Reconnecting Psychoanalysis to Mainstream Psychology

Robert F. Bornstein, Ph.D.

Way Beyond Freud
Reconnecting Psychoanalysis to Mainstream Psychology

An Agenda for the 21st Century

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From *Way Beyond Freud* edited by Joseph Reppen PhD; Jane Tucker PhD; Martin A. Schulman PhD

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Orig. Publisher: Open Gate Press

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There is literally nothing to be said, scientifically or therapeutically, to the advantage of the entire Freudian system or any of its component dogmas.

—Crews (1996, p. 63)

From a scientific point of view, classical Freudian psychoanalysis is dead both as a theory of the mind and a mode of therapy . . . No empirical evidence supports any specific proposition of psychoanalytic theory.

—Kihlstrom (1999, p. 376)

Not too long ago, psychoanalysis dominated American and European psychology. As the preceding quotations illustrate, however, the status of psychoanalysis within the intellectual community has diminished substantially in recent years. Given recent trends in academic and clinical research (Robins, Gosling & Craik, 1999), and the impact of managed care on insight-oriented treatment (Sperling, Sack & Field, 2000), it is difficult to envision psychoanalytic theory regaining its former status any time soon. It is a worrisome situation for any practitioner or researcher interested in the long-term health of psychoanalysis.
The diminished influence of psychoanalytic theory would be understandable if treatment outcome studies had shown psychodynamic psychotherapy to be ineffective, or research findings had demonstrated that the key tenets of psychoanalytic theory had little empirical support, but neither of these things has occurred. The efficacy of insight-oriented treatment is well established (Blatt & Ford, 1994; Crits-Christoph & Connolly, 1998), and the heuristic value of psychoanalytic theory is robust (Bornstein & Masling, in press; Fisher & Greenberg, 1996).

What accounts for the marginalized state of contemporary psychoanalysis in the academic and clinical communities? More than anything else, it reflects psychoanalysts’ willingness to stand by silently as their ideas are co-opted by theoreticians and researchers in other areas of psychology. The end result of this discipline-wide passivity is that while psychoanalytic concepts remain strong, psychoanalysis as a discipline has become "disconnected" from contemporary scientific and clinical psychology.

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a framework for reconnecting psychoanalysis to mainstream psychology, and reclaiming psychoanalytic ideas that have been co-opted by others. I begin by exploring the process by which psychoanalysis became disconnected from psychology during the latter half of the 20th century. I then demonstrate that despite this disconnection, psychoanalytic concepts have been surprisingly heuristic, though the origins
of these ideas are often misattributed by clinicians, theoreticians, and researchers. Finally, I offer suggestions for reconnecting psychoanalysis to mainstream psychology so that the first decades of the 21st century may be as exciting as those of the early 20th century—the time when Freud’s revolutionary ideas were altering forever clinical practice, psychological science, and popular culture.

THE EVOLUTION OF PSYCHOANALYSIS: FROM MAINSTREAM TO PERIPHERY

Broadly speaking, the evolution of psychoanalysis during the 20th century can be divided into two phases: (1) the construction and refinement of psychoanalytic theory through the mid-1950s; and (2) the evolution of the theory during the latter half of the century. In terms of clinical and research influence. Phase 1 was a time of growth, while Phase 2 was a time of decline.

The two disciplines of 19th century psychology

In the mid 1980s, Erdelyi (1985, p. xii) remarked that “contrary to textbook tradition, the nineteenth century gave birth not to one but to two psychologies, one at Leipzig, the other at Vienna. For a hundred years each struggled to develop into a viable science of mind but each, perversely complementing the other, remained incomplete.” Erdelyi was referring, of course, to Wundt’s empiricism and Freud’s psychoanalysis.
Freud and Wundt grappled with a number of common problems (e.g., the nature of consciousness, the dynamics of memory), but they approached these problems from very different perspectives. Wundt’s empirical method—derived from 19th-century positivism and modeled after the natural sciences—adhered to a nomothetic tradition that emphasized controlled experimentation to delineate general laws of human psychological functioning (Bornstein, 1999a; Hilgard, 1987). Freud’s psychoanalytic method—derived from medicine, and invoking a more idiographic approach—emphasized the intensive study of individuals within the context of their past and present relationships (Galatzer-Levy & Cohler, 1993; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). Early in the history of the psychoanalytic movement, general laws of human behavior were secondary to the deepest possible understanding of the person being studied. As psychoanalysis matured, this emphasis reversed: Toward the end of his career Freud shifted much of his effort to setting forth general principles of human mental life that would dictate the direction of psychoanalysis after his death (see Gay, 1988).

**The marginalization of psychoanalysis**

During the first decades of the 20th century, Freud’s psychoanalysis was more influential than Wundt’s empiricism, due in no small part to Freud’s persuasiveness as a writer and speaker. Following Freud’s 1909 Clark University lectures, psychoanalysis became immensely influential within and
outside academia, not only shaping psychology and the other mental health professions, but also art, literature, law, politics, education, anthropology, and myriad other fields (Holland, 1984; Torrey, 1992). By the early 1960s, the landscape had changed. Psychoanalysis was becoming increasingly marginalized within the clinical and academic communities, to the point that a slightly tempered version of 19th-century positivism more or less completely replaced the Freudian approach as a unifying psychological framework and world view (Bornstein, 1999a).

It is ironic that psychoanalysis reached its peak of influence during a period when in-depth analysis of individuals was the centerpiece of Freud’s work. Today, the theory’s idiographic roots have become its greatest burden within the larger intellectual community. The idiographic underpinnings of psychoanalysis were not the sole reason that the theory became marginalized, however. As I have argued elsewhere (Bornstein, 2001), the diminished influence of contemporary psychoanalysis is largely a product of theory mismanagement: Rather than looking forward (to the evolving demands of science and practice) and outward (to ideas and findings in other areas of psychology and medicine), many psychoanalysts have chosen to look backward (at the seminal but dated contributions of early psychoanalytic practitioners) and inward (at their like-minded colleagues’ own analytic writings). As a result, psychoanalysts committed seven “deadly sins” that exacerbated the theory’s decline: insularity, inaccuracy, indifference,
irrelevance, inefficiency, indeterminacy, and insolence (see Bornstein, 2001, for a detailed discussion of these psychoanalytic “sins”).[1]

**THE POSTMODERN REINVENTION AND CO-OPTING OF PSYCHOANALYSIS**

A key tenet of postmodernism is that both internal and external reality are social constructions, reflecting (among other things) an individual’s cultural background, expressive language, and past and present experience (Gergen, 1997; Vollmer, 2000). In the empirical setting, postmodernism has led to a resurgence of constructivist research (Kvale, 1992), and an emphasis on cultural relativism in intellectual discourse (Hermans, Kempen & van Loon, 1992). In the clinical setting, postmodernism has led to greater focus on “narrative truth” (Spence, 1994), and skepticism regarding the relevance of objective research methods to thorny psychological issues (Nichols, 1993; Wertz, 1994).[2]

A key corollary of postmodern thought is the notion that scientific truth—like individual experience—is actively constructed by individuals (Couvalis, 1997; Kirshner, 1999). Theoretical propositions and research results are generated and interpreted within the context of a scientist’s personal and professional milieu, and they may be revised and reinterpreted—many times, if need be—as this milieu changes. In the end, Zeitgeist shapes the generation and interpretation of scientific findings as much as (if not more than)
scientific findings influence the prevailing Zeitgeist (a process described by Kuhn 1962, 1977] in terms of “paradigm shifts”—wholesale Zeitgeist changes that impel a radical reinterpretation of past methods and findings).

The postmodern view of science created new interpretive challenges for a broad array of disciplines (Kruglanski, 2001; Kvale, 1992; Vollmer, 2000), but it has posed a particular problem for psychoanalysis. When coupled with the theory mismanagement difficulties described earlier, postmodernism set the stage for a wholesale co-opting of psychoanalytic ideas by researchers in other areas of psychology. To the extent that scientific and historical “truth” is seen as something constructed rather than observed, researchers in different areas have at hand a ready rationale for rediscovering old concepts within their particular theoretical perspective. And just as an individual's personal history is rewritten and revised to accommodate present-day psychological needs, scientific history is rewritten and revised to accommodate present-day disciplinary needs. Studies show that once personal narratives are rewritten, it can be difficult (sometimes impossible) to change them back to their original form (Greenwald, 1980, 1992). So it is with scientific narratives: Once a revised account has taken hold, it can be extremely difficult (sometimes impossible) to change it back.

Across different domains of psychology, the process by which psychoanalytic ideas have been co-opted by researchers in other areas is
characterized by a common dynamic. By deconstructing this dynamic, we can better understand one of the most vexing paradoxes of contemporary psychoanalysis: how the theory itself became marginalized at the same time as its central concepts flourished in other domains.

The dynamic, in its most basic form, involves three steps:

**Step 1: Revision and Reinvention**

The co-opting process begins when a psychoanalytic concept is revised and reinvented: A researcher reframes some Freudian construct in the language of another discipline, emphasizing differences between the newly described concept and the one from which it was derived. At times, this may involve conscious suppression of common elements on the part of the co-opting researcher, but in many cases, the psychoanalytic roots of the construct in question are unknown (at least consciously) to the person who co-opts it. As I previously noted (Bornstein, 1996, p. 2), many researchers in other areas of psychology were exposed to psychoanalytic concepts during their undergraduate and graduate training, but they no longer remember having been exposed to these concepts. Consequently, they may unintentionally “reinvent” the same concepts several—or even many—years later.

Jacoby and his colleagues refer to this process as “unconscious plagiarism” rooted in the individual’s “source amnesia” regarding the original concept
Table 1 (below) lists some key psychoanalytic constructs that have been revised and reinvented in other areas of psychology. In some cases, the researchers who reframed the construct acknowledged its psychoanalytic roots; in other cases they did not. Certain constructs originated more or less exclusively in some variant of psychodynamic theory (e.g., parapraxis); certain constructs had roots in other domains as well (e.g., object representation).

As Table 1 shows, these co-opted constructs represent a broad range of psychological domains, from memory and motivation to personality and psychopathology. Though not every reinvented construct is operationally defined in precisely the same way as the initial Freudian construct it reflects, perusal of the initial and later sources confirms considerable conceptual overlap for each of these constructs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Psychoanalytic Concept</th>
<th>Revision/Reinvention</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unconscious Memory (1900/1953a)</td>
<td>Implicit Memory (Schacter, 1987)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Process Thought (1900/1953a)</td>
<td>Spreading Activation (Collins &amp; Loftus, 1975)</td>
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Step 2: Constructing an Empirical Base

The second step in the co-opting process involves studying the rediscovered concept empirically, using the measures and methods of the discipline that co-opted it. Over time, this research typically yields valuable new information regarding the concept in question—information that might
not have been obtained had the concept remained solely within the psychoanalytic canon. Thus, it is not surprising that in mainstream psychology, the articles in the right-hand column of Table 1 tend to be more widely known (and more frequently cited) than the original Freudian sources.

The evolution of “implicit memory” illustrates this aspect of the coopting process. Although unconscious (or repressed) memories were central to much of Freud’s work, the psychoanalytic concept of unconscious memory was only loosely defined, and much of the early research testing the psychoanalytic model of unconscious memory was methodologically flawed (Erdelyi, 1985; Holmes, 1990). Following publication of Schacter’s seminal (1987) article, however, hundreds of studies and conceptual critiques have been published on this topic. The broad empirical base created by these analyses has increased substantially our understanding of unconscious/implicit memory. Certain psychoanalytic hypotheses have proven to be incorrect (Bornstein, 1993; Brenneis, 2000); others are reasonably well supported (Bowers & Farvolden, 1996; Williams, 1995).

**Step 3: Acknowledgment of Parallels/Reintegration**

The third step in the co-opting process occurs when enough new information has accumulated that the co-opting discipline assumes full ownership of the construct in question, which is now more or less completely
divorced from its psychoanalytic roots. At this point, one or more researchers may identify important parallels between the newfound concept and the earlier psychoanalytic construct from which it was derived, noting (with some amusement) that Freud speculated about this issue way back when—and some of his hypotheses have been actually supported by recent empirical studies!

Once these parallels have been identified, the stage is set for the concept to be reintegrated with psychoanalytic theory—fleshed out, refined, and reframed to fit with prevailing psychoanalytic language. The concept remains a part of the discipline that co-opted it, but a new connection is forged between that discipline and psychoanalysis (see, e.g., Weinberger, Siegel & Decamello, 2000). Reintegration is often a long time coming (and for some co-opted constructs it may never happen at all). Note, however, that in the context of postmodern constructivist science, the narrative has effectively been rewritten, and in most cases there is no going back: Whatever historical roots this idea might have had, it is now the intellectual property of the discipline that co-opted it.

Again, recent work on implicit memory is illustrative. Initial studies in this area emphasized difficulties with the psychoanalytic model (e.g., tautological features of the traditional Freudian conceptualization of repressed memory; see Holmes, 1990; Kihlstrom, 1987; Roediger, 1990). As
research continued, parallels between the psychodynamic and information-processing models of memory became increasingly clear, ultimately leading to some tentative efforts at reintegration (Bornstein, 1999b; Bucci, 1997; Epstein, 1994; Weinberger, 2000). However far this reintegration process proceeds, it seems likely that the concept of implicit memory will remain a part of cognitive psychology, with psychoanalytic work on unconscious memory relegated to historical footnote status in the minds of most researchers.

RECONNECTING PSYCHOANALYSIS: FROM PERIPHERY TO MAINSTREAM

Psychoanalysis is rich with ideas, but its empirical methods are limited both in scope and rigor (Bornstein & Masling, 2002; Fisher & Greenberg, 1996). Mainstream academic psychology emphasizes rigorous empirical testing and verification, but often this rigor has a stultifying effect on the generation and acceptance of novel concepts (Bornstein, 1999a; Wertz, 1994). Academic psychology has enriched itself by co-opting psychoanalytic constructs and testing them rigorously. The time has come for psychoanalysis to enrich itself by adapting cutting-edge empirical methods from other areas of psychology, and using these methods to validate and refine psychodynamic ideas.

Using nomothetic procedures to test psychoanalytic concepts is easier
said than done. Just as resistance to psychoanalytic theory pervades the larger scientific community (Westen, 1998), resistance to nonpsychoanalytic research techniques is widespread among psychoanalysts (Bornstein, 2001). It is ironic (to say the least) that these contrasting forms of resistance have led psychologists in both camps to the same erroneous conclusion: The belief that psychoanalytic concepts cannot be studied empirically using traditional research methods.

Consider a recent passage from a leading undergraduate textbook in abnormal psychology:

A major criticism of psychoanalysis is that it is basically unscientific . . . There has been no careful measurement of any of these psychological phenomena, and there is no obvious way to prove or disprove the basic hypotheses of psychoanalysis. (Barlow & Durand, 1999, p. 21)

Contrast this with a recent assertion by a leading psychoanalytic theorist:

Handing over ultimate authority on psychoanalytic ideas to empirical verification . . . is a mistake. It gives too much away. We have a perfect right to claim validity (the nonstatistical sort) for our ideas because they are grounded in rigorous thinking and continually cross-checked with clinical experience. (Mitchell, 2000, pp. 158-159)

The first quotation is demonstrably incorrect: Contrary to the assertions of Barlow & Durand (1999), it is possible to define operationally and study empirically virtually any psychoanalytic construct, regardless of whether that
construct originated in drive theory, ego psychology, object relations theory, or self psychology. Operationalizing and testing psychodynamic concepts is challenging, but it has been accomplished successfully thousands of times (see Barron, Eagle & Wolitzky [1992]; Fisher & Greenberg [1996]; Masling & Schwartz [1979]; and Westen [1998] for reviews).

The second quotation is incorrect as well: Contrary to the assertions of Mitchell (2000), rigorous thinking and clinical experience can never compensate for the absence of scientific data (the statistical sort). The unavoidable perceptual and information-processing biases of observers (including clinicians) have been amply documented (Bowers & Meichenbaum, 1984; Gilovich, 1991; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977; Uleman & Bargh, 1989). Studies confirm that even when people are made aware of these biases, they continue to occur (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Jacoby et al., 1992; Ross & Sicoly, 1979). [4]

Over the years, certain mainstream research methods (e.g., content analysis of audio- and videotaped psychotherapy sessions, observational studies of infant-caregiver interactions, tachistoscopic presentation of subliminal stimuli) have been used to evaluate the validity of psychoanalytic ideas and the efficacy of psychodynamic treatment techniques (see Bornstein & Masling, 1998; Masling & Bornstein, 1996). Continued use of these empirical methods is critical to the long term growth and well being of
psychoanalysis. In addition, we must utilize more frequently some alternative empirical methods that have rarely been applied to the psychoanalytic context, because these methods hold particular promise in testing and refining the key tenets of psychoanalytic theory. In the following sections, I discuss three such methods.[5]

Epidemiological studies

Originally developed to identify population-wide risk factors for illness and disease, in recent years epidemiological techniques have been used with increasing frequency in health psychology and psychopathology (e.g., Kessler, McGonagle, Zhao & Nelson, 1994). Though correlational, epidemiological data are amenable to statistical procedures (e.g., path analysis) that allow strong conclusions to be drawn regarding biological, behavioral, and environmental influences on physical and psychological pathology (Kendler, MacLean & Neale, 1991). By identifying those variables that—alone or in combination—predict illness risk, epidemiological techniques allow for rigorous evaluation of diathesis-stress models of psychopathology.

Although most epidemiological studies of psychopathology risk have focused on categories from the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM), these techniques can easily be applied to forms of pathology unique to psychoanalytic theory (e.g., introjective depression). They can be
used to assess: (1) prevalence rates of risk factors presumed to produce these disorders in various segments of the population (e.g., overemphasis on individual achievement at the expense of social connectedness); and (2) comorbid traits and experiences (e.g., perfectionism, stressful life events) that are presumed to exacerbate these underlying risk factors (see Blatt & Homann, 1992).

Just as epidemiological methods can be used to predict the development of specific forms of pathology, they can (with some modification) be used to predict the developmental trajectory of personality traits, or trait clusters (Rost & Langeheine, 1997). Such investigations use different outcome measures (e.g., questionnaire or projective test responses in lieu of diagnoses), but the overall procedure is quite similar: Potential personality precursors are identified, mediating and moderating variables are measured, and theoretically related personality indices are subsequently (perhaps repeatedly) assessed.

Using this framework, epidemiological methods hold great promise in testing and refining psychoanalytic models of personality, and exploring the relationship between family configuration/dynamics and subsequent personality development. Longitudinal follow-up assessments of participants in these studies can help clarify the inter- and intrapersonal causes and consequences of different personality styles (see Franz, McClelland &
Meta-analytic investigations

Meta-analytic techniques have a long history in psychology (Rosenthal, 1984), and they have been used in thousands of investigations to summarize complex sets of research findings and uncover hidden patterns in the literature (Meyer et al., 2001). Meta-analyses have at least two advantages over traditional narrative literature reviews. First, they allow researchers to quantify the magnitude of an experimental effect rather than simply tallying the proportion of studies that yielded statistically significant results. Second, meta-analytic techniques allow researchers to assess the impact of moderating variables on the phenomenon under investigation, even if certain of these variables differed across (rather than within) studies.

Smith and Glass's classic (1977) meta-analysis of psychotherapy effects remains a model for researchers who seek to quantify and contrast the impact of different psychological treatment techniques, and the applicability of meta-analytic methods to the psychoanalytic treatment literature is obvious. Meta-analysis can be used to test theoretical propositions as well. For example, meta-analyses of research using Silverman's subliminal psychodynamic activation (SPA) paradigm demonstrated that: (1) subliminal message exposures produce significantly stronger effects on behavior than do
supraliminal exposures of identical messages (Bornstein, 1990); and (2) only those SPA messages with drive-related content produce reliable behavior change (Hardaway, 1990). In an entirely different context, metaanalysis of the literature on interpersonal dependency revealed that—contrary to clinical lore—men actually have significantly higher dependency levels than women do, but only when dependency is assessed via projective measures with low face validity (Bornstein, 1995).

At another level, meta-analytic techniques can be used to assess the state of the discipline. Thus, a recent analysis of published psychoanalytic research showed that when investigators examine women and men within the same study, significantly stronger experimental results are obtained for men than women. When the behavior of men and women is compared across (rather than within) studies, comparable results are produced by women and men (Masling, Bornstein, Fishman & Davila, 2002). Apparently, the degree to which psychoanalytic theory can predict the behavior of women and men is in part a function of the way studies are designed, and gender differences assessed.

**Neuroimaging techniques**

Although they use a wide range of procedures for constructing brain images, neuroimaging techniques share the common goal of linking neural
activity to psychological activity (e.g., emotion, thought, motivation; see Becker & Mueller, 1998; Buchel & Friston, 2000). Among the most promising neuroimaging techniques for psychoanalytic research are: (1) the positron emission tomography (PET) scan (which measures brain activity by tracking differential uptake of a radioactively tagged substance in various brain regions); and (2) the functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) technique (which uses low-frequency energy to alter neural activity at the molecular level, and produce mathematically reconstructed “snapshots” of brain tissue). PET scans are most useful in linking functional brain changes to ongoing psychological processes (e.g., memory retrieval); fMRI scans can identify structural differences in brain tissue associated with different personality traits and pathologies.

Neuroimaging techniques are already being used to contrast the patterns of cortical activity associated with conscious versus unconscious perception, memory, thought, and motivation (e.g., Rauch et al., 1996; Whalen et al., 1998). Although few of these studies are designed specifically to test psychodynamic models of the unconscious, the results of these investigations have important theoretical implications for psychoanalysis (see LeDoux, 1996; Slipp, 2000). Other neuroimaging investigations have demonstrated that different cortical activation patterns are associated with genuine and confabulated memories (Schacter & Curran, 1995). Aside from the potential applications of these results in forensic settings, such findings may eventually
enable psychoanalysts to distinguish genuine memories from false (or “screen”) memories within the analytic setting.

Such in vivo applications of PET and fMRI technology are not yet feasible, but there is every reason to expect that they will be in the future. When these assessment methods become less intrusive (and less expensive), they will have profound empirical and clinical implications. Perhaps neuroimaging technology will enable psychoanalytic researchers to contrast the patterns of cortical activation associated with realistic versus fantasy-based perceptions of the therapist, providing a real-time neural index of transference. Perhaps researchers will link unique patterns of cortical excitation with specific defense clusters, enabling analysts to validate their inference that a patient was using a particular defensive strategy within the analytic session.

CONCLUSION

When neuroimaging techniques become central to the testing and verification of psychoanalytic ideas, we will have gone full circle. Freud’s first outlines of psychoanalysis were derived from biological principles as well as psychological ones (e.g., Freud, 1895), and much of his early drive model was framed in the language of 19th-century physiology (Gay, 1988; Greenberg & Mitchell, 1983). The post-Freudian evolution of psychoanalysis has been
characterized by an increasing emphasis on psychological processes, with decreasing attention to biology (cf., Slavin & Kriegman, 1992; Winson, 1985). As neuroimaging techniques move from research laboratory to consulting room, the stage will be set for a renewal of Freud’s dream: the creation of a psychoanalysis that integrates biological and psychological principles into a unified theory of human mental life.

Psychoanalytic theorists and researchers have made progress toward this goal, but there is no guarantee we will get there. Postmodern science offers numerous opportunities for reconnecting psychoanalysis with mainstream psychology, and writing a more accurate psychoanalytic narrative during the coming years. To do this effectively, we must reclaim those ideas that have been co-opted by other disciplines at the same time that we reach out to other disciplines for empirical inspiration. Unless we do both of these things, we may find that—unlike the journals and textbooks of the latter half of the 20th century—the journals and textbooks of the late 21st century no longer criticize psychoanalysis. Instead they might not mention it at all.

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**Notes**

[1] The perceived sexism of Freud’s ideas also played a role in the marginalization of psychoanalysis, though in a number of instances psychoanalysis has been unfairly criticized in this regard (see Bornstein & Masling, 2002).

[2] As Reisner (1999) noted, psychoanalysis has always reflected postmodernism’s emphasis on subjective truth, reconstruction, and private, personal meaning. In fact, several theoreticians have pointed out that in certain respects, psychoanalytic theory was postmodern before postmodernism had a name (see Arons, 1999; Kirshner, 1999).
Unconscious plagiarism is not merely an academic concept. In a widely publicized civil trial nearly three decades ago, ex-Beatle George Harrison was acquitted of plagiarizing The Chiffons’ “He’s So Fine” when he composed his hit tune “My Sweet Lord.” The grounds for acquittal: Harrison was judged to have plagiarized the melody unconsciously, not deliberately.

An important ethical issue emerges here as well: As long as psychoanalysis is used to treat mental disorders, a paucity of nomothetic research evidence violates the American Psychological Association’s (1992) Ethical Standards. Principle 1.06 (Basis for Scientific and Professional Judgments) and Principle 2.01 (Evaluation, Diagnosis, and Interventions in a Professional Context) are particularly germane to this issue.

These are not the only underutilized research methods that hold promise for psychoanalysis. Other potentially useful methods include neural and artificial intelligence (AI) simulations, mathematical modeling techniques, and regression analyses (statistical, not psychosexual).
About the Author

Robert F. Bornstein received his PhD in clinical psychology from the State University of New York at Buffalo in 1986, and is now professor of psychology at Gettysburg College. His research interests center on personality and its disorders, unconscious processes, and the empirical study of psychoanalytic constructs. Dr. Bornstein wrote *The Dependent Personality* (Guilford Press, 1993), co-authored (with Mary Languirand), *When Someone You Love Needs Nursing Home Care* (Newmarket Press, 2001), and co-edited (with Joseph Masling) six volumes of the *Empirical Studies of Psychoanalytic Theories* book series. Dr. Bornstein’s research has been funded by grants from the National Institutes of Mental Health and the National Science Foundation, and he received the Society for Personality Assessment’s 1995 and 1999 Walter Klopfer Awards for Distinguished Contributions to the Personality Assessment Literature.