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PSYCHOANALYSIS & DIPLOMACY: POTENTIALS FOR AND OBSTACLES AGAINST COLLABORATION

The Psychoanalytic Century

Psychoanalysis and Diplomacy:

Potentials for and Obstacles against Collaboration

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Vamik D. Volkan

Given the pervasive influence of Realpolitik over government and the study of international relations, and some inherent difficulties within the field of psychoanalysis, it is not surprising that political science and psychoanalysis remain distant cousins. This chapter discusses obstacles against collaboration between these two disciplines, but also points to areas where collaboration is possible and can be useful.

FROM RATIONAL ACTORS TO PSYCHOANALYSIS

Encouraged by the work of Sigmund Freud and a few other pioneers, psychoanalysts have sought to venture beyond the couch and apply their expertise to interconnected aspects of human behavior and the external world. But given the pervasive influence of Realpolitik over government and the study of international relations, and some inherent difficulties within the field of psychoanalysis, it is not surprising that political science and psychoanalysis still remain distant cousins.

The origins of Realpolitik can be traced to Ludwig von Rochau, who introduced the concept in *Grundsätze der Realpolitik* (1853). Rochau advised

politicians to estimate carefully what the opposition *really* wanted, not what they *said* they wanted, and to be prepared to exert force when necessary to support one's own or thwart another's objectives. Eventually the term came to mean the rational evaluation and realistic assessment of the options available to one's group and one's enemies. In the United States, especially after World War II, this latter interpretation of Realpolitik, named the "rational-actor Model," became prevalent in political analysis. This model (in its various forms) assumes that people make decisions by engaging in a rational calculation of costs and benefits, and that leaders, governments, and nations are rational "actors." (For various studies of this model, its modifications and criticism, see Etzioni 1967, George 1969, Allison 1971, Janis and Mann 1977, White 1980, Barner-Barry and Rosenwein 1985, Jervis et al. 1985, Achen and Snidal 1989, Volkan et al. 1998).

The so-called "deterrence" theories characteristic of the Cold War era depended on this type of rational approach, and many political analysts believe that decisions made according to rational-actor models prevented the Soviets and the Americans from using their nuclear arsenals. This is most likely the case, but policies based on deterrence have also failed, and research in a variety of disciplines demonstrated that decisions were not always predictable based on rational assumptions. For instance, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat surprised both Israeli and U.S. military intelligence by launching a massive attack across the Suez Canal on Yom Kippur on October 6, 1973.

Based on the rational calculations of deterrence, policy analysts did not believe an Egyptian offensive could be launched before 1975, and reports of Egyptian troop movements in September 1973 were regarded as only exercises. Therefore, Egyptian forces were able to overrun poorly manned Israeli defenses and drive deep into the Sinai, although Sadat's army ultimately suffered heavy losses before a cease-fire. As the shortcomings of various rational-actor models became evident, some political scientists, and even some government decision-makers and diplomats, began to borrow concepts from cognitive psychology in the late 1970s and early 1980s to explain "faulty" decision-making. But they did not look to psychoanalysis for insights.

The application of cognitive psychology nevertheless expanded the scope of political analysis. But the limitations of this approach, which focused primarily on conscious considerations, also became evident. This shortcoming was recognized by Janis and Mann (1977), who discussed the relevance of unconscious motivations in their application of cognitive concepts to decision-making. They suggested a link between disciplines when they noted that, "If the study of unconscious motives that affect decision-making is to proceed, it is necessary to take into account of other types of research, including psychoanalytic case studies" (p. 98). One of the psychoanalytic cases Janis and Mann examined was Freud's (1901) case of Dora, an 18-year-old woman whose "decisional conflict," to use the

terminology of Janis and Mann, concerned whether or not to have an illicit love affair with Mr. K, who was married and a friend of Dora's family. After deciding against the affair, Dora had much post-decisional regret and remained in "post-decisional conflict." Through their review of Freud's findings on the unconscious reasons why Dora could not "work through and resolve the post-decisional conflict in a normal fashion" (Janis and Mann 1977, p. 100), Janis and Mann noted that psychoanalytic insights were in fact needed to fully understand decision-making.

While both cognitive psychology and psychoanalysis consider the influence of previous historical events in decision-making, the nature of psychoanalytic theory takes into account more than conscious motivational factors and analogous associations; it examines defensive alterations of early experiences, layered personal meanings of events, condensations of unconscious motivations, transference distortions, and the personality organization of decision-makers. The principle of multiple function and over-determination, first described in detail by Waelder (1930) in regard to an individual's decisions and perceptions, also must be considered in the evaluation of diplomatic and political processes of decision-making.

Although politicians and diplomats began to broaden their horizons in order to understand "faulty" decision-making, and political scientists cautiously explored the relevance of psychology, psychoanalysts themselves

did not quickly respond to the opportunity to contribute. Instead, it was two diplomats who indirectly invited psychoanalysts to apply their knowledge of internal psychodynamics to international issues. In 1974, following the division of Cyprus into Turkish and Greek sectors, Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit noted the role of psychology in the long-standing conflict between these two neighboring nations. In response to this pertinent observation, I began to study the Cyprus problem, and later, with historian Norman Itzkowitz, I studied 1,000 years of Turkish-Greek relations through a psychoanalytic lens (Volkan 1976, Volkan and Itzkowitz 1984, 1993, 1994).

A few years later, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat further encouraged psychoanalysts to become involved in the study of international relationships. In 1977, Sadat made a historic visit to Israel, and in a speech before the Knesset, he stated that 70 percent of the problems between Arabs and Israelis were psychological. This statement, backed by Sadat's international reputation and popularity in the U.S., prompted a committee of the American Psychiatric Association (APA) to sponsor a 7-year project (1979-1986) that brought together groups of influential Egyptians, Israelis, and Palestinians for a series of unofficial dialogues. The American team, serving as neutral facilitators, consisted of psychoanalysts (including myself), psychiatrists, psychologists, and diplomats. The Israeli and Arab groups also included psychiatrists and psychoanalysts, but mostly were comprised of influential citizens—ambassadors, a former high-level military officer, journalists, and

others—attending the meetings in an unofficial capacity. As a member of the APA team, and later as the project's chairman for its final 3 years, I was able to observe at close range how such dialogues were exceptionally useful in examining the psychological aspects of international conflict and the ubiquitous expression of ethnonational identity.

Three years later, inspired by my involvement in international and interdisciplinary projects, and encouraged by the writings of German psychoanalyst Alexander Mitscherlich (1971), who urged psychoanalysts to move beyond their clinical offices and become part of interdisciplinary work on societal and political issues, I founded the Center for the Study of Mind and Human Interaction (CSMHI) at the University of Virginia. For over ten years the faculty of the Center, which includes psychoanalysts, psychiatrists, former diplomats, political scientists, historians, and others from both social and behavioral sciences, have conducted research and projects in locations such as the Baltic republics, Georgia, Kuwait, Albania, Slovakia, Turkey, Croatia, Germany, the U.S., and elsewhere. In addition, CSMHI faculty have been invited to present our findings to organizations such as the International Psychoanalytic Association, American Psychoanalytic Association, American Academy of Psychoanalysis, and the American College of Psychoanalysts, as well as the UN, World Federation of Mental Health, and others. As far as I know, this Center is the only organization that specializes in directly applying psychoanalytic concepts to ethnonational conflicts, postwar adjustments, and

facilitation of intergroup dialogues to encourage democracy and peaceful coexistence.

I must clarify, however, that there certainly are others who have significantly contributed to interdisciplinary work and the examination of history, politics, and social movements and relationships through a psychoanalytic lens. Peter Loewenberg, for example, a historian as well as a psychoanalyst at the University of California, Los Angeles, for many years has combined his expertise to analyze both domestic and international political issues (Loewenberg 1995). In addition, Afaf Mahfouz from Washington, D.C., has worked for some time to promote links between psychoanalysts and the UN. Similarly, in 1998 South American psychoanalysts Moises Lemlij and Max Hernandez organized a large and successful meeting in Lima, Peru that brought psychoanalysts together with high-level diplomats and politicians, and there are numerous other examples as well. But collaboration remains problematic.

OBSTACLES PREVENTING EFFECTIVE COLLABORATION

It has proven difficult to define specific areas where cooperation between psychoanalysis and political science or diplomacy can occur in useful and mutually satisfying ways. One reason stems from psychoanalytic traditions and previous attempts to apply psychoanalysis to other disciplines.

Starting with Freud, psychoanalysts have written on a variety of topics relating to the diplomatic and political realms, but their contributions have thus far been mostly theoretical in nature, and of little practical use to diplomats and politicians. Psychoanalysts have studied group psychology, political leaders and their relationships with followers, mass violence and war. They have developed theories on the aggressive drive as the root cause of war, the perception of a state or nation as a mother, groups who respond to a leader as to a father and identification of group members with one another, and other applications of an individual's intrapsychic experience to societal phenomena. Furthermore, frequently and unfortunately, they applied psychodynamic observations on small groups, such as therapy groups composed of six to twelve individuals or organizations with members in the hundreds, to the psychodynamics of large groups composed of millions of individuals. There was little emphasis on understanding large-group identity in its own right, and few theorists accounted for differences between the processes that occur in a stable large group and those that occur when a group is collectively regressed, or when a group is preoccupied with a neighboring group.

Many of these earlier efforts at applied psychoanalysis and the theoretical constructs that resulted are valid, however, when they are utilized to understand specific aspects or limited features of large-group interaction. Freud's (1921) well-known theory on group psychology, for example, which

reflects an oedipal theme, should not be abandoned. The behavior he described can be seen in regressed groups today: the members of the group sublimate their aggression against the leader in a way that is similar to the process of a son turning his negative feelings toward his oedipal father into loyalty. In turn, the members of a group idealize the leader, identify with each other, and rally around the leader.

Some recent international events can be illuminated by applying Freud's ideas. In 1998, tension between the U.S. and Iraq increased over the issue of inspection of some of Saddam Hussein's numerous presidential "palaces" in which illegal weapons were reportedly being manufactured. Some Iraqis responded to the increased tension and possibility of U.S. military action by creating a "human shield" around his palaces and other important sites. These individuals were literally rallying around a leader. Although autocratic persuasion and propaganda played a role in their response, many reputable policy analysts believed that a majority of these Iraqis acted voluntarily.

But we also must remember that Freud, as Waelder (1971) stated, was only speaking of regressed groups, and his theory does not provide a full explanation of large-group psychology. Given such shortcomings, in the last decade or so, some psychoanalysts who study large groups and their leaders have shifted their approach from emphasizing the leader as an image of an idealized father to the leader as an image of an idealized and nurturing

mother. For example, Anzieu (1971, 1984), Chasseguet-Smirgel (1984), and Kernberg (1980, 1989) have written on regressed groups and the shared fantasies of their members in which the group represents an idealized, all-gratifying early mother ("breast-mother") that repairs all narcissistic lesions. The members of such regressed groups, according to Anzieu and Chasseguet-Smirgel, will choose leaders who promote such illusions of gratification, and the group may become violent and try to destroy external reality that is perceived as interfering with this illusion. Thus, there seems to be a growing emphasis on preoedipal rather than oedipal issues on this subject among some psychoanalysts. Kernberg has stated that Freud's description of libidinal ties among the members of a group, in fact, reflects a defense against preoedipal tensions.

I tend to agree with these formulations. Nevertheless, they basically represent individuals' intrapsychic perceptions of large groups and political leaders, and therefore remain theoretical constructs that political scientists or diplomats find difficult to use in their own analysis of day-to-day events or important incidents. My own study of large-group psychology began with my participation in small meetings where representatives of large enemy groups were brought together. I noted that besides speaking about their own individual identities, expectations, and anxieties, and besides the evidence of small-group dynamics such as those described by Bion (1961), participants from antagonistic groups became spokespersons of the large groups to which

they belonged. Each individual participant in a dialogue, regardless of his or her personality organization, professional or social standing, or political orientation, felt that his or her side was under personal attack and was compelled to directly or indirectly defend their large group. Since individuals seemed determined to protect the identity of their large group, I came to believe that *large-group identity* needed to be studied more fully. The details of my investigation of this topic are summarized elsewhere (Volkan 1999b,c), but rather than further discussing such concepts, my emphasis in this paper is on how others in the psychoanalytic professions may best direct their energies if they are interested in contributing to the understanding of international relationships and psycho-political issues.

Given the safety of strictly clinical issues, and the limitations of applied psychoanalysis, there is no simple answer to the question of how political and behavioral scientists or diplomats and psychoanalysts can best collaborate. In his letter to Albert Einstein (1932), Freud was pessimistic about human nature and the role of psychoanalysis in stopping wars or war-like situations. Although Arlow (1973) also found some cautious optimism in Freud's later writings on this subject, Freud's pessimism was mirrored by many of his followers, and this also may have played a role in the limited contributions made to diplomacy by psychoanalysts. Having seen what man is capable of doing to his fellow man in many parts of the world over the last two decades, I cannot help but join Freud in his pessimism. Groups of human beings cannot

completely refrain from committing acts of violence, mass destruction, and atrocity. Thus, it is better for us, as psychoanalysts, to consider a more practical approach to international relationships.

In certain cases we may be able to contribute to the prevention of mass aggressive expressions. We may be able to offer insights on helping large groups and their leaders cope with traumatic events so that enmity between groups will not repeat in endless cycles of violence. And maybe we can encourage greater understanding of decision-making and more flexibility when political attitudes and policies become narrow and rigid.

But in considering how we can contribute to and influence international relationships, there is one more aspect of Freud's legacy which we must consider. It seems evident that he had assimilated, possibly without being aware of it, a degree of European ethnocentrism and a tendency to stereotype and denigrate other cultures. In his correspondence with Einstein, Freud made certain racist remarks about "Turks and Mongols," and also jokingly referred to his patients as "Negroes" (Tate 1996). These were not necessarily vicious or hateful attacks, and racism in general was especially prevalent and to a degree accepted in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century Europe. Freud may have identified with the aggressor in an attempt to defend against mounting anti-Semitism. But nevertheless, his remarks serve to remind us that our own personal analysis, self-analysis, and our extensive study of and

training in human nature do not easily free us from investment in certain cultural norms, the attitudes of our own large group, or even racism. To be most effective in the psychoanalytic examination of large-group processes, and to appropriately apply certain psychoanalytic insights to international or interethnic issues, we must become involved in interdisciplinary work, we must gain first-hand experience with many cultures, and we must work through, as much as possible, our own prejudices. Furthermore, I long ago concluded that, just as I would not enter into analysis with a friend or family member, I would not become directly involved in an unofficial diplomatic project in which my own original large group was a party.

So far I have summarized some of the theoretical considerations and traditions that have prevented psychoanalysts from significantly contributing to the understanding of human relations beyond the couch. But other differences between the disciplines of psychoanalysis and diplomacy have presented difficulties that also should be mentioned.

The nature of the two fields, as they typically are practiced, creates obstacles that prevent psychoanalysts and diplomats from working together. In his or her clinical work, a psychoanalyst becomes involved in a long process that aims to help the patient resolve conflicts, be more realistic about everyday life, and become more flexible and playful without experiencing excessive anxiety, depression, or guilt. The aim of the psychoanalyst is to find

a best possible solution for the patient’s problems. A psychoanalyst typically needs to make money through his or her profession, and hopefully receives personal satisfaction from helping others, but otherwise is not primarily driven by self-interest.

Much of diplomacy, on the other hand, with the possible exception of those aspects that seek only to encourage cross-cultural understanding, concerns defining the “national interest” in a given situation and bargaining to protect or extend this interest. Although others may benefit from policies implemented through diplomacy, it is in essence self-serving. In some cases, it may be in the national interest to encourage, maintain, or ignore a conflict rather than seek its resolution.

Psychoanalysts who have worked with diplomats have been appalled when some diplomats demand short, simple, and quick advice or solutions. Such an approach goes against the psychoanalyst’s training and thinking since in clinical practice he or she focuses on multiple internal and external motivations and their intertwining and is in favor of an open-ended process. On the other hand, most psychoanalysts do not put themselves in the shoes of diplomats and have no experiential knowledge of diplomatic training, practices, and traditions. Diplomats’ aims need to be clearly understood by psychoanalysts if a collaboration between them ever will be fruitful. Furthermore, going through psychoanalytic training does not fully prepare a

psychoanalyst to act as a consultant in diplomatic efforts. He or she needs to gain in-depth knowledge of the political, economic, military, and social issues at hand, each group's shared mental representations of past events that have been transmitted over generations (their chosen traumas and chosen glories —see Volkan 1997, 1999a), and be able to tolerate and enjoy interdisciplinary cooperation.

There are accepted rituals when the diplomats of opposing groups come together, and diplomacy depends heavily on obsessional patterns that try to keep anxiety from interfering with intellectualized considerations. Prejudice and transference distortions are inevitably absorbed in this obsessional process, especially when the large group that a diplomat belongs to is under stress, threat, or is regressed. In effect, under stressful conditions, at official negotiations every component of large-group identity is enhanced and dominates motivations. This leads to even more ritualizations where "playfulness" and the search for creative solutions often dissolve into resistances to change or the slow process of change. And even those diplomats who might want to negotiate creatively or have "orders" from their governments to try to reach agreements may adopt rigidified ritualizations.

Such problematic dynamics are further compounded by other motivations. Vasquez (1986) wrote "the most persistent philosophical question" that has plagued official diplomats has been "whether the foreign

policy of a state ought to be based on the norms and principles of moral conduct" (p. 1). Official diplomacy speaks of *Fiat justitia, pereat mundus* (Let justice be done, even though the world perish) and seeks to galvanize its constituency by invoking images of glory and honor as they devalue the opposing group or take up arms against a foe. Ethnic, nationalistic, religious, economic, and social issues are often used to fuel such "truthfulness" of one's position and "immoral" aspects of the opposition's views and activities. The Christian Crusades and the Muslim holy wars were each pitched as a high purpose in which the Almighty was a partner. When the U.S. invaded Panama in 1989, which resulted in the capture of a drug lord at the expense of countless innocent victims, the incursion was called "Operation Just Cause" in an echo of Thomas Aquinas. The precise definition of morality can become not only ambiguous but also corrupted when threatened by the loss of power, self-esteem, and self-determination that are often connected with the reactivation of chosen traumas and other components of large-group identity.

Morality, formed at the oedipal age, begins as a matter of feeling, thinking, and behaving in ways to avoid being punished (Brenner 1983). The child's oedipal conflicts bring fears of losing loved ones and/or their love and of being punished. The child then becomes "moral" in the way his or her fantasies dictate in order to minimize anxiety and depressive feelings. Children may identify with their perceptions of a forbidding parent or remove themselves from competition in an effort to avoid expected punishment. And,

since the beginning of morality is linked to anxiety or depressive feelings, the more anxiety and depressive feelings the child has, the stricter the superego he or she may develop: the outcome is a compelling sense of morality that is equal to the compelling need to avoid punishment. Children, of course, also develop moral codes that are unrelated to the fear of punishment, such as those related to efforts to please parents. Furthermore, as they grow, they find more sophisticated anxiety-reducing mechanisms and take into account the moral code of whatever group they come to owe allegiance to and, reciprocally, the group's code either corresponds to their psychological needs or is rejected. One is not surprised, however, to find that moral sense is not to be relied upon in situations in which there are regressive tendencies.

At times of stress, nations or other opposing large groups may undergo mass regression (see Loewenberg 1995) in that collectively experienced unconscious fear becomes condensed with a fear of "others." When large groups in conflict are regressed, their negotiators are more prone to hold on to the components of their large-group identity, to utilize more externalizations and projections, and to protect themselves more stubbornly from the return of their externalizations and projections (boomerang effect). These defense mechanisms lead to less empathy for the opposing group's problems and create resistances to attitude changes and the willingness to compromise. The "therapeutic regression" that is part of our clinical vocabulary and is necessary for a successful clinical outcome does not exist in

diplomatic negotiations.

A therapeutic regression refers to taming a patient's existing and chaotic regression so that initial steps of progression can be made. There is no parallel concept or technique in diplomatic interactions for evolving such a process of change. Typically, opposing sides reach agreement not through a therapeutic regression followed by progression, but instead through the utilization of denial and repression of aspects of the existing conflicts, isolating oneself from emotions pertaining to conflict, and rationalizing the acceptance of terms of negotiation. Transference distortions also often occur in diplomatic interactions between the members of opposing groups, but although psychoanalysts are trained to deal with them, diplomats typically accept such distortions by utilizing rationalizations.

When agreements are reached and signed by opposing groups, the conflicts and emotions exacerbated by regression during crises do not altogether disappear and are not fully tamed, but are pushed into the shadows. These conflicts and emotions may erupt later to create new crises. The rule of law and reality testing, such as not having the resources to remain at war, force the parties in conflict to adjust slowly to the terms of agreements and remain at peace. Nevertheless, the legal documents do not change substantially the enemy relationships as far as internal perceptions and mental experiences are concerned. War-like situations, and even wars

themselves, therefore, can remain an imminent but repressed threat. But diplomatically negotiated terms of peace are not necessarily always doomed. New events, such as a friendship between the leaders of enemy groups, internal change, or a revolution within one large group, can lead to the modification of perceptions, emotions, and expectations of the other at a psychological level. Furthermore, if the parties in conflict ask the help of a third, “neutral” team from another country, the third-party representatives may constructively interfere with the malignant effects of the existing chaotic regression among the representatives of opposing groups.

ROOM FOR COOPERATION

The examples briefly discussed above indicate that various phenomena appear in both the daily work of psychoanalysts and diplomats, but are perceived and reacted to differently. In spite of such inherent difficulties, however, there is still room for cooperation. Sometimes, when diplomats facilitate negotiations between enemy groups, they become frustrated when rituals associated with maintaining and protecting large-group identity (Volkan 1999a) are activated and create resistances to fruitful talks. For example, minor differences (Freud 1917) can become significant obstacles in negotiations. When such seemingly pointless discussions arise, psychoanalysts may help to design strategies that allow individual identities and group identities to be maintained and avoid the anxiety that can be

experienced when too much “sameness” is perceived by opposing groups, causing them to seek the “protection” of minor differences. Psychoanalysis also can advise diplomacy about the importance of psychological borders—“togetherness” between ethnic groups, for example, can work better when some form of psychological border between the opponents is maintained. In addition, psychoanalysts can provide consultation when transference and countertransference reactions between opposing parties become very sticky.

In areas where there are chronic conflicts between two large groups, facilitators may become frustrated because leaders or diplomats of opposing large groups keep talking about past events instead of focusing on current issues. When conducting a dialogue, facilitators typically want the representatives of the groups in conflict to focus on “real” issues and make progress toward concrete objectives, but representatives often insist on enumerating in detail their group’s historical grievances—their chosen traumas. For example, U.S. diplomats are periodically assigned to the “Cyprus Problem,” and typically begin their task of negotiating a long-term settlement between Cypriot Greeks and Cypriot Turks with enthusiastic plans and strategies. In a short time many such diplomats complain that the two opposing sides cannot get beyond their preoccupation with past grievances and enter into a discussion of current issues, let alone future scenarios. A psychoanalytic perspective can be useful in such situations since our training and practice has taught us that no progress will be made on present issues if

past ones are not understood and explored. A psychoanalyst, therefore, can help those in the dialogue understand the necessity of discussing chosen traumas and help to expand time when past and present have collapsed, and also assess when the time is right to attempt to move beyond them.

Most importantly, psychoanalysts can team up with former diplomats, historians, and others in certain suitable projects that are often called “unofficial diplomacy” or “Track II diplomacy” (Montville 1987, Volkan et al. 1990, 1991). For example, an interdisciplinary team from CSMHI has worked for over five years on bringing together

Estonian, Russian, and Russian-Estonian representatives, including high-level diplomats who attend in an unofficial capacity, to discuss the nature of post-Soviet relationships and practical means of promoting community and coexistence. This extended process of psycho-political dialogue resulted in three indigenously designed and sustainable community projects to promote collaboration between Estonians and Russian-Estonians (Volkan 1997, Neu and Volkan 1999).

CONCLUDING REMARKS AND PREFACE

The tense situation in Estonia after the fall of the Soviet Union, like many other conflicts spawned by the collapse of the Communist empire, concerned groups within a sovereign state: one-third of Estonia’s population

is Russian (Russian-speaking). A struggle for "large-group identity" followed as those who defined and differentiated themselves from others sought to protect their large group from real and perceived threats. As we all witnessed in former Yugoslavia, governments and the UN are better equipped to deal with conflicts between states rather than within them. Diplomats and political analysts were puzzled by the intensity and irrationality of such large-group identity conflicts. How does the powerful and necessary force of ethnic pride lead to ethnic cleansing? What constitutes large-group identity, how does it come to contaminate legal, economic, military, and other real-world issues, and why does it become a significant and even dominant political force itself? In order to answer such critical questions, psychoanalysts must find appropriate ways to contribute to the general understanding of the role of large-group identity in interethnic and international relationships, and its specific influence in negotiations.

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