. This is an extraordinary notion of self.

In his much-revised, "Three Contributions to a Theory of Sexuality" (1905/1953b), Freud elaborates the libido theory and the vicissitudes of the libido into a developmental scheme in which an objectless autoerotic stage develops into a narcissistic stage, which in turn evolves into the psychosexual stages of orality, anality, and phallicity, and finally into the object-related stage of genitality. In undergoing this development, the component instincts of libido first find expression in oral experience ("love and hunger meet at a woman's breast"); then in anal experience in which sexual pleasure is concentrated in the sensation of the anal mucosa during both retention and expulsion; then in phallic or clitoral sensations in
masturbation; and, finally, after a period of latency, in the mutuality of intercourse. In the course of development, the partial or component instincts of masochism-sadism and exhibitionism-voyeurism also find expression. In healthy genitality, the component instincts find expression and satisfaction during foreplay. Freud’s libido theory is a precursor to his concept of narcissism, and some understanding of his understanding of the vicissitudes of libidinal development is a necessary prelude to understanding narcissism as Freud conceptualized it.

**NARCISSISM**

Narcissism is an old concept that has been given a modern meaning or meanings by psychoanalysis. The word *narcissism* comes from the Greek *narke*, to deaden. It is the same root that is found in the words *narcotic* and *narcotize*. Both narcotics and narcissism deaden, attenuate sensation and feeling. That says something interesting about addiction in its relationship to narcissism. The Greek root took on its meaning of deadening from the name of a protagonist of a legend, Narcissus. In the legend, Narcissus is a beautiful youth who becomes so entranced by his reflection in a pool of water that he remains frozen, gazing upon his own face until he perishes. At his death, he was transformed into a flower, the narcissus. His infatuation with self gave narcissism its meaning of self-love. Both *narke* and the tale of Narcissus remind us that there is something dangerous, even potentially fatal, about self-love, yet without it we would also perish. So there must be a healthy self-love (narcissism), which is life enhancing, and a pathological self-love (narcissism), which deadens.

Freud, 2,500 years later, turned narcissism into a scientific concept in his prescient paper “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (Freud, 1914/1957c). In it, Freud distinguishes several meanings of narcissism: as a sexual perversion in which the self is taken as the primary sexual object; as a libidinal component of the instinct of self-preservation; and as the libidinal cathexis of self, cathexis being the investment of an object with psychic energy. He cites a number of phenomena as evidence for the existence of narcissism: the existence of the above-mentioned sexual perversions in which pleasure in looking at, admiring, and fondling the self provides complete sexual satisfaction; the normal and universal love of self; the megalomania of schizophrenia in which all of the libido seems to be directed onto the self; the clinical evidence of the distinction between object libido and ego libido as manifested in the transference neuroses in which a libidinal bond is formed with the analyst and the narcissistic neuroses (i.e., the psychoses) in which such a
bonding does not take place; organic illness, in which self-absorption is normal; hypochondria, in which libido is also directed onto the self or fragments thereof; the egoism of sleep; love between men in which object choice is choice of a replica (in some sense) of the self; and parental love with its excesses and denial that the restraints of reality apply to the child, which Freud views as narcissistic love once removed.

In his seminal essay, Freud described a normal developmental process in which there is a progression from autoeroticism (love of isolated body parts) to narcissism (love of self) to object love (love of others). The infant first derives pleasure from body parts, experienced as isolates, not as parts of the self; these sensory experiences are later integrated into a self, or ego, that is experienced as tenuous and unclearly demarcated from the not-self (the world); and this ego is loved. Finally, a portion of this primeval self-love, or primary narcissism, overflows and is projected out as object love. Thus, our instinctual energy is first invested in our own body parts, then invested in ourselves before the distinction between self and other has been firmly established, and finally flows outward to emotionally invest (cathect) objects. Narcissistic libido becomes object libido.

According to Freud, disappointment in object love can lead to withdrawal of interest (libido) from the world and reinvestment of that libido in the self. Freud denoted this phenomenon secondary narcissism to distinguish it from the primary narcissism of infancy. Freud postulated that normal self-esteem results from a reservoir of self-love that is retained from the stage of primary narcissism and that continues to exist alongside object love. He thought that secondary narcissism was the basic mechanism of psychotic withdrawal from the world, and that the psychotic delusion of the end of the world reflected the reality of the withdrawal of libido from the world of objects and its redirection onto a now impoverished and isolated self.

Few aspects of Freud's thought have born as much fruit as his discussion of narcissism. Narcissism as the libidinal cathexis of the self make sense in terms of Freud's energetic model, and the conversion of narcissistic libido into object libido explains the lowered self-esteem of unrequited infatuation, in which the lover debases him- or herself concomitantly with idealizing the loved object.

Freud uses two metaphors, that of the amoeba with its pseudopodia reaching out to cathect objects in the environment and that of the manometer in which mercury flows out of one side of a U tube into the other, just as narcissistic libido flows outward, changing into object libido. Both the liquid in the manometer and libido
can reverse their flow. Overinvestment in love of others leads to impoverishment of the ego (the self) and lowering of self-esteem. The amoeba analog implies considerable aggression in loving; retraction of the pseudopodia corresponds to the withdrawal of libido from the world in secondary narcissism. Freud ingeniously interprets the delusions and hallucinations of schizophrenia as an attempt at creating a restitutive world by the ego (self) that cannot stand the aridity and vacuity of the objectless world of secondary narcissism. If loving too much impoverishes the ego, loving not at all is even worse; it results in megalomania and the secondary symptoms (the delusions, catatonic postures, and hallucinations) of psychosis. Libido must be expended (invested) or it goes sour. Freud trenchantly concludes, "We must love or grow ill" (1914/1957c, p.85).

THANATOS: THE DEATH INSTINCT

Freud wrote of the vicissitudes of libido, of self-love and object love, immediately before World War I; after that war, he focused on the death instinct. Western man apparently preferred making war to making love. Beyond the Pleasure Principle (Freud, 1920/1955) is one of the great tragic visions of human life. In it, Freud revamped his theory of the instincts, replacing the ego instincts with Thanatos, the death instinct. Now the dynamic conflict within us is between love and death. Freud compared his new metapsychology to that of the pre-Socratic philosopher, Empedocles, who wrote of the eternal war between Eros and Strife. Freud postulated that all organic matter, everything that lives, has a desire to return to the quietus of the inorganic. Freud variously called this the Nirvana principle or the death instinct. He cited self-destructive behaviors of all sorts, the deeply conservative nature of human beings who seek endlessly to repeat (relive) past traumas; the games of children in which repetition is a source of pleasure; the negative therapeutic reaction in which the better the patient does, the worse he feels; and the all too manifest horrors of human aggression. If the death instinct is indwelling, then there must be a primary masochism analogous to primary narcissism, and just as libido must turn outward to avert emotional illness, so must Thanatos turn outward in the form of aggression. At its darkest, it is a choice of murder or suicide. Just as secondary narcissism is always a human potential, secondary masochism—the taking back and turning on the self of aggression derivative of the death instinct—is omnipossible. If love is primordial, so is hate. All of our lives we must strive to keep our aggression out front, and in the end we all fail, returning Thanatos to its source within, and die. Freud is here trying to account for therapeutic failure, addiction, suicide, and self-mutilation and their murderous externalizations.
He comes up with the notion of the repetition compulsion, the inertial force derived from the death instinct that keeps us acting out the same self-destructive patterns over and over. Sameness is like quietus: nothing new happens, and this inbuilt inertial force is in perpetual war with Eros, the life force, that seeks growth, union, and novelty.

Few later analysts have accepted the death instinct, but most have agreed with Freud that aggression is innate. Their dual instinct theories pit libido against aggression rather than Eros against Thanatos. Closely related to the repetition compulsion is Freud’s notion of phylogenetic inheritance. Freud came to believe that a kind of primitive guilt is inborn, almost as an innate idea. Freud’s innate ideas are a kind of template that predisposes us to Oedipal conflicts, guilt, and selfpunishment. Freud’s theory of the primal crime of the band of brothers killing the tyrannical primal father and sharing the guilt by consuming him in a totem meal, which he developed in Totem and Taboo (1913-1914/1953c) led naturally to his theory of the inheritance of phylogenetic guilt. Freud needed this concept to make sense of the ubiquitous masochistic behavior he encountered in his patients and in human history. If human beings are motivated solely by the pleasure principle, which was Freud’s original contention, human behavior as he found it is inexplicable. Innate guilt, the repetition compulsion, and the death instinct hardly make for an optimistic view of human nature, but as Freud said in “Thoughts for the Times on War and Death” (1915/1957d), “that which is painful may nevertheless be true.”

The template for the Oedipus complex—Freud’s label for the complex, ambivalent feelings children have for parents, particularly their death wishes toward the rival, same-sex parent and desire for sexual possession of the opposite-sex parent—is also innate—part of our phylogenetic inheritance. The Oedipus complex is complicated by children’s love for the parent they hate and hate for the parent they love. Freud first expounded the Oedipus complex in Interpretation of Dreams, where it is the chief fruit of his self-analysis. Freud believed that most psychopathology arises from failure to work through Oedipal feelings and somehow resolve them by renunciation, mourning, identification with, and internalization of the rival parent. In effect, the way out of the Oedipal impasse is “If you can’t beat them, join them.” That is, successful resolution of the Oedipal conflict entails identification with the ambivalently hated, same-sex rival parent.

Freud’s revision of his instinct theory may owe something to Alfred Adler, who advocated the inclusion of an aggressive instinct in psychoanalytic theory; to Sabina Spielrein, a former patient and mistress of Jung,
who like Adler participated in Freud’s “Wednesday Evening” seminars; and most important, to Otto Weininger, a brilliant neurotic, whose *Sex and Character* (1906) became a sensation in Vienna after he suicided in Beethoven’s home at the age of 23. Weininger, who was both Jewish and homosexual, hated both Jews and homosexuals; in his book he advocated a Schopenhauerian renunciation of desire and a seeking for an asexual Nirvana-like state of quietus. Whatever the influence of these three on him, the death instinct is a genuinely Freudian concept; it comes out of clinical concerns, the carnage of World War I, and perhaps an unconscious intimation of the cancer that would soon strike him. Interestingly, it is an oral lesion that Freud and his colleagues are examining in the dream of Irma’s injection. Was Freud, even then, unconsciously anticipating his oral cancer, and was that cancer, caused by the smoking that he wouldn’t relinquish, a self-punishment for his treatment of Irma and for his death wishes toward Julius, his father, and Fliess? It is at least possible that the man who introduced the death instinct, for all his vitality and life force, was “half in love with easeful death.” At the very least, he certainly knew something highly personal about the repetition compulsion and about masochism.

The publication of Weininger’s book brought about Freud’s final break with Fliess. In the book, Weininger advocated an inherent bisexuality in all human beings. That was an idea that Freud had taken over from Fliess, and Fliess accused Freud of giving it to Weininger without giving Fliess credit. Freud had indeed discussed bisexuality with a patient who was a friend of the demented philosopher, but denied it.

In 1923, Freud published *The Ego and the Id* (1923/1961), literally, *The I and the It*. In it he expounded his second, structural model of the mind. The structural model supplements, or perhaps supplants, the topographical model. Freud sees the mental structure as developing from an undifferentiated state in which impulses strive for discharge. The repository or source of these impulses he denoted the id or it. The id operates through primary process and is unconscious. It is the repository of instinctual energy. Using a spatial metaphor, Freud describes the ego, or I, as arising on the surface of the id at the id’s point of contact with external reality. He states that an entity as complex as an I or ego could not exist from the beginning, which is congruent with his description of the ego, here meaning the self, actually coming into being from “islands of self experience” in “On Narcissism.” The ego develops into a separate agency of the mental apparatus defined by its functions of perception, reality testing, defense (against both internal, instinctual threats, and external dangers), memory, motility, and judgment. The ego is partly conscious and partly unconscious. The ego defenses are most likely to be unconscious, and much of contemporary analytic therapy is aimed at making
them conscious. The ego is sort of the executive, but it is a weak executive, having no energy of its own, deriving its energy from the id, and having the formidable task of mediating between the demands of the id for immediate gratification, the restrictions and prohibitions of the superego, and the constraints of reality. The superego, or the over-I, is both the product of further differentiation of the ego into an ego ideal (that which we would like to be) and the heir of the resolution of the Oedipus complex in which ambivalently loved and hated parents (particularly the boy’s father whom he is in love with yet wishes to murder in order to possess his mother) are internalized and made part of self; the ego (self) is the precipitate of abandoned object cathexis. Identification leads to internalization. Now the prohibitions of the parents and of the culture are inside. Freud now defines the goal of analytic therapy as the strengthening of the ego: “where ‘it’ (id) was ‘I’ (ego) shall be.”

The self is now the structural ego, the agency of the mind that attempts to find a “rational” solution to the conflicts of contending forces rather than the person or bodily-mental self of prestructural theory. The id says, “Give me everything yesterday”; the superego says, “You get nothing ever”; and the poor ego has to squeeze out a modicum of satisfaction today or tomorrow.

Freud tells us that the “ego is in service of the Id”; that is, it tries to satisfy the id’s demands while taking into account “recalcitrant reality.” Freud says something very interesting about this ego or self; namely, that it is “first and foremost a bodily ego.” By this he means that the structural ego, the sense of self, is built up out of bodily sensations, much as the prestructural ego emerges from the autoerotic stage. This is diametrically opposed to the Cartesian notion of the self as pure cognition, in which bodily experience is suspect or unreal. Freud’s therapeutic goal is to both strengthen and unify this ego. If we regard it as the self, the self has its origins in bodily experience and only slowly comes into contact with the external world as it evolves into a mental agency that mediates between internal forces and external reality. Further, it is largely unconscious and only comes into full being by becoming more conscious. The self as ego is not a given; it is an achievement.

The ego is in one sense the Jewish professional and middle class caught between the forces of an increasingly violent and anti-Semitic Austrian proletariat and the prohibitions of an authoritarian and increasingly corrupt ruling class. Although having special referent to the Jewish professional class, the ego is in many ways the heir of the goals and values of Austrian liberalism and the class interests that that liberalism represented. Although weak and having no force (army, police, or instinctual energy) of its own, both the ego
and the professional middle class represented the ideals of rationality, prudence, intellectuality, and understanding. Insofar as the ego was that class, it certainly was a weak reed; it has since been exterminated. If the structural model is in part unconscious sociology, it is also powerful psychology. Although many have criticized it, particularly for the powerlessness of the ego, the structural model retains an heuristic power to organize and make intelligible a wide variety of human experience, particularly of conflict, that few other models of the mind can rival.

In 1926, Freud revised his theory of anxiety. In his first formulation, we are anxious because we repress (the toxic theory of anxiety); in his second theory, we repress because we are anxious, and anxiety is reinterpreted as a danger signal, a sign that dangerous or forbidden thoughts or wishes are coming to consciousness, in analogy to the way in which we deal with external dangers. The ego, which is now the “seat of anxiety,” responds with defenses and represses or otherwise fends off the threatening thoughts or wishes. The concept of signal anxiety is clinically useful; the failure to develop it leaves one subject to panic terror, since suitable defenses or actions cannot be instituted when anxiety arises. In Inhibitions, Symptoms, and Anxiety (1926/1959), Freud delineates the resistance to recovery from the three agencies of the mind: from the id, the “adhesion of the libido,” and the “conservatism of the instincts” resist change; and from the ego the transference (acting instead of remembering), repression and other ego defenses, and the “secondary gains” from the illness mitigate against recovery; but the resistance most difficult to overcome is that of the superego. The patient unconsciously believes that he or she doesn’t deserve to be well and holds onto the illness as a means of self-punishment.

Freud now views anxiety as developmental. Anxiety at the earliest stage of life is a panic terror of annihilation, which is followed by fear of loss of the object, which is followed by fear of loss of love of the object, which is followed by castration anxiety, which is followed by fear of the superego, which is followed by social anxiety, fear of punishment by the culture. In the course of that development, anxiety hopefully comes to be treated as a danger signal that can be responded to either with psychological defenses or by actions to modify the external world. Castration anxiety is an important Freudian concept. It refers to the child’s fear that the rival parent will punish him by castration for his aggressive wishes toward that parent and his sexual wishes for the parent of the opposite sex. Castration anxiety and the Oedipal complex are two sides of the same coin. Freud thought castration anxiety was the most frequent cause of repression. However, separation anxiety—fear of loss of the object and fear of loss of the love of the object—became extremely important in
psychoanalytic theory.

At the end of his life, Freud wrote the paper "Splitting of the Ego in the Process of Defense" (1940/1964a). In it, he describes how the fetishist simultaneously believes that women have penises and that they don't have penises by splitting the self into two selves who, so to speak, don't talk to one another. At the same time, he wrote Moses and Monotheism (1939/1964b), a work with many meanings and having many psychological sources. There is a connection between the two works. If polytheism is a projection of unintegrated components of the self onto the cosmos, monotheism represents the human project of the reintegration of the self, the healing of the splits in the ego, which is the final goal of Freud's therapy. Abreaction and insight—self-knowledge—are but tools in that endeavor. The great theorist, in the end, sees the human task as the integration of the conflicting elements of the self, in spite of the fact that he knows perfectly well that it cannot be done. Freud asked what it was that made him Jewish, although he neither believed nor practiced. I submit that the profoundest expression of his Jewish identity lies in his reintegrating the projected monotheistic God of Judaism in the therapeutic goal of integrating the ego—making the self as whole as it can be just as the God of monotheism is a whole.

There is another way of looking at Freud's motivation for writing Moses and Monotheism. Freud was a driven man in writing it, and obviously it had many sources in his life and many meanings for him. It was, as psychoanalysts say, overdetermined. At one level, it was a masochistic act of debasement, a desperate attempt to propitiate the violent murderous anti-Semitism of Hitler's Europe by declaring that the greatest Jewish hero, Moses, was in fact a goy, an Egyptian. As such, it was an identification with the father who passively stepped into the gutter to pick up the hat the Gentile had knocked off; however, on another level, it was a profoundly proud assertion of all that Freud valued and held dear in his Jewish identity. At the time of the most insane, irrational racism and blind pride of race, Freud implicitly asserted that truth is a transcendent value, overriding all considerations of racial pride. The ultimately Jewish act was to stand by the truth, as he saw it, that Moses, the Jewish hero, was in fact not Jewish, and the assertion of that truth was a statement of his, Freud's, ultimate dignity as a Jew and as a human being. Whether or not Freud was factually correct is here irrelevant. So the act of seeming masochistic debasement becomes a contemptuous challenge: I, the hated and persecuted Jew, relinquish brute narcissism for the sake of scientific objectivity, for the disinterested pursuit of truth, while you, the Gentiles, trample on truth in a desperate attempt to raise your self-esteem through infantile grandiosity and archaic narcissism. Few have thumbed their noses so effectively or so
covertly. In doing so, Freud achieved a positive identification with his father and a loving resolution of his Oedipal conflicts.

The episode referred to above, in which Freud’s father’s hat was knocked off by a Gentile and he passively stepped into the gutter and picked it up without replying was profoundly disillusioning to Freud. He recounts the story in his associations to one of his dreams in the Interpretation of Dreams, and the depth of the narcissistic injury he felt at the thought of this big, strong man whom he looked up to and admired being submissive and passive and allowing himself to be debased was profound. A great deal of Freud’s adult life was a repudiation of that kind of passivity and an attempt to be active, aggressive, and self-respecting. Moses and Monotheism is both an identification with the father’s debasement and a repudiation and transcendence of it.

Old and sick, Freud went into exile in England. His books and collection of antiquities were sent to England, where his Viennese study was recreated in his home at Mansfield Gardens, where it can still be seen. A visitor entering the study said, “Professor, it's all here;” to which Freud replied, “Ja. Aber Ich bin nicht hier”—“Yes, but I am not here.” With this mordant statement, this most complex of our theorists about self made what is perhaps his most profound comment on the nature of self, that to have a self is something other than to exist. Paradoxically, he was never more himself than when he denied his presence as a self.