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FREUD, FREUDIANS, ANTI-FREUDIANS: WHOSE FREUD IS IT?

The Psychoanalytic Century

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Table of Contents

Freud, Freudians, Anti-Freudians: Whose Freud Is It?[1]

Dedicated to Peter Heller, mentor and friend

> Freud and psychoanalysis are not about nothing. . . . [Freud] did open up for exploration a realm of the psyche—for better *and* worse. . . . The trouble with the orthodoxists and faddists of psychoanalysis was and is that they might well promote the very opposite of what they intend. For by making excessive and fraudulent claims on behalf of psychoanalysis they may discredit it to the point where it loses all credibility and is discarded as rubbish, which it is not. . . . Americans go for simple alternatives. They like to be all for or all against things. But things are rarely that simple. Freud and psychoanalysis are a mixed bag—not to be put in a shrine nor to be thrown on a garbage dump.
>
> —Peter Heller (1994)

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF PSYCHOANALYSIS

It has become commonplace to say that Freud and psychoanalysis have had an enormous influence on Western culture and society of the twentieth century, and that hardly any tendency in our life has escaped their impact. Speaking of Freud, Richard Wollheim remarks that "[i]t would be hard to find in the history of ideas, even in the history of religion, someone whose influence was so immediate, so broad and so deep" (Wollheim 1971, p. 9). And talking about the success of psychoanalysis in general, the sociologist Ernest Gellner maintains that "[t]here has been nothing like this since the

spread of the potato and of maize, and this diffusion was even faster and may have deeper implications" (Gellner 1985, p. II).[2]

It may be questioned whether Freud actually has influenced the development of culture to such a great extent, or if his name rather stands for changes that would have occurred anyway, with or without him. However this may be, Freud has become a "whole climate of opinion," as W. H. Auden called it (Jones 1957, p. 432),[3] or, in the words of the literary critic Harold Bloom (1986), "the central imagination of our age."

There is no doubt, however, that classical psychoanalysis, as a mode of treatment, is gradually disappearing from the therapeutic landscape, and that vital parts of psychoanalytic theory have increasingly been challenged or attacked. "The past decade, in particular, has seen a dramatic decline of psychoanalysis and simultaneously a triumph of biological psychiatry, of psychopharmacology, genetics, electrical and biomolecular investigations of the brain, and also of behavioral, cognitive, and developmental psychology. It seems that a behavioristically empirical and pragmatic concept of science prevails at the end of the millennium. The trend is against anything speculative or philosophical, doubtlessly at the cost of a more differentiated view of human beings" (Haynal, 1998).

OUR CHANGING IMAGE OF FREUD AND THE ROLE OF HISTORIOGRAPHY

Part of this general trend is our changing image of Freud. There is an ever-growing literature trying to prove not only that psychoanalytic theory is fundamentally wrong, but also that Freud was a dubious character—not only that psychoanalysis is a "hoax," but also that Freud was a "quack." Naturally, psychoanalysts and other adherents of psychoanalysis counter these allegations, but they are clearly on the defense.

Historical research plays a central role in these discussions. Biographical research on Freud and his circle unearths more and more details, adding to our picture of Freud the man and scientist. Furthermore, a combination of psychobiography and intellectual history is pivotal for an epistemology of psychoanalysis and for the "context of discovery" of its theory. It helps, probably better than anything else, to understand the coming into being, the contents, the meaning, and the connotations of a concept. While such a detailed historical investigation does not tell us anything about the *validity* of ideas, or about their "context of justification," it can provide us with the links between the theoreticians and their theories. These links are particularly important in a science such as psychology, where the subject of investigation is also its object, and where, instead of trying to eliminate the autobiographical element, it can be better controlled by systematically taking it into account.

Perhaps even more important, history "sets the record straight and

enables us to see what the relations between the empirical facts and the theoretical constructs really were" (Macmillan 1991). Macmillan (in a prelude to his devastating critique of Freud and psychoanalysis) quotes the example of a theory where the attempt to confirm it fails, and continues: "By itself, the failure provides no guide as to where the fault lies. Perhaps the original facts were inaccurately described or the original theoretical terms inadequately formulated. Would it not be sensible to see how those terms or statements were arrived at? Was there a worthwhile theory to begin with? Until the relation between fact and construct is clarified, we cannot tell whether the theoretical ideas were required by observation alone, by theory alone, or by some combination of theory and observation. In brief, historically based evaluations help us establish what has to be explained and whether any explanatory effort is justified." In my view, this argument—that history and logic may complement each other—not only holds true in the case of a wrong theory (such as psychoanalysis, in Macmillan's view). It is perhaps even more applicable in the case of a highly sophisticated, partly contradictory, multilayered, and stratified theory, containing formulations in differing degrees of abstraction, a theory that has been partly confirmed, partly proved wrong, and has been found in general to be extremely stimulating for a host of disciplines (including Freud-bashing), as I see psychoanalysis.

Historians, however, have not yet reached an agreement on their evaluation of Freud. For some, he is the hero of a legend; for others, the villain

of the piece. He can be the relentless, heroic searcher for truth, or the inveterate liar and falsifier of case histories. We have heard nearly everything about Freud: that he was the greatest psychologist ever, or the criminal, who attempted to murder his best friend; that he was a superhuman being who achieved what no other living creature before him had achieved—descending into his own deepest depths, wrestling with the angel of darkness, and thereby healing himself, transforming himself into a different man, or that he was a drug addict whose "theory" is nothing but wild speculations made "under the influence." Was he an ascetic bourgeois, or someone obsessed, be it with "masturbation" (Crews 1995, p. 124), or be it "with copulation from the rear" (ibid., p. 48), frequenting prostitutes, and sleeping with his sister-in-law? Was he a wise and successful therapist, or did he botch nearly all of his cases? Was he a mild-mannered, tolerant, benevolent friend, or a bitter, acerbic person, whose friendships all ended in breakup? Was he a model husband and father, or a family tyrant? Was he a revolutionary, paving the way for sexual liberation, anti-authoritarianism, pacifism, and women's lib, or was he counterrevolutionary, reactionary, phallocratic, undemocratic, and adamantly opposed to women's emancipation—indeed "the male chauvinist par excellence" (ibid., p. 206)? Perhaps the most important of these controversies is fought over the question whether Freud was a trustworthy, reliable scientist, or someone who lied, cheated, and falsified or invented his case histories, who changed reality to suit his theory, someone, in short, who

sacrificed truth for fame.

Reality, however, is more complex than this picture in black and white. Would it not be time to go beyond these pseudo-dichotomies, and to develop a truly *historical* perspective and evaluation, empathic but as unbiased as possible, trying to understand without idealizing or condemning, showing the roots of a theory and movement that changed the face of the century?

CONFLICTS AND STRATEGIES

In times of conflict, early psychoanalysts, including Freud, often had recourse to a strategy that countered differing views by character assassination, pathologizing, or *Totschweigen* (killing by silence) of their proponents. If it was true that Freud had discovered the truth, as he and his followers were convinced he had,[4] and if it was true that Freud "emerged" from his self-analysis "serene and benign . . . , free to pursue his work in imperturbable composure" (Jones 1953, p. 320), free from neurosis and any trace of personal dependence (Jones 1957, p. 44), any opposing or differing views could only be neurotic, "just resistance" (Freud to Abraham, October 21, 1907): "Had I only experienced one single case of deviation without prior personal motivation!", as Freud wrote to Eitingon (August 24, 1932, Sigmund Freud Copyrights, Wivenhoe, England).

In a chilling summary, Marina Leitner has recently given a list toward

whom and how Freud applied this self-immunizing strategy: among others, Adler was called "paranoid," Stekel "infantile-perverse" and a "perfect swine," Jung was "mentally deranged to a serious extent," Tausk was a "meschuggener," Oberholzer a *"severe* neurotic," Otto Gross "quite paranoiac," Oberndorf a "strongly neurotic person," Storfer "a pathological personality," Rickman's "underlying psychosis must be regarded as incurable," Hárnik's "paranoia . . . fully manifest," Wilhelm Reich's diagnosis of "schizophrenia" was spread by two of his training analysts, and so on. Even Freud's most stalwart and reliable followers did not escape their diagnoses: his *rocher de bronze,* Karl Abraham, had "a trace of a persecution complex," James Putnam suffered from "paranoiac tendencies," Brill was supposed to be a "crazy Jew (meschugge!)," Sachs had a "brother complex," Reik was said to be "decidedly neurotic," and Jones's behavior was explained by *"complex* related motives" (all quotes in Leitner 1999). Perhaps most instructive are the cases of Otto Rank and Sandor Ferenczi, whose character assassination has been described by Balint, Bonomi, Dupont, Falzeder, Haynal, Kramer, Leitner, and Lieberman, among others.

If today we have conflicting views about Freud, so had the early pioneers of psychoanalysis. Abraham had a Freud different from Ferenczi's, and so had Brill, Jones, Rank, Eitingon, or Pfister, and so on. But not only had those persons their peculiar perception, colored by their personality, role within the movement, intelligence, prejudices, and ambition—Freud himself

offered himself in a different way to different disciples. Even more, he actively sought to establish alliances between some of them, to discourage cooperation between others. He had his favorites to whom he was chatty to the point of indiscretion. Part of the fascination of reading Freud's letters to various correspondents is his ability to tune in with the other so that each of these exchanges has its own particular tone and atmosphere. Freud at his best could write in a different way about one and the same event to different people, while still remaining accurate. But there is also Freud the strategist and politician, who very carefully chose what to disclose and what not, who frequently violated medical discretion and therapeutic principles in the interest of the "cause," and who took sides with one of his followers against the other.

Let me give you three examples.

My first example occurred in the spring of 1912, when a Swiss doctor wrote to Freud. His request can be deduced from Freud's reply of March 1, 1912: "I certainly approve of your plan, and will myself, in a publication, endorse that each analyst should have undergone an analysis himself. So if you think that you are in need of my help, I will be only too happy to give it to you." Freud even proposed interrupting the treatment of one of his patients to make a place free for his colleague. This is a very interesting case, as it already contains some key elements and problems that pertain to psychoanalytic

training to this day. For instance, Freud raised the question of fees: "Unfortunately, I am . . . in the embarrassing situation that I have to ask for a fee also from colleagues, whom I would prefer to give my full interest without being paid for." In addition, there is the question of discretion, and of whether this analysis should or could kept secret: "Dr. Jung will not be informed . . . , nor will anybody else, although I think that your presence in Vienna can hardly be kept secret. But then, an analysis is nothing to be ashamed of among ourselves."

Three months later, the colleague started his analysis. To be sure, Freud did not only hasten to inform Jung of the analysis (letter of June 13, 1912, Freud and Jung 1974, p. 511), but also immediately reported to the colleague's wife, herself a budding analyst, who had sent Freud some further information about her husband. Freud had deliberately not read this information, because he had decided "to treat him as correctly, that is, as severely as possible—and for such an undertaking any information which does not come from the patient [sic] himself is interfering (*störend*)" (June 6, 1912, Library of Congress, Washington, DC). He further offered his opinion, which can have hardly been reassuring to the doctor's wife, that her husband would suffer from "very serious disturbances. Unfortunately, five weeks are not sufficient a time to bring about a change. What I can do is to stir him up as profoundly as possible. In the first session he has shown himself as very nasty, and thus has shown me many hidden things. But then in the second

hour he was nice, which makes me fear that he will now hide his resistances from being discovered. But I promise to have a keen eye on him" (ibid.).

Seven years later, this former patient was about to become president of the Swiss Society. Freud was not in favor, and voiced his strong disapproval to Ferenczi, obviously drawing conclusions from what he had learned in the analysis: "The [supposed] president . . . as a *severe* neurotic, is very questionable to me. In Switzerland they certainly have a very special pure strain of fools" (January 24, 1919). Please note that, while Freud made no bones of his reservations against this analyst to Ferenczi and others, nothing of this can be found in his letters to the person himself.

Let me lift the veil. Emil Oberholzer (1883-1958) did become cofounder, in 1919, of the Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis (which is still in existence today),[5] and he did become its first president, remaining in this office until 1927, when he and nine others split from it, founding their own purely medical psychoanalytic group. On that occasion, it became clear that the diagnosis of "neurosis" had become shared knowledge. Max Eitingon, for example, stated that it would have been "quite clear to all of us" that Oberholzer was "a completely unbeatable neurotic" (circular letter of February 16, 1928; Archives of the British Psycho-Analytical Society).[6]

My second example takes place in the 1920s, when Freud consistently

worked against Jones's becoming president of the IPA. To Ferenczi he wrote, for example: "Jones is in many respects a personality unsuited to be a leader" (January 25, 1923). As a matter of fact, Freud had not one good word for Jones, writing to Ferenczi: "Eitingon doesn't want to be president, and I absolutely don't want Jones to" (July 5, 1927). In 1932, Freud strongly supported Ferenczi's presidency ("I would like to insist on it for you"; May 1932), and only after Ferenczi *himself* had stepped down from running for it, the way was open for Jones. To whom Freud then wrote: "Thank you for your first letter as President! I was sorry that Ferenczi's obvious ambition could not be satisfied, but then there was not a moment's doubt that only you have the competence for the leadership" (Freud to Jones, September 12, 1932).

Finally, my third example will be one of a rivalry between two persons, of which hitherto only one side has been laid down. As is well known, Ernest Jones and Abraham A. Brill heavily competed with each other, be it for Freud's approval, for the leadership in the English-speaking countries, or for control over the Freud translations. Only Jones's version was written down, heavily influencing our perception of history. The Freud/Brill letters give us a fascinating counterpart to Jones's account and the facts as known from the recently published Freud/Jones correspondence. Brill was always much closer to Freud's heart than Jones. It is interesting to see how decidedly Freud took sides with Brill against Jones, how he told Brill so, and how veiled and guarded his pertinent remarks to Jones were. When, however, Brill for some

time did not maintain as close a contact as Freud wished, Freud switched sides—although he was never as outspoken to Jones about Brill, as to Brill about Jones (all following quotes, if not mentioned otherwise, from the Library Congress, Washington, DC).

To Brill, Freud wrote, "regarding your disagreement with Jones I have to take your side most emphatically" (February 14, 1909). A few days later: "Before me there lie two letters . . . , yours and the latest from Jones, the one clear and honest, the other obscure and diplomatic, easy to see through with your help. . . . [Jones] has an inborn tendency for intrigues and crooked, diplomatic ways to which he succumbs in a playful way; but of course he is not nearly as satanic as he boasts of himself' (February 22, 1909). Freud even shared his correspondence with Brill and Jones with Jung, while reporting to Brill about it: "When Jung visited me at the end of March, I read to him the letters of Jones and yourself. He was also taken aback, but then decided to take them as neurotic and not to see a hostile intention behind them" (May 2, 1909).

During the First World War, and in the years afterwards, there was a serious conflict between Freud and Brill regarding the English-translation rights. Freud had previously authorized Brill to do all English translations of his works, so Brill was offended when other translations appeared, evidently with Freud's approval. Without going into detail, let me state that much of the

resulting confusion was due to Freud's ignorance regarding American and British translation rights, and his sometimes inconsistent handling of his translations. He was eager to see his works appear in other languages, and tended to authorize the translator who promised to work fastest. Jones, of course, was thoroughly dissatisfied with Brill's translations, told Freud so, and worked hard to have other translations appear under his control. So Brill could write to Freud on October 27, 1914: "I . . . told you of my wish to translate [the *History of the Psychoanalytic* Movement] . . . I was hard at work preparing it when I met Jelliffe and he told me of Jones's [sic] connection with it. I was baffled and I refused to believe it. It was very strange. . . . As a matter of fact Jones did have something to do with it. . . . I am convinced that Jones has been trying in all sorts of ways to bring this about and has not been honest with me about it." Brill felt hurt, and did not answer Freud's letters, which touched a deep cord in Freud: "I have got no answer to my last letter from you. Also Jones complains of your inexplicable silence. Can you be 'falling off?'" (December 9, 1919). Brill should overcome his neurotic tendencies in the interest of the cause: "Now as for Jones I guess your recriminations are justified, but we want him, we owe him a bit of tolerance (the same every one of ourselves stands in need of), he is a true friend and adherer of our cause, a powerful hand and it is important, that there should exist no personal enmity between our leaders" (January 19, 1920). "You ought to bury your jealousy against Jones and cooperate with him for the

common cause" (October 26, 1920).

In this, as in many other examples, it becomes clear that personal motives, not theoretical differences, played the chief role in deciding whether someone was to be regarded as friend or fiend. When we have a look at the theoretical differences in the history of psychoanalysis, we are impressed to see how quick one could become a dissident or heretic. Splits in the psychoanalytic movement occurred over questions such as: How long should a session last? How many sessions per week? Does the Oedipus complex start at four years of age or earlier? Is the role of the mother as important, or even more important, than the one played by the father? Does the material produced during an analysis reflect more the present situation or the past? Is psychoanalytic group therapy permissible? Does aggression or love play the most important role in life and neurosis? In fact, it was "Jung's *behavior* towards [Freud], not his view of the libido [that] . . . destroyed the intimacy" between them, as Freud wrote to Otto Rank (August 22, 1912, emphasis added). From this standpoint, it is not surprising that Freud could maintain lifelong friendships with persons who put forward views very different from his (e.g., August Aichhorn, Lou Andreas-Salome, Ludwig Binswanger, Oskar Pfister, and James J. Putnam), if they could only convince Freud of their allegiance to the "cause" and their friendship to him. Even Abraham, Jones, and Helene Deutsch, members of the inner circle and perceived as pillars of orthodoxy, voiced different opinions and had periods of strained

relationships with Freud at one time or another, without ever falling outside.

MIRRORING CONFLICTS AND STRATEGIES

This is not the place to give a full account of all the controversies within the psychoanalytic movement, and of Freud's and his followers' sometimes questionable roles in them, but these examples may suffice to demonstrate the heated and secret atmosphere in a closely knit group, experiencing the outside world as hostile, and anxious to maintain coherence within. My point here is that many of the present controversies about the history of psychoanalysis duplicate precisely that history, rather than take a true historical stance.

Much of the historical literature has been partisan, has been written with an agenda, and has not escaped pseudo-dichotomies. Each of the parties or camps seems to have construed a "Freud" of its own. Writing the history of psychoanalysis has become instrumentalized, and has been used as a weapon in a very contemporary fight. The field has become a battleground, and we are faced with what has been called the "Freud Wars" (Forrester 1997) or the "Memory Wars" (Crews 1995).

Former colleagues and collaborators, friends even, fall out with each other over details of Freud's academic career or of his private life, over questions whose importance definitely does not impress the spectator—to

the point that they refuse to speak at the same conferences. It would be nice to know, but is it really that important, whether Freud had a fling with his sister-in-law or not.

The hero worship of Freud by some historians is evident. They present Freud as some supreme, nearly superhuman being, and psychoanalysis as the pure and simple truth, while pathologizing their opponents. In doing this, the glorifying historians of psychoanalysis (Ernest Jones, Hanns Sachs, Theodor Reik, and recently, to some extent also Peter Gay[7]), duplicate the strategy applied by Freud and his followers.

In the third volume of his Freud biography, Jones labeled nearly all dissidents neurotic or psychotic, and their dissident theories as the outcome of psychotic thinking, notably in the cases of Ferenczi and Rank (Jones 1957, pp. 44-77; 176-179). There were only a few to publicly stand up against these allegations. Erich Fromm in particular objected to what he called Jones's "typically Stalinist type of re-writing history, whereby Stalinists assassinate the character of opponents by calling them spies and traitors. The Freudians do it by calling them 'insane.' . . [I]ncidentally, Jones does not seem to be aware of the disservice he does to psychoanalysis. The picture he gives of the central committee is, then, that two members, and the most trusted ones, became insane. Of one, Dr. Sachs, he says that Freud said he should not have belonged in the first place. Of Eitingon he says that he was not too bright.

There remain Abraham and Jones, who were, according to Jones' own testimony, constantly engaged in the pettiest quarrels with all the other members. A beautiful picture of the group of those who claim to represent the sanity which follows from psychoanalysis!"[8]

Jones's verdict, however, not only included the dissidents, but also fellow historians and analysts, who happened to see things in a different light. Listen to an astonishing blackmail letter Jones wrote to one of his critics: "I think it is sheer nonsence [sic] to talk of my having made an attack on Ferenczi simply because there are people who cannot bear the truth. The same of course applies to Freud, Rank, and so forth. I have all the letters Ferenczi wrote to Freud from 1907 till the end. They make most painful reading as displaying a thoroughly unstable and suffering personality whom I personally had always loved. But the evidence of the increasing deterioration is only too plain. Up to the end Freud wanted him to be President of the International Association, though he advised him to keep back the paper he had written for the last Congress [Ferenczi 1933] since it would harm his reputation.[9] The President of the Congress refused to admit such an obviously psychopathic paper, and it was only at my intervention that it was allowed. Naturally if anyone attacks me in public I shall have to produce some of the evidence I have taken care to suppress in Ferenczi's own interest."[10] Izette de Forest astutely commented, "one wonders why Freud, trying to prevent Ferenczi from giving the last paper at Wiesbaden, still constantly tried to get

F. accept the Presidency of the [International Psychoanalytic Association]. Why would Freud want a man suffering from 'mental deterioration' to be Pres. ? And why did Jones work to get the last paper published, if it was 'psychopathic' and bad for Ferenczi's reputation and if he loved him so much?"[11]

On the other hand, there is a tendency among the so-called revisionist historians to sympathize, or identify, with the dissidents of the psychoanalytic movement. The past years, for instance, have seen a veritable Ferenczi renaissance, and there are signs that a similar renaissance is imminent for Otto Rank. Having contributed my own little share to rehabilitating both the personal integrity and the value of the theories of Ferenczi and Rank, I may perhaps be permitted to warn against a new, more or less anti-Freudian, Ferenczianism or Rankianism. As Axel Hoffer put it, there is a "Freud and Ferenczi within each of us" (Hoffer 1992, p. 2), and it makes little sense to champion the one at the cost of the other.

As to Freud's most severe critics, they, too, tend to repeat historical patterns. Just like some of Freud's contemporary critics, they regard the whole of psychoanalysis as rubbish, and their agenda is simply to relegate psychoanalysis "to history's ashcan" (Crews 1995, p. 223). As Forrester (1997) observed, they have a "heartfelt wish that Freud might never have been born or, failing to achieve that end, that all his works and influence be

made as nothing." If Freud and his followers were convinced of being in possession of the truth, some contemporary scientists (such as Crews, Esterson, Macmillan, Webster, and others) are equally sure that, in Crews's (1997) succinct summary, "the 'clinical validation' of psychoanalytic ideas is hopelessly circular and . . . Freud's theories of personality and neurosis are woolly, strained, and unsupported" (p. 107), that they "amount to castles in the air" (ibid., p. 34), and that all of "his theoretical and therapeutic pretensions have been weighed and found to be hollow" (ibid., p. 107). They see it as their duty to warn the public against this pseudo-therapy and pseudoscience.

Surprisingly, these polemics against Freud and psychoanalysis have something in common with the target of their venom. Both psychoanalysis and the writing of its history are about reconstruction of the past, indeed of an unknown, a forgotten, or—dare I say—a repressed past. Repression, in Freud's words "the cornerstone on which the whole structure of psychoanalysis rests" (1914, p. 16), naturally is also a main focus of its critics who claim that there is "not . . . a shred of evidence for the existence of such a mechanism" (Crews 1995, p. 122). In other words, the critics say, our lives are *not* largely determined by our past, it is *not* true that we all suffer, more or less, from unconscious reminiscences, from a falsification of our private history, and Freud is *wrong* in claiming that setting that historical record straight would strip our suffering from its neurotic surplus and reduce it to

the "common unhappiness" (Freud 1895, p. 305) we all share as human beings. Yet, this is *precisely* what the revisionist historians claim for the history, not of the individual, but of psychoanalysis: that its past lies in the dark, that it has been suppressed by the superegos of the movement—the "official" historians—that this past has nevertheless strongly influenced the development of psychoanalysis and its offsprings, and that it is important to reconstruct and reveal it in order to bring about changes in the present.[12] Thus, ironically enough, Freud's harshest critics cannot help but bear witness to the ongoing, pervasive influence of his thinking. In a way, the present disputes about, and the plight of psychoanalysis are also part of Freud's legacy.

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Notes

1 This contribution has been given final editing by David Scharff.

2 Freud is also the most heavily cited author in indices for social sciences, arts, and the humanities (Megill 1982). "The documentation on Freud is said to surpass in specificity and depth of insight the extant material on any other human being in history" (Henry Murray, in Mahony 1987, p. 1).

3 . . if often he was wrong and, at times, absurd, / to us he is no more a person / now but a whole climate of opinion" ("In Memory of Sigmund Freud"; reprinted in *International Review of Psycho-Analysis,* 1974, 1:4).

4 For example: "We are in possession of the truth; I am as sure of that as I was fifteen years ago" (Freud to Ferenczi, May 8, 1913; Freud and Ferenczi 1992, p. 483).

5 On February 10, 1919, in a circular letter, Pfister and Mira and Emil Oberholzer proposed the founding of a Swiss Society for Psychoanalysis. The organizational meeting subsequently took place on March 21; the first meeting, with guest lectures by Jones, Rank, and Sachs on "Psychoanalysis as an Intellectual Movement," took place on March 24; affiliation with the International Psychoanalytic Association (IPA) was also decided upon there. The First Chair was Emil Oberholzer, Second Chair, Hermann Rorschach; other members of the Board were Binswanger, Morel, and Pfister.

6 Oberholzer's group eventually dissolved after his emigration in 1938. He went with his wife, the child-analyst Mira, nee Gincburg (1887-1949), to New York, where he became a member of the New York Psychoanalytic Society.

7 In whose monumental Freud biography the name of Wilhelm Reich is not even mentioned.

8 Letter to Izette de Forest, October 31, 1957, Erich Fromm Archives.

9 This reference is to Ferenczi's paper "Confusion of tongues between adults and the child." In *Final Contributions to the Problems and Methods of Psycho-Analysis.* London: Karnac Books, 1980, pp. 156-167. [D.E.S.]

10 Letter to Dr. Magoun, November 28, 1957, ibid.

11 Letter to Erich Fromm, December 3, 1957, ibid.

12 In attacking psychoanalysis and its theory of repression for being the alleged godfathers of the present recovered-memory movement, Crews, by the way, consistently mistakes "repression" (of inner wishes) for "denial" (of outer reality).